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The veiled Muslimah or Muslim woman has figured as a threat in media during the 
past few years, especially with the increasing visibility of religious practices in both 
Muslim-majority and Muslim-minority contexts. Islamic dress has further become a 
means and technique of constructing ideas about the ‘other’. My study explores how 
the veil comes to embody this otherness in the contemporary print media and politics. 
It is an attempt to question constructions of the veil by showing how they repeat older 
colonial and Orientalist histories. I compare and contrast representations of the dress 
in Morocco and France. This research is about how Muslimat, and more particularly 
their Islamic attire, is portrayed in the contemporary print media and politics. My 
research aims to explore constructions of the dress in the contemporary Moroccan and 
French press and politics, and how the veil comes to acquire meanings, or veil 
associations, over time. I consider the veil in Orientalist, postcolonial, Muslim and 
Islamic feminist contexts, and constructions of the veil in Orientalist and Arab Nahda 
texts. I also examine Islamic dress in contemporary Moroccan and French print media 
and politics. While I focus on similarities and continuities, I also highlight differences 
in constructions of the veil. My study establishes the importance of merging and 
comparing histories, social contexts and geographies, and offers an opportunity to read 
the veil from a multivocal, multilingual, cross-historical perspective, in order to 
reconsider discourses of Islamic dress past and present in comparative perspective.   
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 Introduction 
This thesis is concerned with representations of the veil in France and Morocco. How 
did I as a Muslimah muhajjaba (or Muslim woman with a hijab) come to research 
Islamic dress (referred to as libas islami’ in Arabic) in France and Morocco whilst 
studying in England? The veil was not the original point of departure in my research. 
My original study was concerned with colonial discourse and Orientalism; I wanted to 
explore the techniques for generating ideas about ‘the other.’ But it was the figure of 
the veiled woman in the texts I was reading that captured my interest; I was intrigued 
by how she kept coming up.  The research thus became about how Muslimat, and more 
particularly their Islamic attire, is portrayed in the contemporary print media. My 
research thus aims to explore constructions of Islamic female dress in the contemporary 
French and Moroccan press and politics.  I became especially interested in how the veil 
comes to acquire certain meanings over time (what I call ‘veil associations’).  
 
It is worth noting early on that, when I use the term ‘veil’, I do not intend to re-iterate 
the Orientalist view of the veil but rather use the term as inclusive to what is described 
as ‘Islamic dress’ in terms of requirements. The ‘veil’ to which I am referring therefore 
includes items of Islamic dress such as the hijab or headscarf, the niqab or the face-
veil, the jilbab or abaya which refers to the long dress worn with either a hijab or 
niqab, or the burqu’ or burqa which refers to the full face and body covering which is 
also called the soutra in the Moroccan press. I am aware that the term heavily carries 
an Orientalist baggage, but I use it as a synonym for items which come under the 
umbrella of ‘libas islami’ (Islamic dress) which conforms to the requirements of 
women’s modesty in Islamic practice. 
 
Why did I choose the veil as an object of study? And why have I compared and 
contrasted representations of the veil in France and Morocco? There are personal 
reasons for these choices, which I will detail later in this introduction. My decisions as 
a researcher have also been shaped by my awareness of how, in an increasingly 
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globalised world, Muslims have become an important and ‘heated’ topic of discussion 
in media and politics. The veiled Muslimah or Muslim woman is increasingly figured 
as a threat. With the growing immigration movements of Muslims during the past few 
decades, the presence of diasporic communities, and the emerging visibility of 
religious minorities in Western countries, and the rising religious trends witnessed in 
Muslim countries, Islam and Islamic practices, such as the veil, have caught the 
attention of media practitioners and politicians.  
 
This attention is certainly evident in Europe. The most notable example is probably 
France, which passed a law banning the wearing of ‘ostentatious signs’ of religious 
belonging in March 2004, which was recently followed by a law banning the niqab in 
public space in 2010. Islamic dress has been subject to national debates and legislation 
in other European countries including England, Belgium and Germany. But European 
countries are not the only ones showing concern about Islamic dress. It has also been 
subject to debate and bans, in more subtle ways, in Muslim-majority countries such as 
Morocco. Religious practices such as the veil have become not only a central point of 
attention, but come up as a site of anxiety and fear in both Muslim-majority and 
Muslim-minority contexts. 
 
Unsurprisingly, with its long history, Islamic dress has been a primary method or 
means of constructing ideas about ‘the other.’  In this dissertation I explore how the 
veil comes to embody otherness in contemporary media and politics. My work is also 
an attempt to question contemporary representations of the veil by showing how they 
repeat much longer colonial and Orientalist histories. We need to consider the veil in 
relation to these histories, if we are to challenge how the veil becomes such a site of 
anxiety and fear. My research establishes the need for us to consider Islamic dress 
across different historical periods and geographical contexts; my analysis thus locates 
the veil in time as well as space.  
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My personal trajectory and personal circumstances have played a role in this research 
journey, and how I have developed my research focus. In my methodology chapter, I 
use the concept of ‘a politics of location’ as a way of explaining how I ground my 
research in life experience but in way that emphasises movement. For me, as a 
Muslimah muhajjaba researching Islamic dress, the politics of location also means 
recognising how the personal can impact on the academic; how my position as a 
postcolonial Arab-Amazigh-Moroccan-British Muslimah muhajjaba, with the fluidity 
that such categories imply, has a bearing on my research.  
 
A Personal Story 
 Before I analyse Islamic dress in relation to Orientalist, postcolonial, Muslim and 
Islamic feminist theories, I begin by explaining how I came to the specific topic of 
Islamic dress. What has shaped the course of my research? And what difference does 
it makes to embark on this topic as a Muslimah? What does it mean to research Islamic 
dress as a Muslimah muhajjaba? In other words, how do my experiences shape my 
academic research and in what ways does the personal affect the academic? To start 
with, the beginning of my research was linked with the broader issue of the 
representation of ‘Arab’ women in the media and Orientalism. I need to mention the 
significant interest and attention Moroccan universities place on Western academic 
topics and theories within foreign language departments, which include postcolonial 
and feminist research trends among the other major theories. This is an interest which 
I have pursued both during my undergraduate studies as well as my postgraduate 
research in Morocco and England.  
 
As a second-generation postcolonial Moroccan Muslimah in a postcolonial country, I 
was immersed in theories that emerged outside Moroccan academic contexts. This 
brings me to the question: ‘if theory is such a Western phenomenon, what could it offer 
to intellectuals aspiring to question the influence of the West over their projects?’ 
(Kaplan, 1994, p. 30). The fact that, aside from language skills, knowledge of Western 
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theories was the main criteria for selecting students for postgraduate studies poses 
questions about the politics implicit in welcoming ‘foreign students’ who had been 
trained and educated within the realms of these theories. Are we simply offering an 
‘other’ perspective of a previously colonised, silenced and marginalised people based 
on Western theories and within Western academic institutions? How can we question 
the influence of Western theories while being involved in their dissemination? This 
partly constitutes the paradox which Ien Ang (2001, p. 167) refers to as the ‘complex 
borderland experience’ of living, in my case between Morocco and England, or 
between the broader categories of North Africa or the Maghreb and the West,1 an 
experience ‘made up of multiple crossings of peoples, traditions, knowledges, 
histories’ (Ang, 2001, p. 167). This ‘borderland experience’ is made more complex by 
the position of French and English as my fourth and fifth languages, which complicates 
the trilingual character of my research, and the problem of speaking and moving across 
and between not only different linguistic structures, but also socio-historical, political 
and cultural frameworks.   
 
Islamic dress has become, during the last few years, increasingly linked with minority 
rights, racism and Islamophobia or anti-Muslim racism. This brings me to the 
recognition that the research I am undertaking cannot escape ‘positionality’ which 
further complicates the problem of communication (Ang, 2001, p. 167). In other terms, 
Mary E. John (1996, p. 19) talks about feminism as a politics and an epistemology 
where ‘questions of representation must deal with who speaks for whom, along with 
what is being said.’ Working on an object that is close to my body and that I embody 
as a Muslimah muhajjaba opens questions of position, in terms of research, along with 
the fact of being a postcolonial Muslimah speaking primarily to a Western audience in 
my fifth language, which is English. 
                                                 
1 My use of terms such as West, Oriental, Western, Muslim and Other are not meant as homogenising 
categories that have fixed and unchanging meanings, but rather as constructs and categories that imply 
positions of power and hegemony.  
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My own histories of Islamic dress are as diverse and peculiar as the histories of the veil 
that I will tackle in my study. I was born and brought up in an open and practicing 
middle-class family. My upbringing can be categorised as ‘modernised’ in comparison 
with other families within my circle of family and friends. Islamic dress, to my young 
eyes, was primarily a traditional practice. It was an element which was part of women’s 
dress, but it was, for the most part, either worn by older women or women who had no 
education and was therefore not suitable for younger women who would describe 
themselves as ‘modern’. The fact that neither my mother nor my elder sisters adopted 
Islamic dress made me view unveiling as the norm and veiling as the exception.  
 
My educational background positioned me in an even more complex situation as I 
came to associate Islamic dress even more with older age, ignorance, illiteracy and 
being tradition-bound. My French curriculum and mixed French and Moroccan tutors, 
as well as my close relationships with my French cousins, consolidated my indifferent 
and negative vision of Islamic dress. My undergraduate studies in English, however, 
allowed me to build an awareness of the need to be critical, and the possibility of what 
can be considered ‘dislocating the effects of theory’ (Kaplan, 1994, p. 30) was opened 
to me. The school I attended for primary and secondary education also helped position 
me at the threshold between Moroccan and French cultures and values. At home, we 
always used and still do use a mixture of Amazigh or Berber (one of the variations of 
the dialects of indigenous people), Darija (Moroccan Arabic) and French and it was 
perceived as completely normal to inhabit these different socio-cultural and 
multilingual spheres. Classical Arabic was limited to a few hours a week in school.  
 
In my primary and secondary education, in addition to speaking French more than 
Darija and Berber, which was perceived as the norm in school, I was also accustomed 
to considering Islamic dress as ‘outside the norm’ and unveiling as the ‘norm’. The 
fact that no female teachers, whether voluntarily or for reasons outside their control, 
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wore it contributed to reinforcing this assumption. My subsequent high school years in 
a public school allowed me to mix with people from various classes and social 
backgrounds. My experience as a high school student, however, did little to change my 
views on Islamic dress and categorising it within negative terms. This was probably 
caused by the quasi-absence of Islamic dress, which still made unveiling the norm. It 
was not until I reached university three years later in Rabat that I started questioning 
some of my own assumptions. Yet even then, students within European language 
departments viewed themselves as more fortunate than those who were majoring in 
Islamic studies, Arabic, or disciplines such as geography or history or philosophy 
which were all taught in Arabic. Differences between university departments reflected 
to a great extent in modes of dress as there was a contrast between the hijabed and 
sometimes jilbabed (hijab-wearing and jilbab-wearing) students mainly coming from 
Arabic and Islamic studies, and jeans with tops worn by many students including 
myself who often considered themselves as privileged. Islamic dress was rare within 
language departments.  
 
My position can be described as that of an intellectual nomad. As an undergraduate 
student in English (in Rabat) followed by postgraduate translation studies (in 
Tangiers), I travelled to England to pursue further postgraduate studies.  My dress until 
then was already characterised with long dresses, skirts or pants, medium or long-
sleeved tops and jeans. It was not until I came to Britain that I decided to become a 
muhajjaba. After having negative feelings about it, I moved from distance to mixed 
feelings to finally experiencing a deep spiritual journey and increased sense of piety, 
which culminated in my adopting the hijab in 2002. I had adopted the symbol which 
symbolised my otherness, and which I perceived in terms of otherness. What I would 
like to stress through relating my experience is that, even personally, meanings of 
Islamic dress have been diverse and complicated and there are many challenges to 
researching Islamic dress as a Muslimah muhajjaba who was previously non-hijab-ed. 
As Said (1979, p. 10) puts it, no one has yet formulated a means for isolating the scholar 
from ‘involvement (conscious or unconscious) with a class, a set of beliefs, a social 
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position, or from the mere activity of being a member of a society’. Personal 
experiences often have an impact on research inclinations in a way that the private can 
hardly be put aside from the research project. In John’s (1996, p. 6) words, ‘one must 
confront what one is thinking and saying with what one is doing, with what one is’ 
while studying theory in the ‘first world’  (emphasis in the original).  
 
I am providing details of my educational and personal backgrounds not so much to 
claim representation and speaking for Muslimat or muhajjabat, or to authenticate an 
insider’s perspective to the issue of Islamic dress. I do not claim to speak as an 
authentic Muslimah muhajjaba. Rather, I want to highlight that locations, including 
institutional and disciplinary affiliations, as well as the background practices of 
everyday life, play a fundamental role in framing our projects and deserve to be 
mentioned (John, 1996, p. 110). Nonetheless, the significance of location also gives 
rise to the challenge of questioning one’s own assumptions, and putting a distance 
between oneself and the research undertaken on a topic that is close to one’s 
background. In my case, it is also putting a distance between myself and the hijab 
which is a central part of my study. Researching the veil additionally means 
understanding why and how it represents a complex and controversial object of 
investigation, which also lends itself to a cross-cultural and cross-historical study. In 
addition to this, it also means questioning not only other people’s assumptions about 
it, but also my own.  
 
As I mentioned before, my own history of Islamic dress can be linked with the histories 
of the veil. As a postcolonial Muslimah born a generation after independence from 
France, I cannot deny the influence of French values and education on my thinking and 
understanding of the world. The history of colonisation has left lasting impacts on the 
social, cultural and symbolic worlds of the colonised people, which can never be fully 
removed by any process of decolonisation (Ang, 2001, p. 70). Therefore, I consider 
Islamic dress to be of great importance in the movement between colonial and 
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postcolonial spaces and times, as it has become a way of also assessing and 
reconsidering the postcolonial Muslimah parts of my identity, representing, in many 
respects, an anti-imperialist move. This can be considered as part of the beginning of 
what Ang (2001, p. 181) refers to as a more ‘modest feminism which is based on the 
principal limits of the idea of sisterhood’. Departing from this point, in addition to 
postcolonial theories, Islamic and Muslim feminisms offer the epistemological tools 
for a study of the veil and its constructions in Moroccan and French media and politics.  
 
My choice of postcolonial, Muslim and Islamic feminist theoretical frameworks is 
closely related to my histories as a postcolonial Muslimah muhajjaba. Yet, this 
‘borderland existence’, which best qualifies my position, and which includes 
borderlands of ‘critical intellectualism’, also involves ‘political power and trans-
cultural enhancement’ (Ang, 2001, p. 166). At the same time, however, it creates its 
distinctive difficulties, because ‘inhabiting the borderlands should not be mythologised 
as a liberating space for multiple perspectives, partial truths and positioned identities 
and a happy hetero-glossia of narratives’ (Ang, 2001, p. 166). My research constitutes 
a gesture to question constructions of the veil within different texts, as writing on 
Islamic dress represents an attempt to understand how and why meanings become 
attached to it. This gesture acquires a greater importance with the use of texts outside 
the mainstream Western framework, which constitute a significant part of my research. 
As comparative cross-historical, cross-geographic and cross-linguistic, my research on 
Islamic dress emphasises the importance of considering the dress across various 
junctures and contexts. My use of Arabic and French texts and English sources, as well 
as my comparative study aim to bring a modest contribution to the already vast existing 
literature on Islamic dress.  
 
Throughout my research, I take a critical stance regarding the textual manifestations of 
colonial discourse. After a consideration of the veil in Orientalist, postcolonial, Muslim 
and Islamic feminist contexts, my subsequent chapters consider constructions of the 
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dress first in Orientalist and Nahda2 texts. These will be followed by case studies of 
France and Morocco, in which I explore contemporary constructions of Islamic dress, 
focusing on similarities and continuities, but also highlighting differences among them. 
Although the veil has been a widely debated topic in media and academia, the 
importance of merging and comparing histories, social contexts and geographies has 
widely been overlooked. Even more striking is the scarcity of academic studies that 
have attempted to include Arabic material on various forms of Islamic dress. The 
comparison between France and Morocco on the one hand, and between Orientalist 
and Nahda texts on the other provides the opportunity to read the veil from a 
multivocal, multilingual and cross-historical perspective. This allows a multiplicity of 
texts and voices to be considered together. My study represents an attempt to include 
marginal voices on the one hand, and re-visit, re-consider discourses of Islamic dress 
past and present in a comparative perspective, on the other.  
 
Additionally, my study is concerned with exploring how texts and language are used 
to construct the otherness and difference of Islamic dress through working with texts 
and applying a close textual analysis. In this case, we can examine how language is 
used as an effective tool to simultaneously silence, and write the veil within particular 
meanings. There is a double aspect to producing Islamic dress in the texts in question: 
the meanings are conversely explicit and implicit. Taking into account the fact that it 
is situated as other, it is important to consider how the veil is positioned in such a way, 
and how its difference is re-inscribed in more contemporary media and political texts. 
Similarly, it is important to consider the broader socio-political forces and historical 
circumstances that contribute to the construction of Islamic dress in such otherness. 
                                                 
2 The Nahda, also called the Arab Awakening or Renaissance movement, refers to a cultural and political 
movement that arose in Arab countries towards the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth 
centuries, which coincided with colonial movements witnessed in many Arab and Muslim-majority 
countries. Intellectuals of this period and their writings were characterised by a call for modernisation, 
reform and promotion of women’s rights. I provide more details about the Nahda as it relates to the 
Maghreb and Morocco in a subsequent part of this chapter. 
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My research therefore aims to analyse how Islamic dress is ‘otherised’ through text 
and language. It ultimately questions the inherent and implicit frameworks of 
domination and hegemony through textual representation.  
 
Starting from this background, my primary research question is: how and why does the 
veil matter? From this primary question, other questions follow. How is the veil 
constructed and written through texts across historical and spatial contexts? How has 
the veil’s otherness been expressed through contemporary media and politics in France 
and Morocco, and through nineteenth and early twentieth century Orientalist and 
colonial Nahda texts? In other words, what meanings does Islamic dress acquire across 
time and in relation to Orientalist, colonial, Nahda histories, and space through France, 
Morocco and Egypt? Before I consider these questions in subsequent chapters, I first 
provide a socio-historical background for my cross-historical and cross-spatial study 
of Islamic dress by first elucidating the links between the Morocco and French 
colonisation of the Maghreb in the first part, and between the Arab Nahda movement 
which emerged in the late nineteenth century Egypt and Syria, and its repercussions in 
Morocco during the early twentieth century. 
 
Socio-Historical Background: France and Maghrebi Colonialism 
This section provides the background for my study of the veil in the contemporary 
Moroccan and French press and politics. Because my study compares representations 
of Islamic dress in the Moroccan and French press and politics, it is important to clarify 
the links between the two countries, and the histories of Morocco in relation to French 
colonialism and the Arab Nahda. First, I provide a historical background of the French 
colonial presence in Morocco, and its impact on the Maghrebi region. This region 
comprises Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia as well as Mauritania and Libya, which joined 
16 of 347 
 
the Union of the Maghreb more recently.3Secondly, I discuss the influence of the 
nineteenth century Nahda movement on Morocco, and the links between Moroccan 
and Arab Nahda intellectuals of the early twentieth century. The importance of 
providing such a socio-historical background stems from the necessity to contextualise 
my study of Islamic dress, which is concerned with the meanings of the dress through 
different eras (Orientalist, colonial, postcolonial) and various geographical spaces 
(France, Morocco, Egypt). As my research crosses historical, social-cultural and spatial 
contexts, it is important to clarify the threads that tie these different histories and spaces 
together to understand the importance of considering Islamic dress from a comparative 
perspective.  
 
An important factor that distinguishes the Maghreb countries in comparison with other 
Arab countries of the Middle East is the presence of a large number of Berbers, also 
referred to as Amazigh, who inhabited the Maghreb region before the Arab conquests. 
Following the Arab conquests, a large portion of the Berber people both converted to 
Islam and became Arabised well before the advent of European colonisation of the 
North African region in the nineteenth century (Amin, 1970, p. 15). Today in Morocco, 
although Berber is the mother tongue of about forty percent of the Moroccan 
population, the Arabisation trend has reached most of the population. The recent 
government’s attempts to revive Amazigh languages and cultures have been met with 
enthusiasm, especially with the recent inauguration of an Amazigh television channel, 
and the official opening of an Institute for Amazigh Research in Rabat. These 
initiatives can be considered as attempts by the official authorities to promote the 
preservation of historical and cultural specificities of a large part of the population that 
has previously been marginalised. It is noteworthy that Arabisation has gained more 
importance during the nationalist era and after independence, a trend which included 
                                                 
3 The word ‘Maghreb’ is the Arabic word for ‘Occident’. It refers to the countries that are to the west of 
the Nile Valley: Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and the Republic of Mauritania. My study, however, 
focuses on Morocco. 
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the Arabisation of education, which has reached Berber populations in rural areas of 
Morocco.   
 
The Arab conquest of Morocco marked the beginning of a period during which the 
Arab empire expanded throughout the Maghreb area. Starting from the eleventh 
century onwards, the Arabised Berbers of North Africa populated ancient cities and 
founded new ones, although they mainly remained in towns and left the rural areas of 
northern Morocco, Algerian Tell and Constantine in Tunisia to Berber peasants (Amin, 
1970, p. 16). The Arabization of the Maghreb therefore started with the nomadic 
Berbers, their use of the Arabic language and their adoption of Arab and Islamic 
customs, in contrast to the Berber farmers, whose conversion to the new religion was 
somewhat superficial (Amin, 1970, p. 16). Arab populations arrived in North Africa in 
the mid seventh century and over a period of several hundred years transformed the 
Amazigh-populated Maghreb into an integral part of the ‘Arab-Islamic world’ in terms 
of culture, language, and religion (Entelis, 1980, p. 4). The influence of these elements 
is evident in today’s Morocco whose population, although distinct from Middle Eastern 
societies in many respects, shares various affinities including linguistic, religious and 
cultural ones with these different societies. 
 
The Arab conquest of North Africa influenced the region in other ways. Continuing 
the tradition of the Romans who had preceded them, the Arab populations who came 
to the Maghreb divided the area into three provinces (Amin, 1970, p. 20). Life in the 
provinces turned around its ancient capitals, yet while the provinces of the present day 
Tunisia and Algeria were subject to Ottoman rule up until the colonial periods, 
Morocco remained an independent Sultanate until the Spanish invasion, which was 
followed by a French Protectorate in 1912 (Amin, 1970, p. 20). During the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, Maghrebi countries were subject to a vast movement of 
European colonisation which affected many countries around the world. While Algeria 
came under French colonial rule in 1830, Tunisia and Morocco became French 
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Protectorates in 1881 and 1912 respectively (Kenbib, 1993, p. 35). Morocco also came 
under Spanish colonisation which preceded France, and which comprised northern 
Morocco and the Canary Islands.  At the economic level, French colonization of North 
Africa generated an intense transformation and a profound impact on the Maghreb, as 
did modernization (Amin, 1970, p. 25). With the disappearance of the last autonomous 
state and the establishment of a French Protectorate in Morocco in 1912, the process 
of social disintegration of Maghrebi society increased, with the objective of reducing 
what the Moroccan historian Abdallah Laroui (1977, pp. 327-328) refers to as ‘ the 
man of the Maghrib’ to his individual dimension.4 In his study of the history of the 
Maghreb, Laroui (1977, p. 340) argues that the colonial process in these countries 
concentrated on destroying the indigenous society, followed by accepting individuals 
into a new society which was both organised and made for foreigners, with the aim of 
controlling the Maghrebis and maintaining their status as colonial subjects. Algeria, 
Tunisia and Morocco had their own differing experiences of colonisation which 
affected their social, economic, political and cultural lives at different levels. Yet 
despite the fact that Algeria experienced a longer colonial rule, the fact that the three 
countries were subject to French colonial rule represents an important factor in their 
respective histories of colonisation, nationalist movements and later independence 
experiences. Additionally, with their historical, cultural and religious ties, the 
Maghrebi countries shared various affinities in a geographical space which is also 
named the ‘Arab Maghreb’. 
 
French colonialism also had an impact on religious practice. Regarding the colonial 
rule and Islam in the Maghreb, Laroui (1977, p. 342) notes that the policy pursued even 
in Arabic-speaking districts consisted of a slight ‘falsification of Islam’, and 
                                                 
4 Abdallah  Laroui (1977, pp. 327-328) notes regarding the ‘man of the Maghrib’ that he ‘had been 
reduced to the “anthropological” level, that is previous history is denied. All this man’s good and bad 
qualities, his courage, integrity, simplicity, generosity, as well as his duplicity, covetousness, respect for 
force, and “pillage instinct”, are attributed to “human nature”.  
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simultaneously attempts were made to encourage ‘particularisms’, and give popular 
religion a ‘local, naturalistic and primitive character’. Aside from gradually closing the 
old Qur’anic schools (kuttab and msid), the French authorities did their best to 
discourage the pilgrimage to Mecca and to disrupt the old ties between the rural 
sections and urban Islam (Laroui, 1977, p. 342). The policy of cantonnement 
(confining tribes to limited areas) made it necessary to deprive Maghrebis of their 
religion, language and historic heritage, ‘producing a man free from culture, who could 
then be civilized’ (impoverished and “decultured” Maghribi) (Laroui, 1977, p. 343). 
Although Laroui’s (1977) history of the Maghreb offers an insightful perspective in 
relation to the French colonisation of North Africa and its impact on the social, 
political, economic and cultural aspects of Maghrebi societies, his account nevertheless 
maintains a very patriarchal tone. Women’s histories and voices within his account 
remain absent. 
 
The nineteenth century Maghreb also experienced a reform movement. North African 
societies witnessed the coexistence between the makhzen (local authority), which was 
the guardian of a historical tradition in historiography, the urban elite, which produced 
a reformism that was both ‘religious (dogmatic) and political (moderate liberalism)’, 
whereas the rural areas cultivated a local patriotism tied with a religious renewal in the 
area of rituality (Laroui, 1977, p. 369). The reformism which was apparent throughout 
the Maghreb, was already powerful in Syria, and later became part of the nationalist 
call in North Africa, provoking civil unrest in Constantine, Tunis, and Fez in the early 
twentieth century (Hoisington, 1993, p. 80). Another significant influence came from 
colonial European society, which generated ideologies that found direct political 
expression in the Maghreb, such as liberalism, populism and socialism, in addition to 
organizations (clubs, parties, unions), political opinions and slogans, all of which 
influenced nationalist ideology (Laroui, 1977, p. 371). Charles-Andre Julien explained 
in a report on Maghrebi nationalism in 1937 that, in Morocco, ‘national sentiment was 
centred in the young and educated Arab Middle class who were in contact with the 
modern ideas of the West, and yet, because of the vast movement of the Islamic 
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renaissance, were also in touch with the East’ (Hoisington, 1993, p. 86). The mix had 
produced a Western-style nationalism with a religious foundation (Hoisington, 1993, 
p. 86). Maghrebi countries therefore witnessed the influence of both Arab reformism 
or the Nahda, and European ideologies which later came to influence nationalist 
movements throughout the region. 
 
Morocco and the Nahda or Arab Awakening Movement 
So what impact did Arab reformism have on Morocco? What are the links between the 
Nahda and the early twentieth century Moroccan reformist movement? For many 
intellectuals (Laroui, 1977, p. vii), the Nahda represents: 
 
A vast political and cultural movement that dominated the period of 1850 to 
1914. Originating in Syria and flowering in Egypt, the Nahdah sought, through 
translation and vulgarisation, to assimilate the great achievements of modern 
European civilisation, while reviving the classical Arab culture that antedates 
the centuries of decadence and foreign domination.  
 
The Nahda also had an influence on the Maghreb region. The Arab countries’ 
encounter with modern Europe in the nineteenth century was a time when traditional 
ideas and ways of life were challenged in the name of modernity (Patel, 2013, pp. 12-
13). This time marked the emergence of the Nahda movement. After the advent of the 
twentieth century, the Salafiyya movement, which was part of the broader Nahda 
Awakening originating from the Middle East, started to take effect among the 
Maghrebis during the French colonisation of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, and had a 
significant impact on Morocco (El Mansour, 1996, p. 60). As Mohamed El Mansour 
(1996, p. 60) notes, the Moroccan Salafiyya was not limited to acting against what it 
perceived to be ‘corrupt Islam’ or Islamic practices to be condemned, but was also 
playing an active role in the resistance against the French coloniser. As a movement 
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which advocated a return to faith as it was conceived by the salaf al salih (pious 
ancestors), the Salafiyya emerged when the Ottoman empire was declining under 
European imperialism, at a time when new political, social and technological notions 
started to gradually penetrate the doctrines of the movement (El Mansour, 1996, p. 60). 
Egyptian and Syrian intellectuals such as Djamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad 
Abduh and Rashid Rida, developed the movement in an initial phase (Halstead, 1967, 
p. 119). These figures were considered as the pioneers of the Nahda which was to 
influence Muslim countries of the Middle East and the Maghreb. The Salafiyya 
movement was part of the larger Nahda movement which sought to revive Arab culture 
and Islamic practices on the one hand, and organise resistance against colonisation on 
the other.  
 
There are other aspects to the Salafiyya movement. Among these is the movement’s 
conception of religious reform as a means for social renaissance, and its view that once 
Islam was restored to its ‘original purity by the elimination of corrupt medieval 
accretions’, it could subsequently assimilate selected elements of European culture 
(Halstead, 1967, p. 120). The Salafiyya therefore is part of an attempt to reinvigorate 
religion on the one hand, and revive intellectual and cultural life on the other, which 
makes it important to consider it as responding to both internal and external factors. So 
as to tackle the new situation and the changing circumstances, the rulers in the Maghreb 
resorted to fatwas (rulings) issued by ulamas (religious scholars) to justify their actions 
and more particularly the innovations which they envisaged (Chater, 1996, pp. 37-38). 
As Khalifa Chater (1996, pp. 37-38) notes, the proponents of Islah (reform) who dealt 
in the Maghreb with political, social and juridical applications of the sharia’, grounded 
their reform plans on new examinations of sacred texts and revision of the politico-
ethical system during a period which embodied intense ijtihad (independent reasoning) 
activity.5 The reform which was part of the Nahda involved not only advocating a 
                                                 
5 At the beginning of the twentieth century Morocco, El Mansour (1996, p. 54) states that the ulama no 
more represented a ‘monolithic conservative group acting as guardians of the shari’a’ and discarding 
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cultural revival and glorification of the past, but also a borrowing from the West. The 
colonial situation made this process more complex as the reformers both borrowed 
from the coloniser and resisted foreign occupation.  
 
The colonization of the Maghrebi countries additionally had an influence on cultural 
practices. The treatise of Abd al Aziz al-Thaalbi, for instance, which was co-authored 
by al-Hadi Seba’i and Cesar Benattar (Judeo Muslim alliance) highlighted ‘the liberal 
spirit of the Qur’an’ in their work; the conclusions they drew included that women 
ought to have their face uncovered, should not be locked up at home, or remain from 
view, and ought to be educated and have a ‘decent and honest bearing’ (Chater, 1996, 
p. 46).6 During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, such Maghrebi 
initiatives advocated the emancipation of women in the context of modernity and a 
new reading of texts. Having been influenced by the Nahda movement which emerged 
in Egypt, Maghrebi intellectuals sought to adopt modern ideas from their colonisers. 
These included promoting women’s rights in Muslim societies which became a focal 
point of the reform.  
 
The Salafiyya movement also reached the Maghreb region. The movement, which was 
initiated in the Middle East during the late nineteenth century, however, only started 
having an impact on Morocco during the early twentieth century when the French 
Protectorate was establishing itself in Morocco (Halstead, 1967, p. 121). The historical 
occurrence and emergence of the Salafiyya which coincides with the colonial eras in 
                                                 
non-religious models of government, the best example of this change was illustrated by ‘the 
constitutionalist movement’ witnessed by the country during the first decade of the twentieth century 
which presented a liberal current of thought. 
6 In 1930, this ijtihad modernity favouring the emancipation of women was defended by the Zitouna 
sheikh Tahar Haddad, author of the work Our Women in the Shari’a and in Society. This Tunisian 
thinker, who adopted the same methodology and the same strategy of treatise fatwas as the reformers, 
shook the Tunisian intelligentsia during the new era of national struggle. (Chater, 1996, p. 46)  
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both the Middle East and the Maghreb contributes to understanding how the religious 
revival, which was promoted by the movement, also parallels a call for resisting 
Western imperialism which then affected many countries in the Middle East and the 
Maghreb. Paradoxically, the call for religious reform, which represented the main 
focus of the Salafiyya, was also accompanied with advocating the adoption of Western 
concepts in order to revitalise Muslim countries. Although there were differences of 
opinion concerning the concepts to be taken from Europe, reformers agreed on the 
necessity to adopt concepts such as progress, democracy and women’s emancipation. 
In Morocco, reformers believed that religious reform was the appropriate ‘locus for 
political progress’, and that nothing was found in Islam that was ‘unsuited with 
Western constitutional and democratic institutions’ (Halstead, 1967, p. 120). 
Reformers also agreed that successful religious reform and all its social outcomes 
eventually relied on mass education, which would allow modernisation (Halstead, 
1967, p. 120). The Salafiyya movement, therefore, can be considered as a pan-Arab 
movement which promoted the adoption of Western ideas, at a time when nationalism 
was becoming increasingly debated in various colonised countries.  
 
The Arab Muslim intellectuals, who were gradually influenced by the movement which 
had spread throughout the Middle East and the Maghreb by the beginning of the 
twentieth century, were therefore proponents of modernisation, which was to be 
perceived as a means for social and religious reform. This was the case in Algeria 
where it motivated the nationalist association of ulama, and in Morocco where it 
infused the early nationalists and played a prominent role in the Moroccan nationalist 
movement, after the turn of the century (Halstead, 1967, p. 122). By the turn of the 
twentieth century, the Moroccan elite gradually looked more toward the Middle East 
as a basis for inspiration and support, and ideas of pan-Islamism and pan-Arabism 
moved from the Middle East through a number of Moroccan ulama, such as Abu-
Shu’ayb al-Dukkali, Ali Znibar, and Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Kabir al Kattani, and also 
through the Arabic press (El Mansour, 1996, p. 55). The influence of the Nahda 
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therefore was no longer limited to the Middle East, but started having an impact on 
Maghrebi countries which were under French colonial rule. 
 
But the Salafiyya reformers also promoted other reforms. In addition to advocating 
religious reform and social progress and the gradual adoption of Western concepts, 
some proponents promoted a reform of the law. In this regard, figures such as 
Muhammad Abdu and Rashid Rida advocated a revision of the shari’a, especially in 
matters such as slavery and the treatment of women, to concord with the conditions of 
modern society (Halstead, 1967, p. 121). Rashid Rida figures among one of the most 
inspiring intellectuals to have influenced reform in Morocco, and his original 
understanding that the problems of twentieth-century Islam were moral problems, not 
to be defeated by institutional reform alone, was to be developed by young Moroccan 
reformers of the 1920s (Halstead, 1967, p. 121). Some Moroccan intellectuals 
represented links through whom the reform movement emerged in the Moroccan 
framework. Shaykh Abu Shuaib al-Dukkali figures as one of the earliest Moroccans 
who returned to Morocco from studies at al-Azhar University in Egypt after having 
been immersed in the atmosphere of reform surrounding Rashid Rida and his al-Manar 
group (Halstead, 1967, pp. 122-123). After being admitted to the University of Al 
Qarawyiin in Fez in 1908, the reformer had followers from the younger generation of 
Moroccan intellectuals, including Mohammed bel-Arabi al-Alaoui and Abdesselam 
Serghini, as well as some younger men of the next generation who were to become 
influential in the Moroccan nationalist movement (Halstead, 1967, p. 123). The Nahda 
influence was therefore expanding through Maghrebi intellectuals during the early 
twentieth century. 
 
Middle Eastern, and more particularly Egyptian schools and universities constituted an 
important vector and source for the spreading of reformist thought among the North 
African Maghrebi intellectuals of the early twentieth century. Additionally, disciples 
like al-Dukkali and Bel-Arabi were considered as the primary agents for reformist 
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ideology in Morocco. Publications from the Middle East were also helpful in 
disseminating reform principles. The leading reformist periodicals and weeklies were 
al-Manar, al-Fath and al-Zahra from Cairo, and ech-Chihab from Constantine 
(Algeria), yet the most widely read of these in Morocco was Rashid Rida’s al-Manar, 
a monthly review of philosophy, religion and social affairs which represented the 
reform movement’s ideas (Halstead, 1967, p. 124). Arab Muslim public opinion began 
with the pan-Islamic press founded by Djamal al-Din, Abduh and Rida (Halstead, 
1967, p. 124). In the Moroccan context, the main achievements of the constitutional 
movement included the publication in 1907 of the first Arabic newspaper in Tangier 
and the expansion of a project for a constitution (El Mansour, 1996, p. 55). Crucially 
serving to transmit Middle Eastern constitutional ideas, two papers called Lisan al 
Maghrib and Al Fajr which were founded between 1907 and 1909 by Syrian and 
Lebanese intellectuals. The links between Moroccan and Middle Eastern reformers and 
their ideas were therefore expanding through the press and the Moroccan reformers 
themselves.  
 
But the Salafyyia reform was later accompanied by the influence of a more secular 
reform trend. The Moroccan educated elite became acquainted with a number of 
Egyptian publications, such as Al-Manar, Al Ahram, Al Mu’ayyad, and others, but were 
not always aware of the liberal secular content of some of them (El Mansour, 1996, p. 
55). Mohamed El Mansour (1996, p. 56) notes that the ideas of Moroccan nationalist 
leader Allal al-Fassi7 attributed to the Lisan al Maghrib group demonstrates a strong 
secular inclination and a great confluence with the reformist movements in the Middle 
East and in Turkey in particular. The Arab press of Tangier and the presence of a group 
of Middle Easterners in Morocco allowed the Moroccan-educated elite to introduce a 
                                                 
7 Baulin notes that al-Fassi represented for a long time an efficient link between Moroccan nationalism 
and the Arabs of the East. He was one of the numerous nationalists of the Maghreb wishing for an 
independent Morocco enrolled as part of the Great Maghreb and looking towards the East (Baulin, 1962, 
p. 129) 
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political language imported from the Middle East, which influenced the political 
discourse of the Moroccan ulama (El Mansour, 1996, p. 56). The more modernist 
secular trend within the broader Nahda movement also had an influence on Moroccan 
intellectuals and the religious elite. 
 
The presence of a more secular reform from the Middle East which was less inclined 
to emphasise an Islamic reform was instrumental in the Maghreb in the early twentieth 
century. In this context, Halstead (1967, p. 127) informs us that it is important to 
distinguish between two types of secular reformism, ‘pan-Arab and parochial’, which 
arose in the Middle East. In the first category, one finds the Arabist philosophies of 
writers such as al-Kawakibi and al-Manfaluti, as well as Shakib Arsalan, whose pan-
Arabism impacted Moroccan nationalist philosophy (Halstead, 1967, p. 127). The 
Moroccans became familiar with a great deal of the literature of the Arab Nahda. 
Another intellectual of Egyptian reformism who is reported to have had an enduring 
impression on the Moroccans by virtue of his original concern for the plight of women 
in the Muslim context is Qasim Amin (Halstead, 1967, p. 131). Having followed in the 
footsteps of his predecessor Muhammad Abdu who remains one of the leading figures 
of the Salafiyya movement, Qasim Amin’s works, which had already provoked an 
uproar in the Middle East, also stirred up a controversy in Morocco, where the 
Moroccan nationalists themselves attest to the influence of Amin and his movement. 
My study of associations of Islamic dress during the Nahda period makes use of Qasim 
Amin’s books which remain among the major sources that have stirred controversy 
and debate among intellectuals of the time in the Maghreb and Mashreq. His works 
represent an example of how promoting women’s rights in a Muslim context was 
increasingly debated in relation to Islamic dress. The Arab Nahda which was also 
influential in the Maghreb revived a new political and social environment in which 
women’s rights, among other principles, offered a point for debate and intellectual 
production. And this reform was also part of Arab nationalist efforts to gain 
independence from colonial rule.  
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To conclude, both French colonisation and the Arab Nahda movement had a lasting 
impact on the Maghreb region, and on their political, economic, social and cultural 
lives during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This impact was to last beyond this 
time to include nationalist movements which led to decolonisation in the Maghreb. 
Although Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia had their distinctive experiences of French 
colonial rule, they nonetheless shared affinities by virtue of their historical, geographic 
and cultural similarities and their attempts to resist a common domination. Likewise, 
the impact of the Arab Nahda was manifested in different ways in the Maghreb 
countries. Yet as a political and cultural movement that strove to assimilate European 
ideas while reviving an abstract Arab cultural heritage, the Nahda movement, and its 
Salafiyya branch in the Maghreb, also involved resisting foreign domination, as well 
as exchanging, adopting and negotiating among intellectuals and reformers from 
Mashreq and Maghreb.  
 
After this introductory chapter, which provides a socio-historical background for my 
study of the veil, I examine in the next chapter the veil within the histories of 
Orientalism, postcolonial, Muslim and Islamic feminist theories, which constitute the 
theoretical background for my study of Islamic dress. The third chapter elucidates the 
methodology on which my analysis of the veil is based. The fourth and fifth chapters 
offer an analysis of the veil meanings through examples of Orientalist and Nahda 
literary texts of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The sixth chapter analyses 
the hijab in the French press and politics through the examples of three mainstream 
French weeklies and political speeches from Jacques Chirac and the Stasi Commission 
Report which formed the basis for the 2004 hijab ban. The seventh and last chapter 
looks at Islamic dress in the Moroccan press through four weeklies, and in Maghrebi 
and Arab feminist works. Starting from Orientalist and Nahda tropes of the veil, the 
subsequent chapters build on these meanings in order to track how the dress figures in 
contemporary times and across various texts and historical eras. My work aims to 
contribute to comparative postcolonial studies on Islamic dress and the construction of 
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the Muslimah’s body from an Islamic feminist perspective. The comparative focus of 




29 of 347 
 
 The Veil within Orientalism, Postcolonial, Islamic and Muslim Feminism 
  
Can we write a history of the veil? How does the veil have a history? In this chapter, I 
explore how histories of the veil are closely intertwined with histories of Orientalism, 
as well as the implications of this intertwining for Islamic and Muslim feminism. We 
need to give a background to the veil in order to understand how it becomes a focal 
point of attention in postcolonial times. My argument will show how the background 
of the veil in Orientalism and imperialism shapes how the veil matters. We need to 
understand how the veil became a figure within colonial discourses before considering 
its discursive manifestations in contemporary media in France and Morocco. Prior to 
my analysis of the veil in the French and Moroccan print media and a consideration of 
the meanings of the veil in some Orientalist and Nahda texts, this chapter sets the 
theoretical background for my study, which will be followed by more concrete 
examples of Orientalist and Nahda texts on the veil in the next chapter.8 
 
In the present chapter, I thus establish a background for a study of associations of 
Islamic dress in the Moroccan and French contemporary twenty-first century press and 
politics. I explore this background through the histories of the veil in the following 
historical and epistemological frameworks: firstly, Orientalism as a theory of text, 
representation and discourse; secondly, constructions of Islam in Orientalism and 
feminism;  and thirdly, postcolonial Islamic and Muslim feminism. The questions I 
address concern how the veil relates to these different theoretical and epistemological 
paradigms. What links can we draw between Islamic female dress and Orientalism on 
the one hand, and postcolonial and Islamic and Muslim feminist epistemologies on the 
other? How does the dress relate to the histories of Orientalism and to the emergence 
                                                 
8 As a colonial genre, travel literature which poses the question of gender and representation (Melman, 
1995, p. xxv) offers an illustration of different associations of the veil. Similarly, the Nahda literature 
coincided with European colonisation of many Arab countries in which the veil was debated by 
numerous Arab intellectuals.   
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of Muslim and Islamic feminism? How can a study of these histories open a space for 
a comparative analysis of Islamic dress in the Moroccan and French press? Due to this 
chapter's focus on the theoretical aspects which constitute a background for my study, 
my analysis of examples of French and Nahda literatures on the veil will be the focus 
of the second chapter, as they include my analysis of concrete texts rather than 
theoretical debates.   
 
Orientalism as Discourse 
How is Orientalism as a type of discourse relevant to my research on Islamic dress? 
And why is it important to take it into consideration as a theoretical framework for a 
study of meanings of the veil? Said (1979, p. 2) describes Orientalism as ‘a mode of 
discourse with supporting institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, doctrines, 
even colonial bureaucracies and colonial styles’. Building on Michel Foucault’s 
approach to power as productive, Said (1979, p. 12) shows how Orientalism is about 
the intimacy of power and knowledge. 
 
I draw on Said’s model of Orientalism as a mode of discourse and his exposition of the 
relationship of power and knowledge in my research. However I also acknowledge and 
agree with many of the critiques of his work for how it implies Orientalism as having 
an internal consistency or homogeneity as well as how it overlooks gender relations. 
For example, Ziauddin Sardar (1999), argues that Said’s approach to Orientalism is 
overly reductionist. Maintaining that the history of Orientalism is the history of the 
‘Western self, its ideas, doings, concerns and fashions’, Sardar (1999, p. 16) argues for 
an understanding of Orientalism as a sequence of discourses which, although 
interconnected by a coherent set of common features, adapt to ‘changing historic 
situations, scholarly and literary trends’, making possible the existence of ‘sites of 
resistance.’ In her comparative study of French and British Orientalism, Lisa Lowe 
(1994, p. 5) similarly questions whether Said’s model of Orientalism is monolithic in 
how it constructs the Orient as other to the Occident. For Lowe (1994, p. 20), 
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Orientalism embodies discursive conflicts which produce an ‘instability of the 
Orientalist terrain illustrated in the confluences and deviations of other discourses’ 
such as gender, race and class. Her study opens a space for a conception of Orientalism 
beyond the binary logic of otherness (Western vs other), to include a consideration of 
other differences of nation, race, gender and sex. Nashat and Tucker (1999, p. lxi) 
similarly point out that there are different constructions of gender depending on class, 
race, ethnicity and religion among other factors, sometimes even within the same space 
and time, which means we must consider constructions of gender in relation to various 
elements, namely the mode of production, culture and religion that can sometimes unite 
women and at other times separate them. These critiques all usefully explore how 
Orientalism is shaped by other categories of difference. 
 
Said’s monolithic notion of Orientalism has also been criticised by Ali Behdad (1994) 
who claims Orientalism reproduces stereotypes of the Orientalist whose power of 
representation allows an indisputable domination of the victimised Oriental, thus 
leaving no space for potential differences among the different modes of Orientalist 
representation (1994, pp. 11-12). Instead, Behdad (1994, p. 135) has emphasised 
‘belated’ Orientalism’s ability to incorporate heterogeneity through ‘dispersive tactics, 
discursive heterogeneities, strategic irregularities and historical discontinuities’ in the 
late nineteenth century travellers’ accounts, which problematise the monolithic 
conception of Orientalism as a coherent entity. Taking Western arts as the starting point 
of his analysis, John MacKenzie (1995) also challenges the notion of a monolithic 
binary discourse of Orientalism through his study of examples of Orientalism in the 
arts of empire, concluding that ‘arts of imperial culture have witnessed heterogeneity, 
change and instability through seeking renewal and reinvigoration via contacts with 
other traditions, thus challenging the Orientalist binary established between an 
essentialised self and its other ‘ (1995, pp. 208-209). Among the studies that also 
challenge Said’s monolithic Orientalism is F.Codell and Dianne Sachko Macleod’s 
(1998) which investigates the numerous complexities of colonial discourse. The book 
examines how colonised people intervene in the hegemonic colonial discourse 
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‘negotiated, revised, subverted and re-invented’ for their own purposes on the one 
hand, and the extent to which British aesthetic notions were changed by the colonial 
experience, on the other (MacLeod & Codell, 1998, p. 1). 
 
Feminist work has explored how gender and sexuality matter. For example, Billie 
Melman’s (1995) analysis of women’s travel writing to the Middle East during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries shows how women’s texts of the period offer an 
alternative view of the Orient. In relation to the veil, an example of this alternative 
vision of the Orient is a perception of Ottoman and Arab women as women enjoying 
freedom of movement guaranteed by the veil, a symbol of licence in the eighteenth 
century transformed into a trope for female virtue and respectability (Melman, 1995, 
p. 111). Looking at different accounts of women travellers, missionaries and writers 
reveals a perception of the Oriental woman as the West’s ‘recognisable image in the 
mirror’ rather than the ‘absolute and ultimate Other’ (Melman, 1995, p. 316). Reina 
Lewis (1996) also focuses on the production and dissemination of Orientalist images 
by women. She shows how Orientalism is not fixed, but rather continuously answering 
challenges (Lewis, 1996, p. 236). Lewis (1996, p. 4) argues persuasively that women’s 
access to the imperial discourse ‘produced a gaze on the Orient and its other marked 
by difference’ that was less absolute and derogatory than Said’s formulation. Her study 
of the production and reception of representations by women within colonial discourse 
deconstructs the homogeneous notion of Orientalism. Furthermore, in her book 
Rethinking Orientalism: Women, Travel and the Ottoman Harem, Lewis (2004) 
focuses on a group of publications about segregated life by Ottoman women from the 
beginning of the twentieth century, tracing how these women not only engaged with, 
but also fought against the Orientalist discourse and occidental stereotypes. Lewis 
(2004, p. 2) argues that the Orientalist subjects’ re-writing of Western harem literature 
(and use of particular Orientalist styles, forms and techniques) ‘dissolves frozen 
categories of Orientalism and disrupts assumptions of both coloniser and colonised’. 
The engagement of these women enabled the production of alternative voices which 
challenge ‘masculinist histories of Orientalism’ (Lewis, 2004, p. 8). My own concern 
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with how the veil operates within Orientalism is indebted to these important feminist 
critiques.   
 
How then does the concept of Orientalism contribute to my project? Orientalism as a 
model of colonial discourse represents an important point of departure for this study of 
the veil in nineteenth century Orientalist and Nahda texts, as well as in the press and 
politics in Morocco and France. A consideration of the veil figures within Orientalism 
will allow me to show how the veil comes to acquire a set of associations that are 
preserved in time. A history of the veil is a history of these associations. This 
movement back in history will be done through an analysis of French travel and Arab 
Nahda literatures in the second chapter of my thesis. This analysis will be followed in 
the third and fourth chapters with a study of the veil in the postcolonial Moroccan and 
French press and politics. 
  
So how did Orientalism construct the veil and the Muslimah or Muslim woman? Does 
the veil allow for what Sardar (1999) calls ‘sites of resistance’ to dominant Orientalist 
representations? As I conducted my research, what became striking were the 
continuities and discursive repetitions in how the veil came up. I did not begin by 
assuming Orientalist discourse as stable or coherent, but by following the veil across 
different sites, I began to realise that even if the veil has different associations, these 
different associations work to create an impression of coherence. Within the 
framework of Orientalist, Nahda, media and political texts of Islamic dress, my work 
thus explores how different associations generate continuities rather than, to borrow 
Behdad’s (1994) terms cited earlier, ‘discursive heterogeneities’ and ‘historical 
discontinuities’. My study can thus be framed within an attempt to, in the words of 
Muslim feminist Haideh Moghissi (1999, p. 47), confront ‘essentialised images of 
Muslims’ and to ‘interrogate the colonial reduction of women’s identity to its Islamic 
‘essence’’. The veil becomes ‘an essentialised image’ even though there are many 
differences at stake in how veils matter. As postcolonial Muslim feminist Sherene 
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Razack (2008, p. 86) notes, ‘old colonial technologies’ are enjoying ‘renewed vigor’. 
When the veil becomes an essentialised image, it can also be understood as an old 
colonial technology. We need to understand how the veil has been represented over 
time to make sense of the ‘renewed vigor’ in how the veil comes up in contemporary 
media and politics. 
 
Orientalism as a System of Representation 
Said (1979, pp. 202-203) refers to Orientalism as a ‘system of representations framed 
by a whole set of forces that brought the Orient into Western learning, Western 
consciousness, and later, Western empire’. Yet Orientalism was not only concerned 
with representations, but also with how they are tied with domination and power (Abu-
Lughod, 2001, p. 101) As a Western discourse on the other, Orientalism creates the 
need for counter representations (Behdad, 1994, p. viii). Postcolonial anthropologist 
Lila Abu-Lughod (2001, p. 101)refers to the ‘combating-stereotype work’ in her 
writings on Middle-Eastern women. This argument could be read as implying a 
distinction between representations that are ‘true’ or ‘real’ and those that are false. 
However I would argue rather than finding a truth, we can instead analyse the ‘implicit 
and explicit knowledges employed in the reading,’ since texts are polysemic; and thus 
subject to different readings (Lewis, 2004, p. 180). Combating stereotypes does not 
mean we find more authentic representations. Rather than considering my project 
through the lens of combating stereotypes, my aim is to analyse how the veil acquires 
meanings; that render the veil historically dynamic. 
 
In her postcolonial feminist study of the veil, Meyda Yegenoglu (2003) also evokes 
the importance of texts, yet distinguishes between ‘discursive’ and ‘textual’ processes 
that construct the veil politically on the one hand, and culturally on the other. She notes 
that ‘while the political project has been a precise strategy of unveiling, the inscription 
of the veil in the European text is witness to a constitution of subjectivity, an imaginary 
unity and command of experience in the encounter with the other’ (Yegenoglu, 2003, 
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p. 554)The distinction between discursive and textual processes that construct the veil 
both politically and culturally is in my view open to question. It can be argued that 
what is textual is also political, and that writing about the veil within the Orientalist 
framework can also manifest itself as an attempt to frame it within a specific discursive 
field of political power. As we will see in the second chapter, the meanings of the veil 
within Orientalist and Nahda texts can be read as part of a instances which define the 
veil within a range of historical meanings, which, when compared with the 
contemporary veil associations in the French and Moroccan press and politics, reveal 
a politicised undercurrent. It is also important to note that texts on the veil exercise a 
form of political power through assigning particular meanings to the garment. Despite 
this, Yegenoglu’s (2003) psychoanalytically oriented work presents a more gender-
sensitive approach than Said’s vision of Orientalism, thereby adding a necessary 
dimension to my analysis.9Her feminist analysis, which represents a way of looking at 
the veil from a more psychological perspective taken together with a postcolonial and 
an Islamic feminist perspective, represents a starting point for my study of the veil. I 
propose to do this through a cross-cultural, cross-linguistic and cross-historical study 
of the veil, with a special focus on how the veil becomes an ‘essentialised image’ and 
how this relates to politics, sexuality and ethics. 
 
According to Said (1979, pp. 272-273), representations are first ‘embedded in the 
culture, institutions, and political ambience of the representer’, and they are also linked 
with other things besides the ‘truth’ which is itself a representation ‘inhabiting a 
common field of play defined … by some common history, tradition, universe of 
discourse’. Similarly to Yegenoglu, Ali Behdad (1994, p. 26) notes the importance of 
textual signifiers, and particularly in the colonial and Orientalist subject’s desire for 
the Orient, which is defined by the Orientalist ‘intertext’; emphasising that the intertext 
always involves the travellers in the realm of Orientalist power relations.  While these 
                                                 
9 Note the works Reina Lewis, Billie Melman and Lisa Lowe among others offer a more gender-sensitive 
approach than Said’s Orientalism. 
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ideas link discourse to text and representation, Chandra Talpade Mohanty (2003, p. 49) 
discusses the ‘discursive and political suppression of the heterogeneity of the subject’ 
in her analysis of writings on women of the third-world. Invoking a predominantly 
‘discursive’ definition of colonisation, which focuses on a ‘mode of appropriation and 
codification of scholarship and knowledge’ about women in the third-world, Mohanty 
(2003, p. 49) notes that ‘[i]t is in the production of this third-world difference’ that 
Western feminisms appropriate and colonize the constitutive complexities which 
characterize the lives of women in these countries. Mohanty’s (2003, p. 51) concept of 
‘third-world difference’ used by Western feminists involves a process of 
‘homogenisation and systematisation of oppression through which power is exercised 
in Western feminist writing’. She notes (Mohanty, 2003, p. 49) that colonization almost 
consistently implies a relation of ‘structural domination and a discursive or political 
suppression of the heterogeneity of the subject(s)’. Reina Lewis and Sara Mills (2003, 
p. 9) also note that feminist postcolonial theory demonstrates that Western feminist 
theory has often made generalisations about the ‘third-world’ women, thus 
unjustifiably homogenising a very diverse groups of women. These important works 
all address how colonial discourses (including within feminism) operate as a technique 
of generalising about others. 
 
My own analysis of how the veil becomes ‘an essentalised image,’ through a series of 
associations that have become natural over time, is indebted to this work. In other 
words, the veil becomes a means by which general statements about others are being 
made. In the wake of what we can call ‘veil controversies’ in France and Morocco, the 
veil operates not only through a humanist discourse to which Mohanty (2003) refers, 
but also Orientalist and colonial discourses which give Islamic dress an appearance of 
generality and consistency (in political, ethical and sexual terms). The texts I examine 
throughout my dissertation operate through a similar ‘discursive colonisation’ of the 
veil’s complexity and a suppression of other potential meanings for the veil. While 
Mohanty and other postcolonial feminists emphasise the specific construction of the 
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third-world woman, my study examines, by taking up the veil, the construction of 
Muslim woman in the contemporary print media in Morocco and France. 
 
In my research, I am also interested in the systems of representation that have framed 
the veil and defined it within particular parameters. As far as the Orientalist and 
colonial eras are concerned, how is this otherness reproduced through text and 
language? Does the veil within Orientalist and Nahda periods manifest a coherent set 
of meanings, or are there differences within these modes of representation? Most 
importantly, how do representations of Islamic dress through associations in Orientalist 
and Nahda texts compare with the postcolonial texts in the Moroccan and French press 
and politics? If we start from the idea that texts are polysemic and open a variety of 
readings and meanings, how can we compare texts on the veil that are located at 
different historical and socio-political junctures? Before considering these questions in 
the next chapter, it is important to situate the veil within the broader Orientalist 
discourse. 
 
Constructions of Islam and the Veil  
As a field defined by travellers, governments, military expeditions and readers of 
novels and accounts of exotic adventure among others (Said, 1979, p. 203), Orientalism 
is a form of discourse and a body of theory and practice in which a considerable amount 
of investment has been made over the centuries, and a ‘system of knowledge about the 
Orient’ (Said, 1979, p. 6). Before the seventeenth century, Western ideas about Islam 
were obtained from tales of travellers, crusaders and the inferences of clerics from their 
readings of poorly understood Arabic texts (Ahmed, 1992, p. 149). Through the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, readings of the Arabic texts became less vague, 
but the travellers’ interpretations of what they observed were still close to meanings 
that male points of view gave to the customs (Ahmed, 1992, p. 149), and hostility to 
Islam and Muslims was an integral part of most of the travellers’ ‘mental makeup’ 
(Kabbani, 1986, pp. 11-12). As the literary production of the Orient became more 
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important, for Western readers, the East could be summed up as a ‘sexual’ and 
‘despotic’ place, and Orientals as ‘caught in timeless self-indulgence’ (Kabbani, 1986, 
p. 19). Although women and Islam constituted a part of the European narrative of Islam 
early on, they only appeared at the centre of this narrative during the late nineteenth 
century's colonial rule in Muslim countries (Kabbani, 1986, p. 150). Europe’s feelings 
about Oriental women, however, were always ambivalent, fluctuating between ‘desire, 
pity, contempt and outrage’ (Kabbani, 1986, p. 26). 
 
Travel writing during the Orientalist era constitutes a valuable background for the 
comparative study of the veil, as the analysis of examples from French Orientalist 
travel literature will reveal in the next chapter. More importantly, French Orientalism 
provides meanings and tropes of the veil that are worth considering if we are to explore 
the more contemporary associations of the hijab in France. Similarly, Arab Nahda texts 
offer a background for the study of the more recent associations of Islamic dress in 
Morocco. In comparison with other bodies of literature, French Orientalist and Arab 
Nahda texts will help us better understand how the veil is written through various texts 
that are historically linked with two different socio-historical and political contexts. 
Due to the links between Orientalism and imperialism, France’s past as a colonial 
power and Morocco’s histories of French colonialism and Nahda, Orientalist texts 
present a crucial historical background through which to study contemporary 
associations of the veil. The Arab Nahda texts on the veil likewise offer an important 
setting for the comparative dimension to my study, and a suitable background for the 
discussion of more contemporary associations of the veil in the Moroccan press. 
 
As I have noted, Orientalism is ‘essentialising other cultures, people and geographical 
regions’ (Said, 1979, pp. 108-109). Orientalism as a mode of discourse thus creates an 
‘essential difference’ in which the veiled woman remains different from others 
(Yegenoglu, 2003, p. 555). The strategy of constructing the veil in essentialist terms 
involves attaching meanings that fix it within particular parameters. However, my 
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study will not be limited to texts that have been produced within a Western context 
(Orientalist and French press and politics), but will also investigate how Orientalist 
discourse impacted on countries subject to colonial domination, as will be 
demonstrated in the Arab Nahda and the Moroccan press. My research will 
additionally make use of Muslim, Islamic as well as Arab and Maghrebi feminist texts 
which have been produced in Egypt and the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia). 
Through the process of doing the research I began to realise how essentialisation can 
operate across space and time. Starting from Orientalist and Nahda textual sources and 
finishing with the Moroccan and French press and politics of the last decade, I consider 
how the veil has become not only an essentialised image but an image of essential 
difference. 
 
For many centuries, Europe has manifested both a fascination and repulsion towards 
the veil, producing ‘frustration and aggressive behaviour’, while conversely creating a 
feeling of a fantasy or the ‘promise of the exotic and erotic experiences’ (Mabro, 1991, 
p. 2). The veil can be simultaneously a symbol of inferiority, backwardness and 
oppression and of sexuality and exoticism as I show in my analysis of Orientalist and 
Nahda texts. The veil is thus an ambivalent; it retains negative and positive associations 
that are both essential to how the veil becomes essential. Today in the Western context, 
‘culture clash’ is used as expression to imply or to express European superiority in 
relation to the ‘Muslim other’, whose presence on European and North American soil 
has been increasing (Razack, 2008, p. 89). The veil becomes crucial to how that clash 
is imagined within Europe. Yet rather than focusing my study on the European 
framework, I examine texts from the archive across various temporal and spatial 
dimensions to offer a more comparative study of Islamic dress. 
 
The Veil and Feminism  
In what follows, I discuss some feminist works that have focused on the veil as a 
symbol of oppression, backwardness, oriental sexuality and exoticism which figure 
among some the most predominant meanings attached to the veil since the Orientalist 
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era. I consider it necessary to provide an overview of some of the works that have 
tackled these meanings within their respective studies. First, I discuss some of the 
debates about oppression in relation to women and Islam, as it is important to trace the 
various historical factors that contribute to the production and propagation of such veil 
associations. 
 
The origins of perceptions of the Muslim woman as oppressed and male-dominated 
can be traced back to the thirteenth century, and more particularly to the time of the 
Crusades (Alvi, et al., 2003). The image of the veiled docile Muslim woman has been 
omnipresent in the Western imagination, and the veil has been considered as a symbol 
of that oppression (Hessini, 1996, p. 91). Gender oppression of the non-West as well 
as other forms of violence have been ‘generalized as inextricable aspects of non 
Western cultures’, and European powers have historically used patriarchal practices to 
justify conquest and colonisation (Thobani, 2007, p. 228). Subsequently, the 
imperialist powers which dominated the Muslim societies in the nineteenth century 
attempted to account for their power by declaring that ‘Islam was a crude and dying 
religion, stressing alleged mistreatment of women as part of their anti-Muslim rhetoric’ 
(Alvi, et al., 2003, p. 163). The imagery of demonisation of Islam as a peculiar religion 
that is predisposed to mistreat women seems to have a long history (Moghissi, 1999, 
p. 13). Yet it is particularly after the colonial encounter that one can notice the Western 
‘inferiorising gaze’ in European literary and scholarly works, with a focus on cultural 
practices that are perceived to be hostile to women, and a consideration of how and 
when Muslim women can be liberated from Muslim men (Alvi, et al., 2003, p. 13). In 
the more contemporary context, Western superiority is symbolised most clearly by the 
body of the unveiled woman, who is considered as partake of the freedoms said to be 
present in Western societies (Thobani, 2007, p. 218). To link these ideas with my 
project, a contemporary study of the veil needs to move back into history in order to 
consider how the garment has been crucial since the encounter of the West with the 
non-West. Having carried meanings of oppression and subjugation since the Orientalist 
and pre-colonial eras, the veil has additionally been used as a justification for 
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‘civilising mission’ brought by the colonial powers to the colonised populations. A 
civilising mission as often expressed as an unveiling mission.  
 
Imperial domination was thus accompanied, in many Muslim-majority countries, with 
a discourse of the veil that defined it within gender oppression, inequality and 
backwardness. The persistence of meanings of oppression in relation to the veil is 
manifested in the modern context through the increased media attention on the dress. 
Moreover, in the European media as Nilüfer Gӧle (2011, p. 14) argues, there is a 
continual ‘semantic shift’ in the use of the terms used to designate Islamic covering: 
headscarf, hijab, nikap, and now burqa. Although the burqa (or the niqab) is worn by 
very few women in France, it has become a legal issue and provoked a general debate 
on French national identity, as women wearing it and retreating from the public sphere 
have become a ‘subject of fear for European democracies that cherish visibility and 
transparence’ (Gӧle, 2011, p. 95). In the context of the US war in Afghanistan, it was 
the burqa dressed body of the Afghan woman and the visual image of the burqa rather 
than the destruction brought by twenty years of a war funded by the US that served as 
the principal referent in the Feminist Majority’s immense mobilisation against the 
Taliban regime (Mahmood, 2004, p. 197). It follows, therefore, that both the French 
fear of the burqa and the use of the image of the burqa during the war in Afghanistan 
demonstrate that the Orientalist and colonial meanings of the veil are still relevant in 
the contemporary times. 
 
As we will see in later chapters, French travel literature and Nahda writings present 
examples that are worth considering in relation to the Muslimah and the veil as both 
were historically linked to and coincided with the colonial period when Orientalist 
discourse was predominant. In my research, I look at what the veil gets associated with 
in various geographic, socio-political and historical frameworks, and how the language 
used in relation to it creates what Yegenoglu calls an ‘essential difference’. It is 
important to consider this perspective because, as Razack (2008, p. 84) has pointed 
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out, in the contemporary times, expelling groups of individuals from the political 
community such as is the case with post 9/11 detentions, starts with their ‘difference’ 
‘coded as an incomplete modernity’ which presents a ‘threat to the nation’. The 
stigmatization of the foreigner thus carries more than even with it ‘the likelihood that 
the stigmatized group will be literally expelled (deported), marked permanently as 
undeserving of the full benefits of citizenship, or abandoned’ (Razack, 2008, p. 84). 
My analysis will indeed explore how the veil becomes a sign of stigma and how the 
stigmatisation of the veil relates to the stigmatisation of Muslim women. 
 
Can we speak about diverging discourses on the veil which re-inscribe its essential 
difference? How do we define this difference across the various historical eras and 
socio-political and spatial frameworks? Any study of the veil needs to take into account 
its complexity as an object of various histories. Indeed, because of its long history, the 
veil has constituted a focal point of interest even before the colonial era. Likewise, the 
meanings of the veil have been similarly tied to the image of Islam throughout the 
centuries. Some of these meanings were in fact re-enforced and re-inscribed during the 
colonial era. Arab women, their status, and their image have been systematically used 
by occupying forces to support their views regarding Islam’s conservatism, the 
inferiority of ‘Arabs’, and refusal of ‘progress’ (Bessis, 2007, p. 34). 
 
In the case of North African countries (commonly referred to as the Maghreb (Western 
part), as opposed to the Mashreq (Eastern part) of the Middle East), woman represents 
a point of dispute between coloniser and colonised. The coloniser used her status as a 
proof for the backwardness of oppressed members of the society, while the colonised 
considered it as the safest defence against acculturation or adopting another culture 
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(Bessis, 2007, p. 35).10 This dichotomy is not universal, however, as some Arab 
intellectuals who, although fighting against the colonial power, adopted a discourse on 
women and Islam which bore similarities with the colonial discourse as I demonstrate 
in later chapters. At the same time, feminism is seen in some quarters of the Arab world 
as yet another attempt at colonisation. In the framework of the emergence of Islamic 
feminism during the last decades, Margot Badran (2009, p. 221) notes that feminisms 
in the postcolonial contexts have been discredited as Western and as being part of a 
‘project of cultural colonialism’, hence they have been stigmatised as antithetical to 
Islam. Azza Karam (1998, p. 6) similarly points out that, in postcolonial Arab societies, 
the term ‘feminism’ is tainted with stereotypes, and some religious personalities 
associate the notion with colonialist strategies to undermine indigenous social and 
religious culture, using the ‘woman question’ as a tool to attack Islam and depict it as 
oppressive and backward. 
 
The discourse of oppression has been employed during colonial struggles between 
coloniser and colonised, but it is also a contentious topic within each camp. In the 
contemporary context, as Thobani (2007, p. 229) notes, the veil and burqa have come 
to signify not only patriarchal oppression of women, but also the ‘justice implicit in 
the war and the ‘feminist’ sensibility of the nationals who waged and supported the 
‘war on terror.’ Described as oppressed in travel books, literature and art over a long 
period of time, the Muslim woman’s oppression is taken as an unquestionable fact most 
exemplified by the veil and the institution of the harem (Mabro, 1991, p. 1). Similarly, 
after 9/11, the issue of women in Islam, and more particularly women’s oppression and 
the apparent symbols of that oppression, such as the veil and the burqa, once again 
become recurring themes in public debate in the West, a topic repeatedly invoked by 
media and politicians (Ahmed, 2012, pp. 194-195). The idea of the oppressed Muslim 
                                                 
10 This view will however be challenged by many Arab intellectuals who, although fighting against the 
colonial power, adopted a discourse on women and Islam which bore similarities with the colonial 
discourse. 
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woman, often characterised as the norm by Western media, is also seen by some 
Islamic feminists, such as Amina Wadud (2006, p. 41), as the principal motivation for 
Muslim women struggling in the ‘gender jihad’. In addition to Muslim and Islamic 
feminists’ questioning the historical equation of the veil with oppression, numerous 
non-Muslim feminists have challenged the idea of the veil as denoting automatic 
oppression. The automatic link established between the veil and gender oppression 
points to the persistence of an essentialisation. This space has defined Islamic dress 
since Orientalist times through the metaphor of the harem which I explore in the next 
section.   
 
Harem Veils 
The trope of the harem occupies a major space in the Orientalist discourse. Reina Lewis 
argues that the ‘cult of the harem’ was central to Orientalist discourse, noting that it 
was viewed as a segregated and polygamous sphere from which all men were excluded, 
apart from the husband and eunuchs (Lewis, 1996, p. 111). Billie Melman (1995, p. 
61) similarly notes that, conjuring up a collection of ‘potent images in the West’, 
polygyny and seclusion came to be identified with the Muslim Eastern Mediterranean. 
The concept of the harem itself has an ‘iconic status’ in the West and was crucial to 
the fantasies that build the Orientalist discourse (Lewis, 1996, p. 128), viewed as a 
location of ‘social and sexual practice not structured around a central male authority’ 
(Lowe, 1994, p. 48). In my study, I focus on some of the powerful images attached to 
the veil in Orientalist writings of the nineteenth century. Not only have harem veils 
and walls stood for a male desire to look at the forbidden female beauty, but also as an 
obstacle to the mystery of the Orient (Lewis & Mills, 2003, pp. 14-15). As a ‘locus of 
exotic and abnormal sexuality’ and an alternative to the Western model of sexuality, 
the harem was viewed as a ‘microcosmic Middle East’ representing sensuality and 
violence, being at once appealing and threatening (attraction vs repulsion) (Melman, 
1995, p. 60). The East is thus narrated as a place of lascivious sensuality, and a realm 
of inherent violence especially in the nineteenth century period of imperialist 
confrontation (Kabbani, 1986, p. 6). The Orientalist texts which I analyse are part of 
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the literature which takes the harem and the veil as its objects of writing. It is important 
to consider these texts within the context of a broader discourse on the harem, which 
Sarah Graham Brown (2003, p. 502) describes:  
 
Fantasies about harem life pervaded the Orientalist imagination and did much 
to cloud understanding of the social, domestic and sexual lives of women in the 
Middle East. The power of the harem image lay in the notion of a forbidden 
world of women, of sexuality caged and inaccessible, at least to Western men, 
except by a leap of imagination. It was this leap of imagination which shaped 
literature, paintings, engravings, and photographs which purported to reveal the 
life of women behind walls and barred windows of the harem. Women 
appeared first and foremost as possessions, as playthings of men in the harem, 
or as objects of commerce in slave markets which figure in numerous 
Orientalist paintings. 
 
The vision of the harem as an oppressive institution has been challenged by Muslim 
feminist Leila Ahmed (1992, p. 84) who notes that, while women did not have much 
power over their sexual, psychological and emotional lives, some elite women 
commanded fortunes and consequently had power over the lives of some men and 
women.11 While residence in a harem and seclusion put restraints on upper-class 
women’s ability to engage in public-arena economic activity, many of these women 
used intermediaries in order to conduct their businesses (Nashat & Tucker, 1999, p. 
xlvii). Women sometimes held considerable wealth and became significant economic 
actors in many parts of the nineteenth century Middle East, employing agents to 
conduct their business transactions in the public arena, they also invested capital and 
                                                 
11 The construction of the harem as a systematically oppressive institution can also be set against 
accounts of Arab and Muslim feminists such as Huda al-Sha’arawi whose memoirs open a space for a 
more complex vision of the harem.  
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loaned money to men (Nashat & Tucker, 1999, p. xlvii). Thus the actuality of harem 
was, in fact, rather more complex because, as Badran (2009, p. 54) points out, the 
harem was both ‘enabling and restricting’. Such alternative readings of the harem by 
Muslim feminists provide us with challenges to the Orientalist tradition’s reductive and 
often homogenising depictions of this space, which has often been restricted to the 
Middle East and Muslims. 
 
Some women Orientalists also questioned some of the dominant Orientalist notions of 
the harem. In contrast to the claim that women were forced to articulate patriarchal 
values as ‘token travellers’ (Kabbani, 1986, pp. 11-12), women’s access to imperial 
discourse produced a discourse on the Orient and the Orientalised Other that disclosed 
difference less absolutely than Said’s formulation (Lewis, 1996, p. 4), thus 
deconstructing a monolithic vision of the notion of Orientalism. Harem literature in the 
British framework, for instance, presented a challenge to both traditional notions of the 
Orient and to middle-class gender ideology in the West during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries (Melman, 1995, p. 62). Women travellers, missionaries and 
writers did not perceive the oriental woman as the completely ‘alien Other’, but rather 
as the feminine West’s ‘recognisable image in the mirror’ (Melman, 1995, p. 62). In 
the case of the declining Ottoman empire, women travellers refuted the stereotypical 
image of the Turkish woman as ‘odalisque, love object and slave’, writing authentically 
detailed accounts which contradicted male fantasies of harem life (MacLeod & Codell, 
1998, p. 64). The veil as a symbol of licence in the eighteenth century was, however, 
transformed into a trope for female virtue and respectability by many English women 
writers (Melman, 1995, p. 111) and the yashmak (face-veil) and ferace (long loose 
coat) were elevated to metaphors for the changing notion of personal liberty (as 
opposed to metaphors for licence and artful seductiveness) (Melman, 1995, p. 120) 
Many women travellers adopted the Turkish female style of dress while they were 
abroad and continued to wear it on their return to England as a gesture of independence; 
cross-cultural cross-dressing allowed them to stretch the boundaries of their gender and 
distance themselves from the constricting norms of Victorian and Edwardian sexual 
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stereotypes (MacLeod & Codell, 1998, p. 64). As Melman (1995, p. 144) states, the 
domestic a-political interpretation of the harem made Victorians and Edwardians 
perceive it as a ‘society within a society, a female community, an autonomous sorority, 
and self-sufficient, self-ruling and self-justified community’. These studies 
demonstrate why it is important to consider Orientalism as a heterogeneous 
phenomenon which includes differences and splits, rather than a homogenous entity 
which presents the Orient within clearly defined categories. 
 
Polygamy and seclusion figure among the most significant Orientalist themes linked 
to the harem. Although these, along with concubinage, have been practiced in 
Mediterranean societies before the Arab conquest and have also been historically 
practiced by Jews and Christians (Ahmed, 1992, pp. 18,55), they came to be identified 
almost entirely with Islam in the minds of the West, conjuring up a number of powerful 
images (Lewis, 2004, p. 98). Graham-Brown (2003, p. 505) notes that, in the popular 
Western fantasy of seclusion, women had no major relationship excluding with their 
male sexual partners and/or oppressors, and paintings, photographs and literature 
usually stressed ‘passivity and stillness of women’. Patterns of sexual segregation, 
however, varied greatly, and seclusion which was impossible in towns and cities where 
women participated in labour force, could be practiced only in richer families where 
women’s work was not needed (Graham-Brown, 2003, p. 505). Graham-Brown (2003, 
p. 505) also points out that most photographs of the time depicting harem scenes were 
in fact studio reconstructions composed by the photographer, like the painting or 
engraving, the photograph was, in fact, a ‘figment of imagination’. Although we can 
acknowledge the importance of visual imagery in constructing such concepts as the 
harem and the veil, my study focuses on written images of the veil, and how the words 
and language are effectively used to construct the dress.  
 
Polygamy, which was also central to the Orientalist discourse, provided both a male 
fantasy (Graham-Brown, 2003, p. 502) of ‘ownership and control of multiple women’ 
48 of 347 
 
and a reason to condemn Islam as ‘heathen and barbaric’ (Lewis, 1996, p. 155). 
Segregated polygamous life was central to both dominant Western Orientalist 
imaginary, and was challenged by Ottoman women (Lewis, 2004, p. 98). In addition 
to generalisations about polygamy in writings of casual harem visitors–polygamous 
elite vs monogamous majority (Melman, 1995, p. 143) in the dominant Orientalist 
discourse –the harem was represented as a polygamous space characterised by 
‘tyranny, excess and perversion’ (Lewis, 2004, pp. 182-183).12 Since the harem, 
seclusion and polygamy have been almost exclusively associated with Muslims, it 
follows that the images attached to these notions have also been linked with 
constructions of Muslims, and more particularly the Muslim woman.  
 
 Islamic, Muslim Feminism and the Veil 
If Muslim women were seen as oppressed by the veil, how does this relate to the 
emergence of Islamic feminism? Historically, feminist discourse first emerged in the 
writings of women at different moments in the Middle Eastern countries. Margot 
Badran (2009, p. 20) notes that feminist ideas surfaced in the writings of educated 
middle and upper-class Arab women who lived in the secluded realm of the urban 
harem, and who, through education and expanding contacts within the female world, 
gained deeper knowledge of their religion as some started to contest the Islamic 
justification for seclusion (hijab which then meant covering both face and body) and 
other controls over their lives. The emergence of Islamic feminism has much to teach 
us about the veil and its histories. 
 
Viewed as a Western attack on Islamic culture and blasphemy within Muslim 
countries, feminism has for a long time been presumed absent by most in the West who 
                                                 
12 In relation to Europe’s feelings about Oriental women, Melman (1995, p. 61) similarly notes that the 
harem was both appealing and threatening, causing a mixture of attraction and repulsion and Kabbani 
(1986, p. 26) states that these feelings fluctuated between ‘desire, pity, contempt and outrage’. 
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have insisted that ‘feminism and Islam is an oxymoron’, arguing that Muslims are 
unable to produce feminism and ‘Islam’ would not allow it (Badran, 2009, p. 1).13 The 
forces critical of and the ones hostile to Muslim women feminists have stubbornly 
persisted from the early twentieth into the twenty-first century (Badran, 2009, p. 2). 
Yet, as Nashat and Tucker (1999, p. xxxiii) note, feminism challenges both European 
colonial and indigenous patriarchal ideologies, and the relationship between Western 
and non-Western feminism has often been adversarial, partly due to the tension 
between both groups in relation to the explanation provided for women’s oppression. 
Even non-Western women who identify themselves as feminists ‘object to Western 
feminist theories that posit men as the primary source of oppression’, resulting in a 
debate generating theories that focus on the ‘interrelationships of multiple forms of 
oppression, such as race, class, imperialism, and gender’ (Nashat & Tucker, 1999, p. 
xxxiii). Razack (2008, p. 148) argues that, in the current historical times, feminism can 
easily be ‘annexed to the project of empire’ through the language of human rights and 
gender equality, for instance, in which the West is perceived as committed to 
Enlightenment values whereas the non-West remains either incompletely modern or 
hostile to modernity. 
 
In contrast to feminisms in the West, which have been largely secular and articulated 
outside religious frameworks or as a critique of religious frameworks, the feminisms 
created by Muslim women were not a ‘western’ derivative; and whether they have been 
called secular feminism or Islamic feminism, religion has been a fundamental part of 
the Muslim women’s feminisms (Badran, 2009, p. 2). Another aspect of feminisms in 
the context of Islam is that from the colonial period to the present, women have 
continued to ground their feminism in Islam and nationality as they have persisted in 
challenging patriarchy, transcending political and class formations (Badran, 2009, p. 
116). Starting from Badran’s (2009) statement that feminism in the Islamic framework 
                                                 
13 See also Leila Ahmed (1992) 
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has not been derived from the West, I examine the discourse of the veil within the 
Nahda era in the chapter following this one. As I mentioned earlier, the Nahda period 
coincided with the colonisation of many Arab countries in which the woman, her status 
and rights, constituted a focal point of attention and debate. The Nahda texts represent 
an example of this debate. More specifically, Muslim woman’s dress and hijab (in the 
sense of covering both body and face) gave rise to a discourse on the veil among 
intellectuals of the time, during the emergence of al-Nahda al nisa’iya (Women’s 
Awakening which was part of the Arab Nahda). The meanings attached to the veil 
during this period will be compared with examples from Orientalist associations which 
were prevalent during the nineteenth-century French travel writing. Do the Nahda 
writings represent a discourse on the veil different from the Orientalist one in relation 
to Islamic dress? Can we consider this discourse as part of an emerging Islamic 
feminist one? And if so, does it include elements of a secular or Islamic feminism 
derived by Muslim intellectuals of the time?  
 
Muslims’ secular feminism emerged in nascent nation-states in Africa and Asia in the 
late nineteenth century through to the first half of the twentieth century during 
modernisation, nationalist anti-colonial struggle, dynastic decline and independent 
state-building amidst a composite of intersecting secular nationalist and Islamic 
modernist and humanitarian discourses (Badran, 2009, p. 116). Similarly, Amina 
Wadud (2006, p. 111) argues that the colonialist period introduced individuals outside 
the faith into the gender discourse, and whereas many Muslims then have subscribed 
to a secular approach, the methods of such an approach were not investigated for either 
the ‘secular, Orientalist, pro-Western, or even anti-Islamic bias’. The nineteenth 
century also marked the beginning of the ‘Islamic reform movement’, led by Islamic 
modernists such as Muhammad Abduh in Egypt. This movement was influential 
throughout Muslim-majority and Arab countries including Morocco as I mentioned in 
my introduction. The Arab Nahda movement likewise generated a broad movement of 
Arab intellectual and cultural revival. 
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Islamic feminism, on the other hand, emerged in the global Ummah (global Muslim 
community) simultaneously in the East and West in the late twentieth century, during 
the late postcolonial moment at a time of accelerating Islamist movement of political 
Islam and during widespread Islamic religious cultural revival in many Muslim-
majority secular states and minority societies (Badran, 2009, p. 23). The earliest 
articulation of women’s feminist consciousness (not yet called feminism) was first 
discernible in occasional published writings by the 1860s and 1870s, preceding 
colonial occupation and the rise of nationalism, and was more widely expressed from 
the 1890s with the rise of women’s journalism and salon debates (Badran, 2009, p. 
18).14 The Nahda writings exemplify this discourse on the veil. The feminist project 
was caught up in a contradiction, seen both as a ‘source of indigenous liberation and a 
means of colonial subversion of local culture and society’ (Badran, 2009, p. 67) both 
at the time of its emergence and in the postcolonial period (Badran, 2009).15The 
feminists, who started to view patriarchy, rather than Islam, as a source of oppression 
of women, sought to make a distinction between patriarchy and Islam in arguing their 
case throughout the century, and have rejected attempts of opponents to impose 
restrictions on women in the name of Islam, their aim being to end patriarchy and 
tyranny in the private sphere and legitimise entry into the public sphere (Badran, 2009, 
p. 134).16 
 
In the last decades of the nineteenth century, colonial narratives of racial, religious and 
civilizational inferiority came to specifically focus on the issue of women and the ways 
                                                 
14See also Beth Baron (1997) on Arab press of the period. 
15Badran (2009, p. 221) states that the notion of Islamic feminism is fraught with issues of power, 
authority and legitimacy, and that feminisms in postcolonial contexts are discredited as Western, and a 
project of cultural colonialism in addition to being stigmatised as antithetical to Islam (Badran Feminism 
in Islam: 221).  
16 According to Amina Wadud (2006, p. 22), patriarchal norms of the 7th century Arabia left a mark on 
the nature of the Qur’anic articulation and continued to do so for centuries with’ interpretation and 
implementation’. ‘Qur’anic values and virtues inspire persistence in the struggle and resistance to the 
limitations put on women’s dignity. Too many claim authority and legitimacy on the basis of literal, 
narrow, reductionist and static interpretations of Islam, Islamic sources and gender’ (Wadud, 2006, p. 
15).  
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men of other societies oppressed and degraded them (Ahmed, 2012, p. 23). This 
narrative was useful in this era of European imperialism because it cast European man 
in the role not only of bringing civilisation to backward peoples, but also saving local 
women from native men (Ahmed, 2012, p. 23). Dress, as both Gӧle (2011, p. 1) and 
Ahmed (2012, p. 23) note, came to epitomise to Europeans the otherness and inferiority 
of colonised societies. The veil thus became a symbol of Islam’s degradation of women 
and religion’s fundamental inferiority (Ahmed, 2012, p. 24). With the rise of the West 
to global dominance, the Western meaning of the veil (as a sign of inferiority of Islam) 
came to overlay its prior indigenous meanings, leading to propagation of unveiling 
movements (Ahmed, 2012, pp. 44-45). Simultaneously, state and religious forces in 
Middle Eastern countries have retained patriarchal forms of control over women during 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which feminists have identified and confronted 
(Badran, 2009, p. 18). The ‘woman question’ (qadi’yat al mar’a), around which 
competing discourses have flourished, had been about broader issues of power, and a 
means through which the state, religious establishment and Islamic movements have 
projected other designs (Badran, 2009, p. 46). Writing in the tradition of nineteenth 
and twentieth century intellectuals responding to challenges of the West, female 
intellectuals were affected by two important changes in the debate on women’s role in 
the twentieth century: the introduction of Western ideas and references, and the 
participation of women for the first time in the literary debate through writings in 
women’s press (Badran, 2009, p. 103). The ‘woman question’ thus became entangled 
in religious and political issue, and was also fuelled by socio-economic change in 
Egypt (Baron, 1997, p. 104). Al Nahda al-nisa’iyya (women’s awakening) thus 
expanded opportunities for women and set the precedents and foundations for later 
female activism not only in Egypt, but throughout the Arab world (Baron, 1997, p. 
188). 
 
In the 1990s, the notion of Islamic feminism and the term itself has been surfacing in 
parts of the Middle East. The term, however, is controversial, and there is no consensus 
about its meaning on the part of either advocates or adversaries as it is both contested 
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and embraced (Badran, 2009, p. 221). Badran (2009, p. 242) defines Islamic feminism 
as: 
 
a feminist discourse and practice articulated within an Islamic paradigm. 
Islamic feminism, which derives its understanding and mandate from the 
Qur’an, seeks rights and justice for women, and for men, in the totality of their 
existence. Islamic feminism is both highly contested and firmly embraced. 
There has been much misunderstanding, misrepresentation, and mischief 
concerning Islamic feminism. This new feminism has given rise 
simultaneously to hopes and to fears.17  
 
Islamic feminism is a global phenomenon—neither a product of the East nor the 
West—is being produced by Muslim women from both majority and minority 
communities in Africa and Asia, and immigrant and convert communities in the West 
(Badran, 2009, p. 245). 
 
In what follows, I provide some of the concepts tackled by scholars whose works fall 
within the category of Islamic feminism, or within theories promoting concepts such 
as social and gender justice within the framework of Islam. Noting the scarcity of 
works which challenge the absence of gender within Islam, Amina Wadud (2006, pp. 
79-80) argues that, relegated to the role of subjects without agency, women have been 
almost completely excluded from the foundational discourse of what it means to be 
Muslim, being reduced ‘from full humanity and moral agency, or khilafah, to subjects’ 
(1999, p. xi). Similarly, Asma Barlas (2002, p. 14) states that: 
                                                 
17 It is noteworthy that Azza Karam (1998, pp. 9-14) distinguishes three types of feminism in the 
Egyptian context which are: secular feminism, Islamic feminism and Islamist feminism. 
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It may be argued that by teaching the precept of the inherent inferiority of 
women, which breeds misogyny, and by justifying women’s subordination to 
men, patriarchies violate women’s rights by denying them agency and dignity, 
principles that the Qur’an says are intrinsic to human nature itself. 
 
Focusing on hermeneutics, language and text in her close study of the Qur’an, Wadud 
advocates a gender inclusive reading (2006, pp. 15-16)18 of the sacred text for a 
continual development towards a just social order, emphasising not only a just 
treatment of women, but also including them as agents, noting that, although the 
Qur’an highlights the importance of women, gender reform in Muslim societies has 
been ‘most stubbornly resisted’ (Wadud, 1999, p. xiii). Wadud (1999, p. xvii) critiques 
this tendency of the Islamic intellectual legacy to marginalise women’s perspectives 
and render them ‘subjects of male construction’, considering that tafsir, or Qur’anic 
exegesis, which is one of the most foundational disciplines in Islamic thought, a human 
and therefore limited endeavour. Such a critique of ‘male construction’ constitutes one 
of the main concerns of my study since I focus on how the veil, as a gendered object, 
gets constructed through texts. Rather than Islamic tafsir, however, my analysis looks 
at constructions of Islamic dress in Orientalism, the Nahda and the Moroccan and 
French press and politics. 
 
In order to challenge gender biases contained in these endeavours, traditional tafsir 
(Barlas, 2002, p. 2) which was exclusively written by males, needs to be challenged 
(Barlas, 2002, p. 3), where women’s voicelessness, mistakenly equated with that of the 
text itself, resulted in their experiences being either excluded or interpreted through 
                                                 
18Asma Barlas (2002, p. 4) equally mentions the importance of generating a ‘theory of equality’ from 
the Qur’an, which is why critiquing the methods by which Muslims produce religious meaning and 
rereading the Qur’an for liberation are crucial for ensuring sexual equality.  
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male vision, perspective, desire or needs of woman (Wadud, 1999, p. 2). Women’s 
status and roles in Muslim societies and patriarchal structures of gender relationships 
are a function of multiple factors, most of which have nothing to do with religion. As 
Asma Barlas (2002, p. 2) argues, there is nothing innately Islamic about misogyny, 
inequality and patriarchy, yet all three are often justified by Muslim states and clerics 
in the name of Islam. Attitudes towards women at the time and place of revelation 
helped shape particular expressions in the Qur’an, and the concerns it addressed were 
particular to that circumstance (Barlas, 2002, p. 101). My study also represents an 
attempt to also counter this ‘voicelessness’ of the female voice which Wadud (1999) 
evokes. I do this through including female voices which have been marginalised and 
silenced. 
 
Regarding the association between scripture/ sacred and sexual oppression, Barlas 
(2002, p. 3) states that it has served as the strongest argument for inequality and 
discrimination which derive not from the teachings of the Qur’an, but from the 
secondary religious texts, the tafsir (Qur’anic exegesis) and the Ahadith (narratives 
purportedly detailing the life and praxis of the Prophet Muhammad. Barlas (2002, pp. 
4-5) argues that all texts, including the Qur’an, can be read in ‘multiple modes’ 
including the egalitarian one. In the same framework, Omid Safi (2003, p. 4) reiterates 
the importance of repeatedly challenging, resisting and seeking to overthrow the 
structures of injustice built into Islamic thought, which is equally applicable to 
Muslims living in Muslim societies to the ones in Europe and the States. These studies 
by Islamic feminists highlight the significance of reconsidering texts which have 
constructed woman within patriarchal perspectives, and the need to intervene and 
challenge such constructions. I find Asma Barlas’s concept of textual/sexual 
oppression quite useful in thinking about how textual constructions of the veil become 
a technique for sexual oppression. My study represents an attempt to consider how 
textual constructions contribute to sexual oppression, and how the veil is often used as 
an effective tool for such an endeavour. 
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In this conclusion, I would like to come back to my introductory question: what links 
can we draw between the veil and Orientalism on the one hand, and postcolonial and 
Islamic and Muslim feminism on the other? As this review of the veil within 
Orientalism, postcolonial, Islamic and Muslim feminism has shown, many threads link 
the veil to these different theories and their respective histories. For my particular study 
of the veil in the contemporary French and Moroccan press and politics, postcolonial, 
Islamic and Muslim feminism present valuable epistemological tools for critically 
reflecting on constructions of Islamic dress in texts. As my analysis elucidates, 
Islamic/Muslim feminisms offer even more valuable grounds for contesting and 
challenging histories of the veil, a gendered practice which has largely been fixed to 
Muslims. If the history of Orientalism is also a history of colonial discourse, my study 
presents an attempt to challenge such a discourse not from an outsider’s perspective, 
but instead from an insider’s position of a Muslimah. What Islamic/Muslim feminism 
means to a Muslimah like me is a potential framework to consider the veil across 
different contexts and histories, and an attempt to offer a reading of texts from an 
Islamic/feminist/postcolonial perspective. For my own experience as a Muslimah 
researching the veil, it is primordial to recognise these histories in order to forge a 
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 Approaching the Veil: a Veil Methodology  
 
How did I come to study the veil in terms of its associations? As I noted in my 
introduction the original focus of my research was Orientalism. When reading about 
Orientalism, however, it was the veil that caught my attention. I became intrigued by 
how and where the veil came up. In this chapter I offer an account of the research 
process and describe some of the methodological difficulties and challenges I faced in 
researching the veil in this way. Firstly, I will discuss the epistemology that shapes this 
project in terms of the politics of location. Secondly, I will explain how I approach the 
veil as an archive. Thirdly, I discuss my methods of approaching texts that form part 
of the archive. And finally I will discuss the implications of how translation as a 
practice was necessary to assemble my ‘veil archive’ for the research process. 
 
The Politics of Location 
As I have noted, the veil caught my attention as I began to read Orientalist travel 
writing from the nineteenth century. It caught my attention as a reader who was also a 
Muslimah muhajjaba. I began the research into veils because of my own embodied and 
historical situation. I am thus involved in the research at multiple levels.  I write from 
and through my own involvement. Writing from involvement is also writing through 
an explicit acknowledgement of positionality. As Ien Ang (2001, p. 167) argues 
‘admission of positionality and (self) reflection upon it have become a recognized 
analytical strategy in critical studies, creating an awareness of the inevitable 
situatedness of discursive knowledge’.  To admit to positionality is also to reflect on 
one’s own starting points as well as to acknowledge the partiality of the claims we 
make (Mohanty, 2003). I would suggest a politics of location has specific meanings 
for Islamic feminism. As Ziba Mir Hosseini (2000, pp. 3-4) states: 
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Those of us who research, think, write, and talk about gender in Islam must 
also be clear, both to ourselves and to our audiences, where we stand personally 
on issues that touch our innermost feelings of self. I suggest that unless we are 
honest about our own personal, individual motives in participating, there will 
be no movement in the debate. I am not suggesting an individual or collective 
psychoanalysis, but an admission that each of us has a position...I also know 
how difficult it is to recognise and talk about one’s often very complex and 
contradictory identities and positions. 
 
Ziba Mir-Hosseini is suggesting here that as Islamic feminists engaged in researching 
Islam and gender, we need to think about the personal nature of this research both for 
ourselves and for our audiences. What Hosseini refers to as the ‘admission that each of 
us has a position’ constitutes a necessary step in my research as a Muslimah muhajjaba 
researching and writing about Islamic dress, since the veil is a predominantly gendered 
practice in Islam. This position, however, is far from being simple or even stable. As I 
pointed out in my introduction, my position as a Muslimah-Amazigh-Arabya-
Moroccan-British-muhajjaba (or adopting a hijab) writing in a Western academic 
context represents a complex and multifaceted aspect of my position. Although I came 
to the study of the veil through Orientalism, researching the dress as a Muslimah 
muhajjaba reveals some of the complexities of my own positionality in relation to the 
research process.  
 
I have found ‘the politics of location’ a useful way of capturing these complexities. 
This term was first coined by Adrienne Rich in a series of essays published in the early 
1980s. For Rich a politics of location was about thinking from the particularity of one’s 
own situation as a woman. Indeed a politics of location was for Rich a way of 
deconstructing ‘hegemonic uses of the word ‘woman’ within a context of US racism 
and elite or academic feminist practices’ (Kaplan, 1994, p. 138). It is unsurprising 
given its origin that the politics of location has come to have a particular resonance and 
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meaning for postcolonial feminists. For example Chandra Mohanty (2003, p. 106) 
defines the politics of location as ‘the historical, geographical, cultural, psychic, and 
imaginative boundaries that provide the ground for political definition and self-
definition’. Although her analysis pertains to US feminists, a politics of location is 
useful insofar as it provides a tool for how we can ‘determine and produce experience 
and difference as analytical and political categories’ (Mohanty, 2003, p. 106). The 
concept of the politics of location has undergone what Caren Kaplan (1994, p. 138) 
calls a process of ‘cultural translation and transformation’ which functions as a ‘marker 
of Western interest in other cultures’ and ‘signals the formation of diasporic identities’. 
As she notes: 
 
Whether it encourages resistance to hegemonic formations, whether it becomes 
its own academic reification—turning into an instrument of hegemony itself—
or whether it marks important shifts in discourses of location and displacement 
depends, not surprisingly, upon who utilizes the concept in what particular 
context  
 
The politics of location represents a useful tool to conceptualise a consideration of how 
my positionality influences the research I am undertaking. In the framework of the 
‘production of experience and difference’ outlined by Mohanty (2003, p. 118), a 
politics of location allows me to engage with and reflect on my research within a 
Western academic context. Occupying such a position, however, entails a greater 
responsibility for a postcolonial Muslimah writing and speaking in a Western academic 
context. As a postcolonial Muslimah, my experience and difference remain significant 
points shaping my study of Islamic dress. This is why I would like to emphasise the 
importance of time and space throughout my research. As a postcolonial Muslimah 
writing in the twenty-first century Western academic framework, my present location 
cannot erase the temporal and spatial dimensions of my experiences and histories in 
Morocco. While my research and writing spread over a few years, it involves the study 
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of the veil within different historical and local dimensions, moving from Orientalist 
and colonial eras to the contemporary media, and from the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries to the last decade. In terms of space, my project equally moves 
between France and Morocco, and between Egypt in the Mashreq to Morocco in the 
Maghreb. Experience and difference therefore can be added to the time/space 
dimensions which represent important aspects of my politics of location. Locations are 
not stable, but move as we do. 
 
For Caren Kaplan (1994), a politics of location is also about how we relate to the past. 
She usefully describes how in identifying ‘marginal space as both a site of 
representation and resistance, location becomes historicized and theoretically viable—
a space of future possibilities as well as the nuanced articulation of the past’ (Kaplan, 
1994, pp. 143-144). In terms of my research, my position as a Moroccan-British 
postcolonial-muhajjaba or Muslimah with a hijab in England can be viewed as a 
marginal space, which can be stretched to my position in a Western white-majority 
country in which Muslims constitute a minority, of which Arab/Amazigh/Maghrebi 
Muslims represent an even smaller minority. This minority space, however, becomes 
an opportunity to re-consider the past and present associations of the veil. What Kaplan 
refers to as the ‘nuanced articulation of the past’ involves in my study a consideration 
of how historical meanings of the veil compare with its contemporary associations in 
the print media. Because of my own location, because of how the veil matters to me 
personally, I wanted to think about the history of the veil in new ways. 
 
The question of the personal cannot be separated from the question of audience. We 
might write as, but we also write to. As Marnia Lazreg (2001, p. 291) in her writing 
about Algerian women states: 
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I am writing in English about a reality that is generally unfamiliar to an English-
speaking audience. The problem is not only linguistic, it is also one of sharing 
with an audience a history and culture, a frame of mind, significant silences, 
and a multitude of things that are said but dispense with explanations. 
 
Applied to my research, as a Moroccan born person writing in English to an English-
speaking audience, there is a need to provide additional contextual frameworks for the 
study of Islamic dress in France and Morocco. As a postcolonial Muslimah writing 
about the veil in Morocco and France in England, translation, which I discuss in a later 
section of this chapter, offers a means of filling part of the gap which separates texts 
from various contexts. The fact that researching the veil in Morocco and, to a lesser 
extent France, poses problems that go beyond language and translation to differences 
in terms of history and culture, and what Lazreg refers to as ‘a frame of mind’ or a 
worldview opens questions that complicate the notion of positionality.  
 
Admissions of positionality are thus not about securing one’s place but showing how 
place is complicated. As Lata Mani points out, the ‘revised’ politics of location 
demonstrates that the relation between experience and knowledge is now seen not to 
be one of correspondence, but one ‘fraught with history, contingence and struggle’ 
(quoted in (Kaplan, 1994, p. 149)). I was born and brought up in Morocco, a 
postcolonial nation-state, which is geographically located in the North Western part of 
Africa, which is also called the Maghreb. Morocco, despite the many differences it has 
with other Middle Eastern countries, shares various affinities with them, namely 
linguistic and socio-cultural – Arabic is its official language and Islam – its declared 
state and majority religion. Growing up in an open yet religion-conscious family, I 
found myself constantly negotiating the interplay between what I understood to be 
Muslim practices within my immediate close family environment and French ideals 
and values, which remained central in my primary, secondary and higher education as 
well as the wider family and social environments I inhabited. As a young Muslim child 
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and teenager, my feelings of being divided between two different worlds were 
intensified by the Moroccan culture which overemphasised the values of self-
effacement, reserve and restraint. While these were widely held as primordial for the 
construction of an ideal femininity, forms of modest Islamic dress remained marginal 
amongst my immediate and remote families, my friends and acquaintances, and the 
society at large. With the rise of Islamic consciousness during the 1990s in line with 
the Islamic revival currents of the time, Islamic dress has nowadays been widely 
adopted throughout the Middle Eastern and Maghrebi countries including Morocco. It 
is noteworthy, however, that this Islamic consciousness was also accompanied with a 
feminist consciousness. As Mir-Hosseini (2000, p. 10) describes: 
 
In Iran, as elsewhere in the Muslim world, women who acquired a feminist 
consciousness in either a Western or an indigenous form have always faced a 
tension between the different components of their identity: their Muslimness is 
perceived as backward and oppressed, yet authentic and innate; their feminism 
as progressive and emancipated, yet corrupt and alien. Over time, the Iranian 
revolution deepened the perceived divide between Islam and feminism, forcing 
many Iranian women—both religious and secular—to re-examine and redefine 
the relation between their faith and feminism, thus opening a new phase in the 
politics of gender in Muslim societies and fostering a new gender awareness. 
 
To be a Muslim/Islamic feminist can be to face tensions between different aspects of 
one’s own identity. These tensions are about how we are perceived: it is about how 
feminism and Islam are perceived as being in tension. Framing my analysis of Islamic 
dress within a postcolonial, Muslim and Islamic feminist perspective, and taking these 
theories as the theoretical frameworks for my study, I cannot escape the tensions 
implied in the coupling of the terms ‘Muslim’ ‘Islamic’ and ‘feminism’. Being a 
Muslimah muhajjaba myself who has adopted the hijab by my own choice, the 
‘feminist consciousness’ which motivates my research to a significant degree has led 
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me to reconsidering the relationship between Muslimness and feminism. Still largely 
perceived as ‘corrupt and alien’ in Muslim contexts, feminism has been associated 
more with the secular fringes of Muslim-majority countries including Morocco, hence 
with a category of people who define themselves against religious frameworks. As a 
Muslimah muhajjaba writing about Islamic dress, my research can be considered as an 
attempt to re-consider this often polarised relationship between Islam and feminism, 
and to consider ways in which Islam and feminism can be re-visited. 
 
An important component of my politics of location is thus Islam. Saba Mahmood 
(2004, p. 1) notes that while attempts have been made to integrate issues of sexual, 
racial, class and national difference within feminist theory, questions regarding 
religious difference have remained relatively unexplored. Since my research as a 
postcolonial muhajjaba in England focuses on associations of the veil, it cannot be 
dissociated from Islam as veiling is also considered a religious practice. Rather than 
meaning Islam as a homogeneous fixed entity, I refer to Islam as a way of life which 
influences one’s experience not only of growing up in a Muslim-majority country, but 
also of living in a Muslim-minority country such as England. As a postcolonial 
Moroccan-British Muslimah now living in the West, my visible religious difference is 
also part of a politics of location. Consequently, this difference ought to produce a 
different analytical or political category since my positionality with its complex 
elements inevitably impacts and informs my research. What are the politics of the 
production of this particular knowledge? Mir-Hosseini (2000, p. 4) offers some useful 
reflections:  
 
If we are Muslim, whether or not believing or practicing, Islam is part of our 
identity, or way of life, a culture, a system of values. We may be at ease with 
it, or find our position painful and ambiguous. If we are Muslims, Islam is the 
“other”, but whoever we are, since Said’s Orientalism our position is inevitably 
affected by a healthy scepticism toward common Western media 
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representations of Islam as a unitary phenomenon like no other religion, 
incapable of development, reflection, or self-knowledge, and above all anti-
woman...With globalisation, deterritorialisation, and the blurring of Islamic 
discourses with others, the battle is no longer contained within the Muslim 
world. 
 
To write about veils is certainly to be involved in a battle. This was a key reason I 
chose to research how the veil is represented (rather than to interview Muslim women 
about their experiences of the veil), because I realised that this battle was a battle over 
representation, one that cannot be ‘contained within the Muslim world.’  
 
We are as Muslims in many worlds. My own history as a Muslim child and teenager 
growing up in a postcolonial nation-state a generation after independence from French 
colonial rule in a middle class family are all closely interrelated: the dimensions of 
gender, nation, class, ethnicity and religion all come to define my location as a 
postcolonial subject in a Western academic context. This means that these various 
elements have an impact on my own political and intellectual location, to borrow 
Chandra Talpade Mohanty’s (1991, p. 3) phrase, the ‘maps I draw are necessarily 
anchored in my own discontinuous locations’. Mohanty (1991) in her work questions 
how the figure of ‘the third world woman’ appears as a homogenous category within 
feminist work. Mohanty (1991, p. 4) challenges this figuration into order to foreground 
the links among histories and struggles of third-world women against racism, sexism, 
colonialism, imperialism and monopoly capital. Mohanty (1991, p. 4) proposes an 
‘imagined community’ of third-world women as a way of opening up ‘potential 
alliances and collaborations across divisive boundaries’. Mohanty (1991, p. 4) argues 
that the idea of imagined community is useful because it leads us away from essentialist 
notions of third-world feminist struggles in which ‘women with divergent histories and 
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social locations, woven together by the political threads of opposition to forms of 
dominance that are not only pervasive, but also systemic’.19 
 
By the categories of gender, nation, class and religion, I do not mean any homogeneous 
entities constituting my location, neither do I imply any ‘national’ or given categories 
of definition. Rather, I want to emphasise the importance of considering these diverse 
dimensions as crucial in terms of intellectual production in a Western country. As a 
postcolonial Muslimah residing in England, I am also affected by the positioning of the 
third-world woman in terms of ‘underdevelopment, oppressive traditions, high 
illiteracy, rural and urban poverty, religious fanaticism’ noted by Mohanty (1991, p. 
5). What seems to constitute ‘women of colour’ or ‘third-world women’ as a viable 
oppositional alliance, as Mohanty (1991, p. 7) argues, is a ‘common context of struggle’ 
rather than a racial identification. Similarly, it is the third-world women’s oppositional 
political relation to sexist, racist, and imperialist structures that constitutes a potential 
commonality; it is the common context of struggle against specific exploitative 
structures and systems that determines our potential political alliances (Mohanty, 1991, 
p. 7). 
 
It is useful to view my project through the lens of a modest ‘re-writing of history’ based 
on the particular locations and histories of struggle of postcolonial women (Mohanty, 
1991, p. 10). As a postcolonial Muslimah, my work constitutes an attempt to revisit the 
various histories of the veil, departing from my location as a postcolonial Muslimah. 
This location is further complicated by a revision which addresses a Western academic 
environment. Within the concept of feminist struggle, I am interested in the 
‘ideological, discursive level which addresses questions of representation’ (Mohanty, 
                                                 
19 It is noteworthy that, in her definition of the geographic composition of the ‘third-world’, Mohanty 
(1991, p. 5) omits the Middle East and North African nation-states which also constitute parts of the 
non-European third-world.  
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1991, p. 21), and in how the veil is constructed and re-constructed through different 
past and present texts. Significantly, Mohanty (1991, p. 21) states that colonial 
relations of rule ‘form the backdrop for feminist critiques at both levels.’ It is important 
that feminist analysis has always recognised the centrality of re-writing and 
remembering history, as writing often becomes a ‘space for struggle and contestation 
about reality itself, as written texts are also the basis of the exercise of power and 
domination’ (Mohanty, 1991, pp. 34-35). In this context, (feminist) scholarly practices 
(whether comprising reading, writing, critical or textual) are ‘inscribed in relations of 
power—relations which they counter, resist, or even perhaps implicitly support. There 
can, of course, be no apolitical scholarship’ (Mohanty, 1991, p. 53). 
 
I would like to draw attention to the meanings attached to Islamic modest dress in 
various texts and to the effects of these associations within the different historical and 
socio-political frameworks. The production of meanings of the veil cannot be 
dissociated from the histories of the veil within Orientalism, colonialism, and its long 
history of meanings. In my research, I am also interested in what Grewal and Kaplan 
(Grewal & Kaplan, 1994, p. 2) term ‘problematizing theory’ which tends to be a 
‘homogenizing move’ in many locations across Europe and the US and seems to be 
unable to deal with alterity. ‘Global feminism’, for instance, has ‘elided the diversity 
of women’s agency in favor of a universalized Western model of women’s liberation 
that celebrates individuality and modernity.’ (Grewal & Kaplan, 1994, p. 17) As far as 
my position is concerned, I use theories that have emerged and flourished outside the 
boundaries of Morocco, but which have intervened in relation to processes such as 
homogenisation and essentialisation which are central to my project. Postcolonial, 
Muslim and Islamic feminisms, which are crucial to my study of Islamic dress in the 
contemporary print media, contribute not only to questioning these processes, but also 
to providing clues regarding how they operate through time and space. To battle with 
representations of the veil is a decolonising strategy. In my endeavour to engage with 
texts and problematise essentialist discursive constructions of Islamic dress, I would 
like to stress the importance of Islam and being a Muslim as a crucial component of 
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my engagement with such theoretical approaches, and present a ‘revision’ that is 
informed by my politics of location.  
 
Additionally, the issue of race forms an important background to my politics of 
location as a postcolonial Moroccan-British Muslimah muhajjaba. These categories 
add up to categories of class and sex which may be equally important to religious and 
racial modes of identification. Positioning myself, however, should not lead to a type 
of Muslim-centric agenda which would result in reinforcing dichotomies where 
difference prevails over affiliation, and separation over solidarity. The challenge, 
therefore, lies in resisting dominant structures of power while remaining vigilant to the 
more implicit power relations and types of essentialisation inherent in one’s own 
cultural and religious frameworks. This double vigilance should allow us to move 
beyond the black/white divide which characterises a considerable amount of 
scholarship. 
 
How useful can the politics of location be in my research as a starting point? In later 
chapters, I focus on how the veil is constructed through different texts and historical 
contexts. The construction of Islamic dress within defined meanings ensures its fixity 
in essentialist and homogeneous terms. This hegemonic construction of associations of 
the veil is what my research attempts to question through following the dress across 
texts and contexts, and the various meanings attached to it. Kaplan (1994, p. 139) also 
warns us to be ‘suspicious of any use of the term [politics of location] to naturalize 
boundaries and margins under the guise of celebration, nostalgia, or inappropriate 
assumptions of intimacy’. As I mentioned earlier, I do not assume that terms such as 
‘West’ ‘Moroccan’ or ‘England’ refer to fixed, closed entities, with clearly delineated 
boundaries in a world increasingly connected, where the physical and political 
boundaries are broken by new technologies. What I would like to stress instead are the 
power structures inherent in these different locations and what results from them.  
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It is not my intention to celebrate Morocco as an authentic nation. Displacement should 
not be a pre-requisite for idealisation or celebration of ‘home’. What being part of a 
Muslim diaspora can allow is to revisit home. Ien Ang (2001, p. 21) argues that 
diasporas should make the most of their ‘complex and flexible positioning as it is 
precisely that complexity and flexibility which enable the vitality of diaspora 
cultures...a critical diasporic cultural politics should privilege neither host country nor 
(real or imaginary) homeland, but precisely keep a creative tension between ‘where 
you’re from’ and ‘where you’re at’. Ang (2001, p. 35) also speaks about the ‘third 
space of hybridity which enables us to come to terms with the fact that ‘the cultural 
context of ‘where you’re at’ always informs and articulates the meanings of ‘where 
you’re from’. “Only when we utilize the notion of location to destabilize unexamined 
or stereotypical images that are vestiges of colonial discourse and other manifestations 
of modernity’s structural inequalities can we recognize and work through the complex 
relationships between women in different parts of the world.” (Kaplan, 1994, p. 139) 
 
My project seeks precisely to examine and thus destabilize these stereotypical images 
as vestiges of colonial discourse. To revisit history is also to revisit home. Marnia 
Lazreg (2001, p. 291) emphasises the importance of re-considering the past in order to 
understand the present (especially the colonial past):  
 
Colonialism and its interface with the economy and religion overdetermine any 
study of Algerian women in complex ways that have yet to be understood. I am 
thus compelled to revisit two formidable realities, colonialism and Islam, that 
have defeated more than one scholar. 
 
What I would like to highlight at this point is the link between colonialism, Islam and 
the study of representations of the veil in the contemporary media and political texts in 
Morocco and France. Because the histories of the veil are intertwined with Islam and 
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colonialism, any study of the veil in the postcolonial framework needs to re-consider 
the veil within these particular frameworks. More particularly, Lazreg’s (2001) idea of 
how the ‘colonial past still haunts the present’ represents an important aspect of my 
research which seeks to explore associations of the veil in relation to its histories within 
colonialism and Orientalism. Following the veil and its histories, therefore, seeks not 
only to draw out the links between historical and current meanings attributed to the 
veil in various texts and contexts, but also to ask, if such links are shown to exist, how 
are they manifested through language, and what effects do they produce? My aim is to 
scrutinise examples of textual representations and discourses about the veil in media 
texts, and ask the following questions about them: how do the contemporary 
associations of Islamic dress compare with historical Orientalist and colonial 
associations of the veil discussed in earlier texts; how the veil is constructed within 
otherness; what are the effects of these associations regardless of the intentions of their 
authors? Before expanding on my textual analysis of media texts, let me introduce the 
concept of the veil archive which is important for my project.  
 
The Veil Archive  
What do I mean by ‘veil archive’? When we think of archives we might think of places 
that you can go to read texts that have been deposited. An archive in this sense would 
refer to both a place and a function. If you archive material so that it can be accessed, 
then archiving also involves a judgment about the value and significance of that 
material. A veil archive is not an archive in this sense. I use ‘veil archive’ following 
from the concept of ‘an imperial archive’ developed in postcolonial studies. To start 
with, Thomas Richards (1993, p. 6) defines the imperial archive as: 
 
a fantasy of knowledge collected and united in the service of state and Empire. 
Though a literary fantasy, it was shared widely and actually had an impact on 
policy-making. Its impact can be quickly summed up by the way in which the 
70 of 347 
 
word ‘classification’ changed its meaning in the late 19th century. At mid-
century it meant ordering information in taxonomies. 
 
I find this conceptualisation of the archive useful for a study of the veil, whose 
‘archive’ can be considered within these dimensions: the archive as a form of this 
‘fantasy of knowledge’ and a body of constructed knowledge on the one hand, and an 
ordering of the veil into specific meanings and associations which serve political 
purposes of state and empire on the other. The archive here has a different status and 
temporality: it is not simply or only about where you put material, it is how material is 
generated. An imperial archive does not just deposit texts; it creates texts that are ‘in 
service of state and Empire.’ To read the material I have gathered in this thesis as a 
‘veil archive’ is to point to how they are made to serve. 
 
Within cultural studies an archive is regularly referred to not as something ‘out there’ 
that we go to, but as what we assemble through the research process. I thus still had to 
make decisions about which texts to include in my own archive (I will explain these 
decision more fully in due course). One decision I made early on was to think of my 
archive in terms of written texts and words rather than visual images, although I 
acknowledge the importance of the visual. I have always been fascinated by words and 
language (I will explain this fascination in my section on translation). And it was the 
words that surround the veil that caught my attention. In particular I decided to focus 
on ‘associations.’ An association is about the relationships between words. So I began 
to focus on the relationship between veil and other words; these relationships seem to 
be how the veil came to matter; how the veil came to operate ‘in service of state and 
empire.’ 
 
In the previous chapter, I acknowledged the importance of Edward Said’s (1979) work 
on Orientalism to my study. Orientalism is a thesis of the intimacy of power and 
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knowledge. It is also a text that has helped me to develop my own methodology. In this 
book, Said primarily analyses what we might call ‘literature.’ But he also offers a thesis 
of ‘inter-textuality’: how Orientalist texts cite other Orientalist texts. Whilst Said 
mainly analyses literary texts, he does in his introduction also refer what we call 
postmodern or electronic media. He (Said, 1979, p. 26) suggests the following: 
 
One aspect of the electronic, postmodern world is that there has been a 
reinforcement of the stereotypes by which the Orient is viewed. Television, the 
films and the media resources have forced information into more and more 
standardized models. So far as the Orient is concerned, standardization and 
cultural stereotyping have intensified the hold of the nineteenth century 
academic and imaginative demonology of the “mysterious Orient”. 
 
A key decision I made in my research was to widen my archive to include 
contemporary press alongside nineteenth century travel writing; I wanted to explore 
this intensification of the hold the veil has. I thus treat press material as literary 
material; reading the press too for the associations between words.  
 
In some senses, however, my archive expands beyond what we might call a ‘Western 
archive.’ In Culture and Imperialism, Said (1994, pp. xxiii-xxv) discusses the ‘Western 
cultural archive’ in which the narratives, histories, travel tales and explorations of 
imperial powers such as France and Britain constituted discourses which involved 
power during the nineteenth century. Although my research includes an analysis of the 
Orientalist and media meanings of the veil in French travel literature and print media 
which can be considered as part of a ‘Western archive’, I additionally include texts 
produced in the Nahda period witnessed in Arab countries, as well as the contemporary 
Moroccan press, both of which can be situated outside the archive envisioned by Said. 
The concept of the archive, however, remains pertinent for my study. My veil archive 
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also includes the body of texts about the veil produced not only during the Orientalist 
and colonial and Nahda eras in which the veil represents a focal point of interest, but 
also in the postcolonial times in which the media presents one of the most powerful 
means of representation and domination.  
 
My project aims to not only follow the veil through its archive, but also to create a 
space in which texts of the veil speak to one another and can be read against each other 
following meanings which get attached to it, and comparing these meanings through 
history. The concept of the archive also allows for consideration of texts on the veil 
not as separate entities, but as an ensemble or a relational web. The recurrent themes 
which emerge in relation to the veil remain the thread linking various texts produced 
through different times and spaces. As Said (1994, p. 59) pointed out, it is possible to 
‘reinterpret the Western cultural archive’ and do another reading and interpretation. 
My research aims to go beyond texts produced in a Western context to include texts of 
the veil from Arab and Muslim contexts which have been outside the canon. This body 
of literature constitutes a starting point for a comparative analysis which is not only 
transhistorical, but also transcultural and translational. I will deal with the issue of 
translation of the archive in a subsequent section.  
 
Within a postcolonial context, the archive offers a ground for a vision of the veil as an 
object whose image has long been tied with colonialism and otherness. Since my 
analysis builds on a combination of postcolonial Muslim and Islamic feminist 
epistemologies, the concept of ‘a veil archive’ presents us with a body of Orientalist, 
colonial and postcolonial texts on the veil, and an opportunity to examine its movement 
in history through its assigned meanings and associations. It is not my intention to 
provide a comprehensive analysis of this archive, which would be impossible for the 
scope of my research. Rather, my analysis focuses on some of the dominant meanings 
emerging from the archive which will be discussed in detail. More particularly, my 
study of these examples pays close attention to words and concepts circulating around 
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the veil and their effects. The texts, which are subject to scrutiny, have been selected 
as representative examples which focus on defining Islamic dress, and the associations, 
which have become an organising tool, help us understand ‘what the veil gets 
associated/linked/affiliated with’ through texts, times and spaces.  
 
More significant than a collection of texts, the concept of the archive within 
postcolonial studies has been linked with:  
 
the collectively imagined junction of all that was known and knowable, a 
fantastic representation of an epistemological master pattern, a virtual focal 
point for the heterogeneous local knowledge of metropolis and empire...The 
ordering of the world and its knowledges into a unified field was located 
explicitly in the register of representation. (Richards, 1993, p. 11) 
 
A veil archive becomes a unified field to the extent that it is located in the register of 
representation. My reading and interpretation of examples from the veil archive seeks 
to investigate the ‘collectively imagined junction’ of meanings attached to the veil and 
its representation, which is also a means of producing knowledge about and ‘ordering’ 
(Stoler, 2009, p. 20) 20 of the veil within defined and fixed parameters. My first reading 
of the archive constituted a preliminary step to identify the themes which later became 
the focus of my analysis. The subsequent division of the meanings attached to the veil 
into three key areas: political, sexual and ethical helped to categorise associations 
which formed both the focus of my study. I then focused on close reading (strategy of 
reading for associations and links), translation and editing of the archive material, 
followed by a textual analysis paying close attention to the linguistic features of the 
                                                 
20 In her study of the Dutch colonial archive, Ann Stoler (2009, p. 20) speaks about ‘the colonial order 
of things’ to refer to that which is seen through the record of archival productions. 
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material and the images around the veil. Although my study does not claim to provide 
a comprehensive investigation of all the associations of Islamic dress, it contributes to 
a more crosscultural crosshistorical study of Islamic dress and offers a consideration 
of how Orientalist and colonial modes of representation, some of which carry racial 
overtones, are still alive today. It is an attempt to question and unsettle essentialist 
constructions of the veil which posit the body of the Muslimah within otherness and 
difference not only in Western contexts (France and Orientalism), but also in Muslim 
contexts (Morocco and the Nahda).  
  
In his discussion of the British imperial archive, Richards (1993) links knowledge and 
representation with empire and archive-building. Similarly, in the case of the veil 
archive, we can think about the veil and its image through different texts and histories. 
While the veil represents a travelling entity, its meanings and associations present us 
with fixity and immobility in a way that the image of the veil becomes itself a ‘fixed 
place’ where the power to represent the veil parallels affixing it within meanings of 
otherness.  
 
The veil archive around which my research is based comprises texts starting from 
Orientalist and Nahda periods which coincided with the colonisation of different parts 
of the world and the colonial eras to the contemporary postcolonial times in which the 
media has become one of the most important vehicles for the circulation and 
dissemination of information and knowledge about different phenomena.  The archive 
is therefore linked with the generation of texts around the veil which cross boundaries 
of time and space in the construction of the veil as a symbol of otherness in the colonial 
and postcolonial eras. A veil archive is thus also a long history. Yet my work 
concentrates on examples from the Orientalist, Nahda and postcolonial texts ranging 
from literature to the print media and political documents.  
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I am interested in how the veil travels from Orientalist and Nahda eras to postcolonial 
times in postcolonial print media by carrying or sustaining associations. An archive is 
a kind of retainer. The circulation of these meanings and their persistence in the present 
texts demonstrates how the power of representation is important to the production and 
dissemination of the veil archive. What my research seeks to investigate are the links, 
connections and ‘junctions of meaning’ of the veil through a close textual analysis of 
specific examples. In an increasingly borderless and interconnected world, in which 
the ‘Islamic threat’ has become a focus of attention in both Muslim-majority and 
Muslim-minority contexts (Western secular and Arab secular states), it becomes 
politically important to think about how histories are preserved in or as archives.  
 
As I noted already, power often works by what Chandra Talpade Mohanty (1991) calls 
the ‘suppression of heterogeneity’. The focus of her own analysis is on the discursive 
production of ‘the third world woman.’ Said (1994, p. xiii) draws our attention to the 
‘power to narrate or to block other narratives from forming and emerging’ as an 
important aspect of culture and imperialism. My choice of Orientalist travel literature 
(and the Nahda writings from the Arab Muslim-majority countries) is related to the 
fact that these types of literature are affiliated and coincided with empire and 
colonisation. Similarly, the Nahda historically coincides with the colonial era in many 
Arab and Muslim countries. The Nahda and Moroccan texts additionally provide an 
opportunity to examine the archive beyond the Western Orientalist context to include 
a non-Western perspective on the veil through Arabic colonial and postcolonial texts 
from Morocco and Egypt. Although the Nahda was partly inspired by the colonial 
presence in various Middle Eastern and Maghrebi countries, and sought to adopt 
different concepts and ideas from Western countries, it nonetheless flourished in 
Muslim-majority countries and generated debates that have had an impact on these 
countries. In the second part of my research focusing on postcolonial texts, media texts 
produced in Morocco and France during the past decade constitute a starting point for 
a study of the veil archive examples in the postcolonial era. The comparative analysis 
includes France, a previous colonial power, and Morocco which was subjected to 
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French colonial rule up to 1956. In a similar vein, the Moroccan and French press 
present meanings and associations of the veil from the perspectives of two different 
postcolonial spaces.  
 
As far as data collection is concerned, Morocco and France have been the major 
sources for my archive of veil documents. For the French press, the Institut Français 
in Morocco was a starting point, followed by direct access to online material and 
databases for the French press and academia. The archive department of the IF also 
helped me access some resources from the French press. Regarding the Moroccan 
press, the archive section of the newspaper Al-Tajdid in Rabat was my starting point. 
The National Moroccan Library (Bibliotheque Nationale du Royaume du Maroc, 
BNRM) was also a significant source and step in my research for the collection of 
material for my study (especially in terms of postcolonial Maghrebi/ Arab feminism, 
and texts in Arabic and French). Various universities and centres in London also 
offered me access to important resources. The people I met during my research journey 
for the past few years in England, Morocco, Egypt and France also inspired me in many 
ways. An archive can be about how you find materials, as well as who you encounter 
along the way. 
My selection of material came primarily of thinking about audiences: I wanted to 
analyse texts that had a wide reach. As far as the French press and the hijab controversy 
are concerned, I chose to focus on examples of texts from three French weeklies which 
have some of the highest readership within the French mainstream press. Although I 
have limited my analysis to these three mainstream weeklies, I have chosen them as 
representative examples of texts that have focused on the hijab affair. Additionally, 
these weeklies have tended to devote more detailed accounts and opinion sections for 
the debate on the hijab affair. The interest of the Moroccan weeklies in the Islamic 
dress debate was also a criterion for their selection as sources of data for my study. 
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As Islamic dress remains a more problematic topic in a Muslim-majority country such 
as Morocco, the Moroccan weeklies which count the highest numbers of readership 
are also the ones that have addressed the debate more openly and directly. The 
Moroccan weeklies have also tended to address the issue of Islamic dress from a more 
liberal and secular perspective, which is worth reading in comparison with the French 
press weeklies. In contrast with the partisan press, the independent Moroccan press has 
devoted more issues to questions regarding Islam, secularism and women and has taken 
a more independent line in questioning definitions and practices of Islam. My choice 
of Tel Quel and Nichan as my two major sources is based on their obvious interest in 
issues pertaining to Islam and women in general and to Islamic dress particularly. Tel 
Quel is one of the most widely read Moroccan Francophone weeklies. Founded in 2001 
and defining itself as independent and private, Tel Quel advocates (in its ‘A Propos’) 
‘a diverse, plural, democratic and secular Morocco’. It is read by a Moroccan elite that 
can be considered literate, educated, urban and secular. All translations of the archival 
texts under study are mine unless otherwise stated. Tel Quel and Nichan share similar 
content and have the same publisher. Both advocate reconsidering religious values and 
practices in Morocco in relation to a secular model and present their publications as a 
part of a new independent Moroccan media. 
 
Regarding the Orientalist and Nahda texts, the choice of some of the Orientalists and 
Nahda intellectuals similarly rests on the importance they have given to the veil, among 
other Orientalists and Arab Nahda intellectuals. I have chosen texts from three 
Orientalist writers: Gerard de Nerval, Catherine Valerie Boissier (Countess de 
Gasparin) and George de Castellan and four Nahda intellectuals: Malak Hifni Nasif, 
Nazira Zain Din, Qasim Amin and Tahar Haddad. Although numerous studies have 
focused on Nerval, much less attention has been paid to works by Orientalists such as 
Boissier and Castellan. Although I have included Gerard de Nerval and Qasim Amine 
who have been subject to various studies, I have attempted to include more marginal 
female voices from the Nahda and Orientalism (Gasparin, Malak Hifni Nasif and 
Nazira Zain al-Din) who have previously been overlooked. This also applies for the 
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focus on the Moroccan print media which has been marginalised in academic studies. 
The texts which comprise my veil archive remain representative examples of 
discourses on the veil in both historical and more contemporary times. My focus on 
associations and the themes emerging from these texts in relation to Islamic dress 
represents the thread linking these various elements of the veil archive. After building 
a list of Orientalist tropes of the veil through the examples of three Orientalist figures, 
my reading of subsequent texts from the Nahda, the Moroccan and French press 
revealed a reiteration of these tropes, which I classified under political, sexual, and 
ethical associations of the veil. The similarities which emerged as I started analysing 
the primary data and texts was subsequently developed into a concentration on specific 
themes which at once became the main focus of my study. 
 
Approaching Texts 
My approach is to offer textual analysis; a close reading of how the veil comes up in a 
range of texts. I began with the Orientalist travel writing. The idea of ‘veil associations’ 
came from this initial period of research and became the main focus of my study. Close 
textual analysis of the archive also meant moving from Orientalist and colonial Nahda 
times and spaces to postcolonial and contemporary contexts. This has allowed me to 
examine how associations of the veil past and present compare with one another. 
Scrutinising the words, language and images through textual analysis has also allowed 
me to show how the associations of the veil have repeatedly constructed a veil 
difference, albeit in different ways, which has proved to renew itself within the new 
press and political discourses. My research has also enabled me to understand the 
difficulties and challenges of working across various socio-historical, transcultural and 
linguistic frameworks. The close comparative reading, re-reading, translating, editing 
and analysing of texts and case studies have all been part of the process which has 
opened a space for a critical look at contemporary modes of politicisation, racialisation 
and sexualisation of Islamic dress in the French and Moroccan contexts. The 
contemporary textual representations should be read as part of an ongoing and 
continuing process of ‘othering’ which my research seeks to question.  
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As an object of study, the veil can be researched in many ways. Contrary to works 
which have focused on defined historical periods and particular locations, or social and 
cultural settings for the study of female dress, my study offers a comparative textual 
analysis of the veil in the print media in France and Morocco. In other words, I explore 
Islamic dress not only through different historical periods, but also through various 
locations comprising the Maghreb (Morocco), and Mashreq (Egypt), and France. In 
following the veil through various texts in order to examine the different meanings and 
forms of knowledge attached to it, I pay close attention to the linguistic and textual 
aspects of discourse. Ann Stoler (2009, p. 36) in her work on the Dutch colonial archive 
usefully describes how we can attend ‘to the “words in their sites” and the conceptual 
weight they bear, the authority with which they are endowed’. By analysing the 
different meanings of Islamic dress across time and space, I also explore how words 
have their sites. This emphasises the importance of language and words in constructing 
meanings and understandings which become authoritative.   
 
In her study of woman in the Qur’an, Islamic feminist Amina Wadud (1999, p. xvii) 
critiques the inclination of the Islamic intellectual legacy to marginalise the views of 
women and make women as ‘subjects of male construction’ or subjects without 
agency. She uses the strategy of ‘what the Qur’an says, and how it says it, what is said 
about the Qur’an, and who is doing the saying, have been supplemented by a recent 
concern over what is left unsaid: the ellipses and silences’ (Wadud, 1999, p. xiii). In 
my research, I am similarly concerned with what the texts about the veil are saying, 
how they are saying it, but more importantly, I am interested in the things that are left 
‘unsaid’ and hence made implicit in the texts. My strategy for reading the texts 
therefore relies on drawing out some of the tacit references or on bringing them to the 
surface. Yet rather than focusing on ‘who is doing the saying’, my reading discuses 
both the explicit and more implicit or silenced and muted references and meanings 
attached to the dress through words. I also consider this reading to be part of what 
Wadud (1999, p. 1) refers to as: 
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the process of reviewing the words and their context in order to derive an 
understanding of the text. Every ‘reading’ reflects, in part, the intentions of the 
text, as well as the ‘prior text’ of the one who makes the ‘reading’. Although 
each reading is unique, the understanding of various readers of a single text will 
converge on many points. 
 
In reading texts from a veil archive, I am interested in this ‘process of reviewing words’ 
in their contexts so as to understand the texts, and how the veil associations come to 
be constructed through words and language. As Wadud (1999, p. 97) argues regarding 
the implications of individual words or word-groups, ‘words, particles, syntax...and 
contexts are all part of a multi-layered interpretation process’. There is a double aspect 
to producing associations of the veil in the texts in question: the meanings are 
conversely explicit and implicit.  
 
It is important to consider how the veil is positioned as the other: in other words, we 
need to describe the techniques of othering. We can return now to Said’s model of 
Orientalism which could be usefully understood as an explanation of how othering is 
achieved. Said (1994) considers texts not only as material productions, but also as 
representations which in turn depend on institutions and traditions, highlights the 
necessity to link representations of Islamic dress with broader bodies and 
establishments which contribute to constructing the veil: 
 
each work on the Orient affiliates itself with other works, with audiences, with 
institutions, with the Orient itself. The ensemble of relationships between 
works, audiences, and some particular aspects of the Orient therefore 
constitutes an analysable formation—for example, that of philological studies, 
of anthologies of extracts from Oriental literature, of travel books, of Oriental 
fantasies-whose presence in time, in discourse, in institutions (schools, 
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libraries, foreign services) gives it strength and authority (Said, 1994, p. 20) 
(emphasis in the original) 
 
I have approached the veil as one such analysable formation. Although I have confined 
myself to a few examples from each of the named eras and contexts, my critical 
analysis of texts enables me to scrutinise the veil archive in more detail, an initiative 
that would have been compromised with the choice of a wider body of texts. When 
following the veil through texts and various historical and cultural settings, I read for 
associations of the veil which are the focus of my study, following a reading of ‘words 
in their sites’ which I mentioned earlier. What brings the archive of texts and 
documents together in my research are the associations, and how these are linked with 
the dress through various texts. I have categorised these associations into four major 
areas: political, sexual, and ethical.21 My reading of texts is part of an attempt to read 
for resonance, repetition and reiteration. I track how the veil associations get adopted 
and updated in the more contemporary media. From a postcolonial Islamic pro-feminist 
(I borrow the term from Amina Wadud (1999)) standpoint, my study is part of a critical 
reading of discourses seeking to ‘otherise’ Islamic dress by positioning it within the 
scope of a political, sexual and ethical otherness in both Muslim-majority and Muslim-
minority contexts. Throughout my research, I take a critical stance regarding the textual 
manifestations of colonial discourse through scrutinising examples of these 
manifestations in different texts, and through a close reading of the words revolving 
around the veil. 
 
Translation 
                                                 
21My study does not claim to provide an exhaustive consideration of all the meanings attached to the 
veil. Rather I focus on these categories which seem to be predominant in the discourses of the veil past 
and present. 
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This project has relied upon translation. My work is situated at the crossroads of three 
languages (Arabic, French and English). Translation was crucial to the research 
process and is part of my methodology. In doing the difficult work of translation I not 
only brought different materials together, but I learnt from this difficult work about 
those materials. 
 
I have studied translation in its different forms (including legal, literary, and scientific), 
and I have practised and worked as a translator and interpreter in the three languages. 
Translation is thus part of my educational and professional background, as well as 
being one of my keen interests. Equally significant is my position as a multilingual 
person who grew up accustomed to hearing, speaking and reading in different 
languages which also positioned me in various world visions. Having additionally been 
raised in a country where languages were given importance at the educational level, I 
have developed a fascination and interest in words and languages from a very early 
age. In fact, since my primary school, I already felt a desire to pursue my fascination 
with words and language. While most of my classmates strove to excel in science and 
maths, I felt inclined to devote more time to reading, words and languages. My interest 
in languages led me to specialise in English for my undergraduate studies. My focus 
on language, however, also emanated from a family environment and social life where 
multilingualism were the norm rather than the exception. In my parents’ house, for 
instance, Moroccan Arabic, Amazigh and French are routinely mixed in conversations. 
Even personal letters to my French cousins which I took great care to write reflected 
that floating amidst different languages and different cultural frames of reference.  
 
During my research not only my primary material was translated from Arabic and 
French into English, but also some of my secondary sources and theories. My project 
therefore aims at making accessible some of the Arabic and French texts on the veil to 
an English-reading audience. Translation is a particular kind of work. Gayatri Spivak 
(1993) describes how the ‘labour of translation’ involves an ethical responsibility. My 
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research project was also a translation project; and this fact was key both to the ethics 
of my research and my personal ethics. Starting from classical Arabic, which represents 
a near-native language with Amazigh, French similarly occupies the position of a near-
native language, both of which I started learning from the age of five along with 
classical Arabic, in contrast to English which was later introduced in secondary school. 
The question I would like to consider is: how can my histories with languages impact 
on the translation process which forms a core element of my research? In other words, 
how does my position vis-a-vis these different languages affect the labour of translation 
in my research process?    
 
In order to consider such a question, I turn to Spivak and her comments on translating 
the literary works of Indian feminist Mahasweta Devi. In her preface to the translated 
novel, Spivak (1996, pp. 269-270) speaks about ‘something that has not got across’ in 
relation to the translation and profound engagement with a text/person, a concept 
which Spivak calls a ‘secret’. In her essay, Spivak (1996, p. 273) quotes JM Coetzee 
asserting that: 
 
It is in the nature of the literary work to present its translator with problems for 
which the perfect solution is impossible...There is never enough closeness for 
fit between languages for formal features of a work to be mapped across from 
one language to another without ‘shift of value’...Something must be ‘lost’; that 
is features embodying certain complexes of values must be replaced with 
features embodying different complexes of values in the target language. At 
such moments the translator chooses in accordance with his [sic] conception of 
the whole—there is no way of simply translating the words.  
 
Regarding my translation work, the focus of my study on the language disseminated 
around the veil was not accompanied with a straightforward translation of words from 
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source to target language. Rather this process was done through a close consideration 
of the meanings that such words communicated in their particular cultural frameworks 
of reference. The task of translation I faced, therefore, involved communicating these 
frames of reference which would be unknown in the target language. Although my 
research centres on words and language, the translation process made the task of 
researching the veil more complex. The task of translation introduced issues of cross-
cultural translation, and communicating the meanings of words and language which 
were often made implicit in texts. 
 
The veil archive examples which I use for my analysis comprise texts from Arabic, 
French and English. However, the primary material consists of French Orientalist 
literature, Arab Nahda writings, French media texts and Moroccan French and Arabic 
press. A great deal of time has been invested in translating and editing these texts into 
English. Arabic is a near-native language, French can be considered as my first foreign 
language, followed by English which occupies the position of a third foreign language. 
The challenges of translation into a second or third foreign language are supplemented 
by the task of travelling through different text genres and historical moments. This can 
be added to the position of English in my linguistic background as the last acquired 
foreign language after not only classical and Moroccan Arabic, but also French and 
Tachelhit (one of the local indigenous dialects of Berber). Regarding the task of 
translation, my position as a postcolonial Arabic-Amazigh native language speaker and 
translator has been further complicated by tackling not only Orientalist texts, but also 
postcolonial material and theory much of which was originally written in Arabic and 
French. As a postcolonial translator, I am inevitably influenced by my historical and 
cultural baggage that accompanies any translator faced with the task and challenges of 
translation. In addition to the significance of positionality, my experience and 
background therefore form an inseparable element from my experience as a translator 
of given texts. What is distinctive about my work is my attempt to introduce a cross-
cultural study of the veil, and my reading of these texts within a comparative 
framework. The ‘labour of translation’ discussed by Spivak (1993) has formed an 
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integral part of my research process as well as a significant tool in making some 
examples of the veil archive accessible.  
  
In addition to making Arabic and French texts more accessible, translation has allowed 
me to provide a comparative framework for the study of veil. Translation has further 
enabled me to travel through different texts, following the veil and its meanings across 
languages and worlds, working on Arabic Nahda texts in comparison with French 
Orientalist literature, and on French press texts in comparison with Moroccan Arabic 
and French media texts. Regarding the distinction between text and words in the 
context of translation, Paul Ricoeur (2006, p. 30) notes that: 
...it is texts, not sentences, not words, that our texts try to translate. And texts 
in turn are part of cultural groups through which different visions of the world 
are expressed, visions which moreover can confront each other within the same 
elementary system of phonological, lexical, syntactic division, to the extent of 
making what one calls the national or the community culture a network of 
visions of the world in secret or open competition. 
 
Although my analysis focuses on meanings of the veil in various texts and text genres, 
the process of translation involves the communication of texts and their translation. 
These texts are themselves associated with cultural aspects and what Ricoeur refers to 
as ‘visions of the world in secret or open competition’. Needless to say cultural 
translation has been an important part of the process across not only three different 
languages and cultural frameworks, but also worlds and worldviews. Translating from 
a non-Western (Arabic) to a Western (English) framework, and from a Western 
(French) to a Western (English) framework, emphasising issues of cultural baggage. 
Translation itself as a practice acquires importance in postcolonial studies. It becomes 
a tool for critically assessing colonial discourse and its various manifestations in the 
more contemporary times, and bridging gaps between different ‘worlds’, and between 
the colonial and the postcolonial through crossing spaces and times. 
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Translation additionally represents an important process within postcolonial studies. 
Homi Bhabha (1994) in his influential book, The Location of Culture discusses the 
relation between translation and ‘cultural untranslatability.’ He (Bhabha, 1994, p. 224) 
writes: 
 
This liminality of migrant experience is no less a transitional phenomenon than 
a translational one...the subject of cultural difference becomes a problem that 
Walter Benjamin has described as the irresolution, or liminality, of 
‘translation’, the element of resistance in the process of transformation, ‘that 
element in a translation which does not lend itself to translation’... The migrant 
culture of the ‘in-between’, the minority position, dramatizes the activity of 
culture’s untranslatabililty; and in so doing, it moves the question of culture’s 
appropriation beyond the assimilationist’s dream, or the racist’s nightmare, of 
a ‘full transmissal of subject-matter’, and towards an encounter with the 
ambivalent process of splitting and hybridity that marks the identification with 
culture’s difference. 
 
Bhabha here positions migrant experience not only as a transitional, but also a 
‘translational phenomenon’, thus equating migration with a form of translation, an ‘in-
between’ position contained within migrant life, as the ‘subject of cultural difference’. 
In Bhabha’s terms, the migrant culture and minority position ‘dramatizes the activity 
of culture’s untranslatability’.  
 
To relate this to my work, my experience as a postcolonial Muslimah writing and 
translating in a Western academic context represents a ‘translational phenomenon’ in 
a way that my in-between position as the subject of cultural difference constitutes ‘that 
element in translation which does not lend itself to translation’. Bhabha (1994, p. 225) 
87 of 347 
 
speaks about the ‘present of translation’ not as a ‘smooth transition, a consensual 
continuity, but the configuration of the disjunctive rewriting of the transcultural, 
migrant experience’. Translating texts from the veil archive has similarly not been a 
‘smooth’ operation. Rather, my experience as a minority, and the position of Arabic as 
a minority language have made the task of translation more challenging than 
continuous. A contrast can also be drawn between the discontinuity that characterises 
the translation process, and the continuity of otherness that the veil embodies within 
the veil archive. Bhabha (1994, pp. 226-227) again notes that: 
 
the ‘present’ of translation may not be a smooth transition, a consensual 
continuity, but the configuration of the disjunctive rewriting of the 
transcultural, migrant experience...To dream not of the past or present, nor the 
continuous present; it is not the nostalgic dream of tradition, nor the Utopian 
dream of modern progress; it is the dream of translation as ‘survival’ as Derrida 
translates the ‘time’ of Benjamin’s concept of the after-life of translation, as 
sur-vivre, the act /of living on the borderlines. 
 
In my work on the veil, reading, translating and interpreting veil texts from the archive 
has been an integral part of my experience as a ‘transcultural subject’ working within 
the orbit of three languages and ‘worlds’. The transition from one language and world 
to another, and more specifically from near-native languages to a non-native language 
has constituted an attempt to connect various culturally different and disparate aspects 
of my position as a Moroccan Arabic/Amazigh native speaker reading and translating 
from classical Arabic and French into English. In this sense, the process of translation 
can be equated with ‘survival’ as it also represents the fact of ‘living on the borderlines’ 
where the intervening space of translation can be paralleled with occupying what 
Bhabha calls an ‘empowering condition of hybridity’. 
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In the process of translating the material which constitutes the basis of my study of the 
veil, I would like to use Gayatri Spivak’s (1993, pp. 189-190) description of her 
translation of Mahasweta Devi’s works: 
 
The understanding of the task of the translator and the practice of the craft are 
related but different. Let me summarize how I work. At first I translate at speed. 
If I stop to think about what is happening to the English, if I assume an 
audience, if I take the intending subject as more than a springboard, I cannot 
jump in, I cannot surrender. My relationship with Devi is easygoing. I am able 
to say to her: I surrender to you in your writing, not to you as intending subject. 
There, in friendship, is another kind of surrender. Surrendering to the text in 
this way means, most of the time, being literal. When I have produced a version 
this way, I revise. I revise not in terms of a possible audience, but by the 
protocols of the thing in front of me, in a sort of English. And I keep hoping 
that the student in the classroom will not be able to think that the text is just a 
purveyor of social realism if it is translated with an eye toward the dynamic 
staging of language mimed in the revision by the rules of the in between 
discourse produced by a literalist surrender. 
 
To relate Spivak’s description to my work as a translator, the process of translating 
from Arabic and French to English must first involve what Spivak (1993, p. 183) refers 
to as ‘surrender’, a process through which the translator surrenders to the original text 
which often means ‘being literal’ and paying attention to the ‘rhetorical aspect’ of texts. 
One can describe such as process as yielding to the text and its words which are given 
equivalents in the target language, and letting oneself go with the original text. This 
means that the primary consideration during the first stage of the translation process is 
the textual stage, in which the translation transfers the textual component of the written 
word from the source language or languages to the target language. The major concern 
during this process of ‘surrender herself to the linguistic rhetoricity of the original text’ 
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(1993, p. 189) and the ‘writing’ is accuracy and precision. The distinction which 
Spivak draws between surrendering to the author in her writing rather than to the author 
as ‘intending subject’ is also relevant to the task of translation which I carry out 
throughout my research. In approaching different texts of the archive which belong to 
various registers and genres, the translation process of these texts is accompanied with 
a focus on texts rather than on ‘intending subjects’ or their actual authors. Just as my 
study of veil associations emphasises the important of words in constructing 
understandings of the dress through time and space, my translation of the archive 
material similarly stresses the significance of words and texts in the process of 
‘othering process’ to which the veil is subject. The movement of getting immersed in 
the text which results from the strategy of ‘surrender’ is part of this attempt to 
understand how and why words acquire such an importance in the translation process. 
 
The second stage following the ‘surrender’ consists of revising one’s translation in 
order to produce what Spivak (1993) calls ‘a sort of English’. Interestingly, considering 
that English is my fifth language by order of learning, my position as a postcolonial 
Muslimah translating into English texts that were originally written in Arabic and 
French highlights that the English language which I produce through translation can 
be considered as a ‘variety of English’. The process of translating, therefore, cannot 
stop at the literal level of the text in which the main concern is transferring the words 
from an original to a target text. It is in fact the revising and editing of translation which 
demands a higher focus and more time. The translation process and its politics 
therefore entails a consideration of the challenges posed by the act of translating from 
an Arab context to an English context, and from a French context to an English one. 
The movement which this process of translation brings is also the bridge which makes 
us cross space and time in the study of Islamic dress.  
 
In this chapter, I have reflected on the research process and the methodological tools I 
have employed in my study of Islamic dress. These have included a consideration of 
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the significance of the politics of location, the notion of the archive which I use for my 
study of the veil as an archive, on how I have approached texts within that archive, as 
well as the process of translation which has accompanied my research on the veil. It is 
now time to turn to the texts themselves.  
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 Orientalist Veils 
 
In this chapter I explore meanings of the veil in some nineteenth century French travel 
literature. First, I examine how the veil is tied with the notion of happiness. Secondly, 
I analyse how it is associated with imprisonment and enslavement. Third, I look at how 
the dress links with exoticism. The last section considers how the veil is affiliated with 
darkness. My aim in this and the next chapters is to provide a comparative study of the 
veil between the Orientalist and Nahda eras, both of which coincided with the 
colonisation of different countries, including Arab countries of the Middle East and the 
Maghreb. The Orientalist and Nahda chapters also offer a background for the later 
study of contemporary veil associations in France and Morocco. The key themes which 
I explore in the present and following chapters will be discussed in terms of how they 
link with the veil, which embodies otherness through notions such as happiness, sex 
and race, and how these can be used for ‘othering’. I ask the following questions in this 
chapter: what are the different meanings attached to the veil in Orientalist texts? How 
does the construction of the veil as an object of otherness operate in these texts?   
 
Why use the contrast between Orientalist and Nahda eras? I chose to conduct the 
analysis this way so I could also explore the connections between colonialism and 
Orientalism, and the role of French Orientalism in defining practices such as the veil. 
To lay the foundation for further research and build on already existing scholarship, it 
therefore seems essential to consider the veil in both Orientalist and Nahda texts, in 
order to better understand how and why the dress represents such a focal point of 
attention in the contemporary Moroccan and French print media. Additionally, a 
historical analysis of veil associations will enable us to understand how the histories of 
the veil are intertwined with the histories of Orientalism, the Nahda and colonialism 
as we follow its meanings through different texts and historical periods of the archive. 
The historical tropes of the veil will be compared with the more contemporary 
associations of Islamic dress in the Moroccan and French press and politics, which I 
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discuss in subsequent chapters. The themes I examine in this and the next chapter will 
provide points of comparison for meanings of the veil in the French and Moroccan 
press and politics. I am presenting my argument through key themes not only as a way 
of organising the material of the veil archive, but also because of the repetitions and 
resonances which I began to notice when working with these materials closely. So, for 
instance, I did not originally expect to be considering veils in relation to happiness, but 
was struck by how happiness came up in the texts themselves.    
 
The texts taken together are travel writings, and they travel through the veil. As a way 
of assembling and recording information, travel was usually found in societies with a 
high level of political power, as the traveller was ‘sustained by a nation and empire, 
not only militarily and economically, but also intellectually and spiritually’ (Kabbani, 
1986, p. 1). European travel narrative about the East, in particular, contained 
knowledge that served the ‘colonial vision’ (Kabbani, 1986, p.139). Muslim feminist 
Haideh Moghissi (1999, p. 13) argues that, although gendered practices and legal 
traditions are a ‘recurring theme in travellers’ tales, diplomats’ reports and the diaries 
of Europeans recruited by Middle Eastern states’, it is particularly after the colonial 
encounter that we discern in European scholarly and literary works of the ‘West’s 
inferiorizing gaze’. What does the language and words used to describe the veil tell us 
about the archive, its ‘colonial vision’ and ‘inferiorizing gaze’? Although women and 
Islam constituted a part of the European narrative of Islam early, they only appeared at 
the core of this narrative during the late nineteenth century's colonial rule in Muslim 
countries (Kabbani, 1986, p.150). This explains the importance of the Orientalist and 
Nahda time frames in defining the Muslimah, and more particularly the veil, through 
their different literatures.  
 
Unhappy Veils: ‘Miserable Conditions’ ‘Melancholic Expressions’ 
In this section, I analyse Orientalist associations of the veil with unhappiness during 
the nineteenth century. The examples of texts from Orientalist travel writing will be 
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read in conjunction with postcolonial and Muslim/Islamic feminist theories, with a 
focus on concepts pertaining to Orientalism and the representation of otherness through 
the veil.  Starting from Reina Lewis’s category of the ‘Orientalised’ as a classification 
meaning ‘racialised, gendered and classed’ (Lewis, 2004, p. 75) in Orientalist 
discourse, I focus on how associations of the veil in Orientalist and Nahda texts under 
study codify it in terms of happiness, sex and race.  As I noted in my introduction, I 
did not predict to study the veil through tropes of happiness and unhappiness but was 
surprised by how often they emerged. If Orientalism is a technique of ‘essentialising 
other cultures, people and geographical regions’ (Said, 1979, pp. 108-109), then I 
explore how and why happiness becomes a technique, that is to say how the veil 
becomes a signifier of the misery of others.  
 
How do Oriental texts associate veils with unhappiness? Countess de Gasparin22 
inscribes misery to the veiled woman. During travels with her husband to different 
parts of the Orient in the nineteenth century, Gasparin took great care in writing about 
the Muslim ‘veiled woman’. Writing about Turkish women in the harem, for instance, 
she notes how they are living under ‘miserable conditions’, yet expresses her surprise 
at them being endowed with ‘many modest values’ much needed by European women. 
During one of her trips to Turkey, she (Gasparin, 1985, pp. 557-558) portrays what she 
perceives as the harem confinement, a term which she equates with the veil:  
 
As for me, I am surprised that, being placed under such miserable conditions, 
covered in this idleness which is a form of demoralisation, deprived of duties 
                                                 
22 Valérie de Gasparin, Boissier (1813 – 1894) is the daughter of Jacques-Auguste Boissier, and Carole 
Butini.. She published Nouvelles in 1833, and Voyage d'une ignorante dans le midi de la France et l'Italie 
in 1835. The death of her mother in 1836 was followed by her involvement in the movement of Revival. 
Her works, both social and literary, carry a religious character, with more than eighty titles, including 
Le mariage du point de vue chrétien (1843) and Camille, her sole novel (1866), which was translated in 
English. In 1859 she created with her husband, l'école normale de gardes-malades à Lausanne, which 
later became La Source, the first independent secular school for nurses.  
http://www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/textes/f/F11123.php  
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that create energy, of tenderness that gives courage, of faith that explains 
existence and makes it bearable, I am surprised to find them (Turkish women) 
endowed with such calmness, such a sweet resignation, the restraint that is 
suitable, and with many of these modest virtues that we perhaps would have 
needed, we the strong women of Europe who are a bit too emancipated, a bit 
too determined, a bit too ‘good lad type’. 
 
In this example, the image of the veiled woman is that of deprivation: she is deprived 
of happiness, energy and life. It is due to the misery of her condition that Gasparin is 
surprised to find the women themselves to be ‘endowed with modest virtues.’ It is 
possibly the acceptance of her state which makes the fate of the veiled woman so 
miserable. In another chapter of her work entitled ‘Veiled Women’, Gasparin (1985, p. 
568) makes a more explicit reference to the veil, noting the ‘sadness’, ‘melancholic 
expression’ and ‘languishing eyes’ of the harem women. The veiled woman at this 
point is given the expression of misery; her condition is reflected in her eyes and facial 
expression. She (Gasparin, 1985, p.568) describes how she perceives veiled women of 
the Orient, and wonders:   
 
What sadness, indefinite wave, weighs on this sweet face, all the ladies keep 
the same melancholic expression. People speak of their happiness, they say that 
they spend their lives entertaining themselves; I only crossed languishing eyes. 
Not a single joyous laugh, neither from children nor from mothers comes to 
break the barely audible murmur of these harems in celebration, and when I ask 
Fatma if she goes every week to fresh water sites, she hesitates and answers: 
when the husband permits it. 
 
Here Gasparin explicitly refutes the views of unnamed ‘people’ that these women can 
be happy. She negates this view not only assuming she can read their generalised 
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expression of misery (‘cross languishing eyes’, ‘melancholic expression’) but from her 
own encounters with individual women. She assumes female obedience and restraint 
as a sign of unhappiness not only of a condition but with a condition. In the same text, 
Gasparin speaks explicitly of being deprived of happiness. She (Gasparin, 1985, p.568) 
notes: 
  
…there are concerns and pains under these charming figures that remain 
without light, as if the absence of happiness has tarnished them. One could well 
be the second, third, fourth or fifth spouse of an Effendi, this did not prevent 
her from giving him all her heart. In the absolute emptiness that life in the 
harem creates...when the earth deprives you of happiness, and the sky itself 
does not hold any definite hope for you? 
 
Surprise is a word repeatedly mentioned by Gasparin in her writing about veiled 
women and the harem. In The Promise of Happiness (2010, p. 125), Sara Ahmed shows 
how empire is justified as a ‘happiness mission’, carried out by the coloniser to save 
others from their state of misery. We can certainly see how European women, 
including Gasparin herself, make happiness into a mission: she must save veiled 
women from their state of misery. Unveiling the Muslim woman therefore becomes a 
happiness mission, unveiling as making happy.  
 
It is important to consider how gender equality becomes tied to an idea of happiness. 
Countess de Gasparin also provides descriptions of the equality women enjoy in 
Europe, while ignoring the boredom, frustration and unhappiness which many women 
like her suffered in their own societies (Mabro, 1991, p. 11). The image of the harem 
woman ‘covered in idleness’ refers not only to the assumed laziness and inaction 
attributed to the harem life, but also to the veil that presents the most visible sign of 
the difference between the veiled woman and the her European counterpart. Although 
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the explicit reference is to the harem, the implicit reference is to the veil as the material 
or cloth of idleness, and how the veiled woman becomes clothed by her condition. The 
image of the veil’s idleness also communicates the idea of fixity and stillness of the 
veil, and through the veil, of the oriental woman herself. 
 
In addition, idleness of the harem is equated with ‘a form of demoralisation’, a term 
which evokes not only sadness and unhappiness, but also depression and annihilation 
tacitly caused by the veil. The Turkish woman described by Gasparin is ‘covered’ not 
only by the harem and its idleness, but also by ‘demoralisation’ and the veil which is a 
more direct and concrete form of cover. We can speak about a physical or material 
veil, a spatial veil in the form of the harem, and an emotional or affective veil. The 
word used in the original French text to refer to the veil is ’enveloped’ which is 
synonymous with ‘covered’, and implicitly refers to the veil that unsettles Countess de 
Gasparin who seems to forget that the veil has been practiced in Christianity and 
Judaism for centuries (Tillion, 1983, p. 163).23 Moreover, even today, Mary the Virgin 
is always represented veiled and the veil has been an integral part of Christianity. 
Whether in the rural or urban areas, it has been obligatory to enter the Church with 
one’s head covered, in accordance with prescriptions of the New Testament (Baubérot, 
2004, p. 11). So it is only some veils or covering that become identified with idleness 
and unhappiness.  My analysis has already implied a connection between a happiness 
mission and a life mission. By contrast, the veil is dark, and is associated with death 
and extinction. These distinctions are affective.   
 
                                                 
23 In her study of women in the Mediterranean area, Germaine Tillion (1983) provides useful examples 
of veiling in countries (comprising Spain, France, Italy, Greece and Cyprus and Christian Lebanon). 
Regarding veiling in Christianity, she refers to Saint-Paul’s statement that women’s veil in Christianity 
symbolises their subjugation to men, as it was mentioned in the Corinthians of Saint Paul. See also 
Fadwa el Guindi (1999), Leila Ahmed (1992) and Billie Melman (1995). 
97 of 347 
 
The associations made between the veil of the Oriental woman and negative qualities 
contrast it with the positive attributes linked with the European woman. In this 
comparison, the veil implicitly stands as the boundary distinguishing and separating 
the Oriental woman and her European or Western counterpart. Portrayed as a major 
source of unhappiness, the veil marks the difference between misery and happiness, 
faith and non-faith, emancipation and submission, feminism and non-feminism, thus 
embodying an antithetical relationship to everything that is European. This is an 
instance of how the veil creates an ‘essential difference’ (which I referred to earlier in 
relation to the European subject) of the ‘emancipated’ women like Gasparin. Her 
examples show how this ‘essential difference’ of the veil becomes affective as the 
garment represents a source of mixed feelings for the European gaze. Surprise, 
admiration and horror seem to define the carrier of the ‘happiness mission’ as the veil 
becomes a trigger for mixed and contradictory feelings.   
 
The oriental woman is figured as lacking what the liberated European woman has. 
Postcolonial feminist Chandra Talpade Mohanty (2003) examines the production of 
the image of what she refers to as an ‘average third-world woman’. Such women are 
constructed as living lives that are ‘sexually constrained’ (Mohanty, 2003, p.52-53). 
Her status is coded as ‘poor, ignorant, uneducated, tradition-bound, religious, etc’, a 
figure which contrasts with the self-representation of Western women as ‘free, 
educated, modern and having control over their bodies and sexualities’ (Mohanty, 
2003, p.52-53). We can now also show how unhappiness and happiness participate in 
this distinction. While the categorisation of writings such as Gasparin’s as ‘feminist’ 
remains open to question, the imagined feminist agenda, which Gasparin exemplifies, 
endorses the Orientalist and later colonial narrative contrasting the ‘Oriental woman’ 
with her European counterpart through equating veiling with unhappiness and 
constraint and unveiling with happiness and liberation.  
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Just these small examples of how veiled woman are described as miserable participate 
in a broader discourse of Orientalism, which gives a collective notion of Europeans 
against others, and the idea of European identity as superior in comparison with non-
European culture and people (Said, 1979, p.7). These binary oppositions were often 
used to justify imperial control of the ‘uncivilised Orient’.  Such scripts of cultural 
superiority can also become feminist scripts. Muslim feminist Sherene Razack (1998, 
p. 6) notes in her contemporary study of racism and sexism in courts and classrooms, 
narratives of Western superiority often meet up with a ‘Western feminist script’ 
whereby African and Asian women are depicted as victims of their cultures, when 
European women can haste to save them, affirming their own ‘positional superiority’. 
In Gasparin’s examples, the contrast drawn between the European woman and the 
veiled woman also relies on an assumed superiority whereby Gasparin justifies the 
need to civilise the Oriental woman and save her from unhappiness. She also repeatedly 
makes reference in her writing to the mission of European women as bringing meaning 
to the existence of women who are said to have lost all ‘hope’. The constructed image 
is that of a ‘miserable Muslim woman’ in need to be saved by her European counterpart 
whose mission acquires a spiritual level (namely of converting the Muslim woman to 
Christianity) as well as an emotional dimension (releasing her from her miserable 
condition). Additionally, happiness as a mission is coupled with conversion as another 
mission to which the veiled woman becomes a target. Connecting happiness not only 
with unveiling but also with converting to Christianity further posits the European 
woman as the bearer of civilisation and happiness through conversion. Converting to 
Christianity thus becomes equated not only with a ‘happiness mission’ but also with a 
‘happiness conversion.’  
  
The image of the secluded veiled Oriental Muslim has been a source of fascination to 
the West for many centuries (Lewis & Mills, 2003, p. 15). The examples from Gasparin 
illustrate this fascination. Yet, associating the Muslim woman’s veil with unhappiness 
demonstrates how feelings about the Oriental woman are ambivalent ‘fluctuating 
between desire, pity, contempt and outrage’ (Kabbani, 1986, p.26). Gasparin’s 
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examples mainly portray the veil as an object of unhappiness, thereby emphasising the 
pity and outrage which characterises her depiction of the veil.  
 
Oppressive Veils: ‘Enslaving Harems’24 and ‘Prison Hoods’  
In this section, I look at how Orientalist texts associate the veil with seclusion, 
oppression, inferiority and imprisonment. In the first part, I tackle meanings of the veil 
with the institutions of veil-harem-polygamy and the inscription of the veil within 
seclusion and oppression.  
 
In her anthropological analysis of the institutions of the veil-harem-polygamy, Muslim 
feminist anthropologist Fadwa El-Guindi (1999, p. 3)argues that, from a feminist 
perspective, this complex set of institutions is considered a direct expression of 
women's oppression through the ages. Islam was regarded as inherently and 
permanently oppressive to women and customs such as the veil and segregation 
embodied that oppression (Ahmed, 2003, p. 43). Western-ideology feminists (in both 
East and West) have dominated the discourse on the veil, viewing it as patriarchal: as 
a sign of women's ‘backwardness, subordination, and oppression’, thereby reducing its 
long and complex history to a ‘fixed thing’. (El Guindi, 1999, p.3). More generally, the 
category of ‘woman’ undergoes a significant amount of homogenisation that often 
overlooks not only considerations such as gender, class and culture, but also religion 
and race. As Mohanty (2003, p.53) reminds us, ‘women are characterised as a singular 
group on the basis of a shared oppression and what binds (them) together is a 
sociological notion of the ‘sameness’ of their oppression. These postcolonial and 
                                                 
24 Fadwa el Guindi (1999, p. 25) notes the sacred aspect embedded in the concept of harem ‘from the 
Arabic term harim, the notion of haram means sacred. Both harim and (the Turkish term) haramlik refer 
to the women of a household and to women’s quarters, as opposed to guest (and men’s) quarters, which 
are called salamlik. 
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Muslim feminist studies represent a valuable starting for a consideration of the veil in 
Orientalist texts.  
 
Despite the great cultural diversity in the practice of veiling, one particularly 
widespread phenomenon is Western reaction to it (Hirschmann, 1998, p. 349). In 
addition to feminists, non-feminists frequently assume that it is an inherently 
oppressive practice through which women are brainwashed or coerced to wear the veil 
as a key emblem of this oppression (Hirschmann, 1998, p.349). The central 
significance of the veil in European representations of oriental society arises not only 
from its role as the most public and visible signifier of ‘radical sexual segregation’, but 
also as the major symbol of the ‘essential inferiority’ of Islamic societies (Macmaster 
& Lewis, 1998, p. 121). In texts, paintings and photographs, the image of the veil is 
deliberately placed to ‘signify a much wider field of religious, social and cultural 
practices which include the purdah, harem, polygamy, and a repressive political order 
based on ‘the subjugation of women, Oriental despotism, sadism and lasciviousness’ 
(Macmaster & Lewis, 1998, p. 121). These additional studies highlight the links 
between the veil and the harem and concepts such as oppression, segregation and 
polygamy.  
 
In the Orientalist discourse, the harem represents a polygamous realm which includes 
different forms of tyranny, excess and perversion (Lewis, 2004, p.182). During the 
colonial era, the Muslim woman is subject to a discourse that stresses her victimisation 
(Bessis, 2007, p. 35). The veil often signified oppression through being associated with 
other practices such as the harem and polygamy. Take for example the following 
statement made by Countess de Gasparin (1985, p. 630) when writing about ‘Arab 
women’ in relation to the harem: 
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Living for one man and with one thought inside their apartments, spending the 
day on the divan knotting their hair, graciously disposing of the considerable 
amount of jewellery that they wear, breathing the fresh air of the mountains or 
the sea from the top of a terrace or through a window covered with wire mesh, 
walking a few steps under orange and pomegranate trees in a small garden, in 
order to dream at a side of a pond animated by the murmur of splashing water, 
healing the people in the household, making the bread dough with their own 
hands, sorbets, jams, going once a week to spend the day in the public bath 
accompanied by all the young women of the town, and singing some stanzas of 
Arab poets accompanied with a guitar: here is all that the Orient life amounts 
to for women. 
 
This example summarises in an effective way the vision of the Oriental woman: forced 
to live for one man (in an earlier example, Gasparin notes the unhappiness of the 
Muslim woman who may be the ‘fifth spouse’), the Arab woman is secluded in the 
harem, with ‘wire mesh’ confirming her imprisonment.25 Confinement in the 
apartments exposes her to the emptiness and idleness of harem life, in which women 
allegedly only occupy themselves with their hair and jewellery. When she ventures out, 
she is still confined to the terrace or the window, or the garden where she can walk ‘a 
few steps’. On the whole, the place of this woman is the household and her life is 
restricted to the domestic sphere (Mernissi, 1998, p. 14). The occasional public bath 
ritual only puts her in another confined place, and her singing a few poem stanzas does 
not change her situation. The last phrase marks a dramatic statement: ‘all the oriental 
life amounts to.’  We can see how she reduces life for Oriental women in how she 
describes that life as reduced. 
                                                 
25 Muslim feminist Haideh Moghissi points that both the condemnation of Islamic treatment of women 
and the recurring indulgence of ‘signifier of female enslavement’ (harem, veil, polygamy) contributed 
to ‘obscure and legitimise sexual and cultural repression of women in Europe, their non-person status 
and the sexual double standard’. (Moghissi, 1999, p.16.) 
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In the section entitled ‘Veiled Women’, Gasparin further describes her feelings and 
sympathies for the victimised Oriental women. Her depictions abound with negative 
feelings and conditions of life that she associates with the veil-harem-polygamy 
institutions. In her example, the charming features of the veiled women, that repeat the 
Orientalist trope of exotic beauty and will be investigated in more detail later, are 
contrasted with ‘concerns and pains’ which are associated with the harem. This 
strikingly contrasts with some Muslim feminists’ definition of the harem as a space 
where women sometimes exercised their power. Regarding the harem, Leila Ahmed 
(1992, p. 84.) states that despite the fact that women did not have much power over 
their sexual, psychological and emotional lives, some elite women ‘did command 
fortunes and consequently did have power over the lives of some men and women’. 
Nashat and Tucker (1999, pp. 84-85) additionally assert that, although female seclusion 
and sexual segregation permeated the Middle East during the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, women were not completely closed off from political power and 
possessed multiple ways in which they could influence power relations.  
 
The sadness to which Gasparin refers is also implicitly caused by polygamy which 
victimises the ‘Oriental woman’. Ironically, Gasparin refers to the woman as the ‘fifth 
spouse’ of an effendi.  Added to this sadness is the presumed emptiness of the harem 
that constitutes another cause of victimisation of these women. She is not only subject 
to and forced into a polygamous marriage, but also into confinement in the harem, and 
into ‘relative ignorance’. In contrast to the absolute ignorance mentioned in other 
examples, Gasparin links the veiled woman only to ‘relative ignorance’, hence 
attributing some knowledge to her.  
 
All this summarises the ‘horror’ in which this woman is living, with no hope of being 
saved either by the ‘sky’ or by her ‘Christian woman’. Ironically, despite the fact that 
veiling and seclusion have been practiced in other cultures, the idea here is that it is 
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exclusive to ‘Oriental women’ who happen to be Muslim.26 The veil, which is 
symbolised by the harem and represents an extension of the practice, is thus confined 
to the frontiers of Islam. Concerning seclusion and polygamy, which were key to the 
dominant Orientalist fantasy, Reina Lewis notes that, by the last decades of the 
Ottoman Empire, both practices became almost completely associated with Islam in 
the Western imaginary, and the harem was conceived as ‘essentially and unavoidably 
polygamous’ (Lewis, 2004, p. 98-99). However, the veil precedes Arabs and Islam (El 
Khayat-Bennai, 1987, pp. 24-25). Ironically, such concepts as female domesticity, 
sexual purity and chastity were considered appropriate in Europe in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, and were resolutely promoted at home, while for Muslim women 
it was presented as ‘evidence of sexual slavery’ as well as signs of a ‘peculiar moral 
and religious deficiency of the other’ (Moghissi, 1999, p.15). If we look closely at the 
language used, a range of terms situate the veil in the realm of darkness, ignorance and 
even savagery and barbarity, which all implicitly contrast with the European woman’s 
enlightenment, knowledge and civilisation. These associations will be investigated 
further in this chapter.  
 
We could usefully describe these styles of representation of the veil in terms of 
objectification. In her work on the representations of ‘third-world women’, 
postcolonial feminist Mohanty (2003, p.54) argues that the mode of defining women 
primarily in terms of their object status is what characterises the use of ‘women’ as a 
category of analysis. This objectification process is what Gasparin’s example 
illustrates through the veiled woman. She summarises the life of the Oriental woman 
in terms of her object status and victimisation. Not only is the Muslim and Arab woman 
a victim of the veil, she is also a victim of the harem and polygamy, which are regarded 
                                                 
26 Leila Ahmed (1992, p. 18) argues ‘During the first Christian centuries the notion of women’s seclusion 
[...] together with veiling and attitudes about the proper invisibility of women, became features of upper-
class life in the Mediterranean Middle East, Iraq and Persia [...] Widespread by the early Christian era, 
they did not emanate (as is often suggested) solely from the Persian world but seem rather to represent 
a coalescence of similar attitudes and practices originating within patriarchal cultures of the region.  
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as extensions of the veiling practice. These institutions grouped together define her 
oppression and inferiority. Therefore, Gasparin contributes to the Orientalist discourse 
that seeks to assert the ‘objectification’ of the Muslim woman, which also implicitly 
contributes to confirming the subject position of the Western/European subject. In his 
study of Orientalism, Said refers to the ‘objectification’ of the Orient. He states that 
the Orient [is considered] as an ‘object’ of study, fixed with an otherness, will be 
‘passive, non-participating, endowed with a historical subjectivity, above all, non-
active, non-autonomous, non-sovereign with regard to itself’ (Said, 1979, p.97). As 
shown in the examples, in the more particular discourse on the veil, the Muslim woman 
is ‘othered’ in a way that makes her victim of many institutions (veil-harem-
polygamy), positioning her as an oppressed, inferior and backward being defined by 
others. The fixed character assigned to the veil in the Orientalist tradition bears not 
only a confinement in relation to space which the harem and the material veil embody, 
but also in terms of a time which marks a difference with the European, emancipated 
and enlightened subject. This helps to define the veiled woman as an object fixed in 
time and space.  
 
Some Orientalist texts also associate the veil with slavery, imprisonment and the 
absence of freedom. Nerval’s27 description of the ‘Oriental woman’ displays an 
equivocal stance towards the veil in this respect (Nerval, 1985, p. 859):   
 
                                                 
27 Gérard de Nerval, of his real name Gérard Labrunie, is a French poet. He is the son of a doctor who 
had served in the Grand Army, and particularly in the Russian campaign. He began his literary career 
with a translation of Goethe's Faust. His unsuccessful love experience with Jenny Colon, and her 
subsequent death plunged him into the most violent despair. During this time, he travelled to Italy, then 
to Germany, Holland and the Orient. Since 1841, he suffered from madness, but recovered. For ten years 
he continued to write books, and in newspapers and magazines, including La Presse where he wrote 
with Théophile Gautier. In 1855, his body was found hanging from the bars of a gate leading to the Place 
du Chatelet. His literary works include Slylvie, Aurelia and les Filles du Feu. (Encyclopedie de l’Agora) 
http://agora.qc.ca/Dossiers/Gerard_de_Nerval ) 
105 of 347 
 
...we feel the need to interrogate the eyes of the veiled Egyptian woman, and 
this is the most dangerous thing. The mask is composed of a thin and long piece 
of black mane that stretches from head to feet, and pierced with two holes like 
the hood of a prisoner, a few glittering rings are made to slide in the space 
joining the forehead to the beard of the mask, and it is behind this barrier that 
passionate eyes await you, armed with all the seductions that they can borrow 
from art.   
 
The focus in Nerval’s example lies on the eye, the only visible body part that the veil 
reveals. The veil itself is synonymous with a prison, much like the harem is equated 
with a prison in which the Oriental woman remains confined. The veil in this type of 
discourse is an expression of women’s oppression, and the veiled woman is defined as 
a victim of the veil. Yet despite this visual barrier, the Western traveller still sees an 
item through which he can fantasise and exteriorise his desire. The urge to interrogate 
the eyes involves a ‘danger’ which is also an urge to unveil this woman and strip the 
veil placing a barrier between her and the ‘Western eye’. The verb ‘to interrogate’ also 
carries the connotation of the prison guard as the Western man becomes complicit in 
the imprisonment. The viewer is tempted to see ‘behind this barrier’. Although he can 
only see the eyes of the veiled woman, this does not block Nerval from presenting the 
veil paradoxically as a symbol of confinement and seclusion through the expression 
‘hood of a prisoner’, and a sign of seduction and ‘oriental beauty’ with ‘glittering 
rings’, ‘ardent eyes and seductions’.  
 
This can be considered as an instance of a ‘dual paradigm’ emphasising the 
representation of the veil within oppression and confinement on the one hand, and with 
seduction and sexuality on the other. Muslim feminist Malika Mehdid (1993, p. 26) 
notes how popular myths of the Arab female seem to have revolved around dual 
paradigms, hovering between the image of a ‘silent beast of burden’, that of a 
‘capricious princess, half naked odalisque or the shapeless figure of a woman wearing 
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the veil’ in Mehdid’s words. The Arab female who goes through the process of 
orientalisation becomes a ‘nebulous creature [...]enduring and universal, devoid of 
depth and deprived of historicity and a consciousness’ (Mehdid, 1993, p.26). Nerval’s 
veil thus fluctuates between its representation as a ‘sexual object’ and an ‘object of 
oppression’, thereby emphasising its ambivalence. The association of the oriental veil 
with danger further positions it within a sexual threat that remains open to the Western 
subject. 
 
Interestingly, this section is entitled ‘Mask and Veil’, building a dichotomous vision of 
the veil as both a confining and exotic device, or as an element of both mystery and 
threat. The use of the word ‘mask’ itself is suggestive, connoting disguise and 
concealment on the one hand, and obscurity on the other. Nerval’s mixed meanings 
attributed to the Egyptian veil therefore reiterate its Orientalist depiction as a sign of 
oppression and victimisation of the oriental woman. However, going beyond the 
‘objectification’ of the veiled woman and the reduction of the veil to the oppression 
and inferiority of Muslim women and Oriental societies, his depiction of the Egyptian 
veil marks a definition of the veil within an otherness that oscillates between 
oppression and an active sexual threat on the other. The sexualisation of the veil within 
these terms complicates its dominant association with oppression and inferiority which 
are commonly linked with the Orientalist discourse. 
 
We could think more about how the veil becomes imagined as a prison. In his book 
The Colonial Harem, Malek Alloula’s (1986) postcolonial reading of Orientalist cards 
points out that the veil of the Algerian woman during colonisation is also perceived as 
a type of ‘perfect and generalised mask’ that constitutes the everyday ‘uniform and 
instils uniformity for the French colonial photographer’ (Alloula, 1986, p.11). The 
expression ‘hood of the prisoner’ can be paralleled to the recurrent theme of 
imprisonment. The idea that women are inaccessible to sight by being veiled is linked 
with their imprisonment, equating veiling with imprisonment (Alloula, 1986, p.21). In 
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her study of the veil and Orientalism, postcolonial feminist Meyda Yegenoglu (2003, 
p. 547) argues that it is believed the veil is hiding something behind it, a ‘knowledge 
that is kept secret’. The veil thus becomes for Yegenoglu ambivalent: what is revealed, 
what is hidden. Nerval’s account of the veil is likewise ambivalent. The veil is an object 
of danger and threat. However, the veil is also a source of seduction and attraction as 
the expressions ‘passionate eyes’ and ‘seductions’ connote. The word ‘brightened’ 
reiterates the reference to light which paradoxically stands behind the barrier that the 
imprisonment veil hampers. The link between the mask/veil and the ‘black mane’ in 
Nerval’s text, which refers to thick long hair, also suggests the growth of animal hair, 
positioning the veil and the Oriental woman within sub-human parameters. Not only 
does the veil present a mask which may possibly be hiding the ‘truth’ of the woman, 
but it also associates her with a prisoner. The combination of the expressions ‘mask’, 
‘mane’, ‘prisoner hood’, and ‘barrier’ position the veil within associations of 
deception, imprisonment and animal-like state, thus de-humanising the veil. 
 
Exotic Veils: ‘Coquettish Nuns’, ‘Frail’ and ‘Muslin Veils’ 
After illustrating how the veil is associated with imprisonment and enslavement, I 
discuss examples of how the dress is portrayed as an emblem of exoticism. This section 
therefore looks at associations of the veil with exoticism and eroticism in Orientalist 
texts through examples of texts from Nerval, Castellan and Gasparin.  
 
In his travels to the Orient in the nineteenth century, for instance, Gerard de Nerval 
(1985, p.858) describes his experience of a traveller discovering the city of Cairo: 
 
Cairo is the city of the Orient where women are still the most hermetically 
veiled. In Constantinople and Smyrna, a white or black gauze sometimes allows 
us to get a glimpse of the features of the beautiful Muslim women, and the most 
rigorous orders rarely succeed in thickening this frail material. These are 
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gracious and coquettish nuns who devote themselves to one spouse, and who 
are nonetheless not sorry for causing unhappiness to the world. Yet Egypt, 
serious and pious, is always the country of enigmas and mysteries, beauty 
encircles it, as it did in the past, with veils and bandages, and this dark attitude 
easily discourages the frivolous European man. 
 
In this example, the expression ‘hermetically veiled’ implies a tightly sealed item 
which prevents the European subject from seeing the veiled woman. If we link the term 
hermetic to its original meaning, the veil can be read as also preventing access to air 
and water, which are the basic elements for life.  The veil is, therefore, implicitly 
associated with death and seclusion through the figure of the ‘hermit’.  
 
The veil is understood as a form of withdrawal. Malek Alloula notes how the veil 
constitutes the origin of the coloniser’s initial ‘experience of disappointment and 
rejection’ when the Algerian woman discourages the ‘scopic desire’ of the 
photographer; the photographer faces three types of rejection: rejection of his desire, 
the practice of his photography as well as his place in an environment to which he does 
not belong (Alloula, 1986, p.7). In her study, Yegenoglu discusses the depiction of the 
veil as a mask hiding woman. She states that the ‘opaque veil’ is often represented as 
a type of mask hiding the woman and turning her into an enigma, and that this type of 
discursive construction presumes that the ‘real nature of these women is concealed, 
their truth is disguised and they appear in a false, deceptive manner’ (Yegenoglu, 2003, 
p.547). If we apply this description to the Orientalist example, it becomes clear how 
the veil, which Nerval also ties to ‘masks’ in the title of his chapter, represents both an 
element of exotic beauty, grace and coquetry, and a sign of mystery, enigma and death 
at once. In contrast to the enigmatic veil to which he refers earlier, the veil in 
Constantinople and Smyrna allows a glimpse of the features of Muslim women. It 
moves from being a symbol of mystery and enigma to being synonymous with beauty, 
exoticism and sexual attraction.  
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The veiled woman in the example reminds us of the odalisque, the most important 
symbol in the harem, filling it with a ‘presence that is at once mysterious and luminous’ 
as she is ‘hidden yet available, core, always throbbing with restrained sensuality’ 
(Alloula, 1986, p.74). The veiled women of Constantinople and Smyrna are equated 
with nuns, but they are somewhat different. Although the religious aspect of the veil is 
mentioned through the analogy with nuns, it is also a symbol of grace and coquetry 
and is linked with sexuality and attraction. The image of enigma and mystery is 
extended to Egypt through ‘veils and bandages’ as well as ‘enigma and mystery’.  
 
Nerval associates the veil with coquetry and playfulness by contrasting the 
‘hermetically veiled’ women of Cairo with the ‘lighter’ veils of women in 
Constantinople and Smyrna. On the one hand, the veil figures as a source of seduction 
and oriental sexuality, and on the other a source of concealment and mystery. These 
meanings can all be derived from the attributes used to describe the veiled women who 
are once well-mannered, and sophisticated (and possibly even humane as the word 
‘gracious’ implies), or stern, dark and dangerous beings as implied by words such as 
‘serious’ ,‘bandages’, ‘enigmas and mysteries’ and ‘gloomy’. This woman can also 
paradoxically be seductive as the expression ‘coquettish nuns’ denotes, or even weak 
and vulnerable as is implied through the term ‘frail’. The adverb ‘hermetically’ also 
conveys the idea that the veil is darker on the one hand, and obscure and difficult to 
understand on the other hand. It therefore comes as no surprise that the word ‘gracious’ 
is ironically used with the word ‘nuns’, implying that civilisation and sophistication 
are perhaps attainable only through embracing Christianity. Although Nerval does not 
directly refer to the ‘civilising mission’ of bringing Christianity to the oriental woman, 
the use of positive attributes in relation to nuns may be part of a ‘civilising mission’. 
This can however be reversed through the use of the term ‘coquettish’, which implies 
seduction and sexuality which are attributed to the Muslim veil. 
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In the example, the veil is equated with ‘beauty’ and ‘coquetry’. The veiled Egyptian 
women whom he calls ‘nuns’, discourage the ‘frivolous European man’. He contrasts 
what he refers to as the ‘serious and pious Egypt’ with ‘enigma’ and ‘mystery’ attached 
to ‘veils and bandages’. On the one hand, Nerval attributes a religious aspect to the 
Egyptian veil through the use of the word ‘nuns’, a characteristic which he extends to 
Egypt as being ‘pious’ and ‘serious’. On the other hand, he associates the veil with 
mystery. Only allowing the sight of the eye, the veil is perceived as a ‘means to reveal 
charms’. At this point, the veil stops being a religious symbol and a sign of piety. The 
coquetry which he attributes to Egyptian women is what ‘defies the forbidden’ and 
‘excites desire’. These expressions and images position the veil within sexual attributes 
which are implicitly contrasted with piety. The sexualisation of the veil in this type of 
Orientalist discourse frames the dress within non-religious terms, away from a 
religious practice and a sign of piety.  
 
This construction of sexualised veils is common in Orientalist writings. Castellan28, for 
instance, writes the veil as a symbol of the Turkish exotic Orient (Castellan, 1985, p. 
442): 
 
We cannot better determine the beauty of women in these places than when we 
meet them in the streets, as they are also covered with a large feretgé, and their 
head is encircled many times with a muslin veil, which only allows the sight of 
the eyes, yet the coquetry, which is more powerful than fear in all countries, 
                                                 
28 Antoine Laurent Castellan (1772-1838) was a French painter, traveller, man of letters and a famous 
engraver. He was born in Montpelier in 1772. After his studies in landscape painting under 
Valenciennes, he visited Turkey, Greece, Italy and Switzerland, and published several series of letters 
on his trips. These letters were illustrated with views drawn and engraved by himself. His best known 
work is his book Moeurs, Usages et Costumes des Othomans which was published in 1812, and which 
was highly praised by Lord Byron. Castellan was also the inventor of a new process of painting in wax. 
He died in Paris in 1838.  https://archive.org/details/cu31924092716962  
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defies the forbidden, excites desire, and designates to women the means to 
reveal their charms.  
 
In Castellan’s example, the veil is likewise equated with exoticism and ‘oriental 
beauty’. Rather than being represented as a victim, the ‘oriental woman’ ‘defies the 
forbidden’, ‘exciting desire’, revealing her charms through the veil, hence becoming 
active rather than passive. The description of the veil with sexuality and exoticism and 
the oriental woman as an active subject in relation to the ‘Western viewer’ contrasts 
with earlier examples of the veil as a sign of passivity and inaction. Here, the oriental 
woman is out in the public space of the bazaar, among men and women who are 
complete strangers, she is no longer the victimised, imprisoned being who needs to be 
freed from the harem. 
 
The description of the dress (large feretgé) and the muslin veil which is repeatedly 
encircled around her head echoes the earlier example of the veil being equated with 
‘bandages’. The binary oppositions also confirm the ambivalence of the discourse: 
coquetry contrasts with fear, and the forbidden with desire, yet the eyes of the veiled 
woman still enchant the Western subject. Although the veiled women who are 
described are almost totally covered (the large feretgé being like a long cloak worn 
with a face-veil which leaves only the eyes visible), they are nonetheless subject to a 
Western male fantasy as they become the source of seduction, provocation and sexual 
appeal for Castellan. In her anthropological study of the veil, Fadwa el Guindi notes 
that the veil has replaced the older obsession with harems and hammams, the veil now 
‘evokes a public sexual energy that early Christianity, puritanist Western culture, and 
contemporary elements of fundamentalist Christianity have not been able to come to 
terms with, comprehend, or tolerate’ (El Guindi, 1999, p.10). Castellan’s description 
provides an example of Orientalist discourse on the veil which evokes this ‘sexual 
energy’, and in which the oriental woman, who is now in the street instead of the harem, 
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becomes active and yet still subject to sexual fantasy. The veil functions as a tool to 
maintain the oriental woman within the realm of a sexual object.  
 
The coquetry is described as being stronger and therefore also potentially transcending 
fear. This coquetry is also triggering sexuality, allowing veiled women to unveil their 
‘charms’ which can also categorise them as women with magic power and witchcraft. 
The example thus moves us from the representation of the veil as a symbol of 
oppression, submission and danger to an object of desire, sexuality and seduction. This 
adds another more explicitly stated dimension which carefully combines various veil 
associations within the same text. 
   
In another text, Castellan (1985, pp. 442-443) extends beyond simply defining the veil 
within explicit sexual parameters as an object of danger, by introducing the figure of 
the ‘oriental man’:  
 
...one has to be suspicious of these attractive, dangerous and sometimes 
treacherous  beginnings. If we were to neglect consulting caution for a well 
ephemeral pleasure, we would expose ourselves to the cruel effects of revenge 
resulting from the jealousy and superstitious hatred of the Turks. After having 
made you fall in the trap, they would only grant you the favour of life in order 
to force you to adopt the turban. 
 
In Castellan’s words, the term ‘amorce’ in French not only means beginning, but also 
refers to a ‘detonator’ or ‘bomb’ which positions the veil within the realm of not only 
treachery and deceit, but also of a potential terror object. These elements justify the 
‘suspicious’ stance of the European who can nevertheless still be subject to the 
‘revenge’, ‘jealousy’ and ‘superstitious hatred’ of oriental men. The potential pleasure 
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attributed to veiled women, and which again associates the veil with sexuality and 
Oriental lasciviousness, is countered with the negative and dangerous attributes of 
Turkish men. Castellan again implicitly places the veil within sexuality, but also within 
an object of terror and fear as it triggers feelings of suspicion and caution.  
 
Although he represents it as an exotic and sexual symbol that excites the desire of the 
‘Western man’ (Fanon, 1967, p. 43), the veil is also subject to suspicion as it may 
contain or hide elements of danger, treachery, vengeance, jealousy as well as 
‘superstitious hatred’. The Muslim veiled woman becomes a ‘suspicious being’ who 
has ‘attractive’ yet ‘dangerous’ and ‘treacherous’ moves. The ‘ephemeral pleasure’ is 
replaced by ‘cruel effects of revenge’, and the ‘jealousy’ and ‘superstitious hatred’.  
 
The veil is often given quite paradoxical qualities. Fanon notes in the context of French 
colonial rule in Algeria that the European’s aggressiveness will be expressed in 
contemplation of the Algerian woman’s morality, and her qualities and characteristics 
(such as timidity and reserve) are transformed into the opposite as the Algerian woman 
becomes ‘hypocritical, perverse’ (Fanon, 1967, p.46). In Castellan’s example, although 
the veil is linked with the exotic and sexual, it is also an element of danger, treachery 
and revenge, and a possible hatred of ‘Turks’. In this example, it goes beyond the 
Muslim woman’s morality (if we consider that exoticism and sexuality are part of the 
realm of desire which is forbidden in Castellan’s eyes), and Nerval’s reference to the 
‘frivolous European’ in the ‘serious and pious Egypt’. All the negative attributes 
Castellan wields in his account imply that the ‘Oriental woman’ is being watched by 
her husband, and that one should not venture into such grounds. Against the short-lived 
pleasure derived from looking at the ‘veiled woman’ moving along the bazaar and 
shopping, Castellan sets characteristics of the ‘oriental man’ that locate this figure 
within an otherness in relation to the ‘white man’. As Yegenoglu (2003, p.543) argues, 
the veil produces an ‘exteriority’ or a ‘target or threat’ for the European subject, which 
enables that subject to produce himself, vis-a-vis an ‘other’ while, at the same time, 
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erasing the process of this production. Moreover, the cruelty of the ‘Oriental man’ 
would go so far as to force the ‘Western man’ to adopt the turban, hence to become 
Muslim.  
 
In Castellan’s example, describing the veil in terms of a sexual threat is made more 
explicit. In his writing about the ‘veiled woman’, he cautions against ‘attractive, 
dangerous and sometimes treacherous beginnings’, implicitly attributing danger and 
threat to the veil which he had previously defined as a sexual symbol. Furthermore, he 
warns against the ‘cruel effects of revenge’ ensuing from ‘jealousy and hatred of the 
Turks’. In this example, Castellan superposes the sexualisation of the veil with threat 
and treachery. Through these associations, the veil is positioned not only within sexual 
terms, but also within emotional and ethical dimensions.    
 
In the Orientalist examples, the veil is implicitly positioned as a ‘threat’ which at once 
contrasts with its sexual overtone and its association with oriental seduction and 
sexuality, a threat that extends to the Oriental man who becomes a potential second 
source of danger for the European man. For Castellan, this implies the compulsion to 
adopt the Oriental man’s religion. In contrast to Gasparin’s ‘civilising mission’ to 
Christianise the victimised veiled woman, Castellan fears the forceful Islamisation of 
the Turkish man, which, if declined, would mean his death. This idea of death and 
killing also reminds us of the image of the Orient as a land of barbarity and savageness, 
this time linked to the Oriental man. In short, Castellan’s narrative shows instances of 
an Orientalist discourse which emphasises the placement of the veil within exoticism, 
sexuality and pleasure yet, paradoxically, attaches meanings of danger, threat and 
hatred to it. Unlike Gasparin’s examples which focused more on oppression, inferiority 
and unhappiness, and Nerval’s which used more metaphors of exoticism and sexuality, 
Castellan’s writing of the veil adds more explicitly the dimension of threat to veil 
associations.   
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To conclude, the analysis of some Orientalist texts on the veil demonstrate how the 
dress is constructed through various and sometimes dichotomous associations. As we 
have seen through the examples from Orientalist texts, the veil acquires various 
meanings through language and words that circulate around it in texts. I have explored 
placements of the veil within the concepts of happiness, slavery, imprisonment, 
oppression and lack of freedom as well as exoticism and sexual threat. I now turn to 
the Arab Nahda texts of the early twentieth century to consider some of their 
associations of Islamic dress.  
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 Nahda Veils  
 
In this chapter, I examine associations of the veil in Nahda texts of the early twentieth 
century. First, I analyse images of happiness in relation to the veil. In the second part, 
I examine associations of the veil with enslavement and imprisonment. In the third 
part, I look at meanings of seduction and attraction attached to the dress. In the fourth, 
I consider images of ignorance and backwardness before ending with tropes of 
darkness and enlightenment. During the Nahda period29, in which the Arabic press, 
and more pertinently women’s journals and literature flourished, women intellectuals 
represented the first generation of Arab women to write and publish their works as 
printed texts (Baron, 1997, p. 1). These writings provide unique historical sources to 
consider the meanings attached to Islamic modest dress during the Nahda and colonial 
epochs. As feminist Beth Baron (1997, p. 2) informs us, this was a time when the 
middle and upper-classes had the resources to invest in literature, and when journals 
and newspapers fast became vital media for communication, with women’s journals 
providing an opportunity to debate issues such as marriage, divorce, veiling, seclusion, 
education and work.30 Regarding the Nahda era, much attention has been devoted to 
Qasim Amin31 who is considered a central figure in the turn of the century debate on 
                                                 
29 Of course I still had to make a small selection from vast bodies of work from different countries. The 
fact that I discuss Nahda figures from Egypt (and one from Tunisia) can be justified intellectually by 
the prominence of Egypt as a pivotal point for the Nahda movement, and with the longest history within 
the movement itself to which it gave rise. Additionally, Egypt offers original texts and a significant body 
of material on which I can draw from and expand in my particular study to think about contemporary 
media associations of Islamic dress. 
30 Margot Badran (2009, p. 18) argues in this context that the emergence of women’s earliest signs of 
‘feminist consciousness’ was ‘first discernible in occasional published writings (poetry essays and tales) 
by the 1860s and 1870s, preceded colonial occupation and the rise of nationalism’, but ‘was more widely 
expressed from the 1890s in the rise of women’s journalism and salon debates’. 
 
31 Qasim Amin (1863-1908) was an Egyptian jurist and one of the founding members of the Egyptian 
national movement and Cairo University. His mother was Upper Egyptian, and father an Ottoman who 
had served as an administrator in Kurdistan then Egypt. Amin is most renowned as an early advocate of 
women's rights. His 1899 book The Liberation of Women (Tahrir al mara’a) and its 1900 sequel The 
New Woman (al mara’a al jadida) examined the question of why Egypt had fallen under European power, 
despite centuries of Egyptian learning and civilisation, and concluded that the explanation was the low 
social and educational standing of Egyptian women. He grounded this criticism on Islamic scholarship 
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women and society. Yet writings of women such as Malak Hifni Nasif32, Nazira Zain 
al-Din33 and Tahar Haddad34 have been overlooked, as much as the bulk of literature 
of al Nahda al nisa’iya35 (women’s awakening) which constituted a part of the broader 
Nahda movement originating from the Middle Eastern countries and later spreading 
throughout Arab and Maghrebi countries. On the one hand, my work is part of an 
attempt to recover these voices which have been neglected from the dominant 
discourse of the Arab Nahda movement. On the other hand, a study of some of the key 
meanings and tropes of the veil in Nahda texts provides a preliminary background for 
the consideration of current associations of the veil in Morocco, a postcolonial nation-
                                                 
and argued that women should develop intellectually in order to be competent to bring up the nation's 
children. Amin was a central figure of the Nahda movement.  
http://www.in.com/qasim-amin/biography-225775.html 
 
32 Malak hifni Nasif (1886-1918) known as bahitat al-badiya (seeker in the desert) was a poet, writer 
and feminist. She was born in Cairo into a literary family. She spoke on Fridays at the women’s lectures 
at the Egyptian University, and in the offices in the liberal paper al-Jarida. Her speeches and essays 
were published in 1909 under the title al-Nisaiyat (Feminist Pieces). She was a strong advocate of rights 
for women within marriage. (Badran & Cooke, 2004, p. 134)  
  
33 Nazira Zain al-Din was born in Lebanon in 1905. Her father, who was a scholar of Islamic religion 
and jurisprudence, encouraged her education and intellectual development. She met learnt men, and 
more particularly religious scholars, with whom she debated topics such as the veil.  
(Badran & Cooke, 2004, p. 270) 
 
34 Tahar Haddad (1899-1935) was born in the medina (old quarter) of Tunis. He grew up in a family that 
lived in extreme poverty, and was called upon to contribute to the family income. The hardships Haddad 
experienced left an indelible mark on him, even though he was able to improve his circumstances 
through education. This happened after his religious studies at the famous Zaytuna mosque, where he 
graduated in 1920 with a licence to practice as a notary-public. Politically, these were important times 
in Tunisia with the emergence of a nationalist movement that called for the end of the French colonial 
rule. During his studies Haddad became part of the nationalist reformist movement which shaped his 
social and political thought. Together with an interest in workers’ and women’s rights, education would 
remain a leitmotiv in Haddad’s thought, as expressed in his writings. He is mostly known for his work 
Our Women in Muslim Law and Society (1930). The book represents an indictment of the condition of 
woman in traditional society, and the injustice suffered by the poor in the Tunisia Haddad wrote from 
the position of a Muslim scholar who used religious sources to support his views. He was accused of 




35 As Beth Baron (1997, p. 188) informs us, not only did al nahda al-nisa’iyya (women’s awakening) 
expand opportunities for women, but it also set grounds for later female activism in Egypt and 
throughout the Arab world.  
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state having experienced the influence of the Nahda during the early twentieth century 
colonial period in the Maghreb as I explained in my introduction.  
 
Unhappy Veils: Law, Order, Justice and Hijabs of Hardships 
In this section, I explore how the veil becomes a signifier of unhappiness and misery 
in some Arab Nahda writings of the early twentieth century. In these texts, the veil 
sometimes figures as a cause of unhappiness or as embodying unhappiness itself. 
Unveiling, as the examples will demonstrate, is in turn implicitly constructed as a way 
to attain happiness not only for the Arab Muslim woman, but also for the whole Muslim 
Ummah, or the community of believers.  
 
During the Nahda era in which the texts under study were written, women entered the 
realm of print culture at a dynamic moment in Arabic literary history, and hoped to 
encourage social reform and women’s awakening through the creation of literary texts 
(Baron, 1997, p. 39).  Part of their attempts included a call for unveiling, which referred 
both to removing the face-veil or the niqab which was commonly worn among the 
middle and upper classes, and the call for ending seclusion (Baron, 1997, p. 39). In the 
early twentieth century, Malak Hifni Nasif36, considered as one of the first Egyptian 
and Arab feminists, writes an article entitled ‘My View on the Hijab’ where she 
advocates gradual unveiling, justifying her call for unveiling with the unhappiness that 
has come as a result of the practice. She states (Nasif, 1962, p. 272): 
 
                                                 
36 Malak Hifni Nasif wrote and gained literary experience in the bi-weekly then weekly paper al-‘Afaf 
(The Virtue) which started in 1910. She became one of the best known speakers of the day and one of 
the most prominent women who joined the Nahda movement. 
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...Were it not for the hardships in our Egyptian homes caused by the veil, and 
the feeling of the majority of us of the unhappiness of life as a result of our 
inequitable and restrictive marriages, I would by no means call for change from 
following our old system. 
 
Here Malak Hifni Nasif associates the practice of the hijab, then meaning seclusion 
and face-veiling, with the ‘hardships of Egyptian homes’ and with unjust and 
restrictive marriages in reference to the inequitable treatment of women and their 
confinement by their husbands to the private realm. She also refers to the hijab as ‘the 
old system’ which she considers should be gradually changed, and emphasises the 
equation between married or domestic life and the hijab. Hifni Nasif writes about 
women at the turn of the twentieth century when not only many Muslim, but also 
Coptic women, particularly those of the middle and upper classes, were still veiled and 
could not move about without being accompanied or having a reasonable purpose, in 
contrast to lower class women who were not veiled or secluded to the same extent 
(Baron, 1997, p. 39). Veiling and seclusion were not restricted to Muslim women. 
 
While the Orientalist examples I examined in the previous chapter associate the veiled 
woman with unhappiness in relation to the spatial hijab of the harem, Hifni Nasif’s 
example emphasises social injustice manifested in ‘inequitable and restrictive 
marriages’ as the main cause behind the majority of Egyptian women's state of 
unhappiness. Her call for a gradual unveiling, therefore, is motivated by a need to 
improve social justice within Egyptian homes, since the hijab which refers to both 
confinement to the domestic space and the niqab (or material face-veil) in Hifni Nasif’s 
days is perceived as a barrier for improving women's condition within society. What 
Hifni Nasif refers to as ‘the hardships of our homes’ and the ‘unhappiness of life’ 
constitute the two factors enticing her to call for a ‘change from following the old 
system’ of the hijab. We can consider how her association of the veil with unhappiness 
is a reiteration of the Orientalist trope of unhappy veils. We can, however, see how her 
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concept of happiness and the hijab presents a discontinuity from the Orientalist 
discourse, from a focus on the harem as a space of unhappiness to an emphasis on the 
material and space hijabs in the shape of the niqab on the one hand, and confinement 
to the domestic realm on the other. Her call needs to be read within debates for social 
justice and women's rights in the early twentieth century Nahda period. 
 
Happiness becomes here a strategy of improvement, and unveiling as self-
improvement. In the framework of al Nahda al-nisaayia, Nazira Zain al-Din (al-Din, 
1928) not only associates the niqab with unhappiness and unveiling with happiness in 
her book Asufur wal Hijab (Unveiling and Veiling), but also attributes order, justice 
and law to unveiling. She ties the dress with unhappiness and despotism, implying that 
the veil is an oppressive exercise of power by men.  
 
In the context of her critique of the hijab (the face-veil and seclusion), Nazira Zain al-
Din (1928, pp. 58-59) extends the notion of unhappiness in relation to the hijab from 
the space of woman and the small family to that of the whole society and Muslim 
community: 
 
...the family and society can only find order and happiness when justice and 
law prevail [...]. There is therefore no happiness, integrity or order with 
despotism, oppression and half of the family and society remaining deprived of 
that light [...] denied freedom and all means of progress, which in turn deprives 
her of the ability to raising her children and making them happy. 
 
In this example, there is a similar discourse about women's rights in society. An 
examination of the positions and aims of women writers in the early years of the 
women’s press shows that the phrase ‘the rights of woman’ had many connotations 
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and that the views of female intellectuals covered a wide range of meanings (Baron, 
1997, p.104). Similarly, and as the examples from Hifni Nasif and Zain al-Din 
illustrate, the veil and happiness were conceptualised differently during the Nahda era. 
In her call for unveiling, Zain al-Din emphasises justice and law as prerequisites for 
the happiness and order of the family, and the overall society and Muslim community 
of believers. In addition, Zain al-Din places ‘integrity’ and ‘order’ as antithetical to 
happiness. She associates the veil with unhappiness, despotism and oppression, 
additionally tying the absence of happiness with woman’s inability to fulfil their roles 
of raising children who are in turn happy. The transformation of women's state from 
unhappiness to happiness therefore entails the establishment of social justice and the 
rule of law, which would ensure happiness not only for women, but also for the 
generations to come.  
 
In another article where Zain al-Din compares Muslim women with Christian nuns, 
she contrasts the ‘freedom, independence, development and knowledge’ of the nuns 
with the ‘unhappiness and blindness’ associated with the Muslim veil. What we have 
in this example is a transposition and contrast of two veils, with the Christian nun’s 
veil associated with happiness and the Muslim veil with unhappiness. Veils become 
positive or negative through these associations. It is interesting to read this comparison 
with the earlier comparison that Countess de Gasparin draws between the veiled 
woman and her European counterpart, attributing unhappiness, idleness and weakness 
to the first one and happiness, strength and emancipation to the latter. In Zain al-Din’s 
discourse, the veil fluctuates between an unhappiness caused by the absence of law and 
social justice on the one hand, and that caused by lack of progress and development 
and ignorance on the other. While she links unhappiness with injustice, despotism and 
oppression, she equates happiness with freedom and progress, which can only be 
achieved with removing the veil.  
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Even when the veil maintains its association with unhappiness, there are differences in 
how it is represented. Couched within a discourse of women’s rights and development 
which were crucial to the Nahda proponents, how Zain al-Din’s links the veil with 
unhappiness (in the sense of the physical niqab and space confinement) is different 
from Hifni Nasif’s highlighting of the hijab as the main cause of the Muslim woman’s 
unhappiness. Although both evoke happiness in relation to unveiling and associate the 
veil with unhappiness, Zain al-Din expands the scope of the ‘happiness mission’ of her 
predecessor to include references to law, social justice and the attainment of freedom 
and progress through enlightenment and unveiling. Both writers, however, offer 
expanding models of the Orientalist depiction of the veil as a fixed miserable condition, 
confined to the face-veil and the harem. Hifni Nasif’s and Zain al-Din’s texts extend 
the Orientalist happiness notion to a consideration of the veil (in both material and 
spatial senses) as an element preventing social, legal and intellectual happiness. 
Additionally, Hifni Nasif’s and Zain al-Din’s examples illustrate how the happiness 
notion is not merely restricted to space and a removal of the space hijab which prevents 
women from attaining their full rights in Muslim society, but also attaining the 
happiness of the global Muslim Ummah (crosscultural, crossborder, transnational 
happiness).  
 
Orientalist texts imply a forward movement or progression in time in relation to 
attaining happiness which they tie with unveiling and conversion (making unveiling a 
condition for happiness). Nahda texts of happiness in relation to the hijab equally 
emphasise the concept of time, and the necessary movement forward towards progress 
and freedom to attain happiness. Yet such a type of happiness expands the individual 
level of Orientalist happiness mission to include that of the society and the Muslim 
Ummah.      
 
Likewise evoking a discourse about women and human rights that was prevalent at the 
turn of the twentieth century, Qasim Amin reminds his readers of the right woman has 
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to pursue ‘happiness in the outside world’ through the same means as her male 
counterpart. With the increasing debate about women’s status and role in society which 
gained momentum at the turn of the century, the writings of Qasim Amin provoked a 
debate which must be read in the context of women’s press and its concern with the 
rights of women (Baron, 1997, p.21-22). In his book Al Mar’a al Jadida (The New 
Woman) (Amine, 1987), he writes about the concept of happiness in relation to the veil 
in more detail: 
 
We have overlooked the fact that she [the woman] is a human being like us, 
and that she has the right to pursue her search for happiness with the means 
placed in the outside world for men to seek happiness. When we brought down 
the status of woman without justice, justice has taken revenge on us and has 
heightened it. It has thus prevented us from genuine happiness, has brought our 
morals down, and spoiled our children’s upbringing as misery and unhappiness 
have overwhelmed our hearts until many among us thought the life of Islamic 
nations has come close to an end (1987, p.46-47).  
 
Like Nasif and Zain al-Din, Amin here refers to the hijab as a practice depriving 
women from their humanity and happiness. He additionally attributes unhappiness to 
the injustice brought upon the status of woman. Moreover, the link Amin establishes 
between injustice and unhappiness is added to the one he posits between unhappiness 
and immorality, which he also implicitly associates with the spatial and material hijabs. 
In addition to a humanitarian discourse of the veil, Amin adds an ethical dimension to 
the issue of the veil through the link between the dress, happiness and morals. He 
therefore ties the absence of happiness with the material niqab and the spatial hijab or 
confinement on the one hand, and with immorality and spoiling children’s upbringing 
on the other. By implication, he also considers the veil to be a compromise for the 
happiness of the children, or generations to come. In this statement, Amin further 
positions the veil as an object potentially causing the death of the ‘Islamic nations’ as 
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the example states. His writing of the veil as unhappiness includes not only a human 
rights discourse emphasising woman’s rights and the need for social justice, but also 
an ethical dimension linking the veil in both dimensions with immorality and the 
potential death of Islamic nations. This evokes Gasparin’s own association of the veil 
with annihilation. Amin’s concept of happiness in relation to the veil therefore adds to 
the space and time dimensions an ethical aspect whereby the hijab embodies a negation 
of moral values within Muslim society. His example illustrates how the meaning of 
happiness as it pertains to the veil expands both the Orientalist notion of the ‘happiness 
mission’ and Hifni’s and Zain al-Din’s social, legal and intellectual dimensions of 
happiness to include an ethical happiness that crosses the borders of the Islamic 
nations. Let us now consider associations of the hijab with sexual meanings.     
 
‘Veiled in her house, Veil on her face’ ‘Prison of the hijab’  
The Arab Nahda texts also tie the veil with slavery, imprisonment and lack of freedom. 
During the early days of the Nahda al nisa’iya, Malak Hifni Nasif warns about keeping 
the veil tradition exactly as it has been adopted in the past. Advocating a ‘moderate 
creed’ between Western unveiling and the old traditional Egyptian veiling, she cautions 
against a veil that ‘would create a prison constraining body and mind and destroying 
well-being’ (Nasif, 1962, p.271). Such a vision of the veil emphasises not only the 
physical restriction assigned to the hijab, which is also extended to the spatial 
confinement in the private realm, but also points to the intellectual constraints of the 
veil, as denoted by the complex ‘body and mind’. We need to consider this statement 
in the context of a period when women’s education became subject to a wide debate in 
Arab countries which were still under colonial rule.  
 
Later on during the Nahda era and at the peak of decolonisation movements in Arab 
countries, Nazira Zain al-Din’s writings offer an instance of how the early Arab 
feminist discourse has taken a step further in openly advocating unveiling. Zain al-Din 
also relies on associations of the veil with slavery and imprisonment in her writings. In 
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an article entitled ‘The Freedom of Veiling and Unveiling’, she condemns the veil as 
a symbol of woman’s subjugation in society: 
 
Since the creation of human beings, people have differed in their approach to 
the protection of woman. Some have considered that a woman can be protected 
only through subjugating her [...] enslaving her, depriving her of her freedom 
and imprisoning her veiled in her house, and drawing the veil on her face (Zain-
al Din, 1928, p.46).  
 
In a similar vein, Qasim Amin evokes freedom and enslavement in relation to the status 
of the Muslim woman in his society during the Nahda era:    
 
The man who compels his wife not to leave the house without a reason except 
his own desire for her to leave it, does not respect her freedom. She is from this 
perspective a slave, or rather imprisoned, robbed of her freedom in a worse way 
than a slave [...] we all know that it is very rare for woman to be left to her own 
will and choice in her movements [...] Whether the imprisonment of woman is 
lessened or not, she is still restricted to her house which the best woman for 
them does not leave (Amin, 1987, p.30).  
 
Zain al-Din adopts here a humanitarian discourse, suggesting that the hijab is a form 
of ‘protection of woman’ that restricts her movement. The hijab in both examples not 
only refers to the material bodily niqab which women widely adopted at the time, but 
also the space hijab which confined women to the house. Both examples equate the 
two forms of hijab with subjugation, enslavement and imprisonment. Yet while Amin 
blames the Muslim man for the veiled woman’s state and for being disrespectful to her 
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freedom, Zain al-Din implicitly contrasts the subjugated status of the veiled woman to 
that of the European woman which is presented as the model to be emulated.  
 
In the framework of the debate regarding women in Islamic countries, Leila Ahmed 
argues that proponents of improving women’s status during colonial times placed their 
demands in the ‘need to abandon the (implicitly) ‘innately’ and ‘irreparably’ 
misogynist practices of the native culture in favour of the customs and beliefs of 
another culture—the European’ (Ahmed, 1992, p. 129). Zain al- Din’s writing about 
the hijab can be couched within such rhetoric of the veil. In her example, the veiled 
woman symbolises deprivation, imprisonment and enslavement. Her discourse about 
the veil additionally relies on a defence of women’s rights within an Islamic 
framework. Being the daughter of a renowned cheikh (religious scholar), Zain al-Din 
was in a position to challenge the patriarchal norms of society without compromising 
her religious credentials.37 We can position her examples within a discourse advocating 
women’s rights in Islam on the one hand, yet calling for freedom and emancipation in 
a discourse which bears resonance with a Western Orientalist tradition and ‘colonial 
vision’ equating unveiling with freedom and emancipation.    
 
In her book, Zain al-Din (al-Din, 1928, pp. 58-59) draws a clear contrast between 
freedom and slavery, and between a slave (in reference to a veiled woman) and a 
knowledgeable person: 
 
                                                 
37 Zain al-Din (1928, p. 50.) also evokes the support of authorities in this respect. In a later article, she 
considers the presence of authorities a ‘blessing’ and an ‘opportunity for women to appear in the way 
they want to’ (that is without the face-veil). She therefore attributes them with having ‘freed [her] 
intellect, will, pen and belief, and having removed enslavement from the world.  
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I believe that unveiling, knowledge and freedom call more for protection, 
honour and modesty than veiling, ignorance and slavery, and that they pertain 
more to the meaning of motherhood, the human family and the good of society. 
This is because good manners are not implanted in the soul of an ignorant 
person in the way that it does in the soul of a knowledgeable one, nor is it 
consolidated in the mind of a slave in the way that it is in the mind of a free 
person. 
 
In a more explicit fashion, Zain al-Din equates veiling with ignorance and slavery, and 
unveiling with knowledge and freedom. The veiling to which Zain al-Din refers here 
covers the material hijab (which is also called niqab) and the spatial hijab which 
confines woman to the house. As such, the hijab in both forms is constructed as a 
barrier against freedom and knowledge.  
 
In her study of woman’s identity in relation to the Qur’an, Islamic feminist Nimat 
Hafez Baraganzi (2004, p. ix) states that the traditional Muslim focus on educating 
woman so that she can play only a ‘complementary and domestic role’ conflicts with 
Qur’anic principles and the lived realities of Muslim women. In parallel with her call 
for ‘civilisation’, Zain al-Din advocates ‘freedom’ which would be unattainable with 
the double hijab to which Muslim women are subject. Repeating the Orientalist 
association of the veil with enslavement and imprisonment, Zain al-Din’s examples 
further highlight the importance of ‘knowledge’, which would be possible once the veil 
is removed from the veiled woman. The hijab in both senses therefore stands in the 
way of intellectual fulfilment, and epitomises not only a physical and spatial 
imprisonment, but also a cognitive enslavement. 
 
At another level, while unveiling, which is equated with knowledge and freedom, is 
connected with positive attributes such as protection, honour, modesty, and ‘good 
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manners’, veiling is conversely associated with ignorance, slavery, and more tacitly 
with lack of honour, immodesty and ‘bad manners’. Zain al-Din further equates the 
veil with a potential failure in the ‘meaning of motherhood, the human family and the 
good of society’. All these associations attribute morality to unveiling and immorality 
and decadence to the veil. Reminiscent of earlier examples associating the veil with 
lack of modesty and honour, this example considers unveiling closer to protection, 
honour and modesty in such a way that ‘good manners’ are seen as more easily instilled 
with unveiling than with veiling.  
 
The veil becomes like a prison, or even becomes a prison. In a personal note to one of 
her conference speeches, Nazira Zain al-Din reminds her audience that it was her father 
who has feed her from the ‘prison of the veil’. She declares (al-Din, 1928, p. 59): 
 
I hope you gentlemen will not accuse me of transgressing the system and 
escaping from the prison of the veil [...] He [my father] is the one who has 
considered my prison as opposed to the justice of God, the good of the family 
and society, and has put faith in my soul and manners, sending me unveiled to 
life and light.  
 
Here Zain al-Din gives a speech unveiled in front of an audience of men and women, 
evoking ‘transgression’ in relation to breaching both the visual and spatial hijabs. She 
relies on the authority of her father who is a religious scholar. The image of the ‘prison 
of the veil’ reiterates its vision as an object of enslavement and subjugation, which 
Zain al-Din opposes not merely to ‘the justice of God’, but also to ‘the good of the 
family and society’. The expressions ‘prison of the veil’ and ‘unveiled to life and light’ 
equate the veil with imprisonment, and unveiling with ‘life and light’, which reminds 
us of associations of the veil with enlightenment which I discuss in a subsequent 
section. The dichotomy is reiterated between prison and freedom, life and death, and 
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light and darkness, in relation to veiling and unveiling respectively. Zain al-Din’s 
association of the veil with imprisonment therefore additionally evokes wider social 
and ethical notions through the link established between unveiling, the justice of God 
and the good of family and society, as well an affective dimension tying the veil with 
death and darkness.    
 
Unveiling becomes associated with freedom. Like Malak Hifni Nasif, Nazira Zain al-
Din (1928, p. 62) also advocates gradual unveiling in order to achieve woman’s 
emancipation, considering unveiling to be the primary stage in the ladder of this 
liberation. In her words, this is ‘because veiling leaves half of society paralysed, and a 
society half of whose organs are paralysed cannot excel, triumph, win or gain victory’. 
In an article about nuns and the lessons that Muslim women should learn from them, 
Zain al-Din (1928, p. 138) again equates the veil not only with imprisonment, but also 
with blindness and death: 
 
...As for us, miserable ones, nothing suits us better than blindness and putting 
an end to the soul, and imprisonment under the heavy cover which is like a 
shroud or a cage. It is not suitable for us to emerge from their [men’s] private 
quarters except to go to our graves.  
 
In this example, Zain al-Din equates the veil not only with imprisonment through the 
word ‘cage’, but also death through the term ‘shroud’. Likening the veil to a ‘shroud’ 
or a ‘cage’, she additionally attributes blindness and death to the state of the Muslim 
woman in her society. The veil is further inscribed within the states of blindness and 
death. The concept of imprisonment repeatedly connected with the veil in both visual 
and spatial senses, as I have illustrated, is complicated with the reference to blindness, 
which is a form of visual impairment, and ‘end of the soul’ which echoes physical and 
spiritual and intellectual death. Such images of the veil therefore include references not 
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only to the visual blindness which can be linked with the visual hijab (or niqab in the 
modern sense of the word), but also to the physical death which can be associated with 
physical confinement. The hijab becomes and embodies both physical and intellectual 
death.    
 
There are many examples from the archive that associate unveiling with freedom. 
Another Nahda figure whose texts evoke freedom in this way is Qasim Amin. Take 
the following quote from The New Woman (Amine, 1987, pp. 47-48):  
 
Concerning the veil, its harm consists in depriving woman of her innate 
freedom, preventing her from completing education, and from getting her 
means of livelihood when needed [...] Freedom’s merits consist of removing 
all the harms arising from the veil, and [...] its only harm is that, in its principle, 
leads to misuse [...] but it is easy for her to do so with freedom, which she will 
achieve as other Western women have achieved it.  
 
In a more explicit reference to the ‘Western woman’, Amin contrasts the veil with 
freedom, and woman’s access to public space, education and work. He is suggesting 
here that whilst freedom can be harmful when it is misused, the veil is much more 
harmful. The veil is the harm of being deprived of freedom. In the example, freedom 
is equated with the achievement of modesty, work and responsibility, as well as self-
reliance and integrity which as qualities are implied to be unachievable with the veil. 
Amin’s association of unveiling with freedom, education and employment therefore 
implicitly equate the hijab (in both senses) with imprisonment, ignorance and 
unemployment. In her study of woman in the Qur’an, Amina Wadud (1999, pp. 7-8) 
notes that while women have been restricted to biological functions, men are deemed 
superior, more human, and benefiting from ‘the choice of movement, employment, and 
social, political and economic participation on the basis of human individuality, 
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motivation and opportunity’. Wadud thus criticises the tendency of patriarchal 
interpretations of the Qur’an to deprive Muslimat from the agency which the Quranic 
text grants them.    
 
The niqab and physical confinement of Arab women is thus associated with negative 
attributes which reinforce the image of the veiled woman as a victim. In his book The 
Liberation of Woman, Amin (1987, p. 72) equally associates the veil with lack of 
education, work and intellect: 
 
The desire to gain knowledge, the interest in exploring what people are doing 
in their works, and the desire to explore the truths and everything that draws 
the soul to investigate and learn lessons cannot be achieved by the woman with 
her veil. This is because the veil imprisons her in a confined and closed circle 
in such a way that she only hears and sees and knows about trivial events 
happening outside, as the veil stands between her and the live world which is 
the world of intellect and work. 
  
Here the veil is understood as a bar on a woman’s intellectual life by blocking her 
access to the main source of knowledge which is the outside world. In another example, 
Amin (1987, p. 75) blames the veil for spoiling a woman’s health due to her 
confinement at home, and depriving her of air and sunshine and all physical activity. 
Having emphasised the equation of the garment with slavery and imprisonment, Amin 
introduces an intellectual dimension to unveiling. She would be freed because her mind 
would be freed. 
 
As the examples above illustrate, Malak Hifni Nasif, Nazira Zain al-Din and Qasim 
Amin affiliate the veil with spatial confinement which is reminiscent of the harem and 
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polygamy in the case of Orientalist texts. The examples, however, emphasise notions 
of enslavement and imprisonment in the form of both visual and spatial hijabs of 
confinement (the house becomes a metaphor for the veil). By contrast, Mernissi (1991, 
p. 43), who grew up in a Moroccan harem in the city of Fez in the 1940s, defines it 
firstly as a ‘power structure’ where the aspirations of young women vary depending on 
their status.  While women holding a higher status (such as daughters of harem owners) 
reinforce their power within the group and develop complicity with other women, 
young women from ‘poor classes’ are subject to the law of the group, that of men and 
more powerful women within the harem (Mernissi, 1991, p. 43). In her ethnographic 
study of the veil, El Guindi (1999, p. 36) argues in her ethnographic analysis that the 
harim is not about ‘women, sexualised life and seclusion’, but rather ‘a structure of 
governance, management, negotiation of a relational setting of gender 
complementarity.’ Such studies complicate the unidimensional depiction of the harem 
as a sexualised realm. The Nahda texts present the veil as a prison for the body and the 
mind. While Zain al-Din’s and Nasif’s examples emphasise the importance of a 
humanitarian and women’s rights discourse against seclusion and the niqab, which 
they both equate with imprisonment and enslavement, Amin’s and Zain al-Din’s 
examples highlight the significance of education, knowledge and the perfection of 
intellect to achieve freedom, an asset which they contrast with the practice of veiling.  
 
More than a symbol of sexual segregation and oppression, the Nahda examples portray 
the veil as a barrier against not only the ‘good of the society’ and a ‘human family’ but 
also with the ‘justice of God’. The Nahda discourse of the veil therefore complicates 
the Orientalist depiction in terms of oppression and victimisation to a humanitarian and 
ethical discourse which also defines divine justice in opposition to the practice of 
veiling. In parallel to the Orientalist discourse, the Nahda texts equate veiling with 
enslavement and imprisonment and unveiling with freedom and emancipation. 
However, the texts additionally associate the veil with knowledge, the good of the 
family and society and the justice of God, thereby complicating the dominant 
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Orientalist depiction of the veil. The ‘prison of the veil’ is contrasted with ethical and 
moral aspects which shall be developed in a subsequent section.         
 
In contrast to the focus of Orientalist texts on the institutions of the veil-harem-
polygamy, the Nahda associations of the veil and oppression emphasise the link 
between the face-veil and home confinement and the Arab woman’s imprisonment and 
enslavement. The examples focus on the veil (as meaning the physical face-veil and 
the broader confinement) as a symbol of the Muslim Arab woman’s oppression. These 
Nahda examples illustrate how the veil was repeatedly linked with the imprisonment 
and enslavement of the Muslim woman. Furthermore, as the texts from the three Nahda 
writers demonstrate, the association of the veil with imprisonment and enslavement 
during the colonial period of the Nahda parallels its association with ignorance, lack 
of freedom and intellectual deficiency.  
 
Whether implicitly or explicitly evoking the model of the ‘Western woman’, the 
examples advocate a vision of the veil as an object that should be viewed through time 
and space. Already defined in visual and spatial terms, the veil in such a discourse also 
acquires a temporal meaning which positions it outside the Nahda time, and as a 
practice to discard in order to attain enlightenment. This type of discourse can be 
considered as part of the ‘objectification’ of the veiled woman, perceived as the victim 
of the institutions of the veil. In parallel with an Orientalist discourse focused on fixing 
the veil in terms of otherness, the Nahda examples fix the veil within meanings of 
imprisonment and enslavement, and space and time which nonetheless mark some 
differences with the Orientalist discourse.  
 
Seductive Attractive Veils: Thin, Transparent Burqu’s and Revealing Mu’zars 
The Nahda texts affiliate the veil with attraction and seduction as I illustrate in this 
section. One instance of Nahda writing that draws the veil into the ambits of seduction 
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comes from Malak Hifni Nasif’s (1962, p. 82) speech in Al Jarida (the newspaper 
office), which was attended by hundreds of women. She links the veil (the burqu’) with 
a dress that reveals more than conceals the female body: 
...As for the veil (burqu’), it is more transparent than the heart of a child, so 
what is the purpose of the Izar? The aim behind it is to cover the body, the 
clothes and the adornments which Allah has made forbidden. So does this go 
in accordance with the current Mu’zar which has become a dress revealing the 
breasts, the waistline and the bottoms, in addition to the fact that some women 
have started wearing it in blue, brown and red?  
 
Nasif here opposes the Mu’zar (which is a long cloak usually worn over clothes), and 
which has become a means of sexual attraction in Nasif’s days. Although she is less 
vocal about total unveiling, and considers it a gradual process to be experienced in a 
society where the majority of women still have very little access to education and 
public space, she however provides us with some examples of how early Arab feminist 
writings associated the veil with meanings of seduction and sexual attraction. Nasif 
therefore contrasts the meaning of the veil in the religious discourse as that which 
covers the sexual aspects of women’s bodies, with the adoption of the veil in her times 
in order to highlight and draw attention to the female body and anatomy. Speaking 
about the purpose of the Izar (which is similar to the modern equivalent of the jilbab, 
or a long cloak usually worn over other clothes), she rhetorically asks her audience if 
the Izar accords with the more current Mu’zar which reveals the female body and 
exposes it in public. She therefore equates the veil in her era with sexual attraction and 
seduction. 
 
In an article entitled ‘My Doctrine on Veiling and Unveiling’, Nasif (1962, p. 273) 
writes a response to criticism from one of her opponents, a man of law who was 
surprised by her previous silence regarding the issue of veil: 
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How would the veiled woman be harmed by the white niqab (burqu’) and the 
old veil (milaa’a) if she observes seriousness in her walking, and elaborates her 
veil (mu’zar)? If all women beautified themselves with the new niqab which 
our free jurist advocates, would the new veil cleanse their hearts from filth and 
their bodies from swaying and swaggering? [...] The moral is through woman’s 
education and her will. Let her wear whatever pleases her from appropriate 
dress and let her be modest in her walking and no harm shall afflict her. I 
consider the unveiled woman who has good morals better than the veiled 
woman who is wearing the heaviest silks and the most inhibiting veils and who 
is licentious and frivolous.  
 
In this example, Nasif associates the niqab with playfulness and coquetry (which 
reminds us of earlier examples from Orientalism also linking it with coquetry). The 
niqab or burqu’ here embodies a beautifying and aesthetic element of the female attire, 
rather than a modest dress. The words ‘swaying’ and ‘swaggering’ suggest that the veil 
can be used as a means of sexual attraction, which contrasts with the modesty 
associated with it in other writings, and within the religious discourse of Islamic dress. 
In contrast to Amin’s earlier reference to the veil as harm, Nasif wonders how a veiled 
woman can he harmed if she observes seriousness and ‘elaborates her veil’. The ‘new 
veil’ in Hifni’s words, is characterised with ‘swaying and swaggering bodies’ and ‘filth 
of the hearts’ to the point where unveiling is equated with good morals while the veil 
epitomises immorality and playfulness. These images reinscribe the veil within not 
only seduction and playfulness, but also with impurity and obscenity. Hifni’s depiction 
of the veil, however, relies on the idea that women’s dress ought to be devoid of 
exhibitionism (tabarruj), following the Qur’anic insistence that women do not wear 
makeup or ornaments in public space, and the requirement to cover all part of the body 
except the face and hands (Saadawi, 2010, p. 85). Unveiling the face was a process 
which would make the practice moral.  
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Nasif describes the burqu’ as ‘more transparent than a child’s heart’, in addition to 
describing the mu’zar/Izar as a ‘revealing dress’ increasingly worn by Egyptian 
women of her time while revealing the contours of the female body in public space. 
Adopting a religious discourse to criticise this practice of veiling, Nasif cautions 
against what she regards as the increasing sexualisation of modest Islamic dress at the 
turn of the nineteenth century. Although she did not advocate total unveiling, Nasif 
both spoke and wrote about the importance of education and upbringing in combating 
the sexualisation of Islamic dress. In contrast to the Orientalist discourse which 
emphasised the European subject’s sexualisation of the Oriental/harem veil, the Nahda 
examples stress the uses and abuses of the veil by Muslim women in order to emphasise 
certain features of the female body, thereby focusing on the sexualisation of modest 
dress by veiled women themselves. 
 
This type of veils becomes a source of seduction and sexual attraction (fitna). In 
another example, Qasim Amin associates the burqu’ or niqab with fitna (seduction and 
sexual attraction). He writes (Amine, 2003, p. 64): 
 
The burqu’ and niqab increase the fear of fitna because it is behind this white 
thin niqab that charms appear and imperfections disappear. The burqu’ hides 
the area of the nose, mouth and lower jaw, and reveals the forehead, eyebrows, 
eyes, cheeks, temples and the surface of the neck. These covered items in fact 
are part of the beautifying elements of the desiring onlooker, and they urge him 
to discover little that has been hidden after being charmed by a lot that has been 
revealed. If the woman disclosed her face, her whole being would turn one 
away from looking at her. 
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Here the niqab or burqu’ is seen as a means of seduction rather than an element of 
Islamic modest dress. The invisibility of the facial features is what makes it a sexually 
appealing symbol as the covered face which reveals the eyes and the eyebrows also 
exposes what is under the thin niqab. Thus the veil is associated not only with sexual 
attraction and seduction, but also with the fear of fitna. In relation to the notion of fitna, 
Margot Badran (2009, p. 74) states that, in popular belief, women were believed to be 
‘essentially sexual beings’ and considered to ‘possess greater sexual instincts, 
threatened to ignite chaos, or fitna’ with which they were associated. In Amin’s 
example, the burqu’ and niqab are directly associated with the ‘fear of fitna’. 
Portraying it as an item which ‘reveals charms’ and ‘hides imperfections’, he also adds 
to the sexual appeal of the veil an aesthetic dimension. In addition to echoing the 
Orientalist discourse of the veil as a symbol hiding the ‘beautifying elements of the 
desiring onlooker’, Amin links unveiling with turning the gaze away from women. It 
is interesting to read Nasif’s and Amin’s examples in parallel with the religious 
discourse part of which uses the idea of fitna as a justification for the practice of veiling. 
Opposing this type of discourse, Amin links the increase of fitna with the burqu’ and 
niqab, which he maintains ‘urge to discover more’. Moving away from the association 
of the veil with the sexualisation of the female body, the concept of fitna is introduced 
as a potential threat which can be caused by the veil rather than its absence. The 
sexualisation of the veil read within this concept therefore emphasises its sexual threat 
mentioned earlier in the Orientalist examples which I examined in the previous chapter.      
 
What is striking about the above examples is that, in contrast to the dominant religious 
discourse which equates veiling with modesty and honour and emphasises the de-
sexualisation of the female body in public space, Nahda proponents tie the veil with 
sexual attraction, seduction and fitna. As the examples illustrate, linking the veil with 
these notions positions unveiling not only within seriousness and a-sexuality, but also 
with morality. The veil in these terms stands against reaching a moral status. Unveiling 
thus becomes a means of achieving a better society which is implicitly unattainable 
with the veil. The association of the veil with sexual playfulness and unveiling with 
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seriousness and morality explicitly contrasts with the prevalent religious discourse 
which emphasises the importance of the veil in maintaining modesty within the public 
space. The examples from these texts therefore mark a difference with the dominant 
religious discourse of the veil as a means of achieving morality.  
 
‘Veiled in her Ignorance and Backwardness’ and ‘bonds of ignorance and the 
veil’ 
Nahda intellectuals additionally classify the veil as a symbol of backwardness and 
ignorance. In his book Athar Bahithat al Badiya, (Reports of the Seeker in the Desert) 
(Nasif, 1962) Malak Hifni Nasif’s brother, who collected her writings and later 
published them, introduces the works of his sister, whom he considers the first feminist 
woman orator in Egypt who openly fought for women’s rights at the dawn of the 
twentieth century. In his writing about women’s conditions during colonialism, he 
states (Nasif, 1962, p. 67) that: 
 
At that time, the veiled woman was veiled in her ignorance, backwardness and 
misguidance, and the cowardice of many of the reformers, the hegemony of the 
British colonial rule, the power of the foreign infiltration, and the weakness of 
governors and men of letters.  
 
Directly linking the veil with ignorance and backwardness, Magd Deen Hifni Nasif 
blames not only the reformers, but also the British colonial rule as well as the weakness 
of the governors and men of letters of the time. The veiled woman becomes an example 
of ignorance due to the lack of education that was widespread, and additionally 
embodies backwardness which contrasts with the implicit progress and power of the 
colonial rule. The metaphor ‘veiled in ignorance and backwardness and misguidance’ 
explicitly refers to being denied and deprived of education and knowledge, but 
implicitly refers to the veil as an epitome of ignorance and backwardness. This 
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inherently associates unveiling with knowledge and progress, both of which are linked 
with the colonial ruler. Writing during the British colonial rule in Egypt, Magd Deen 
Nasif contrasts the ‘power of foreign infiltration’ with the ‘cowardice of reformers’ 
and the ‘weakness of governors and men of letters’. He ties the veil with ignorance and 
backwardness which also implicitly contrast with the ‘hegemony of colonial rule.’ This 
was a at a time when the reformers and intellectuals were debating issues pertaining to 
women’s rights, seeking means to improve their status which was also perceived as a 
means of achieving the progress of the whole nation and Muslim Ummah. 
 
The image of the veil as a form of ignorance and backwardness echoes its colonial and 
Orientalist counterpart, but the allusion to ‘colonial rule’ and ‘foreign infiltration’ 
emphasise the dilemma faced by many colonised peoples of the time, having to 
negotiate between borrowing from the West, yet struggling against colonial intrusion, 
and between adopting Western ideals, and maintaining local religious and cultural 
specificities.38 The discourse of the veil as a symbol of ignorance and backwardness is 
therefore part of an Arab reformist discourse aiming at changing the practice of veiling 
which had previously confined women to the private space.  
  
There are many examples in Nahda texts which equate the veil with ignorance and 
backwardness. In his book, The New Woman (Amine, 1987), Qasim Amin likewise 
associates the veil with ignorance. Towards the end of his book, he offers a solution 
that would take his people out of their backwardness. In a more explicit nationalist 
stance, he (Amine, 1987, p. 140) proposes to ‘raise them [his people] to the ranks of 
civilisation’: 
                                                 
38 In the case of the Algerian colonial battle, Muslim feminist Marnia Lazreg (1994, p. 54) notes how 
the veil’s shape changed as it became longer and acquired a new importance not as an emblem of cultural 
difference, but also ‘protection from and resistance to colonial-qua-Christian domination’. 
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It is the liberation of woman from the bonds of ignorance and the veil. We have 
not invented this method, and we have no merit for inventing it, but other 
nations have used it before us and have benefited from it [...] Despite 
differences in their countries of origin, race, language and religion, these 
women have united on the issue of possessing their freedom and enjoying their 
independence. This is the freedom that has taken the Western woman out of her 
old backwardness.   
 
Qasim Amin’s expression ‘the bonds of ignorance and the veil’ positions the dress 
within the constraints of a lack of knowledge. The veil thus becomes an embodiment 
of ignorance and darkness, against the implicit light and knowledge of the Western 
woman. The veil is ignorance and darkness. Advocating the liberation of the Arab 
Muslim woman from ‘old practices’ such as the veil, Amin also supports the view that 
emulating Western women would save veiled woman from the ‘old backwardness’ of 
her Western counterpart. Unveiling epitomises a movement of progress. The double 
image of ‘ignorance’ and ‘backwardness’ reiterates the superiority of the Western 
model, and inferiority of the veiled Muslim woman. Fixing the veil within ignorance 
and backwardness likewise positions the dress in a time frame that is past and needs to 
be crossed to achieve knowledge and progress. Openly adopting a liberal discourse of 
emancipation, Amin stresses the importance of benefiting from ‘other nations’ and 
advocating the model of the Western woman. In order for the veiled woman to achieve 
progress and civilisation, following the Western model of freedom and independence 
are imperative. Unveiling, which he advocates in his books, are defined as the only 
means of saving the veiled woman from backwardness and ignorance, allowing her to 
join the Western woman who had already achieved freedom and independence.  
 
Another Nahda proponent who evokes the issue of ignorance and backwardness in 
relation to the veil is Nazira Zain al-Din. In her book Asufoor wal Hijaab (Unveiling 
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and Veiling) (al-Din, 1928, p. 46), she implicitly links the hijab (both visual burqu’ 
and spatial confinement) with making Muslim women ‘ignorant’, ‘lacking intellect and 
religion’. The association of the hijab with lack of religion contrasts with some Muslim 
and Islamic feminists’ equating Islamic dress with religiosity and piety (Alvi, et al., 
2003, p. xiv). Associating the hijab with a form of protection for woman, Zain al-Din 
contends that ‘it has taken the shape of oppression, ignorance and confinement to the 
house’, as well as the adoption of two forms of the veil: the face-veil (or burqu’) which 
is the direct one, and the house which operates like a metaphor of the veil as it ‘veils’ 
woman from the outside world. Like in the earlier example, the veil embodies lack of 
intellect and reason, therefore ignorance. Although considered a more concrete and 
committed form of practice of religion and a sign of an increased religiousness, the veil 
for Zain al-Din is paradoxically linked with lack of religion. In addition to this, the 
hijab in both forms limits woman to ‘the production of progeny’ and ‘serving men’, 
implicitly preventing her from accessing freedom, independence and emancipation. 
 
Tahar Haddad (1978) pursues the Nahda association of the veil with ignorance in his 
book ‘Our Woman in Shari’a and Society’, which caused an uproar at the time of its 
publication in Tunisia during the Nahda period due to its call for unveiling. He asks 
(Haddad, 1978, p. 91): 
 
Can you imagine that after Muslims have strived to prepare the woman to 
confront society and accurately exploit the rights Islam has provided her with, 
this same reform which has solved her problem has thrown her back to the 
depths of homes veiled from the world which has made her the most striking 
example of ignorance, foolishness, injustice and bad education?  
 
Here the expression ‘depths of homes veiled from the world’ equally positions home 
as a metaphor for the veil. The veil in both forms (the niqab and home confinement) is 
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associated not only with ignorance as in earlier examples, but also with foolishness, 
injustice and bad education. Calling for the removal of the visual and spatial hijabs, 
Haddad evokes ignorance and ‘bad education’, which implicitly posit the European 
subject as the holder not only of knowledge and education, but also enlightenment 
against the darkness of the hijab. Moreover, he refers to injustice in relation to the veil. 
Taking an Islamic perspective in his argument for the rights provided to Muslim 
women within an Islamic framework, he calls for unveiling which would not only free 
Muslim women from both visual and spatial hijabs, but also provide her with 
knowledge, justice, intelligence, and education, all of which are unattainable with the 
hijab. He stresses the idea of the veil as antithetical with intellectual ability and 
knowledge. Although he grounds his argument on Islamic principles, he reiterates the 
essentialist tropes of the veil that were common in the Orientalist tradition.  
 
Similarly adopting a human rights discourse about the Arab woman, the Tunisian-born 
reformist states that the reform of women’s rights has paradoxically led to an increased 
adoption of the hijab, the confinement and face-veiling of women which were common 
practices at the time. In this rhetoric of intellectual deficiency, the veil does not only 
mean ignorance and lack of education, but also injustice associated with confinement 
and veiling.  
 
Zain al-Din similarly uses a discourse of women’s rights in relation to the concept of 
knowledge as an ideal that is unattainable with the practice of veiling. In an example I 
cited earlier, she (al-Din, 1928, pp. 58-59) likewise equates veiling with ignorance, 
which she contrasts with knowledge and freedom provided by unveiling: 
 
...I believe that unveiling, knowledge ... call more than veiling (hijab), 
ignorance...for protection, honour and modesty... This is because good manners 
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are not implanted in the soul of an ignorant person in the way that they do in 
the soul of a knowledgeable one.  
 
This example similarly equates veiling with ignorance whilst unveiling, which is 
equated with knowledge, is connected with positive attributes. Similar to the previous 
example which links the veil with the restriction of woman to her reproductive 
capacity, Zain al-Din here equates the veil with a potential failure in the meaning of 
motherhood, the human family and the good of society. All these associations attribute 
morality to unveiling and immorality and decadence to the veil. Additionally, Zain al-
Din ties the veil with ‘making woman ignorant’ in addition to it being a means for 
‘attributing to women lack of intellect and religion’. Alluding to a long tradition of 
excluding women from the fields of intellectual production and religious interpretation, 
she challenges the perception of woman which reduces her to ‘serving man and the 
production of progeny’. In her association of the veil, she establishes the significance 
of education, including in religious matters, in order to overcome the ignorance of the 
veil. Unveiling becomes a means of raising woman’s status from simply serving man 
and producing progeny, to becoming knowledgeable and improving her status within 
the family and the overall society. Through the association of the veil with ignorance 
and backwardness, Zain Din reiterates the Orientalist trope of ignorance and darkness 
of the dress, yet further emphasises the discourse of human rights that was prevalent 
during her time, in which woman’s status was increasingly debated among the Arab 
intellectual elite in various Arab and Muslim countries. Progress, knowledge and 
enlightenment in these terms were only achievable through unveiling. 
 
Other Nahda figures used the idea of ignorance and backwardness regarding the veil. 
Another Nahda proponent who also associated the veil with backwardness and 
ignorance was Qasim Amin whose books The Liberation of Woman and The New 
Woman focused on the issue of Islamic dress as the point of departure for any reform 
in the Arab countries. In his first book, he discards the idea of following Western 
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nations in all their traditions for the sake of imitation and mimicry, or of getting 
attached to new habits merely on account of their novelty. However, he demands a 
‘lightening of hijab’. In this context, Amin (2003, pp. 68-69) directly links unveiling 
to progress when he asks the question:   
 
Is it now necessary for us to live and stay alive, or condemn ourselves to die 
and become extinct? [...] Or do we have to observe how others have progressed 
and we have regressed, how they have gained power and we have become 
weak? [...] This is a serious matter to which we have turned our attention.  
 
In addition to indirectly connecting the veil with death and extinction through the 
expressions ‘to die and become extinct’, Amin explicitly associates the dress with 
regression, backwardness and weakness, which contrast with Western progress, 
enlightenment and power. On the one hand, this reiterates the dichotomous and 
hierarchical relationship between Western progress and Eastern backwardness through 
the image of the veil. On the other hand, these themes position veiling as a movement 
back in time, in opposition to unveiling as a movement forward in time. Veiling 
becomes a backward movement, unveiling a forward movement. The hijab is 
accordingly symbolic of the division between a West which unveiling has made 
stronger and more developed, and a weak East whose veiling keeps it backward.  
 
Still emphasising the dichotomy between East and West, Amin compares the levels of 
education of Christian women and Muslim women in the East. He (Amine, 2003, p. 
75) concedes that, due to their free mixing, Christian women have been able to develop 
mentally and intellectually, and have therefore gained a higher status than Muslim 
women, despite both women being from the same countries. Amin thus contrasts 
Western progress with his people’s backwardness and Western power with his people’s 
weakness. Bringing images of death in relation to maintaining the practice of veiling 
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and seclusion, he calls for ‘life’ which he associates with discarding the veil in order 
to achieve progress and power. The veil thus becomes weakness, unveiling power.    
 
Veil and Dark Times: ‘Darkness of the veil’ or ‘Enlightened Guardians’ 
The ideas of darkness and enlightenment were also part of the Nahda discourse of the 
veil. In a chapter of her book where she openly calls the authorities to free women from 
their low status, Nazira Zain al-Din draws an image of darkness with the veil and 
ignorance:  
 
Some of us have been cursed in the East with four types of darkness: darkness 
of the veil (niqab) in a woven cloth, darkness of the veil (niqab) in ignorance, 
darkness of the veil in hypocrisy, and darkness of the veil in inertia. We are 
therefore placed within many types of darkness, and the veils have grown to 
terrify us to the point where we almost fear the East draws a veil between us 
and its true luminous state (al-Din, 1928, p. 50). 
 
In her association of the veil with darkness, Zain al-Din enumerates four different types 
of darkness. She adds to the material darkness symbolised by the niqab cloth the 
darkness of the metaphorical ‘niqab of ignorance’, the darkness of hypocrisy, and the 
physical darkness of inertia and inaction. After naming these different types of 
darkness, Zain Din cautions against the ‘terror’ which she associates with the veil, and 
against the East ‘drawing a veil between us and its luminous state’. 
 
In contrast to the West and its ‘enlightened’ state, the East is ‘cursed’ with different 
layers of darkness of which the veil (or the niqab/burqu’ more precisely) becomes an 
embodiment. The veiled woman is here clothed in various kinds of darkness. 
Positioning the veil within an antithetical relationship to enlightenment and progress, 
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the example also implicitly contrasts it with knowledge, education, sincerity and 
action. We can link the reference to the veil and hypocrisy with the idea of wrongly 
forcing women to veil without any religious basis. Additionally, the veil seems to cause 
strong emotions of fear and horror. The veil is thus not only dark, it embodies various 
forms of darkness. The curse of the veil is dark, and it is not only temporal, but also 
affective. 
 
The image of darkness is also paralleled with a vision of the East as ‘luminous’, a 
perception which moves away from the previous association of the East with darkness 
and absence of enlightenment, which is attributed only to the Western model. Rather 
than echoing the dominant discourse of the veil as a symbol of the ultimate darkness 
of the East, which is in need of emulating the West to achieve progress, Zain al-Din’s 
reference to the ‘luminous state of the East’ complicates the dominant discourse 
exclusively linking enlightenment with the West, and total darkness with the East. 
Although she recognises the four types of darkness, she nonetheless attributes a 
potential ‘light’ which the East can draw from its state. The physical, material, 
metaphorical types of darkness which represent a ‘curse’ for the Muslim woman can 
be overcome not through Western enlightenment, but via the ‘true luminous state of 
the East’ itself. Unveiling is thus associated not only with a Western model, but with a 
search for an ‘authentic’ and genuine enlightened state of the East. The veil darkness 
can be overcome through Eastern light.   
 
The link established between the veil and darkness is sometimes crouched within 
religious references. In her book, for instance, Zain al-Din (1928, p. 51) blames men 
for deceiving women into thinking that the veil is an obligation (an action which maybe 
be linked to the image of ‘darkness of the veil in hypocrisy’ mentioned in the example 
above): 
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How much have they put a strain on us, what have they concealed from us in 
the dark periods of time that religion wants us to cover our faces, and their 
distortion was associated with compulsion, and not with valuing woman [...] 
How many enlightened guardians are there, whose hearts have bled at the sight 
of unmarriageable relatives oppressed in the darkness of the veil against their 
own wills. Compulsion originated from every person who had a fantasy until 
the Muslim woman witnessed every backward person or every person with an 
aspiration as a master, a guardian and a representative of her matters. 
 
The veil is yet again associated with darkness. Here Zain al-Din draws a contrast 
between ‘enlightened guardians’ and their implicit unenlightened and backward 
counterparts who have forced women to wear the veil. As in the previous example, she 
directly ties the veil with ‘darkness’. This contrasts not only with the ‘enlightenment’ 
of ‘many guardians’, but also the West, which is perceived as the model to be followed. 
Haideh Moghissi (1999, p. 15) draws our attention to how the trope of the 
‘domesticated, subjugated, unenlightened Other as opposed to the liberated, 
independent and enlightened Western self was used as a moral prop to legitimise 
colonial power relations’. We can see how Zain al-Din uses the idea of darkness to 
emphasise the superiority of the Western model in contrast to the Muslim other in need 
of enlightenment.  
 
In her writing about the practice of face-veiling, Zain al-Din confirms that man has put 
a ‘strain on woman’, concealing from her that the niqab is not a religious obligation. 
This distortion to which she refers dates back to the ‘dark periods of time’. Zain al-Din 
stresses that men have concealed knowledge from women in relation to the niqab, a 
compulsion linked with backwardness in her example. She thus establishes a 
connection between the niqab imposition and the ‘dark times’, and between the niqab 
and backwardness. She additionally ties unveiling with ‘enlightened guardians’ as both 
images reiterate the association of the veil with darkness, and unveiling with 
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enlightenment. The images of darkness/enlightenment and backwardness/progress 
draw the veil within the ambits of a discourse which again equates the practice with 
the dominant meanings of darkness and backwardness. Enlightenment, which is 
implicitly equated with unveiling, repeats the Orientalist images of the veil as a barrier 
against freedom and emancipation. The veil embodies darkness, tension, and perhaps 
damage and harm, duplicity, compulsion and distortion at once. As the example 
illustrates, the images attached to the garment situate it not only within the traditional 
darkness/enlightenment dichotomy, but also within an emotional realm. The veil is 
thus an affective object. 
 
Zain al-Din repeatedly alludes to the images of darkness in her writings about the veil. 
In a similar example, she (al-Din, 1928, p. 51) calls upon the authorities of her country 
to ‘dispel the darkness of ignorance and tyranny’: 
 
Since you [authorities] have freed yourselves from the West in the last period 
of time, the light of freedom and knowledge has been reflected upon us, shining 
and dispelling the darkness of ignorance and despotism. We have been 
educated and have considered our religion with all its wisdom and eminence, 
and have found in it the opposite of what they have been hiding from us. We 
have seen that religion wants us to unveil our faces to the air and the light as all 
people uncover their faces.  
 
Zain al-Din refers here to the decolonisation movements witnessed by many Arab 
countries during the beginning and middle of the twentieth century. She points out that 
the ‘light of freedom and knowledge have been reflected on us’, which she contrasts 
with the ‘darkness of ignorance and despotism’ attributed to the ‘East’ (which reminds 
us of the dichotomy made between darkness and enlightenment). The image here is 
that of reflection: the light of freedom and knowledge is ‘reflected’ on Muslims, and 
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Muslim women become a reflection of the West, an image or clone or mirror of the 
West. Unveiling is reflectional and inspires reflection.  
 
Like in the earlier example, Zain al-Din ties the veil with deception and secrecy, while 
she equates unveiling with ‘air and light’. We can read this as another reference to 
enlightenment, as well as to life itself which contrasts with the death of the veil. The 
veil embodies death, unveiling life. She attributes not only ‘light’ to the colonial rule, 
but also knowledge and freedom, which are contrasted with local darkness, ignorance 
and despotism. Speaking from a position of knowledge, she notes that education and 
religious knowledge are the means through which she found that religion advocates 
unveiling ‘our faces to air and light’, again reiterating the image of light to unveiling. 
As her examples illustrate, the veil does not only embody darkness, but also deception 
and death. In addition to being affective, the veil is deceptive and perhaps unethical.    
 
What is the significance of the contrast between Orientalist and Nahda eras? As the 
comparison between the Orientalist and Nahda texts illustrates, decolonisation 
struggles such as the Nahda movement can retain many of the colonial meanings and 
tropes attached to the veil in their writings. If we consider these meanings in terms of 
continuity and discontinuity, we can argue that the veil represents a line of continuity 
of construction between Orientalist and Nahda writings of the 19th and early 20th 
centuries. However, whilst the Nahda texts retain and reiterate these associations of 
the veil, and whereas the different writings of the Nahda intellectuals demonstrate how 
the Nahda preserves the basic Orientalist discursive construction of the veil in terms 
of an ‘other’ object, they nonetheless diversify and expand this construction by 
embodying and embedding/fixing veils more in their local contexts and struggles.  
 
On the one hand, Orientalist and Nahda texts use the trope of happiness to construct of 
the veil as a signifier of unhappiness. Yet while Orientalists emphasise the idea of 
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unveiling as a happiness mission coupled with a life mission which associates the veil 
with death and extinction, Nahda writers construct the veil as a signifier of unhappiness 
not only of the Muslim woman, but also of the Muslim society and global Ummah. 
Against the Orientalist limiting the notion of happiness to the victim-status of the 
Oriental woman in the harem, Nahda writings embed the notion of happiness within 
not only the concept of the hijab (visual and spatial veils), but also the notions of social 
justice, law and women’s status in the family and Muslim societies at the beginning of 
the twentieth century. The Nahda writings therefore retain the construction of the veil 
with unhappiness, yet position it within broader debates about women in Arab Muslim 
contexts. As my analysis has shown, Nahda texts also demonstrate how the trope of 
happiness is embedded in an ethical and affective discourse of the veil. Regarding 
associations of the veil with enslavement and imprisonment, the Orientalist texts 
reiterate the trope of victimisation through the veil by constructing the veil as a prison, 
while the Nahda texts expand the Orientalist trope to include not only physical and 
spatial confinement, but also embodied and intellectual slavery. Although their 
writings rely on a colonial discourse for unveiling, their construction of the veil as a 
signifier of enslavement and imprisonment emphasise the importance of intellectual 
freedom, divine justice and the good of the family and society, hence including an 
ethical dimension to unveiling. Likewise, Nahda texts retain the Orientalist 
construction of the veil within exoticism and sexual seduction, (veil as sexual 
emotional and ethical dimensions) but expand these notions to include notions of the 
veil within immorality, impurity and obscenity. In contrast to the sexualisation of the 
Muslim woman in Orientalist writings, Nahda texts stress the abuses of the veil by 
Muslim women themselves, and the sexualisation of modest dress to include the 
notions of morality and fitna. The additional tropes of ignorance, backwardness and 
darkness which I have analysed in this chapter likewise retain the construction of the 
veil within these meanings. However, the Nahda writings continue to position 
meanings of the veil within their local struggles for women’s rights and the attainment 
of justice, knowledge and progress which are constructed as antithetical to the hijab. 
Their constructions of the veil in these terms in turn emphasise the status of the veil as 
not only embodying these various associations, but also adding affective and ethical 
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dimensions to those embodiments. Analysing the construction of the veil in this 
comparative framework has allowed to see how the Arab Nahda texts of the early 20th 
century retain many of the basic constructions of the veil that were prevalent in 
Orientalist writings. As my analysis has shown, the contrast between texts from both 
eras demonstrates how colonial meanings of the veil can be adopted even within the 
framework of anti-colonial struggles of the early twentieth century. Yet although 
maintaining these colonial and Orientalist constructions, anti-colonial movements such 
as the Nahda also incorporate divergences from the traditional Orientalist tropes. These 
deviations operate, in constructions of the veil, as attempts to embed debates about the 
hijab within local struggles of the early twentieth century contexts of Arab and Muslim 
countries. The veil thus functions as a line of both continuity and discontinuity between 
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 French Veils 
 
The previous chapters investigated the veil within Orientalist and Nahda texts of the 
archive, and tracing its trajectory through the histories of Orientalism, postcolonial, 
Muslim and Islamic feminism, and setting the background for a study of contemporary 
associations of Islamic dress in France and Morocco. As I elucidated in my 
methodology chapter, I chose Orientalist and Nahda texts because of the historical 
specificities of Morocco and France within these traditions and time frames: France 
with its long Orientalist tradition and colonial history, and Morocco due to its 
involvement with the Arab Nahda movement and its history as a Maghrebi North 
African nation-state and previous French protectorate. 
 
Starting from Afsaneh Najmabadi’s (2006) argument that ‘the meaning of a Muslim 
woman’s veil is both multiple and historically contingent, that this meaning has been 
subject to challenges and negotiations’, the comparative focus of my analysis enables 
me to consider Islamic dress through different social and historical junctures in order 
to examine its meanings through time and space, and assess how the currently 
heightened preoccupation with the Muslim woman in media and politics is illustrated 
through the focus on the dress of the Muslimah in the French and Moroccan 
contemporary press. This can be added to my personal histories of a postcolonial 
diasporic Muslimah. 
 
In this chapter, I analyse the meanings of the veil in three French mainstream weeklies 
during the hijab controversy which preceded the 2004 hijab ban in France39, and 
                                                 
39 Alma and Lila Levy (daughters of a Jewish father and a kabyle mother, Kabyle referring to 
Amazigh/Berber people of Algeria) are expelled from their school in Aubervilliers in 2002 by the 
disciplinary council. The event marks a starting point for a polemic that will lead to the hijab ban in 
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consider first how the hijab is attached to different notions and values. In particular, I 
explore how the hijab becomes an embodiment of fundamentalism40, Islamism41 and 
extremism,42 and how the garment is constructed as antagonistic to, or irreconcilable 
with, secularism and the French nation as defined by the French mainstream press and 
politics. In the second part of the chapter, I explore how the dress becomes associated 
with sexual otherness through the notions of oppression, inferiority and stigma, and 
how it comes to embody an attack to emancipation and equality. In the third and last 
part of the chapter, I examine how the veil signifies an ethical and communal otherness 
through acquiring meanings of proselytising, propaganda and communalism. I explore 
the various meanings of the hijab in the press and politics through a close examination 
of examples of texts from the weekly newspapers Le Nouvel Observateur,43 Le Point44 
                                                 
French public schools in 2004. I chose this timeline of the headscarf affair as it provides the first case 
which led to the hijab ban which is still in place today.  
 
40 Olivier Roy (2007, p. 9) defines fundamentalism as follows: ‘when religion separates itself from the 
surrounding cultures and defines itself as pure religion in a system of explicit codes (in its political form 
this is called Islamic ideology; in its strictly religious form, it is Salafism)’.   
41 Olivier Roy’s also defines Islamism as ‘the brand of modern political Islamic fundamentalism that 
claims to re-create a true Islamic society, not simply by imposing sharia, but by establishing first an 
Islamic state through political action. Islamists see Islam not as a mere religion, but as a political 
ideology that should reshape all aspects of society (politics, law, social justice, foreign policy, and so 
on). (Roy, 2002, pp. 58-59) 
 
42‘Fondamentalisme’, ‘integrisme’ (or extremism) and ‘islamisme’ are French words which have been 
used to describe French Muslims who adopt the hijab in France. In contrast with ‘liberal and moderate 
French Muslims’ who are categorised as proponents of French secularism (laicity), Muslims donning 
Islamic dress are viewed as a threat to the republic which is interpreted as symbolising allegiance to an 
Islamic political ideology at the expense of French secularism and laws. 
43 Le Nouvel Observateur which has been named L’Obs since 2014 is a weekly French newsmagazine 
which is based in Paris. It is the most outstanding French general information magazine as far as 
audience and circulation are concerned. Since its inauguration in 1964, the weekly has covered political, 
business and economic news, and features coverage of European, Middle Eastern and African political, 
commercial and cultural affairs. It is  most notable for its strong political and literary issues, and is well-
known for its detailed treatment of current issues. Its current editorial board is presided over by two of 
its co-founders, Jean Daniel and Claude Perdriel, two editors-in-chief, Laurent Joffrin and Serge 
Lafaurie, as well as director general, Jacqueline Galvez. A 65% stake in the magazine was purchased 
by the owners of Le Monde in 2014. Jean Daniel and Claude Perdriel were the founders of the 1964 
magazine. The circulation of the magazine during the first half of 2013 was 526,732 copies. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Le_Nouvel_Observateur (accessed) 
 
44 Le Point is a French weekly political and news magazine published in Paris. It was established 1972 
by a group of journalists who had left the editorial team of L'Express, which was then owned by a 
member of parliament of the Parti Radical (Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber). Le Point is published 
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and Marianne45 as well as the Stasi Commission Report and Jacques Chirac’s 
speeches.  
 
As I noted in my methodology chapter, my choice of the three weeklies is based on the 
important readership that they have within the French mainstream print media. 
Although my study does not claim to provide a comprehensive consideration of all the 
associations and meanings which are evoked in relation to the hijab, the three weeklies 
remain representative examples of a wider discourse on the veil within French print 
media.  In addition to the press, I have examined examples from political texts which 
include President Jacques Chirac’s speeches and the Stasi Commission Report46, both 
of which constitute the basis on which the 2004 hijab ban was issued.  
 
My analysis also aims to compare how the current meanings of the hijab47 evoke older 
colonial meanings and images of the veil; they re-evoke an ‘essential difference’ of the 
veil. I argue that in the French publications and texts, we can read associations of the 
hijab in terms of a colonial discourse adopted and updated to suit the contemporary 
context. Throughout, I will be reading the archival texts in the light of postcolonial, 
Muslim and Islamic feminist frameworks. After I analysed how the veil operates as a 
metaphor of otherness within Orientalist and Nahda texts, I compare this construction 
                                                 
weekly by Le Point Communication. The editorial team of spring 1972 was directed by Claude Imbert. 
The magazine has recently modelled itself closely on Time Magazine and Newsweek. Le Point has a 
conservative and centre right stance. The 2013 circulation of the magazine was 417,062 copies. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Le_Point  
45 Marianne is a weekly news magazine based in France. It was inaugurated in 1997 by Jean-François 
Kahn with Maurice Szafran as editorialist. The weekly claims a distribution of 300,000 copies per week. 
It has a centre-left, left-wing stance. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marianne_(magazine)   
46The name of the Commission was taken from its heading member, Bernard Stasi who was the 
spokesperson for the government. 
47 As Caitlin Killian (Killian, 2003) points out, the girls concerned with the 2004 ban and who were at 
the center of the controversy usually wore Western clothes with a veil (hijab) pinned around their face 
to cover their hair. As we shall see through the examples, this distinction will be obscured through 
references to other elements of modest attire such as the niqab, jilbab or khimar, which have also been 
attributed to the young French Muslimahs. 
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with the more contemporary one emerging from texts within the French press and 
politics. So what meanings are attached to the veil before the 2004 hijab ban? How do 
these compare with Orientalist and Nahda tropes of the veil?  
  
Political Threats to the French Nation  
6.1.1. Islamist Violent Fanatic and Other French Hijabs 
 
This section explores texts in the French press and politics where the veil is affiliated 
with a difference that is defined explicitly in political terms. It is noteworthy that, as 
Pnina Werbner (2007) noted in her comparative study of Muslims in Britain and 
France, although the meanings of veiling differ depending on contexts, the French have 
emphasised ‘the pernicious features of veiling’ in discussing and passing the law 
against the veil in schools. These include stories about the veil which are linked in 
public imagination with violent compulsory veiling in Iran after the revolution and in 
Afghanistan under the Taliban (Werbner, 2007). In what follows I consider veil 
associations with Islamism48 and violence where ‘political Islam’ is presented as a 
‘creeping danger’ that seeks to manipulate the French political scene (Gozlan, 2004). 
In the French weekly Marianne, for instance, during the heated debate about the hijab 
affair, Martine Gozlan (Gozlan, 2004) asks the question: 
 
                                                 
48 Nilüfer Göle refers to the terms ‘Islamist movements’ and ‘radical Islamism’ interchangeably to name 
‘Islamic movements as a collective action whose ideology was shaped during the late 1970s by Islamist 
thinkers all over the Muslim world (such as Abu-Maudoodi in India, Sayyid Qutb in Egypt, Ali Shariati 
in Iran, and Ali Bulac in Turkey) and by the Iranian Revolution’. The term ‘radicalism’ connotes ‘a 
return to the origins, to the fundamentals of Islam, to address a critique to Western modernity on the one 
hand and a desire to realize a systemic change, to create an Islamic society, on the other’. (Göle, 1996, 
p. 1). Lila Abu Lughod (2001, p. xiii) additionally notes that the term Islamism emphasises ‘self-
consciousness about Islamic identity and the very deliberate way that people who adopt this identity 
want society to conform to Muslim values’.  
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Who are the authors of this [veil] manipulation? Is it the vast galaxy exploiting 
the Islamic frustrations to revive, all around the world, this intensely violent 
identity which is the launch pad of political Islam? The affair of the veil is like 
holy bread and the veil the banner which floats on every major Muslim crisis. 
Its adoption or refusal have accentuated in a century (in reality since the dawn 
of Islam, but let us stay in the contemporary age, from Turkey to Egypt and in 
the Maghreb) all the tragic forward and backward social movements caught 
between the obsession of the past and the dizziness of the future. It is therefore 
logical that the Arab-Islamic world - mainly Islamist in answer to the attacks 
to which it has been a victim, has been at once subject to manipulation and has 
been manipulative – as it gave in once more to the spell of the battle of the veil.  
 
In addition to attributing the hijab to an undefined ‘nebulous group’, Martine Gozlan 
also identifies it with a major symbol of political Islam and Islamism, and evokes the 
Islamic Revival movement experienced in Muslim countries through the terms ‘revive’ 
and ‘Islamic frustrations’. Gozlan further ties what she calls ‘the battle of the veil’ (la 
bataille du voile), and implicitly Islamic Revivalism, with an ‘intensely violent 
identity’ systematically associating the hijab (and the wider Islamic Revivalism) with 
an extreme form of violence. As Islamic belief and the hijab become an indicator of a 
‘latent commitment to violence that can never fade,’ (Razack, 2008, p. 47) we can link 
this vision of the hijab with a violence which remains invisible. Against the disturbing 
visibility of the garment in public space, the invisibility of violence is considered to be 
inherent and intrinsic to the hijab as a symbol which promotes an extremist and 
‘intensely violent identity’. In their insightful study of ‘honour killings’, Heidi Safia 
Mirza and Veena Meetoo (2007) argue that, since September 11, ‘young ethnicised 
women have become highly visible. However, they are now problematically contained 
and constructed in the public consciousness within a discourse of fear and risk posed 
by the presence of the Muslim alien ‘other’’ (Meetoo & Mirza, 2007). We can see how 
such a discourse can be applied to the visibility of the hijab in the French context. It is 
a visibility of young Muslimahs through which the hijab is constructed as a ‘violent’ 
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symbol. It is also the higher visibility of the hijab in public space which paradoxically 
allows for a greater emphasis on the risk that the dress poses. Characterised by a global 
transnational impact reaching beyond the French national borders, the violent identity 
of the (Arab-Islamic) muhajjaba moves from the ‘mainly Islamist Arab-Islamic world’ 
to the French scene. The example thus equates the hijab not only with an extremely 
violent identity, which has its roots in a geographically remote place (the Middle East 
and the Maghreb), but also with an ideological difference with this ‘other’ space, 
defined as violent and Islamist.  
 
There is a context to how the hijab becomes an Islamist threat: even if we know this 
context, we still need to understand it. September 11 has marked what Göle refers to 
as the ‘violent eruption of Islam at the heart of Western hegemony’ where Islamism, 
which we cannot reduce to terrorism alone, acquires ‘transnational dynamics, and 
establishes itself in Western spaces’ (Gӧle, 2011, pp. 32-33).49 Although Islamism 
encompasses various dimensions and one needs to distinguish between Islam as a 
religious practice and Islamism as an ideology, in the example the hijab becomes a 
symbol of radical Islamism which promotes violence and terror. In other words, it is 
through the values projected onto the hijab that Islam as a religious practice is conflated 
to Islamism as an ideology. 
 
As Naima Bouteldja (Bouteldja, 2007) argues, ‘as Muslims and Islam are increasingly 
conflated with Islamists and terrorism, it is fast creating a climate in which Muslims 
are presumed guilty until proven innocent, and where many feel they have no other 
choice than to withdraw into an identity being constructed for them’ (Bouteldja, 2007). 
Violence, terror and Islamism are thus conflated with the hijab which in turn positions 
                                                 
49 Sulltana Alvi (Alvi, et al., 2003, p. xiv) additionally point out to the tendency of Western media and 
political leaders to associate Islam with terrorism. 
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the French Muslimah in a state of culpability. There are many examples of this 
conflation; it has become routinised. For instance, the text also defines the ‘Arab-
Islamic world’ as ‘Islamist’, reinforcing at once the assumption of a systematic link 
between Islam and extremism, hence the conflation of religious or pious practice and 
violent ideology. The statement further limits religious fanaticism to the Islamic 
religion. Amina Wadud (Wadud, 2006, p. 57) notes that, in the context of Judaism, the 
term ‘Zionism’ disentangles the political and the sacred spheres, whereas there exists 
no similar operation to distinguish political Islam from the sacred, making it difficult 
to understand what the term ‘Islam’ means when it is used. The example systematically 
affiliates the hijab with political Islam and violence, thereby conflating the practice of 
veiling with the promotion of violent Islamism. The associations of the hijab with 
manipulation, violence and fanaticism parallel the Orientalist and colonial themes I 
discussed in earlier chapters. There are similar instances of associations of the veil with 
a violent and extremist symbol in Castellan’s texts, and Fanon’s writing about the 
mission of the French coloniser to attack the most visible symbol of Algerian tradition. 
 
The use of the expression ‘Arab-Islamic world’ (monde arabo-musulman) additionally 
shows an imprecise view of the homogenised and essentialised category ‘Arab’: not 
only is it monolithic and implies the existence of a homogeneous and fixed unity, but 
it is also questionable since not all Arabs are Muslims and not all Muslims are Arabs 
(Razack, 2008, p. 34). In this context, anti-Muslim racism or what is referred to as 
Islamophobia has produced an ‘Arabification’ of Muslims and ‘Muslimification’ of 
Arabs (Razack, 2008, p. 34.). In fact, in addition to the fact that Arab countries are 
inhabited by other ethnicities, Arabs represent a minority among Muslims worldwide. 
Many Muslims in Arab countries, or countries that have a majority or near majority of 
people who identify themselves as Arab, may share certain characteristics pertaining 
to Islam, yet there are differences in branches of Islam such as Sunni, Shi’a, and 
Matha'hib, or major recognised Islamic schools of thought within Sunni Islam, Hanafi, 
Hanbali, Sha'fi'i or Ma'liki. Additionally, Arabophone Muslims speak different 
dialects of Arabic (as well as indigenous dialects such as Amazigh or Berber), and they 
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have no political or economic union, such as the European Union. Moreover, in 
addition to Christians and Jews, different ethnicities inhabit Arabophone countries, 
among which one of the major distinctions in North Africa is between the Berber or 
Amazigh people, and the people of Arab descent who later conquered Maghrebi 
countries. Also the use of ‘world’ implies an imagined unity which remains rather 
mythical.  
 
In addition to indicating a preoccupation with the Islamic and Middle Eastern countries 
and their associated Islamic Revivalism symbolised by the veil, the term ‘Arab Islamic’ 
also denotes a concern with the French Muslim population from Maghrebi origin 
through the link with the ‘battle of the veil’ which refers to the French hijab 
controversy, and more tacitly to the colonial battle of the veil in Algeria. Coding the 
hijab with the category ‘Arab’ additionally racialises French Muslimat (Muslim 
women) by depicting them through their historical cultural/ethnic Maghrebi origins, 
hence restricting the hijab to a particular racial and cultural category. This is 
comparable with Amina Wadud’s statement about wearing the hijab which has raised 
her ‘ethnic  anonymity’  in different countries including the United States, not 
disclosing her African origins and making others identify her with various Muslim 
ethnicities. (Wadud, 2006, p. 224.) In the case of French Muslimat, rather than being 
anonymous, the hijab instead becomes synonymous with their ethnic/cultural 
background as it unambiguously marks their cultural and historical North African 
origins. The French Muslimah is thus identified through her hijab, hence becoming 
‘ethnically’ remarkable and ‘racially’ outstanding.  
 
We can further draw an analogy between the category ‘Arab’ and that of ‘immigrant’ 
which, as Sunera Thobani (2007, p. 76) argues, unsettles the notion of the nation as a 
‘homogeneous non-racial entity, drawing attention to the presence of ‘racial Others’. 
Paradoxically, the racialised category immigrant also ‘upholds the myth of the 
homogeneous nation’ by constituting immigrants as ‘perpetual strangers’ even when 
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they belong to the second or third generation (Thobani 2007, p.76), in this case of 
French-born citizens. Sara Ahmed (2000, p. 16) has also pointed out to how the ‘figure 
of the stranger’ is constructed through various discourses, arguing that the difference 
of ‘strangers is claimed as that which makes the nation be itself’. The categories ‘Arab-
Islamic’ and ‘Maghreb’ which Gozlan evokes in relation to the hijab affair construct 
the hijabed body of the French Muslimah within a racial, ethnic and cultural difference 
and otherness in relation to the French non-Arab, non-Maghrebi, non-Muslim citizen. 
The example thus constructs the hijab within racial terms, or a ‘racialised knowledge 
production’ (Razack, 1998, pp. 94-92) of the hijab as an alien element to the French 
nation. The French ‘battle of the veil’ which evokes the colonial times becomes a 
means of linking the practice not only with an ‘Arab’ and ‘Maghrebi’ phenomenon, 
but also with an ‘Islamist’ threat, hence both racialising and politicising the hijab.  
 
The homogenisation of the French nation accompanies that of the hijab as a political 
‘Arab’ ‘Islamist’ phenomenon having roots in the ‘Arab-Islamic world’. In the review 
of the histories of the veil, I discussed Mohanty’s idea of ‘homogenisation’ in the 
Western feminist representation of the ‘third-world woman’. We can usefully apply 
this idea to the homogenisation of the ‘Arab Islamist world’ on the one hand and the 
‘Islamist veil’, both of which serve to draw frontiers between France and the ‘Arab 
world,’ and distance the hijab from the French context. The idea that the majority of 
the ‘Arab world’ is ‘Islamist’ implies that Arab nation-states adhere to a violent type 
of Islamism which remains unclear and non-defined in the example.  
 
In practice, governments and states of the Arab and Maghrebi regions, whose legal 
systems have been changed since the colonial era, seek to promote a modern reading 
of Islam. This is the case for Morocco which will be examined in the next chapter. The 
predominant nationalist ideology in Tunisia, for instance, held that liberalism and 
secularism should be the founding principles of the Tunisian nation, and woman the 
‘bastion’ and force that should hold the burden of the national project after 
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independence from colonial rule (Daoud, 1993, p. 12). In various Muslim countries, 
the influence of modernisation was manifested in women’s discarding of the Islamic 
dress. 
 
The abandonment of the veil endorsed by Muslim countries through their experiences 
of modernisation following decolonisation movements, and the secularisation policies 
adopted in most Muslim-majority nation-states, represent an instance of a discourse 
which equates the veil with non/anti-modernity. Yet, as Olivier Roy notes, the process 
of westernisation of Muslim countries, although it has been followed by an Islamic 
revival in different points (political, societal, increased veiling, references to sharia in 
the law) does not signify a ‘return to a premodern society’ but rather an endeavour to 
‘Islamise modernity’. (Roy, 2002, p.18-19) In the more recent European context, Göle 
states that Muslim women’s participation in public life, their visibility in urban spaces 
as well as socialising with men point to a secular way of life, and a significant change 
in the way public life is structured (Göle, 2011, p.107-108). The ‘secular way of life’ 
which French Muslimat in hijab adopt through their visibility and participation in urban 
space contrasts with the homogeneous image of the hijab as an exclusively violent 
Islamist, and by implication an anti-modern symbol which promotes a violent 
Islamisation of the French political and social systems.  
 
At another level, against the affiliation of the hijab with an ‘intensely violent identity’ 
which symbolises a threat to the secular ideal, the process of immigration is 
accompanied by ‘acculturation concerning organised religion and authority, as young 
Muslims usually part with traditional interpretations of religion’ (Göle, 2011, p.23).50 
                                                 
50Regarding the term acculturation which has replaced the word assimilation, Caitlin Killian (2006, p. 
8) argues that ‘acculturation differs from assimilation because it implies becoming competent in the 
ways of the host society while continuing to be identified by others as a member of a minority group—
in other words assimilating culturally but not being socially and/or economically assimilated into the 
host country’s institutions. Used this way, acculturation reads much like segmented assimilation’.  
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The image of the veil as a fixed, homogeneous and violent symbol which is importable 
from a remote place rests on the assumption that it constitutes an essential Islamist and 
violent object which systematically transfers violence to the French scene. The 
example endorses a vision of the hijab as a culturally, racially and ethnically alien 
symbol to the French framework and the secular normative subject, further 
emphasising its otherness.  
 
The expression ‘battle of the veil’, which is also the title of the article, emphasises the 
danger that Arab/Maghrebi Muslim countries pose to France through the ‘violent 
Islamist’ threat. This places the hijabed body of the Muslimah outside the borders of 
the French nation as it represents an ‘Islamist’ ‘Arab’ and ‘Maghrebi’ threat, and 
therefore an alien element to the French secular space and geographical boundaries. 
‘The Battle of the Veil’ also connotes the colonial obsession with the veil in Algeria 
evoked by Fanon. We can draw a parallel between the battle in France taking place 
prior to the hijab ban, and the older colonial battle of the veil in Algeria, Morocco, and 
Tunisia, with the difference of the ‘Muslim other’ being a second and third-generation 
French-born-citizen rather than a colonial Maghrebi subject. The transposed ‘battle of 
the veil’ reinscribes the hijab not only within an otherness defined in racial and cultural 
terms (‘Arab’ ‘Maghrebi’) but also in political terms as a metaphor for manipulative, 
violent Islamism.  
 
The idea of the hijab as a violent Islamist symbol is sometimes more explicitly tied 
with its notion as a threat to the republic, thereby pitching the republic against what it 
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calls ‘fanaticism’ or ‘extremism’ as in this statement from Le Point by Jean Francois 
Revel51: 
...the headscarf attack is launched by girls who are not suddenly caught by a 
renewal of their faith, but are duly reprimanded and manipulated by Islamist 
fanatics. That is why the headscarf in schools is not a simple religious sign, 
indicating the faith of those who wear it. It is the message which the Islamists 
send to us, and they decide to lead the assault against the Western values. It is 
the Muslims who are sincerely republican who denounce this danger with the 
utmost lucidity in our country. Our leaders, on the contrary, believe they can 
overcome the difficulty by declaring that it does not exist [...] But the conflict 
is already open, and the activated war is not that of the republic against Islam, 
but of fundamentalism against the republic (Revel, 2003) 
 
Similar to the image of the ‘battle of the veil’, this article attributes expressions to the 
hijab which include ‘attack of the veil’ (offensive du voile), ‘open conflict’ (conflit 
ouvert) and ‘activated war’ (guerre activée), all of which suggest a combat launched 
by the hijab against the republic. As Werbner writes in the context of ‘embodied 
struggles’ among Muslims in Britain and France, in addition to being perceived as the 
forerunners of a dangerous attack to French secularism, the girls who wear headscarves 
in France are comprehended as the pioneers of more ‘extreme demands for separate 
institutions and special treatment, and for the predatory expansion and colonization of 
                                                 
51 Jean-François Revel, whose real name is Jean-François Ricard, was born in 1924 in Marseille. From 
1943 until the end of the war, he participated in the Resistance led by Auguste Anglès, under the 
pseudonym "Ferral." It was during this time of war that he published his first texts in the magazine 
Confluences. He left University in 1963 to devote himself to a career as a journalist and writer. His 
literary career began in 1957 with the novel Histoire de Flore. He is the author of about thirty works, the 
most famous of which are Ni Marx ni Jésus (1970), La Tentation totalitaire (1976), Comment les 
démocraties finissent (1983). He regularly collaborated to the art magazine L'Œil from 1961 to 1967. 
Pamphleteer and essayist, he collaborated with France-Observateur, and became director of L'Express  
in the late 1970s,which he left in May 1981. Jean-François Revel has also worked as a columnist for 
radio stations: Europe 1 (1989-1992), RTL (1995-1998). From 1982 he was a columnist for the 
newspaper Le Point. http://www.babelio.com/auteur/Jean-Francois-Revel/3818 
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public spaces’. (Werbner, 2007) We can certainly see how the use of terms such as 
‘attack’, ’conflict’ and ‘war’ in relation to the hijab in France depict the French 
Muslimah as a potential threat to French secular values. The hijab in such a discourse 
not only embodies an attack, but also carries potential ‘extreme demands’ by French 
Muslims who are grasped as ‘colonisers’ of French secular space.   
 
As the carrier of an ‘Islamist message’, the hijab is portrayed not merely as an assault 
to Western values (Zuhur, 1992)52, but also a war of the republic which fights against 
‘fundamentalism’. The inscription of the hijab within fundamentalism suggests a 
process of ‘looking backward’ which contrasts with the ‘looking forward’ promoted 
by the ideology of progress and enlightenment on which secularism is based. In his 
study of Islam in the media, Edward Said argues that the concept of ‘fundamentalism’ 
which is constantly evoked in the media, has come to be routinely tied with Islam’ and 
that ‘the deliberately created associations between Islam and fundamentalism ensure 
that the average reader comes to see Islam and fundamentalism as essentially the same 
thing’ (given the tendency to reduce Islam to a handful of rules, stereotypes, and 
generalizations about the faith, its founder, and all of its people) (Said, 1997, p. xvi). 
 
In Revel’s example, the hijab epitomises not only an implicit ‘backwardness’, but also 
an essentially ‘fundamentalist’ symbol of Islam in France. The hijab embodies a 
broader ‘fundamentalist’ war. The example yet again conflates Islam as a religious 
practice with fundamentalism, which is in turn equated with Islamism. Notions such 
as ‘radical Islamism’ and ‘neofundamentalism’ seek to explain Islam’s political and 
collective renewal, yet the perspectives adopted by political scientists stress the 
collective and ideological aspects of the movement, without considering the 
                                                 
52 In her study of Islamist movements in Egypt during the 1980s, Sherifa Zuhur notes that the word 
‘fundamentalism [usuliyya] suggests ahistoricity and looking backward.’ (Zuhur, 1992, p. 10.) 
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‘problematic and personal relation to modernity’ (Göle, 2011, p.46-47). Similarly, 
equating the hijab with fundamentalism and fanaticism overlooks the personal 
dimension that French Muslim girls hold in relation to the dress. As Werbner notes, 
the hijab which is worn in Britain communicates a ‘new identity’ which is not 
necessarily ‘fundamentalist, Islamist or radical’ because its signification and the 
politics of embodiment it symbolises can vary to a great extent in different contexts as 
well as among individuals. (Werbner, 2007) The ‘activated war’ which the example 
establishes between Islamic fundamentalism and the republic further stresses the idea 
of the nation facing a threat embodied by the presence of the hijab in schools. Such a 
discourse of the hijab as an essential symbol of fundamentalism (and a threat to French 
civic culture) needs to be considered not only within the framework of a post 9/11 fear 
of Islam, but also in the context of fear that members of the Algerian Islamic Salvation 
Front (FIS) were organising in France, and images of forced veiling in Iran and Algeria 
since the early and mid-1990s. (Killian, 2003) These contexts have also contributed to 
reinforcing the image of the veil as a fundamentalist threat. 
 
We can add the link which the earlier example sets between the hijab and the categories 
‘Arab’ ‘Maghreb’ and ‘immigrant’ to the category of ‘Muslim’ girls who are strictly 
defined following their religious/cultural belonging, and who are thus reduced to their 
visible/visual Muslimness. Additionally, allying French Muslimat’s bodies with a 
‘terrorist threat’ through the named expressions serves to reproduce ‘past encounters 
in the present times’, as Thobani notes in the Canadian context of constituting the 
Canadian ‘sense of nationality’ in terms of ‘actual and paranoid encounters’ as ‘the 
protection of nationals from explosive racial and terrorist violence through the 
strengthening of state power becomes the solution to the presence of potentially lethal 
racial strangers’. (Thobani, 2007, p23).  
 
The fundamentalist threat attributed to the hijab in the French republican schools is an 
instance of a discourse which defines French Muslimat against the ideal secular 
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national subjects. As the most visible symbol of Muslimness in France, the example 
constitutes the hijab as an assault not only against the French secular normative subject, 
but also against ‘Western values’ and identity, portrayed as a fixed and static entity in 
open combat against dangerous ‘Islamist fanatics’ and ‘fundamentalist’ others. Sara 
Ahmed’s notion of ‘strange encounters’ and Thobani’s ‘paranoid encounters’ can be 
usefully applied to the idea of the hijab as a threat to the French republican school, 
extending to the republican values and nation. These encounters with ‘potentially lethal 
strangers’ position the hijab not only within a political threat, but also with an 
inherently racial and cultural threat to the French republican subject and its values. The 
hijabed Muslimah thus embodies and consolidates the vision of the French secular 
subject as one that is distanced from the Islamist, fanatic, and fundamentalist other. 
Equally important is the attack said to have been launched against the French 
republican values, which emphasises the dichotomy between superior French Western 
values, and inferior Islamist values assigned to the hijab.  
 
The image of French Muslimat ‘manipulated’ and controlled by their male counterparts 
and the example’s allusion to hijabed girls ‘manipulated by Islamist fanatics’ recall the 
image of the Oriental woman as a victim of her male oppressor. As Mirza and Meetoo 
argue in relation to the more recent Islamophobic discourse of the media, ‘ethnicised 
women’ are ‘pathologised as victims’ (Meetoo & Mirza, 2007). Positioning French 
Muslimahs as tools deployed and controlled by ‘Islamist fanatics’ is an instance of a 
discourse which equates them with victims. Not only are they ‘ethnicised’ through 
references to their racial/ethnic origins, but also ‘pathologised as victims’ of a fanatic 
fundamentalism. This idea is that of French Muslim girls being coerced or forced to 
wear the hijab, despite the fact that many were repeatedly requested to remove it, either 
by their parents or schools authorities, and others voluntarily quit school after being 
expelled. The title of the article ‘Extremism against the Republic’ reinforces the idea 
of a violent battle against the hijab which embodies fanaticism, which further suggests 
links with the war fought between coloniser and colonised during the colonial era. 
Revel tacitly positions ‘secular’ Muslims against other French ‘extremist’, and 
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‘fundamentalist’ Muslims, contrasting ‘republican Muslims’ with non-republican ones 
against whom the war is waged. The binary construction republican/non-republican 
Muslims hence sets the ground for a vision of the West as a homogeneous entity with 
a ‘duty to sort out good Muslims from bad Muslims’ (Razack, 2008, p.49). These 
binary oppositions also serve to alienate young hijabed Muslimat and situate them as 
‘outsiders’ to the secular nation, as the others who cannot be accepted within the 
republican school.  
 
There are many examples associating the hijab with extremism. In an article affiliating 
the hijab of French Muslimahs with Islamism, Claude Imbert53 from Le Point allies the 
dress with demands by French Muslims, masking extremist views that are 
irreconcilable with the ‘French democracy’ (Imbert, 2004): 
 
...Because we quickly understood that the veil of the young ladies announced 
only a veiled and joint operation of evident fanatics, that in certain classes, the 
teachers could not teach any more without being threatened, either in biology, 
or history of the religions, or the Shoah, and that the aversion of Jews 
proliferated in classes. In hospitals, the women refused the ungodly exam of 
the doctor. In brief, a certain Qur’anic law instilled in various places its 
unbearable taboos. And the declared opponents of democracy began to 
challenge the rights of our open and gentle democracy to their profit. 
                                                 
53 Claude Imbert was a French journalist who was born in 1929 at Quins in the Aveyron. He began his 
career at Agence France-Presse on behalf of which he spent several years in Africa. In 1964, he joined 
the newspaper L'Express, of which he was chief editor since 1966. In 1971, he left L'Express and became 
chief editor at Paris Match. The following year, he founded Le Point where he was managing editor and 
general manager before giving his post to Franz-Olivier Giesbert. He however continued to deliver a 
weekly editorial to the magazine. In 1976, he was editor of samedi matin at Europe 1, with Jean Daniel 
and Serge July. He participated for several years in a weekly current affairs debate with Jacques Julliard 
on LCI. http://www.babelio.com/auteur/Claude-Imbert/68403 
http://www.aveyron.com/accueil/imbert.html http://www.revue-medias.com/claude-imbert-l-homme-
qui-fait-le,70.html 
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Set within a discourse of rights, the example draws a contrast between ‘democracy’ 
and an implicit ‘theocracy’ linked with the hijab. The image of a ‘veiled and organised 
operation of evident fanatics’ suggests an Islamist threat against the republic, 
resonating with earlier references to the ‘battle of the veil’ ‘war’ and ‘veil attack’. The 
example constructs this hidden ‘joint operation’ as a dangerous Islamist threat 
organised against republican values, and challenging its laws. The hijab thus stands as 
the marker of a political difference (Islamist, theocratic) against the French nation 
(secular, democratic). Turned into a national threat, the few instances of students who 
refused to attend some biology classes, religious history and the Shoah, and women 
expressing their preference for female doctors are portrayed as part of a ‘joint operation 
of evident fanatics’. The text also contrasts ‘Qur’anic law’ with republican laws offered 
by an ‘open and gentle democracy’ (Baraganzi, 2004, p. 6). In short, the example not 
only aligns the hijab with fanaticism and extremism, but also with a war waged against 
republican schools, hospitals, and laws. The reference to Qur’anic law, which is itself 
misleading, explicitly contributes to contrasting the hijab with French democracy, 
further marking it with an ideological difference from French secular laws. Similarly, 
the implicit equation of the veil with theocracy and more explicitly with ‘Qur’anic 
laws’, locates it outside the French republic. Regarding Qur’an and Shari’a, Baraganzi 
argues that ‘the constructs ‘Islamic law’ and ‘shari’a law’ do not represent the 
Qur’anic Shari’a (with capital S), meaning the collective guidelines of the Qur’an that 
encompass an intertwined moral and legal bind once the individual accepts the 
guidelines of his or her belief system, nor do they represent the Qur’an’s principles’ 
(Baraganzi, 2004, p.6). By giving these opinions a legal status as ‘law’, Orientalists 
and contemporary Muslims have confused the Qur’anic Shari’a (guidelines) with other 
legislation or canonized laws (Baraganzi, 2004, p. 6). We can notice how Imbert’s 
reference to ‘Qur’anic law’ represents an instance of attaching ‘laws’ to the ‘Qur’an’ 
which provides guidelines rather than ‘laws’. This conflation of Qur’an with laws 
additionally marks the hijab of the French Muslimahs with ‘laws’ which belong outside 
the ‘democratic’ laws attributed to the republic.  
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The image of the dress ‘veiling’ a ‘vast invisible mass of evident fanatics’ bears 
resemblance with the perception of veiled women as agents for the battle against the 
colonial power during the Algerian national liberation struggle, when ‘haiked’54 
women were actively involved in the war that brought about the end of colonisation. 
The same scenario was repeated in Morocco where sisters, wives and members of the 
resistance participated in the struggle during two years preceding the independence of 
Morocco from French colonial rule, when they were reported to have used their veils 
to carry weapons (Daoud, 1993, p.255). Fanon’s accounts show how Algerian women 
used the haik as an instrument, a form of camouflage against the colonial authorities, 
making them play a decisive role in the Algerian national liberation movement (Fanon, 
1967, p. 67). A similar image inhabits the perception of the French Muslimah as the 
newly dressed threat to France. Yet, rather than being a threat to colonial power, the 
hijab prior to the 2004 ban represents a threat to the French republican values.  
 
We can think about the image of the hijab as a threat in other terms. Razack argues in 
her study of the construction of such categories as the ‘dangerous Muslim man’ and 
the ‘imperilled Muslim woman’, ‘the eviction of a groups of people from political 
community begins with their difference’ (Razack, 2008, p.84). In the case of the hijab, 
expelling the hijabed body of the Muslimah from the recognised political community 
and secular space similarly operates through inscribing it with a difference which is 
incompatible with the French republic and its values. Marked as a political threat to 
the French nation (Islamist, fundamentalist, extremist, fanatic), the examples further 
define the hijab as belonging to a race, culture and ethnicity situated outside the French 
republic, which adds both a cultural and racial difference to the political one. Reviving 
                                                 
54  Similar to my use of the term hijabed and niqabed to refer to a person wearing hijab or niqab, I use  
haiked to mean wearing a haik which is type of long and ample cloak Maghrebi women wrap around 
their bodies from head to ankles, the only visible parts of the body being the eyes, and sometimes the 
nose. 
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‘old colonial relationship and the structures of feeling on which they rely’ (Razack, 
2008, p. 178), the examples reiterate the vision of the veil not only as a hidden political 
threat, but also as a legal threat to the French laws (by implication: the hijab becomes 
against law). While the haik was used as a tool of resistance during the Maghrebi wars 
for independence, the hijab of French Muslimat is used to reinforce the image of the 
French nation against French Muslims who are said to undermine republican laws. In 
2002, the hijab is perceived as an immediate menace and in an open war against the 
French political and legal systems.  
 
The French Stasi Commission Report (Commission de Reflexion Sur l'Application du 
Principe de Laïcité Dans La Republique, 2003) similarly establishes links between the 
hijab and Islamism. In recalling the historical battles between Church and State in 
France that led to the crystallisation of French secularism, the Report declares that ‘the 
spiritual and the religious must renounce their political dimensions’ (Stasi Report). It 
further states that ‘laicity is incompatible with any conception of religion that would 
wish to control, in the name of its supposed principles, the social system or public 
order’ (Commission de Reflexion Sur l'Application du Principe de Laïcité Dans La 
Republique, 2003).55 (Emphasis mine) The Report therefore assigns a political 
dimension to the hijab through which it aims at ‘controlling public order and society’. 
The implication is yet that, on the one hand, the religious includes a political 
dimension, and that the hijab hides a will to control public order and society.  As we 
will see in later examples, the vision of ‘control’ is also linked with the depiction of 
the hijab as a proselytising tool.  
                                                 
55Regarding French secularism, Olivier Roy notes that France has battled against religion in order to 
impose a state-enforced secularism, and that laicite is an ‘exacerbated politicized, and ideological form 
of Western secularism’ that has evolved at two levels: ‘a very strict separation of church and state, and 
an ideological and philosophical interpretation of laicite that claims to provide a value system common 
to all citizens by expelling religion into the private sphere’(Roy, 2009, p.xii). Naima Bouteldja (2005) 
also refers to French secularism as ‘a historical construct that blossomed with the victory of the republic 
over the Catholic Church. Its three founding juridical principles are the separation of church and state; 
the freedom of thought; and the free exercise and organisation of worship’.  
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Another statement in the Stasi Report implicitly affiliates the hijab with fanaticism. In 
its defence of French secular history, the Commission (Commission de Reflexion Sur 
l'Application du Principe de Laïcité Dans La Republique, 2003) declares that to 
manifest one’s ‘cultural identity’ cannot be done ‘in the shape of a fanaticism of 
difference inclusive of oppression and exclusion’ (emphasis mine). The Report 
attributes a ‘cultural identity’ to the Muslimat muhajjabat, yet again defining the hijab 
as the embodiment of a cultural/ethnic/racial origin, and which also conveys the idea 
of a fixed and unchanging entity. The automatic association of the hijab with a culture 
(implicitly an Arab/Maghrebi/North African origin) and with ‘fanaticism of difference’ 
is another instance of a homogenisation and essentialisation of the dress, perceived as 
a gendered Maghrebi/Arab/Muslim phenomenon. The Report thus views the hijab 
worn by French Muslimat as essentialised and embodying a ‘culture’ located outside 
the boundaries of the French nation. This is an example of how Islam as a religion can 
be conflated with ‘Muslim culture’. (Roy, 2006, p.10) As Killian argues in her study 
of North African women in France, the hijab affair reveals how different societal 
groups ‘continue to use women in battles over culture and identity and how Muslim 
women in particular bear the brunt of fears about the “other”. (Killian, 2006, p.11) 
Hijab stands for a ‘culture’ and ‘identity’ situated outside the French republic.     
 
The idea of the hijab in such a depiction is comparable with ‘a disloyalty that is visible 
not in what people do but in who they are’ and ‘who people are is formulated in terms 
of an unchanging essence derived from their histories, associations, and religious 
practices, a constellation of invariant characteristics inherited from a culture, religion, 
and region’ (Razack, 2008, 28). As Joan Scott (2007, p. 149) stated in her insightful 
study of the veil in France, the headscarf was deemed ‘a flag of a different color’ which 
indicated ‘disloyalty’ to the values of the republic. Who Muslimat are therefore matters 
more than what they do, as the hijab becomes the means through which they are 
defined.  
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In its attempt to construct the unity and indivisibility of the French nation, the Stasi 
Commission defines the hijab in terms of an essential difference and ‘unchanging 
essence’ encompassing not only the political domain through the expression 
‘fanaticism of difference’, but also a racial and cultural difference through its reference 
to ‘cultural identity’. The example thus ties the hijab with a specific culture and religion 
deemed inferior to the French nation and secular model. It is useful to think about this 
association through the concept of disloyalty evoked by Razack, which the 
governmental political body (the Stasi Commission) recognises in ‘who’ the hijabed 
Muslimat are: as the descendents of immigrants, the hijabed girls concerned with the 
ban are defined through an essential cultural, religious and geographical origin 
perceived as a threat to the loyalty and allegiance requested by the French secular 
nation. The visible nature of this disloyalty in the secular space enables the 
Commission to condemn young Muslimat of being outside the boundaries of its 
constructed national community.  
 
We can additionally read the examples of the Report through the notion of a 
‘communalising power’, a process through which the state constitutes the Muslim 
community as a distinctive cultural and racial group (through religious belonging and 
ethnic origin), existing outside the bounds of the nation (Thobani, 2007, p.149). In her 
study of the narratives constituting the Canadian national subject through various 
historical junctures, Thobani highlights the ‘power of the state as a ‘communalizing 
power’, that is, a power which constitutes communities as discrete racial, ethnic, and 
cultural groups existing within its territorial borders, yet outside the symbolic bounds 
of the nation’ (Thobani, 2007, p.149). If we consider both concepts together, we can 
notice how the language and images used with reference to the hijab of French 
Muslimat contributes to emphasising their ‘disloyalty’ and ‘communalism’, both 
constructions being part of a broader process linked with their visible difference within 
the secular nation. As Göle argues, the presence of Islam in Europe, manifested through 
its immigrant population, seemed to the European consciousness as a ‘forcible 
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intrusion’ and an ‘invasion’ which has provoked a feeling of ‘losing the bearings of its 
identity, its geographical and cultural borders’ (Göle, 2011, p.40). Joan Scott similarly 
notes how headscarves were considered an ‘intrusion of religion into the secular sacred 
space of the schoolroom’ (Scott, 2007, p. 90). 
 
In contrast to the vision of the hijab as a ‘communal’ dress, Göle notes that, Muslims 
who seize the new values of Islam today are involved in an ‘ethnic-identity process’ 
which manifests itself in personal practices, and that the contemporary Islamic identity 
‘is defined less by a collective and discursive process than by a performative and 
personal one that seeks to inscribe it in public space’ (Göle, 2011, p.121). Although 
limiting the practice of veiling to an ‘ethnic-identity process’ can be restrictive and 
risks ‘ethnicising’ Islamic dress, it is useful to think about the hijab of many French 
Muslimat as a ‘performative and personal practice’, especially considering that many 
of them adopted it against the will of their families, and that the majority of the 
Muslimat concerned with the ban are second and third-generation French born citizens. 
This does not occlude the fact that pressure can be exercised on some young women 
to wear the hijab, but attributing pressure to the adoption of the dress amounts to 
another instance of homogenising the practice and the multiple experiences of veiling, 
as well as denying young Muslimat agency. As Killian demonstrates in her study of 
cultural adaptation and privatisation of religion of Muslim women in France, religion 
which was a communal matter in North Africa, becomes an ‘affair of the heart’ for 
some Muslim women in France as headscarves are relegated to the private space of 
home (Killian, 2007). Such studies problematise the homogeneous vision of the hijab 
as an automatically imposed dress, which is also ‘communal’. 
 
The examples from the weeklies and the Stasi Report tie the hijab with Islamism, 
extremism, fundamentalism and fanaticism, which inscribe it with a political difference 
in relation to the French nation. Alongside the equation of the hijab with these 
meanings, the examples additionally mark the dress as a culturally, ethnically and 
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racially different entity, constructing it outside the definition of the French political 
and national community. The essential difference of the Muslimat muhajjabat hence 
goes beyond the political field of imposing an Islamist and fundamentalist stance to 
the dress, to that of the racial realm through imposing a cultural, ethnic and racial 
otherness in France. 
 
To sum up, associations of the veil with violence, Islamism and fanaticism and a 
political threat to the French republic serves to show how it is irreconcilable with the 
concept of the French nation as the holder of democracy and progress. The inscription 
of the hijab as a political and national threat also shows how a more implicit cultural 
and racial threat is coded on the dress as an alien element of the French nation. The 
multi-sided threat serves to stigmatise French Muslimat not only as potentially lethal 
dangers to the French nation and republican laws, but also a racial threat to the 
republic’s cultural identity and values, which are repeatedly constructed in 
homogeneous and essentialist terms. Linked to this construction of the hijab is that of 
the dress as an Islamist threat to national cohesion and civilisation. 
 
6.1.2. French Civilisation, Islamist Veils 
 
In this section I analyse how the dichotomy of ‘civilised’ and ‘uncivilised’ maps onto 
a distinction between French values and that of Islam and the hijab. As I noted in 
chapter two, Orientalism often operates by making ontological distinctions. Edward 
Said (1979, pp. 300-301) describes how Orientalism creates a distinction between the 
West and the rest: by positing an ‘absolute and systematic difference between the West 
as rational, developed, humane, superior,’ Orientalism creates an Orient that is 
‘underdeveloped, inhumane and inferior’. In this section I explore how the distinction 
between France and Islam becomes defined in terms of civilisation. 
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Before the 2004 hijab ban, many French political and media texts from the archive 
imagined the hijab as a threat to the French civilisation. Jean Daniel56 from Le Nouvel 
Observateur entitled ‘Marianne and her Veil’ contrasts ‘Islamist French people’ to 
‘republican citizens’ (Daniel, 2004): 
However minor they are, the Islamists have asserted in broad daylight a 
presence which we suspected but also a determination of which we ignored the 
coherence. The advantage of the project of adopting a law is to reveal this 
dismaying and irrefutable fact: these Islamist French people speak about Islam 
as a nation, and about their traditions as a civilisation. They do not adhere 
individually, as citizens, to the republic. They collectively claim to Islamise it 
by contamination.  
 
Through the image of ‘contamination’, Jean Daniel transposes the danger of ‘Islamists’ 
to the French nation via its population of French Muslims. We can consider this image 
in the context of a perception of French Muslims, and the hijab in particular, as a 
‘cultural’ symbol from which French Muslimat must be, in Razack’s terms, 
‘deculturalized before they multiply to contaminate the superior civilization in which 
they have migrated’ (Razack, 2008, p.108). The image of Muslims ‘Islamising’ the 
republic‘ by contamination’ projects an idea of the French Muslimah as the 
‘inassimilable and diseased Other’ (Razack, 2008, p.108) who posits a threat of 
contamination to the French nation. Regarding the French assimilationist model, Roy 
(2002, p. x) states that access to citizenship ‘means that individual cultural 
                                                 
56 Jean Daniel (Jean Daniel Bensaid) was born in Blida, Algeria in 1920. As a young man he moved to 
France and became a freelance journalist. He worked with L’Express. In 1964, Daniel left L’Express 
with several other journalists, including André Gorz, to establish Le Nouvel Observateur, a weekly news 
magazine. In 1982 he helped establish the Saint-Simon Foundation think-tank.  http://spartacus-
educational.com/JFKdanielJ.htm  See also http://www.thenation.com/article/175947/colonist-good-
will-albert-camus# 
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backgrounds are erased and overridden by a political community, the nation, that 
ignores all intermediary communitarian attachments (whether based on race or ethnic 
or religious identities) which are then removed to the private sphere’. The hijab in this 
context is read as an ‘inassimilable’ difference.  
 
We can also tie the image to the concept of the threat of contamination, and the idea of 
the ‘possibility of being pathological, yet appearing normal’. The idea of a ‘sleeper 
cell’ can be extended to the vision of the veil as a latent threat which the example 
characterises with coherence and resolution. Against the autonomous individual 
promoted by the republic, the communal hijab’s ‘pathological’ stance lies in its ability 
to contaminate the republic through Islamisation. However, as Roy (2002, p.14) notes, 
the process of re-Islamisation in terms of personal behaviour (hijab, veil, beards) and 
an increase in religious practices have been accompanied with a process of 
westernisation. In evoking the image of ‘Islamist contamination’ in relation to the hijab 
in France and the concepts of Islamic ‘nation’, ‘tradition’ and ‘civilisation’, the 
example constitutes the French citizen and national subject within a nation (and 
civilisation) that contrasts with the communalisation of the Muslimah whose belonging 
to Islam which marks her as an outsider to the community of citizens. The references 
to ‘tradition’ and ‘civilisation’ further codify the hijabed body within an essential racial 
difference and belonging to an ‘other’ nation, culture and civilisation situated outside 
the boundaries of France. The feelings of concern and anxiety justify the need for a 
law despite the stated ‘minor’ number of ‘Islamists’. The Islamist Muslimah muhajjaba 
parallels the ‘figure of concern’ and ‘strange encounter’ evoked by Ahmed and 
Thobani. It is this figure that casts the Islamist stranger and outsider--the figure which 
threatens to contaminate the republic--against the trope of the insider French citizen 
who is in danger of contamination. Within the context of schools, as Joan Scott noted, 
girls in headscarves symbolised the danger from which other children needed to be 
shielded, and that they ‘carried the virus’ of religion into the school (Scott, 2007, p. 
107). Legislating against the hijab hence becomes an imperative step to protect the 
‘civilised’ French citizen against the uncivilised Islamist.  
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The images of a ‘coherent presence and determination’, and ‘collective Islamism’ 
make a minority of French Muslimat appear like a militant and organised movement 
of a gigantic proportion that presents a danger to the French nation.57 The example 
refers to the allegiance to Islam, through wearing the hijab and expressing an 
opposition to the ban in public, instead of loyalty to the republic, a loyalty implicitly 
coded with unveiling and supporting the ban. Constructed as an attack on republican 
values that position religious practice as secondary to republican belonging (French 
citizenship preceding religious practice), the hijab represents the devotion (hence to 
the notion of loyalty) of French Muslimat to Islam at the expense of a community of 
citizens. The example contrasts individual citizens to ‘Islamist French people’ who are 
defined through their assigned ‘religious community’, and the ones who adhere to the 
republic ‘individually’ against those who adhere to it ‘collectively’. The ‘Islamist 
French people’ are therefore reconstructed in opposition to the principles of the modern 
individual (Göle, 1996, p.19). While the French model citizen is portrayed as an 
individual whose allegiance is to the republic and the nation, the hijab confines the 
Muslimah muhajjaba within a definition which contrasts with that of the autonomous 
citizen. The adoption of the hijab marks her body as alien to the community of French 
citizens. Marking the hijabed body with an outsider nation, tradition and civilisation 
further emphasise the status of the autonomous and secular normative French citizen 
whose ‘nation’ and ‘civilisation’ are constructed as superior. These additional notions 
inscribe the veil within a cultural and racial difference. Grouped together, the terms 
                                                 
57 In contrast to the image of ‘Islamists’ as a fixed, united and coherent entity constituting a threat to the 
French nation and values, the French Muslim population has been divided into groups represented by 
various Muslim and non-Muslim associations, many of whom supported the ban (January 2004 CSA 
poll, 42 percent of Muslims favored the ban (CSA 2004). (Killian, 2007). In addition to having different 
ethnic and cultural backgrounds, the percentage of French Muslims provided by studies and the media 
amounts to about five million Muslims. Moreover, the national census excludes all references to 
religion, ethnicity or ethnic origin and language, and the percentage of French Muslims who were in 
favour of a ban, according to the official discourse, exceeded that of Muslims who were not. The anti-
ban demonstration was made threatening by the media that portrayed it as a national peril, and a proof 
that Islam has become a dangerous threat to the republic, as the example from Le Nouvel Observateur 
demonstrates. 
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equally inscribe the hijab within a hierarchical relationship whereby the French nation, 
tradition and civilisation is positioned as superior to the other (Islamist nation, tradition 
and civilisation) to which the hijab belongs.  
 
The association of the hijab with an outsider nation operates in an increasingly 
interconnected world. The definition of a public space identified with a ‘pre-
established’ national community creates ‘tensions and exclusions in a world traversed 
by migratory and transnational dynamics’, whether they are religious, economic, or 
cultural (Göle, 1996, p.10). The hijab paradoxically places French Muslimat within the 
loyalty to religion (Islam) in a nation that only acknowledges loyalty to the republic 
(France), and therefore assumes an opposition between ‘Frenchness’ and 
‘Muslimness’.  
 
The hijab of the French Muslimat also epitomises the impossibility of Muslims to 
become civilised. In their study of the narrative constructions of Muslim women in 
British schools, Meetoo and Mirza (Meetoo & Mirza, 2007, p. 127) argue that ‘the 
reification of (young women’s) cultural/religious difference, and in particular the 
preoccupation with their over-determined dress, has made them an Islamophobic 
signifier, symbolic of the ‘barbaric Muslim Other’ that has existed in Western 
imagination since the terrorist attacks of 9/11’. We can notice how, in the French 
context, an implicit correlation is drawn between the hijab and the figure of the 
‘barbaric Muslim Other’. It is through delineating the parameters of the French 
civilisation that the Muslimah muhajjaba comes to be positioned not only as an other 
to this civilisation, but also as lacking this civilisation. The hijab, which already stands 
as an ‘Islamophobic signifier’ now also epitomises barbarism and savagery. While in 
the colonial era, the trope of civilisation was harnessed to position Islam and the veil 
as inferior to Western civilisation, the French press revives the concept of civilisation 
to contrast Western superiority with Muslim inferiority through the hijab. The hijabed 
body of the Muslimah thus operates as a tool for maintaining French Muslims within 
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the realm of non-civilisation and barbarism, and the French nation in the sphere of 
progress and civilisational superiority.  
 
We can further link the notion of civilisation with modernity. Writing about the 
narrative of modernity, Göle states that the concept is grounded on a universalism 
which also carries a ‘characteristic of civilisation and a pretention of a superior way of 
life that makes Western men and women more civilised than the 'barbarians’ (Göle, 
2011, p.112-113). The example’s reference to civilisation in relation to the hijab and 
Islam within the republican space represents an instance of a universalist discourse 
based on the idea of a linear progress and universal history. Contrasting the republic of 
citizens to the Islamist community is another way of building a dichotomy between 
progress and backwardness, and between civilisation and barbarism. In addition to the 
repeated inscriptions of the hijab within a political threat to the republican values I 
discussed earlier, the example further codes the hijab within a cultural and racial 
otherness through allusions to civilisation and tradition.  
 
In the political rhetoric, the idea of an ‘Islamist coherence’ finds parallels in portraying 
the hijab as an organised threat to ‘national cohesion’, advocated by President Jacque 
Chirac (2003.2) in one of his speeches on secularism: 
 
It [laicity] sends us back to the issue of our national cohesion, and our ability 
to live together, and meet around what is essential. Let us transform the 
interrogations of today into the assets of tomorrow by resolutely seeking the 
unity of the French people. By confirming our attachment to an open, generous 
laicity, as we have known how to invent it year after year, by making equality 
of chances live better with the spirit of tolerance and solidarity, and by 
undertaking a resolute battle for the rights of women, and gathering around the 
values that have made and still make France.  
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In order to put Chirac’s speech in context, let us remember that the debate around 
secularism in France witnessed a resurgence prior to the 2004 hijab ban. The Stasi 
Commission, which was charged with considering secularism in the framework of the 
hijab controversy, supported a ban which was often constructed as a protection of 
French secular values. Chirac’s speeches, which equally focus on laicity, implicitly 
contrast it with the hijab. Through the expressions ‘national cohesion’, ‘unity of the 
French people’, and ‘generous laicity’, the example associates the French republic with 
one indivisible unity. When we compare the expressions with earlier ones such as 
‘Islamist cohesion’ and ‘collective Islamism’, we notice how Chirac not only portrays 
the hijab as a threat to the French nation, but also as antithetical to national cohesion 
and unity, and to the ‘generous laicity’.  
 
In contrast to the press examples’ association of the hijab with a salient political 
symbol, Chirac represents it instead as an enemy of national cohesion, since it 
expresses a visible difference within the republican space. Through the focus on 
expressions of unity, cohesion and togetherness, there is an implicit coding of the hijab 
as a divisive object creating conflict and separation. The republic unites whereas the 
hijab divides. In her discussion of citizenship and Muslim visibility in France, Göle 
points that ‘the confrontation between this space defined as public space and a place 
of gathering and regulation at the same time, and the inscription within it of a difference 
and a non-conformity that raise a problem’ (Göle, 2011, p.131). As Scott notes in her 
compelling study, the distinction between private and public is grounded on traditions 
which are historically linked with Christianity (Scott, 2007, p. 92). The difference that 
the hijab marks in a space defined as a place of ‘living together’ ‘around what is 
essential’ is also perceived as a breach of that space and of secular rules of bodily 
visibility. The expressions build a certain consensus of all citizens on what is most 
important and refers back to the ‘common good’ mentioned earlier. Olivier Roy states 
that today’s laicity is built on ‘the myth of a consensus’, and specifically on the 
consensus of republican values’; rather than dismissing believers, laicity was a bout 
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outlining a space of neutrality, and the consensus is on ‘respect for a rule of the game’ 
rather than on values. (the political and constitutional principle of laicity and not 
philosophy) (Roy, 2007, p.21) Chirac rightly points out that laicity has been invented 
and reinvented through the years. Starting as a principle of freedom of religious 
practice, it has acquired an anti-clerical stance. Through its reference to laicity as the 
founding principle of the republic, the example further inscribes the hijab as an element 
preventing the ‘living together’ of French citizens. The visible non-conformity of the 
hijabed body to the secular norm of visibility in public space is inscribed as an affront 
to secularism, and a barrier against national unity and cohesion. 
 
Jacques Chirac (2003.1) repeatedly uses the concept of civilisation in relation to the 
hijab before the 2004 ban, as he does in another speech on secularism in which he 
states: 
 
This battle [for the republican values] is one among other ones that will draw 
the face of tomorrow's France. The degree of civilisation of a society is 
measured firstly by the place that its women occupy.  
 
Setting his speech on secularism within a ‘battle for republican values’ which resonates 
with earlier examples of the hijab waging a war against France, Chirac estimates the 
degree of civilisation of societies following the position its women occupy. The 
statement affirms the position of France as a ‘civilised’ nation, implicitly contrasting 
it with the ‘non-civilised’ others. Chirac names the battle of the veil which the press 
has repeatedly used a ‘battle for republican values’. Not only does he position an 
implicit hierarchical relationship between a civilised superior republic and non-
civilised societies hence attributing universality to a ‘Western cultural model’ (Göle, 
1996, p.12-13), but also tacitly places the hijab outside the symbolic boundaries of the 
French republic and civilisation. In its battle for republican values which resonates with 
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the colonial battle of the veil, women’s position, considered unequal within Islam, 
presents a marker of civilisation. Systematically understood as a symbol of oppression, 
subjugation and inequality, the hijab of the French Muslimah poses a challenge to the 
values of emancipation and equality which are considered to be inimical to the secular 
liberal subject.  
 
The importance of evoking the idea of civilisation lies in its ability to divide the world 
into civilised and barbaric, cultured and uncultured, superior and inferior. Latently 
marking the hijab with such characteristics contributes to ‘culturalising’ the dress as 
well as ‘racialising’ the difference of the French Muslimat, who are tacitly framed 
within a culturally and racially inferior status. Tilting between symbolising inferiority 
and threat, the hijab epitomises the new centre of attention for the forthcoming ban and 
its justification.  
 
To sum up, associations of the hijab of the French Muslimah with political meanings 
construct it as a multi-dimensioned peril to the French nation, republican society and 
its values. The examples analysed in this section illustrate how it is repeatedly affiliated 
with Islamism, extremism, fundamentalism and fanaticism, as well as an attack to the 
French nation and its Western values of democracy, secularism and the rule of law. 
The current inscriptions of the hijab with a political threat and attack to the republic 
need to be read as a continuity of a discourse which can be traced to Orientalist and 
colonial eras. Let us now turn to another set of associations of Islamic dress with 
sexuality in the French weeklies and political texts.  
 
6.1.3. The Hijab and the Threat to Gender Equality and Emancipation 
In this section, I explore sexual associations that have occupied an important part of 
the French print media and political texts prior to the 2004 hijab ban in France. I 
analyse how the hijab is repeatedly defined as an attack to gender equality and 
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emancipation, two of the founding principles of secularism. In the previous section, I 
have demonstrated how political associations of the hijab mark the body of the French 
Muslimah with an irreconcilable difference with the French nation, and how attaching 
the hijab to particular concepts and language (how words around the veil matter) 
contributes to constructing it as an alien element of the French symbolic nation and 
values. The question in this section is how does the French press and politics, through 
the examples of the named weeklies and political texts, define the hijab within sexual 
parameters? How do the texts mark the hijab within a sexual difference and otherness? 
I want to use the concept of a ‘communalising power’ which I mentioned earlier to 
think about how detaching the veil from notions of gender equality and emancipation 
contributes to similarly ‘communalising’ it with a specific racial/ethnic/cultural group, 
defined in terms of being outside the borders of the French republic. 
6.1.4. Hijabs of Oppression, Inferiority and Sexual Stigma 
Starting from the premise that the idea of the oppressed Muslim woman is mostly often 
characterised as the norm by Western media (Wadud, 2006, p.41), I want to examine 
how the Muslimah muhajjaba is perceived as a victim of her patriarchal culture or 
religion, and how defining the veil within sexual parameters contributes to coding it as 
a racial and cultural symbol. My focus is on how the hijab associations outside gender 
equality and emancipation consolidate what Razack refers to as the ‘othering and 
inferiorising of people of colour in the North’ (Razack, 1998, p.7). The veil as a sign 
powerfully re-enacts the ‘otherness’ of Islam to the West, as women’s bodies and 
sexuality resurface as a ‘political site of difference and resistance to the homogenizing 
and egalitarian forces of Western modernity’ (Göle, 1996, p.1). Through a close 
analysis of sexual associations of the veil, I examine how this ‘othering’ of the veil 
operates not only within the concept of the nation, but also within that of gender. This 
process enables marking the hijabed body within a sexual difference. In her study of 
the Qur’an and woman, Wadud (1999, pp. 7-8) argues against values that have been 
assigned to women in comparison with men, which include the vision of women as 
‘weak, inferior, inherently evil, intellectually incapable, and spiritually lacking’, and 
confining them to biological functions, in contract to men who are estimated as 
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superior. The sexual difference and otherness evoked by the French weeklies and 
politics can be considered within this framework where the historical and 
contemporary attributes to women as inferior to men define Islamic dress as a symbol 
of inferiority.  
 
Numerous texts codify the hijab with an otherness defined in sexual terms. Michèle 
Vianès58 from Marianne, for instance, evokes the rule of law against ‘the Islamist 
hijab’, identifying the hijab as a violation of women’s dignity (Vianès, 2004): 
 
The Islamist hijab [...] is an infringement on the dignity of women, considered 
only as a sex to be hidden. In our state under the rule of law, as in any 
democratic society, the freedom of some ends where that of the others begins. 
Only law allows the liberties of some and others to cohabit rather than oppose 
one another [...] The personal, religious or political choices are not rights that 
the community [of people or citizens] would have the obligation to grant. 
 
Tying the hijab with Islamism as in earlier examples, Vianès portrays the dress as an 
‘infringement’ and ‘encroachment’ on the dignity of women, considered ‘only as a sex 
to be hidden’. The paradoxical image of the ‘Islamist hijab or headscarf’ (foulard 
                                                 
58 Born in 1947, Michèle Vianès was a French teacher and feminist activist, founder of Regards de 
femmes, a NGO association of special status in the United Nations Economic and Social Council. As 
part of the association, she has organized conferences in partnership with the Comité laïcité République 
(secular Republic Committee). She was a founding member of the committee of Ni putes, ni soumises 
(Neither whores, nor submissive) in Grand Lyon et Rhône. She was also General Secretary (2006 to 
2010) and Vice President (2010 to 2012) of the French Coordination for the European Women's Lobby, 
an association that has consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council. She 
was a city councillor in Caluire-et-Cuire, and delegate to gender equality from 2001 to 2008. She was 
also at the top of the list of European elections in 2009 in the South-East constituency. Archives :  
http://ripostelaique.com/author/Michele-Vianes Twitter : https://twitter.com/michelevianes Other : 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EbN3MkS2LMc 
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islamiste) combines an active extremist political stance (Islamism) and a passive status 
of inferiority (oppressive headscarf), hence both endowing and depriving the 
Muslimah with agency. The example contrasts the dress with the democratic space of 
liberty, cohabitation and the rule of law granted by the French state to its community 
of citizens. The text also codes the ‘Islamist hijab’ as inhuman through recognising 
women only as sexual objects. By contrast, the ‘democratic society’ governed by the 
rule of law places freedom, cohabitation and law against the hijab, also depicted as a 
‘personal, religious and political choice’. This triple and paradoxical depiction of the 
hijab with Islamism and victimisation/oppression on the one hand, and as a ‘choice’ 
on the other hand, posits the French law as the protector and guarantor of these 
principles, and implicitly classifies the dress not only with Islamism and theocracy, but 
additionally with disrespect and indignity. The hijab of the French Muslimah is 
Islamist and oppressive, and yet it is a choice.  As Werbner argues, in the context of 
migration and the headscarf affairs, the meaning of veiling as well as modesty has 
become so burdened that it produces a variety of ‘contradictory messages’ which 
bestow or deny or disallow agency to young Asian and Muslim women. (Werbner, 
2007) The example from Marianne illustrates such a message about the French 
muhajjaba as the carrier of ambivalent meanings.      
 
The statement indicates links with the Orientalist and colonial discourses of the veil 
through reiterating the image of the veiled women’s oppression, and contrasting the 
hijab with concepts of freedom and emancipation for which the state is said to be the 
guarantor and protector. Coded as a sexually ‘inferiorising’ object and a potential 
source of conflict and opposition in democratic societies, the example contrasts the 
hijab with democracy, the rule of law and freedom, duplicating an Orientalist and 
colonial discourse of the veil and Islam with autocracy and tyranny. This is moreover 
in line with a process of constructing the bodies of Asian and African women, in this 
case a majority of Maghrebi women, as Muslim bodies of ‘the oppressed other in need 
of protection and thus open to pastoral intervention’ (Mirza & Meetoo, 2013, p. 127). 
Reduced to a sex devoid of dignity, the presence of the Islamist hijabed body, which 
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the example also classifies as dishonourable, necessitates the intervention of the French 
state to secure democracy, freedom and cohabitation. Marked as superior, the state’s 
values and rule of law simultaneously position the hijabed Muslimah’s body as 
belonging not merely to an inferior undemocratic and oppressive religious tradition, 
but also to one that is inhuman. The oppression and indignity attributed to the ‘Islamist 
hijab/headscarf’ positions the hijabed body within an inferior sexual difference to the 
secular normative body. Not only is the dress associated with an Islamist stance, but 
also with a cultural and religious practice that needs to be regulated by the French state.  
 
This process parallels what Reina Lewis (2004, p. 142) refers to as the use of ‘the 
female body as a marker of a racialised difference’ in her study of Ottoman women’s 
writings, and how the gaze is ‘racialised’ in relation to Oriental women’s bodies 
(Lewis, 2004, p.142). The example illustrates how the hijab of the French Muslimah is 
not only ‘sexualised’ through being defined in terms of oppression and indignity, but 
also ‘racialised’ through its association with inhumanity, tyranny and an inferior 
society and community, and through coding it with an inferior cultural and religious 
practice. The example emphasises the idea that the ‘community of citizens’59 gains 
precedence over the individual and personal choices, which contrasts with the concept 
of individual rights and freedoms promoted by French secularism. 
 
Although the republic guarantees liberty and democracy for all its citizens, it 
paradoxically puts an end to these notions when a ‘personal, religious or political 
choice’ is concerned. Razack’s concept of a ‘space of exception’ where the rule of law 
does not apply to Muslim bodies is useful in thinking about this point. The republican 
space and its institutions such as the school become in this case spaces where the rule 
                                                 
59 The original French word ‘collectivité’, which is synonymous with community and society, also 
ironically refers to the Church and monastery, which contrasts with the idea of a community of citizens 
free of all religious affiliations. 
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of law does not apply to hijabed bodies. Yet as Werbner and Killian note, despite calls 
for religious privatisation and secularism, French schooling is inherently Christian, as 
most public holidays are saints’ days (Werbner, 2007). The calendar and cultural 
atmosphere are additionally favourable for practicing Christianity and not to practicing 
Islam (Killian, 2007). The personal or religious choice to which the example refers 
therefore does not apply to French Muslimahs who are requested to fit into an already 
implicitly Christian school system. The Muslimat muhajjabat are therefore requested 
to discard the hijab in a space which is officially defined as secular, and yet 
accommodates Christian believers.   
 
The statement’s reference to cohabitation and to preventing ‘opposition’ in rights 
suggests the hijab is a source of tension and hostility. This further conjures up the 
capacity of the veil to provoke feelings of fear and anxiety. Affiliated with a regression 
from the principle of freedom and equality of the sexes, the example also equates the 
hijab with undermining republican values and national harmony. These are implicitly 
opposed to the dress itself which the example links not merely with oppression, 
subjugation and indignity, but also with opposition, conflict and disruption of national 
harmony60.  
 
At another level, the hijab of the French Muslimah operates as both a sign of disrespect 
to women, and a symbol of disrespect for the state’s concepts of freedom and equality. 
The indignity attributed to the dress therefore acquires a double dimension whereby it 
poses a threat to the Muslimat wearing it, as well as the state under whose laws they 
live. This type of disrespectful and dishonourable hijab allows the justification of a law 
                                                 
60 This scenario was more recently repeated prior to the niqab ban in France. As Naima Bouteldja notes 
(2011), the more recent ‘battle of the veil’ which concerned the niqab witnessed the emergence of a 
consensus which potrayed ‘many innocuous forms of Arab/Muslim cultural and religious expression as 
serious threats to national harmony’ 
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in order to protect not only the hijabed body from lack of dignity, but also the state 
from potential conflicts and oppositions.  
 
These associations make the hijab a threat to the republic and its values, moving 
between epitomising a political danger to embodying a sexual, religious and a more 
latent cultural attack. The year 1989 marks the first hijab controversy, initiated by 
expelling two girls from primary school under the claim that their hijabs violate French 
secularism. Debates over the controversy led to issuing a law containing implicit 
references to the veil, portrayed as an ‘attack to dignity’, and a symbol of women’s 
inferior status. Many years later and prior to the 2004 hijab ban, these references are 
reiterated in the French print media and political texts.  
 
There are other examples equating the hijab with indignity. In the political texts, 
Jacques Chirac uses the symbolism of the veil as an attack to the dignity of women, as 
is illustrated through one of Chirac’s speeches (2003.1): 
 
One has to be vigilant and uncompromising against threats of a return backward 
[...] We cannot accept that some people, hiding behind a biased conception of 
the principle of laicity, seek to undermine what our republic has acquired: 
equality of sexes and dignity of women. I solemnly proclaim it: the republic 
will oppose everything that separates, everything that removes and everything 
that excludes! The rule is co-education, because it brings us together and puts 
everyone on an equal footing, because it refuses to make distinctions based on 
sex, origin, colour or creed.  
 
The Stasi Report makes a similar reference to dignity when the Commission recalls the 
law regarding freedom of expression in schools. During the first hijab affair of Creil, 
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the French Conseil d’Etat (highest administrative court) states obligatory points in the 
1989 law pertaining to education and freedom of expression for students, among which 
is the fact that ‘any forms of behaviour likely to cause harm to dignity, pluralism or 
freedom of a student or any other member of the education community, and forms of 
behaviour that jeopardise their health or security are prohibited’ (Commission de 
Reflexion Sur l'Application du Principe de Laïcité Dans La Republique, 2003). Chirac 
suggests a state of alert conveyed by the word ‘vigilant’. He warns against ‘threats of 
a return backward’, which he associates with the adoption of the hijab by French 
Muslimat, thus inscribing it against the implicit ‘forward’ movements towards progress 
of the republic. Allying the hijab with backwardness further conveys an idea of the 
garment as a culturally/religiously retrograde and inferior practice which constrains 
young Muslimat’s bodies with a gap in time in relation to the republic. A ‘return 
backward’ therefore operates as a temporal backwardness of the hijab. This enhances 
the role of the state to bring these bodies to enlightenment and progress through 
unveiling them. It suggests an image of unveiling as a process of ‘moving forward’ in 
opposition to the ‘moving backward’ attached to veiling. The movement ‘forward’ 
towards the future (of unveiling) is what prevents the return ‘backward’ towards the 
past (of veiling). It is the same movement which allows evolvement and progress 
towards a more advanced state. 
 
Chirac euphemistically refers to French Muslims as ‘some people’, and attaches a 
‘biased conception of laicity’ to them through their opposition to the forthcoming ban. 
We can read this idea of a partial or prejudiced conception of secularism through the 
concepts of ‘disloyalty’ and ‘deceit’ both which I mentioned earlier. Chirac’s language 
connotes the ‘disloyalty’ and ‘deceit’ of French Muslims regarding French secularism. 
The notion of bias also connotes lack of reason and holding hostile feelings and 
opinions, thereby associating French Muslims with hostility and lack of reason which 
have been historically used constructs in relation to the ‘Oriental’ figure. As a majority 
of second and third-generation French nationals, French Muslims are hence accused of 
distorting the concept of secularism in order to oppose the hijab ban. The vigilance of 
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the state is accordingly heightened with the values which the hijab is said to undermine: 
the equality of sexes and dignity of women. The hijab is again portrayed as inherently 
and essentially antithetical to equality and dignity. Numerous Islamic feminist 
scholars, however, demonstrate how the Qur’an promotes egalitarianism, against the 
inequality existing in practice within Muslim-majority countries. Amina Wadud (2006, 
p. 187-188), for instance, notes that precisely because women are not deemed as 
important as men in most Muslim-majority communities, they do not enjoy an equal 
status to men, and that ‘unraveling the binds of patriarchy in Muslim cultures’ will take 
more time.61 Despite the research done by Islamic feminists regarding gender in Islam, 
the veil in media and politics, as exemplified by the French press and politics, continue 
to essentialise the hijab.  
 
The association of the hijab with indignity has also been accompanied with references 
to separation and segregation, as is the case when Chirac refers to the importance of 
co-education in the French republican school. His statement additionally equates the 
hijab with ‘removal’ ‘separation’ and ‘exclusion’  (Hamzeh, 2012, p. 48). In her study 
of the gendering discourse of veiling, Manal Hamzeh (2012, p. 48) demonstrates how 
some hadiths with androcentric intentions made the hijabs as tools of seclusion and 
exclusion of women in the public space, hence closing off the potential of entrusting 
Muslim women in public affairs. As has been argued by numerous Islamic feminists, 
the Qur’an does not advocate the exclusion and removal of women from public spaces. 
The notions of exclusion, removal and separation evoked by Chirac codify the hijab 
with an irreconcilable difference from the French community of citizens, and echo 
segregation and seclusion which has been historically associated with the veil and the 
                                                 
61 On the egalitarian vision of Islam as expressed through the Qur’an as the ‘root of democratic 
feminism’ see Nimat Hafez Barazangi Woman Identity Quran (2004), and the gender egalitarianism 
contained in the ethical vision of the Qur’an, Leila Ahmed Women and Gender in Islam (1992). 
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harem.62 As Wadud (2006, p. 175) notes, gender separation was never highlighted in 
the Qur’an, which urges women and men to abide by modesty while they are in each 
other’s presence. We can therefore notice how the various notions which Chirac 
attaches to the hijab rely on historical assumptions about the inferior status of woman 
in Islam. 
 
The language of the veil carries additional meanings in the political texts. In a grave 
tone, Chirac declares that the rule is co-education and equality regardless of ‘sex, 
origin, color or creed’. It is ironic that, as Scott (2007, p. 109) points out, mixed-sex 
schools were non-existent before the 1960s in France, and that they appeared due to a 
shortage of funds for separate buildings for boys and girls. Expelling the hijabed 
Muslimat from the republican school, however, precisely excludes them from the 
equality which the republic guarantees for its citizens. The hijab becomes a religious 
and cultural practice linked with their status as second or third generation immigrants. 
The Stasi Report makes an analogous link between the hijab and harm to ‘dignity, 
pluralism or freedom’. Similarly to the earlier examples, the hijabed body is equated 
with oppression and subjugation. In a more serious tone, the Report attributes the threat 
to dignity to the hijab, which is supplemented with a risk to health and security. The 
image of the veil as a political and sexual threat is therefore complicated in this instance 
by its depiction as a security and health threat in the political discourse.  
 
In addition to affiliating the hijab with indignity, the French weeklies and political texts 
portray it as a form of sexual stigma and impurity of the Muslimah’s body. The Stasi 
Commission Report, for instance, explicitly positions a correlation between the hijab 
and stigma through asserting that ‘the meaning of the Islamic veil stigmatises the 
                                                 
62 As Wadud (2006, p. 175) notes, gender separation is not an Islamic principle, and was never 
highlighted in the Qur’an, which urges women and men to abide by modest limits while they are in each 
other’s presence. 
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young girl of puberty age or the woman as the only person responsible for the desire 
of man, a vision that is presented as contravening the principle of equality said to be 
established between men and women’ (Commission de Reflexion Sur l'Application du 
Principe de Laïcité Dans La Republique, 2003). Resonating with earlier images of 
woman’s body as only a sex ‘to be hidden’ and the sexualisation of Islamic dress, the 
Report’s definition of the hijab as stigma additionally endorses a vision of the hijabed 
body within sexual stigmatisation. As a symbol of shame, ‘the Islamic veil’ positions 
the young Muslimah as the only one responsible for male desire, a perception which is 
more in accordance with a Christian vision of veiling. The hijab registers not only a 
sexual difference from the normative secular body, but also a religious and cultural 
otherness which tacitly contrasts it with the principle of gender equality which the 
Report ties to French secularism. Defining the hijab as a symbol of stigma and shame 
therefore allows the Commission to position ‘the Islamic veil’ as a religiously and 
culturally alien object to France. This definition similarly marks the hijab in an inferior 
status to the normative secular body and its presumed intrinsic gender equality.   
 
There are many examples equating the hijab with stigma in the French texts. For 
instance, Bernard Henry Levy63 from Le Point declares the ‘battle of the veil’ as also 
one of women’s emancipation since it symbolises stigmatisation and hatred (2004): 
 
                                                 
63 Bernard Henry Levy was born in 1848 in Beni-Saf, Oran Algeria which was then part of France. He 
is associate of philosophy, writer, novelist, journalist, filmmaker, activist and founder of the magazine 
La Règle du Jeu. He is a columnist for Le Point, the Corriere della Sera, and El Pais in Madrid. He also 
contributes to various publications including political, artistic and cultural events such as the New York 
Times, the Huffington Post, Daily Beast, Haaretz, Aftenposten, Espressen of Stockholm and New 
Republic. He is accused of being too media-savy due to his frequent TV apparitions. He had his look-
alike puppet in the French show Les guignols de l'info (1988). In 1981, Lévy published L'Idéologie 
française ("The French Ideology"), arguably his most influential work, in which he offers a dark picture 
of French history. Source :http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0529717/bio?ref_=nm_ov_bio_sm Official : 
http://www.bernard-henri-levy.com Twitter : https://twitter.com/bernardhl Other : http://www.c-
span.org/person/?bernardhenrilevy 
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The veil is not a sign of piety, but of stigmatization and hatred. Leading a 
woman to cover herself, and telling her, in contempt [...] that wearing the hijab 
is a sacred command; hiding from her the fact that there are important 
commentators supporting, for example, the idea that the hijab was the privilege 
of the women of the Prophet and that it is a sin of pride, on the contrary, to 
claim their status and dignity. 
 
In advocating a law against the hijab, Levy here not only distances and dissociates the 
hijab from piety, but also attaches it to the ‘hatred’ (haine) and ‘stigmatisation’ 
(stigmatisation) of woman. The term stigma, which also connotes humiliation and 
shame, contrasts the veil with notions of respect and honour (Werbner, 2007). In 
relation to the veiling of Muslimat in France and Britain, however, Werbner points to 
how the veil is a ‘protective shield against the male gaze’ and ‘unwanted advances by 
young men’, particularly in crowded immigrant districts, mixed schools and 
universities; and how the veil in such a context conforms to the ‘honor shame code that 
demands respect from outsiders’ (Werbner, 2007). It is interesting to consider how a 
symbol that is part of the Judeo-Christian tradition is here portrayed as a non ‘pious’ 
sign. Moreover, attaching such notions as stigma and hatred with the hijab contrasts 
with the meanings of respect and honor which some young women associate it with in 
the minority spaces of Europe where Muslimahs are already perceived and constructed 
in terms of their ethnic, racial and cultural origins as noted earlier. The equation of the 
hijab with stigmatisation and hatred moreover implies that it taints the French 
Muslimah by positioning her within attributes of shame and hatred, hence with her 
assumed inferiority to Muslim men (Wadud, 2006, p. 37). As Wadud (2006, p. 37) has 
demonstrated in her studies of gender in Islam, the assumption of male superiority is 
not ‘essential to Islam, but is rather produced by culture and circumstantial 
convenience’. Indirectly raising the status of superiority of non-hijabed women, the 
example marks the hijab with a sexual and cultural difference which represents an 
attack to the concept of gender equality, and an implicit otherness in contrast to the 
implicit humility and superiority of the non-hijabed body.  
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The idea of stigmatisation is sometimes accompanied with references to the 
Muslimah’s body in terms of sin. In Levy’s article (2004), the necessity for legislating 
against the hijab in France also stems from its additional link with the view of woman 
as an ‘offense to God’: 
 
to make her believe that her face is an insult to God, her body a source of sin, 
her sex a stain. This is why you should not be afraid of asserting it: even beyond 
this law on the school, the battle against the veil is a battle for the freedom of 
women, thus for human rights, which will not stop at the re-affirmation of the 
principles of laicity. 
 
Levy here adopts a human rights discourse in favour of a ban. He evokes ‘the battle 
against the veil’ which resonates with the often reiterated colonial battle, as one 
established for ‘freedom of women’ and ‘human rights’ within the context of 
secularism. Through the violent expressions ‘insult to God’, ‘source of sin’ and ‘sex as 
stain’, reference is made to the niqab (through the generic term voile) which was not 
debated prior to the 2004 hijab ban.64 Although it was the hijab that posed the point of 
controversy, the example instead codes the niqab/burqa as a culturally alien and 
violent symbol which scripts the body of the French Muslimah as an outsider to the 
republican secular subject who is marked as enjoying freedom, equality and human 
rights. In a similar fashion to the examples linking the ‘Islamist hijab’ and 
predisposition to violence in the political associations, Levy’s statements posit a 
correlation between the veil and violence against the French Muslimah’s body.  
                                                 
64 Levy’s expressions refer to the full-face niqab or burqa worn by some Muslimat in various parts of 
the world. There was no reported case of French Muslim girls entering schools with either the face veil 
(niqab) or the full-face veil (burqa) in 2002. The niqab, however, was subject to a more recent ban in 
public space, which is enforced in France today. 
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We can read the violent religious and cultural meanings assigned to the veil within a 
definition of immigrant women as more ‘family and tradition bound, amenable to 
greater patriarchal control by men in their families and communities’, and the 
Orientalist constructs which position these women as ‘passive and highly subservient 
and their communities as inherently patriarchal as a result of their ‘backward’ cultures 
and traditions’ (Thobani, 2007, p.132). The example implicitly evokes the idea of 
deceiving Muslimat through ‘making them believe’ their own body stigma. It fixes the 
hijab of the French Muslimah as a religious and violent emblem, and tacitly defines 
her in oppositional terms to the enlightened emancipated (and perhaps even gentle and 
peaceful) secular subject. The images also confine the French Muslimah to the 
boundaries of a patriarchal cultural and religious tradition and simultaneously distances 
her from French values. Furthermore, the definition of the French Muslimah in these 
terms contributes to elevating the republic to the level of the superior protector and 
guarantor of human rights. The regulation of the hijab becomes justified on the grounds 
that it contravenes republican principles and poses a sexual, cultural, and religious 
threat to the girls concerned. ‘The battle of the veil’ is a battle of superior republican 
values against the inferior and violent patriarchal and religious others. The republic, 
which the example portrays as committed to the values of secularism, bears the 
responsibility of ensuring the re-affirmation of its principles against a violent and 
threatening patriarchal practice. From another angle, the example’s references to 
expressions of blame and guilt provide an image which codifies the hijab with an 
ethical otherness. Besides the sexual/cultural otherness attributed to the dress, the 
example further embeds it within an ethical otherness attached to stigma, which also 
tacitly equates unveiling with innocence and piety.    
 
Such visions of the veil as a fixed symbol of sexual oppression have been challenged 
by some Muslim and Islamic feminists. Homa Hoodfar, for instance, argues that, while 
the veil was invented and perpetuated within a patriarchal framework, women have 
appropriated it to ‘loosen the bonds of patriarchy’ (Alvi, et al., 2003, p. 39). She adds 
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that it is the lack of acknowledgement of women’s agency and the tendency to view 
women ‘as passive victims that has flawed the debate, distorted the image of veiled 
women and promoted the divide between those who do and those who do not wear the 
hijab’ (Hoodfar, 2003, p.39). The images of the hijab as a sexual stigma represent an 
instance of not only othering the veil, but also ‘inferiorising’ it, and positioning it 
within the realm of another religion, culture and race which belong outside the 
boundaries of the secular republic. The process of othering the hijab has also been 
accompanied with affiliating it with lack of emancipation and equality.  
 
6.1.5. Hijabs against Emancipation and Equality  
After exploring how the hijab figures as a symbol of oppression and inferiority, and 
how it is coded as a form of sexual stigma, I now turn to explore how the hijab is 
scripted against emancipation and equality. Wasila Tamzali65 in Le Nouvel 
Observateur, for instance, maintains (Tamzali, 2003): 
 
This ostentatious veil (voile ostentatoire) hides reactionary ideological 
positions: against the emancipation of women, against the liberation of 
individuals, and against the other cultures [...] You, politicians, do not play with 
fire! Be watchful to the respect for the French laws. Fighting against the veil at 
                                                 
65 Born in Algeria in 1941, Wasila Tamzali worked in the legal profession at the Court of Algiers and 
conducted parallel journalistic and cultural activities. Chief editor of the first weekly Maghreb free 
"contact" (1970-1973), she wrote a book in 1975 on the North African cinema which is a plea for 
freedom of expression, and an art book on the ornament of Berber women 'Abzim'. In 1979, she joined 
the International Civil Service at UNESCO where she was in charge of the program on women's rights 
violations within the Division of Human Rights and Peace, and among other issues, issues of equal rights 
of men and women and violence against women. Her role in women’s struggle in Islamic countries, as 
well as in the fight against prostitution and trafficking of women is recognized by both associations and 
decision makers. In 1989 she joined the Socialist Forces Front and holds leadership positions in the 
party. In 1992, she was a founding member of the Collectif Maghreb Egalité as 1992. Source : 
http://www.babelio.com/auteur/Wassyla-Tamzali/87667PDF :  
http://sisyphe.org/IMG/pdf/C.V._W._Tamzali.pdf 
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the school or on identity cards, it is not attacking a religion. To defend it, on 
the other hand, is to question the equality of men and women. A proverb says 
that in case of great danger, the middle way leads straight ahead to death. In 
other words, if we begin to negotiate, we are lost! 
 
Woman’s ‘emancipation’ and ‘the liberation of individuals’ are contrasted here with 
the ‘ostentatious veil’. The article adopts an alarming tone reminiscent of the earlier 
examples from Jacques Chirac. Notwithstanding the fact that many French Muslimat 
chose to wear the hijab, at times in opposition to their own parents, relatives, and 
school authorities, the idea that they are coerced mainly by their male relatives or by 
Islamist organisations is frequently reiterated in the press and politics. This deprives 
French Muslim girls of agency, and contradicts the notions of freedom of choice and 
human rights which the republic advocates. Yet, as Werbner and others have argued, 
the hijab can acquire different symbolisation for Muslimahs. The hijab in the French 
and British contexts, for instance, may be utilised by young Muslim girls as a sign of 
‘independence and the right to claim autonomous agency vis-à-vis their parents’ while 
symbolising their ‘defiance of the wider society perceived to be hostile to Islam’ 
(Werbner, 2007). Coding the hijab of the young French Muslimat against emancipation 
and liberation essentialises the dress on the one hand, and homogenises the various 
experiences of veiling of French Muslimahs. At another level, such a script reinforces 
the idea of inequality of women within Islam, an assumption which has been 
problematised by numerous Islamic feminists as I mentioned earlier. In this type of 
discourse, notions such as emancipation and liberation as they have been defined 
within the Western context and histories are deemed universal models that are 
applicable to all.  
 
There are various ways in which the hijab becomes coded against emancipation. 
Tamzali implicitly positions the ‘ostentatious veil’ as an alien element of French 
history. Through its inscription as an attack to the values of emancipation and 
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liberation, the example defines the hijabed body as one in need of values which are 
considered universal. The example invokes French and European histories alongside 
the notions of emancipation and liberation. This emphasises the enlightenment 
philosophy which namely advocates the freedom of individuals from the bonds of 
religion, hence with a vision of religion as part of a backward practice which needs to 
be discarded. Yet this history led to the imperial enterprise and colonial movements 
which paradoxically enslaved other societies in the name of civilisation and freedom 
from the bonds of barbarism. The concepts of emancipation and liberation as they have 
been developed in the Western context have also been used as effective tools for 
justifying the colonial enterprise, and the need to save ‘other women’ from their state 
of oppression and inequality as Leila Ahmed and other Muslim feminists have 
demonstrated. French history additionally led to the French Revolution and the ensuing 
separation of church and state in 1905, and the consolidation of French secularism 
emphasising the neutrality of public space from religious signs. As Joan Scott (2007, 
p. 91) points out, in France, the separation of church and state was meant to ensure 
allegiance of individuals to the republic, and destroy the political power of the Catholic 
Church.  These histories, however, kept women away from the changes in French 
society, as they were struggling for their rights, including the right to vote. Even today, 
it is problematic to speak about an achieved ‘emancipation’ and ‘liberation’ in a 
context where women face many forms of discrimination, sexism and violence.   
 
Numerous Muslim and Islamic feminists have demonstrated ways in which Islamic 
dress can acquire meanings of freedom and liberation. A case in point is the Iranian 
revolution against the forced ‘unveiling’ policy of the Shah regime. This was a time 
when thousands of women took to the streets in tchadors in their struggle for 
emancipation from an oppressive monarchy based on an even more oppressive 
imperialism (Sabouri, 1995, pp. 60-61). My point here is not to state that the practice 
of veiling cannot be used in an oppressive manner. Indeed instances of compulsory 
veiling can be as oppressive as compulsory unveiling laws as some Islamic feminists 
have pointed out, since these can be accompanied with beatings, fines and 
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imprisonment for non-compliance, as has been the case in Iran (Alvi, et al., 2003, p. 
10). In addition to essentialising the hijab, the categorisation and categorical 
association of the dress in the French context with a symbol against emancipation and 
liberation, however, is an instance of a homogenising discourse which codifies it as 
different and other to the French society. Moreover, such a process of homogenisation 
and essentialisation is even more problematic when applied in the context of young 
Muslimahs who are second and third-generation Muslims in Western secular spaces.  
 
In contrast to the movement for veiling which symbolised emancipation during the 
Shah era in Iran, many Arab countries adopted a discourse of emancipation of women 
where unveiling signalled a movement from tradition to modernity and from 
oppression to emancipation. Examples of such a movement include Tunisian President 
Bourguiba’s unveiling of a woman on national television, and the Moroccan king 
Mohammed V’s unveiling his daughter during the French protectorate in Morocco.  
Both leaders built movements aligning with the Arab Nahda to promote women’s 
liberation along the lines drawn by Western colonial powers. These examples also 
illustrate how different and sometimes contrasting concepts can be attached to the veil, 
and construct it as either a form of oppression or emancipation.  
 
Wassila Tamzali expands on her description of the oppositional stance which she 
attributes to the hijab. Besides the notions of emancipation of women and liberation of 
individuals, which are two key principles of French secularism, she positions the hijab 
in terms of a ‘reactionary ideological position against other cultures’. This reinforces 
the hijab’s image as an element against ‘French culture’, which comprises French, 
Western, European cultures. The multi-oppositional stance which Tamzali links with 
the hijab (against ‘emancipation’, ‘liberation’ and ‘other cultures’) consolidates the 
view of the French Muslimah as inferior, oppressed and in need of values and a culture 
deemed superior to the the ‘culture of the hijab’ to which she adheres. Furthermore, 
her statement demonstrates how the hijab is tied to a ‘cultural/Maghrebi/Arab origin’ 
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which is applicable to a majority of second and third-generation French Muslimat who 
are again associated with their historical cultural/racial/ ethnic origins. Not only does 
the veil ‘hide’ a threat to the republican values, but it also ‘hides’ an assault against 
‘other cultures’. The visibility of the hijab which the text characterises as ‘ostentatious’ 
contrasts with its hidden and invisible attack, a mutli-dimensional attack which it poses 
not only to republican values, but also to undefined cultures. Tamzali addresses 
politicians in an admonishing tone, and states that any form of negotiation risks causing 
death. In addition to its sexual otherness which bears a political significance, the hijab 
is yet again defined in terms of a cultural and racial difference which poses a death 
sentence to French secularism and culture.   
 
There are other examples which illustrate the association of the hijab with lack of 
emancipation and inequality. Jean Daniel from Le Nouvel Observateur, for instance, 
categorises non-hijabed young Muslimat wearing ‘skin-tight jeans’ as ‘freed’, 
‘libertines’, and ‘egalitarian’, explicitly contrasting them with young hijabed Muslimat 
as oppressed and unequal (Daniel, 2003):  
 
at the same time, it [the veil] is an attitude which consists of accepting a 
submission to a backward pressure, and risking to appear willing to give a 
lesson to the freed Muslim women, the law-abiding Muslim women or simply 
polite ones. This scene was witnessed in Morocco, from where I just returned: 
girls in skin-tight jeans wait on the platform for the boat coming back from 
France. Some time before the passengers landing, they hurry to wear the veil. 
Why? It is the fashion in France, and they do not want exiled women to appear 
better Muslims than the emancipated women staying in the country. 
 
In a similar vein to earlier examples, Jean Daniel defines the hijab as a form of a 
‘submission to a backward pressure’, and implicitly reiterates the broader historical 
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classification of Islam as a backward religion and the veil as an imposed practice.66 
Daniel also tacitly contrasts the hijab with concepts of progress, enlightenment and the 
freedom of choice. Yet he equates unveiling not only with freedom and liberation, but 
also with being ‘law-abiding’ (hence sincere, virtuous and ethical) and ‘polite’ through 
adherence and compliance with the laws of the republic. It qualifies the ‘freed’ 
unveiled Muslimat as ‘law-abiding’ and ‘polite’, in opposition to the implicitly 
oppressed, impolite, and possibly dishonest and disrespectful hijabed Muslimat. The 
dichotomy between hijabed and non-hijabed Muslimat further emphasises the superior 
status of values such as emancipation, the rule of law and morality, all of which the 
example attributes to the unveiled body which conforms to the French secular norm.  
 
The positive characteristics of the Moroccan Muslimat’s unveiled bodies contrast with 
the negative traits marking the veiled bodies with an inferiority that Daniel ties with 
backwardness and oppression. These distinctions position the hijab within an essential 
difference in relation to the unveiled secular/secularised normative body. At another 
level, Daniel categorises the hijabed French Muslimat as ‘exiled’, making France not 
as their ’home’, but rather their ‘exile’. Pointing to their outsider status, the term 
suggests their strangeness in relation to the French ‘home’ nation, as they are again 
defined in terms of their racial, cultural and ethnic origins (Maghreb/Arab/Muslim). 
The French Muslimat concerned with the hijab controversies and later ban are, unlike 
their mothers and fathers, second and third-generation French citizens born and raised 
in France. The word ‘exile’ itself implies being expelled from one’s country, mostly 
for political reasons. This echoes the association of the veil with a political symbol 
discussed in the previous section. With the additional notion of exile, the example 
                                                 
66 The Stasi Report (Commission de Reflexion Sur l'Application du Principe de Laïcité Dans La 
Republique, 2003) similarly considers religious signs as an issue to be tackled by the French republic, 
stating that ‘the secular rules cannot remain indifferent [...] to the exercise of pressures, threats, racist 
and discriminatory practices under the pretext of religious, spiritual arguments undermining the bases 
of the school. Although the exercise of pressure and discrimination cannot be refuted, the hijab adopted 
by many schoolgirls demonstrates the ‘personal and aware appropriation of Islam’, which frequently 
differ with the Islam of their parents. (Göle, 2011, pp. 23-24.) 
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provides an image of the generous French state offering immigrants and exiles a place 
to live. 
 
There are other examples from the French press which point to inequality in relation 
to the hijab, as is illustrated by another extract from Claude Imbert in Le Point. His 
example, however, further states that the veil demonstrates practices which victimise 
gender equality, including ‘forced marriages’, ‘other forms of divorce’ and 
‘polygamy’, practices which are also made synonymous with the hijab (Imbert, 2004):  
 
Evidence up to now concealed by official negligence: it has been discovered 
[...] that wearing the veil shows, in all the Muslim universe, the submission of 
women, and that gender equality is victim of forced marriages everyday in our 
country, of polygamy and other forms of divorce. So women rose in a good 
number in order to denounce the evident symbolism of the veil. And our 
daughters coming from the Maghreb were the most fervent ones in showing the 
gangrene. 
 
The automatic link which Claude Imbert establishes between forced marriage, divorce, 
polygamy and the veil constructs the dress as a patriarchal and backward practice 
which demonstrates gender oppression. The example takes ‘forced marriages’,67 
‘polygamy’, and ‘other forms of divorce’ as instances of practices already used to 
associate Islam with gender subjugation and inequality. It hence ties the ‘victimisation 
of gender equality’ to these practices through the veil. Muslim and Islamic feminists 
                                                 
67 Forced marriages have no basis in Islamic sources where consent from both partners is a condition for 
the validity of the marriage contract. Although widely but not exclusively practiced by Muslims, forced 
marriages are considered invalid according to Islamic texts. The practice belongs to a cultural rather 
than an Islamic tradition, and is governed by patriarchal ideology. Regarding polygamy, it was practiced 
for centuries before Islam, and was also widespread among non-Muslim populations.  
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have pointed out that the laws related to rights in marriage, divorce, and child custody 
have been profoundly resistant to alteration, despite endeavours to promote change in 
various Muslim countries, where the laws introduced in the first three or four centuries 
of Islam still rule the interactions between men and women (Ahmed, 1992, p. 242). In 
relation to divorce, one of the examples of the inequality in divorce in Islamic practice 
is the unilateral right of repudiation, and the need for court intervention in case women 
want divorce. (Wadud, 2006, p. 25) For polygamy, Wadud notes that, although it is 
permitted in the text, it is also based on ‘practically unattainable terms of justice’. 
(Wadud, 2006 p. 193.). Claude Imbert’s statement is another instance of how the hijab 
can be scripted with a gender difference which bears imprints of a racial, religious and 
cultural otherness through which the hijab and its associated practices further stress its 
outsider status in relation to the French context. 
 
Claude Imbert also warns the reader against a ‘gangrene’ that suggests a threatening 
decay of the republican body. These associations equally position the secular nation as 
the guarantor of gender equality, which endorses the position of France as an 
enlightened and superior nation responsible for guaranteeing emancipation and 
equality, as well as challenging the decay emanating from the veil. The term 
‘gangrene’, which also symbolises the veil, suggests the idea not only of disease and 
decay attached to the veil in earlier examples, but also of decomposition of tissue, 
hence of the metaphorical death of the republican body. The reference to the hijab as 
a gangrene further emphasises its image as a decomposing element associated with 
death and degeneration. 
 
The “inferiorisation” of the hijab operates at other levels, as when the example 
explicitly situates it with a geographically remote and monolithically constructed 
space, the ‘Muslim universe’. The use of the caricature phrase ‘Muslim universe’ 
(similar to the use of ‘the Muslim world’ in relation to Islamist veils) inflates and 
dramatises the size of the Muslim population, in addition to homogenising Muslims, 
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who remain largely unknown to the majority of the French society. The expression also 
creates confusion through mixing the situation of Muslims in Muslim-majority 
countries, with that of French Muslimat, thereby conflating two different social and 
political frameworks. The fusion further enables grouping French Muslimat with 
nationals of Muslim countries rather than France. This distancing of French Muslims 
from French nationals also codifies them with a racial and ethnic difference. Taken as 
the epitome of oppression and inequality, the example moves the hijab from one 
geographical location (‘Muslim universe’) to another one (‘France’) in a way that it 
becomes tied not only with a spatially, but also a culturally, religiously and even 
racially ‘other’ context that is remote from the French republic.  
 
Imbert extends the notion of inequality evoked in relation to the hijab to include 
polygamy, divorce and forced marriages. It affiliates the hijab with a breach of the 
republican concept of gender equality through recalling the three key historical 
practices that are associated with the inferiorisation of the Muslimah, and that have 
long epitomised her oppression. As signals of the Muslim woman’s inequality, these 
practices operate as supporting evidence for the inscription of the veil within the 
oppression and victimisation of the French Muslimah. Ultimately, the automatic link 
which the example posits between the veil and these practices situates the hijabed body 
of the French Muslimah not merely within a sexual difference characterised with 
gender inequality and oppression, but also with a cultural and religious difference and 
racial inferiority which consolidates the superiority of French values and inferiority of 
Islam and French Muslimahs as demonstrated through its attributed oppressive 
practices which are understood as being stable and fixed, and unconditionally endorsed 
by Islamic texts. 
 
Inbert’s statement also scripts the hijab with an otherness to the French definition of 
the secular emancipated subject. The automatic link which he creates between the 
hijab, divorce, polygamy and forced marriages simplifies complex practices which 
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should be considered within their historical, social-cultural and geographical contexts. 
Indeed the question of women’s oppression in Islam needs to be considered within a 
historical framework where the absence of what Nimat Baraganzi (2004, pp. 33-34) 
calls ‘self-identity with Islam’ and the female voice in the realm of interpretation of 
sacred texts has led to women maintaining their own oppression. As Baraganzi argues, 
the absence of women’s voice in the field of interpretation of religious texts 
consequently made them ‘follow interpretations dictated by others, which has resulted 
in women’s participation in their own oppression’ (Barazangi, 2004, pp. 33-34.). It is 
therefore imperative that Muslimahs engage with religious sources in order to 
challenge restrictive interpretations and contribute to developing a more gender-
sensitive reading of texts within Islam. What poses a problem in Imbert’s statement is 
the automatic equation of Islamic dress (or the veil) with practices which have long 
been associated with oppression in public imagination. At another level, it reinforces 
the idea that Western women have acquired emancipation and equality which their 
Muslim counterparts still need, thereby positioning French Muslimahs within a 
hierarchical relationship which further inferiorises them.  The expression ‘other forms 
of divorce’, for instance, which defines divorce in Islam as an oppressive practice, 
overlooks the existence of patriarchal elements in divorce within secular democratic 
societies which are constructed as models which provide women’s rights and gender 
equality. As Göle (1996, p.77) states, the presence of equality as a principle in the 
social perception does not designate the presence of absolute equality in practice. 
Associating the hijab with such practices additionally emphasises the oppression to 
which women are subject within Islam, whereas oppression and inequality exist 
beyond what is defined as the boundaries of the Islamic religious practice.  
 
Other texts in the French press tie the hijab with cultural practices. An example from 
Marianne similarly connects the veil of French Muslimat with immodesty and ‘self-
discrimination’ as the title of the article states (Vianès, 2004):  
 
206 of 347 
 
Today, in our state of law, some persons try to distort the spirit of laws, 
especially measures concerning the forms of discrimination to which people 
are subject. They claim discrimination if we ask them to remove the sexual 
religious attribute worn in public place. This sign, supposed to qualify them as 
‘pure’, separates them from the other ‘impure’ women. They have the 
immodesty to show themselves as civil parties against the women who refuse 
this stigma which is tainted with the blood of raped, whipped, stoned to death, 
and strangled women because they have refused to wear it. 
 
What is striking about this example is the repeated use of dichotomous references such 
as ‘our State of law’, ‘we ask them’, ‘qualify them’, ‘separates them’, ‘they have’, all 
of which place the hijab in a hierarchical and oppositional stance in relation to the 
French state, the guarantor of the rule of law. The dichotomies between ‘them’ and ‘us’ 
also serve to distance and symbolically exclude the hijabed Muslimah’s body from 
public space, marking it as an ‘other’ body which belongs elsewhere. The dichotomies 
enhance the role of the state in bringing ‘different’ bodies to conform to the accepted 
and acknowledged forms of visibility advocated by the French secular republic. Similar 
to earlier expressions, references to the hijabed bodies as ‘other persons’ and ‘them’ 
emphasise the otherness of the hijab, as well as its inferior status in comparison with 
the implicit superior position of the secular body.  
 
Michele Vianes also attributes discrimination to the hijab, and qualifies the girls 
concerned with the ban as persons ‘distorting the laws of the country’ through claiming 
discrimination. While promoting freedom of conscience, expression, and non-
discrimination on the basis of religion, race or ethnic origin, the republic justifies the 
hijab ban in the name of secularism, neutrality and democracy. Vianes further qualifies 
the hijab as a ‘sexual religious attribute’, again suggesting it epitomises the inequality 
between men and women in public space. The reference to the state asking Muslimat 
to ‘remove the religious sexual attribute’ is an expression which sexualises and 
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essentialises the hijab. The image of the veil as a means of distinguishing ‘pure’ 
women from ‘impure’ ones further assigns a pejorative meaning to the dress within an 
ethical realm.  
 
Modesty represents a central meaning characteristic of Islamic dress within an Islamic 
framework. Nonetheless, the example reverses this through stating that veiled women 
‘have the immodesty to side against a stigma which is ‘tainted with the blood of raped, 
whipped, stoned to death, and strangled women’. Razack (1998, p.125) notes how 
images of ‘mutilation, barbaric customary rites, severe penalties for adultery, forced 
veiling, and polygamy are all highly powerful symbols of the barbaric East or South 
and, correspondingly, the civilized West or North’. As Meetoo and Mirza argue, 
contrary to the colonial times, Muslim women are not ‘saved’ amidst discourses of 
islamophobia and multiculturalism; rather, the discernibility of cultural practices back 
the ‘further construction of the ‘other’s’ barbaric customs and cultures’ (Meetoo & 
Mirza, 2007). We can see how the references to physical violence in the example 
operate through a similar logic of a ‘civilised France’ and ‘uncivilised muhajjabat’. 
The images evoke violent acts which the example ties to physical abuse against women 
in some Muslim-majority countries. Relying on an Orientalist baggage, Vianes depicts 
these oppressive and violent acts, simultaneously presenting them as directly related 
with the hijab. This restricts physical abuse committed against women to a spatially 
remote space (Muslim countries) and a single religion and culture which is read as 
Islamic. Such violent practices attached to the hijab equally serve to incite feelings of 
anxiety within a politics of fear often used in media. 
 
Not only is the hijab deemed a symbol that provokes, discriminates, oppresses and 
stigmatises the Muslimah, but it inherently carries the stain of various forms of physical 
abuse endured by all women who refuse to wear it. The dramatic picture offers us a 
homogeneous view of abuse in the shape of rape, flogging and killing, whereas in 
Islamic theology, there is no punishment mentioned for women who choose not to wear 
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Islamic dress.68 Such a discourse about the hijab contributes to emphasising its ‘other’ 
status in relation to the French state and its secular values. 
 
We can additionally find references to gender violence of the hijab in political texts.  
In the political discourse, the Stasi Report similarly brings forth physical and 
psychological violence in relation to the adoption of the hijab, referring to the 
‘resurgent sexism’ in relation to the dress, manifested through ‘the various pressures, 
verbal, psychological or physical forms of violence’. The Report further points that 
young girls are ‘forced to wear covering a-sexual garments, to lower their gaze at the 
sight of man, or else they are stigmatised as whores’ (Commission de Reflexion Sur 
l'Application du Principe de Laïcité Dans La Republique, 2003). The reference which 
the Report makes to a-sexual garments contrasts with the ‘sexual attribute’ to which 
the earlier example refers. The idea of being forced to veil which the Stasi Report 
evokes contrasts with the adoption of the hijab by women students in the French and 
British contexts, a step through which these young women indicate to Muslim male 
students that they are not available sexually to non-Muslims, and indirectly reques that 
they in turn behave morally with non-Muslim girls (Werbner, 2007). In such cases, the  
hijab represents a tool for these young women to access public spaces and educational 
opportunities where free mixing becomes regulated through a language of signs which 
does not only involve donning the hijab, but also signalling messages to other Muslim 
and non-Muslim men in public spaces. 
 
                                                 
68 Whipping and stoning have been widespread as punishments for fornication and adultery in the Middle 
East before Islam, stoning was first mentioned in the Old Testament as a punishment for adultery. 
Women in different cultural frameworks suffer many forms of abuse and crime, as rape, domestic 
violence and killing are widespread and worldwide (works of different women’s organisations and 
international bodies remind us of this fact). Regardless of racial, cultural, ethnic or religious differences, 
women suffer different forms of abuse. Therefore, to exclusively associate abuse and crime with the 
veil, or the refusal to wear it, provides a distorted picture of the global situation of non-Muslim women 
who are also subject to crime and abuse. 
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We can read references to violent abuses assigned to the hijab in the French context 
through the notion of violence I discussed earlier. In such circumstances, race becomes 
an important ‘pivot on which the narrative turns’, as it enables to ‘believe readily in 
Muslim irrationality and the monsters it spawns’ (Razack, 2008, p.47). As the 
examples I examined elucidate, the reference to these physical forms of abuse and 
torture implicitly position the hijab within a barbarism/primitiveness which defines the 
hijabed body of the Muslimah in opposition to the civilised and enlightened French 
body. Razack’s notion of a ‘latent commitment to violence’ communicated through 
attaching the practice of veiling (and by extension being a Muslim) to these violent 
acts, and their systematic equation with the dress contribute to constructing it within a 
racial violence attributed to Muslims, which requires the intervention of the rule of 
law. Such statements tacitly place the secular, rational and civilised French subject 
against the violent and barbarous Muslim, portrayed as imposing an inherently violent 
religious and cultural symbol in a space where the hijabed body is read as a threatening 
racial and cultural object.  The image of the dress as a threat which hides crime and 
abuse is reinforced in such a way that accepting the hijab within the republic becomes 
equated with being an accomplice to these violent abuses. This would ultimately 
question the superior status of France as the guarantor of the ‘rule of law’ that must 
ensure all its subjects are protected against all forms of abuse.  
 
There are also religious references to the hijab which link it with impurity. We can 
trace the dichotomy between the ‘pure women’ who veil, and the ‘impure women’ who 
do not to the Christian conceptualisation of the veil of nuns as an emblem of purity. 
Similarly, the depiction of Mary the Virgin in paintings includes her wearing a veil 
which symbolises her purity. Vianes, by contrast, defines the hijab as an ‘immodest 
symbol’, which strips it from one of its most important characteristics as an 
embodiment of modesty. 
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The images associating the hijab with sexuality, impurity and immodesty are 
reminiscent of the stigmatisation attached to the hijabed Muslimah’s body prior to the 
2004 ban. In her writing about what she refers to as ‘the Other Europe’, Göle (2011, p. 
24) states that the presence of Islam as the epitome of the Other poses the issue of 
difference in European culture in terms of the notions of the body and sexuality, as 
Islam challenges the ‘emancipatory perception of the subject and introduces another 
notion of the feminine subject that is simultaneously public and pious’. This point is 
useful in reminding us that the hijab, which is one of the most salient symbols of 
Islamic presence in Europe, also introduces into the European public space a different 
notion of the female subject which is at once ‘public and pious’, a vision which 
challenges attributing immodesty to the hijab of French Muslimat. 
 
To sum up, sexual associations of the veil in French texts, as illustrated through the 
French weeklies and political examples, have defined the hijab within an antithetical 
place in relation to the French concepts of gender equality, emancipation and 
liberation. On the one hand, I have illustrated how the dress is linked with an attack to 
equality and emancipation which are deemed central to the republican secularism. On 
the other hand, I have shown how the veil symbolises indignity, oppression and 
inferiority, and discrimination against Muslim women, and how the veil is associated 
with impurity and immodesty as well as stigma and violence. Let us now consider 
instances where the veil is affiliated with ethical meanings prior to the hijab ban.  
 
French Ethical Threats  
6.2.1. The Hijab as Propaganda, Mission and Proselytising 
The assigned meanings to the hijab in political and sexual terms have been 
accompanied with drawing clear boundaries between an autonomous individual 
considered to be free from religious affiliations, and a threatening hijabed Muslimah 
whose body often links her with a religious threat and an intrinsic willingness to 
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islamise the French public space. In this section, I consider how the hijab is defined in 
terms of an ethical (and moral) otherness in relation to the French values. The hijab in 
the French press and politics prior to the 2004 ban is constructed as a threat to the 
French social space. The French Muslimah’s body is hence repeatedly affiliated with 
propaganda, proselytising and a missionary stance as the examples in this section will 
illustrate.  
 
In comparison with other religious symbols, the hijab is portrayed as an item that 
‘interpellates’ others within the republican school who may be Christian, Jewish, or 
atheist. Daniel Sibony69 reference to interpellation suggests the veil constitutes an 
interrupting and interceding object, sending a moral and ethical message in public 
space (Sibony, 2003): 
 
Contrary to the wearing of a cross, a star, a kippa, etc., which indicate a certain 
bond of the believer to their God, a bond which does not seem to interpellate 
others, the headscarf means for those who wear it decency and modesty. The 
message which ensues to the other girls or teachers is that they lack modesty 
and decency. It is thus an implicit and pejorative judgment on others. That is 
what creates a problem. 
 
Although the hijab, like the cross, kippa or Star of David, can indicate a spiritual or 
personal bond for Muslimat, Daniel Sibony limits its symbolism to ‘decency’ and 
                                                 
69Daniel Sibony was born in 1942 in Morocco, in a Jewish family living in the Medina. He is a French 
writer and psychoanalyst, author of thirty books. At the age of 5, he began to learn French, and emigrated 
to Paris at the age of 13 years. He holds a PhD from the University of Paris, and a position of lecturer 
then professor at the same university until 2000. He also studied philosophy and obtained a doctorate in 
1985. He became a psychoanalyst at age 32 after training with Lacan and his school. Source: 
http://www.babelio.com/auteur/Daniel-Sibony/81483  
Own Youtube Channel: https://www.youtube.com/user/danielsibony  
Other: http://www.danielsibony.com/biographie.html 
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‘modesty’. Contrary to the claim that the headscarf (foulard) does not express a bond 
of the believer, for many Muslimat, veiling signifies piety and spirituality.70 In the 
framework of Islam in Europe, the veil, like the minarets and mosques in public life, 
exposes the ‘Muslim actors’ in European countries (Göle, 2011, p.12). As a potential 
sign of piety and religious practice, the hijab thus marks a visible difference in 
European countries which Daniel Sibony links with posing a ‘problem’. Although Göle 
defines the veil as a ‘mute symbol’ which risks fixing it within the realm of 
voicelessness, her idea of the ‘pious Muslim actor’ in the public realm of Europe is 
useful in conceptualising the hijabed French Muslimah and her visibility in public 
space. In such a perspective, piety and spirituality become constitutive elements to the 
presence of the hijab in secular public life. Reading the hijab in the French republican 
school as a derogatory statement that ‘poses a problem’ expresses a view of the 
Muslimah’s body (and Islam in France) as an outsider to the French context. The 
‘freedom of conscience’ repeatedly emphasised in secular ideology seems to be 
questioned when the hijab is concerned. Distancing the hijab from piety and 
spirituality hence also functions as a way of distancing French Muslimahs from a 
secular space in which some religious signs are accepted and not others. 
   
Although Sibony restricts the practice of veiling to Muslimat, many Jewish and 
Christian women adopt veiling or modest dress today. Women, for instance, cover their 
heads before entering the Church or attending religious congregations and ceremonials, 
and nuns are required to cover and dress modestly. Likewise, many Jewish women 
adopt modest dress often composed of a wig and long garments. Although modesty 
applies to both men and women in Islam, this virtue has become more linked with 
Muslim women ‘wearing a headscarf and not socialising with men in public’ (Hamzeh, 
2012, p.79). Borrowing Fatima Mernissi’s categorisation of different types of the hijab, 
Manal Hamzeh notes that modesty in dress and mobility in public are manifested 
                                                 
70  See (Alvi, et al., 2003), also see (El Guindi, 1999) and (Abu-Lughod, 2001) 
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through three hijabs, and that while the visual hijab means covering parts of the bodies, 
the spatial hijab refers to seclusion in private spaces away from public life, and ethical 
hijabs to the protection from forbidden behaviour (Hamzeh, 2012, p. 79). Although 
still used as a justification for attempting to restrict women’s access to the public realm, 
the concept of ‘spatial hijabs’ and the seclusion of women into private spaces is 
however challenged by the significant visibility of Muslimahs and their different forms 
of Islamic dress in public spaces today. This is the case in France in which second and 
third generation French Muslimahs have become an increasing visibile minority in 
French and other European public and urban spheres. 
 
The presence of Muslims in France, as is manifested through the visibility of the hijab 
worn by French Muslimahs, is what constitutes a ‘problem’. It is not the cross, kippa 
or Star of David that cause concern in the French press and politics, but the hijab which 
is portrayed as an ‘other’ sign, historically affiliated with Muslims as the colonial 
‘others’. As Hoodfar notes, in the Canadian context, it is the colonial image of Muslims 
and the veil, and the continuous demonisation of Islam that have proved a major 
obstacle to the integration of the Muslims into society (Alvi, et al., 2003, p. 39). The 
vision of the hijab as an element that ‘interpellates’ others is an instance of how the 
dress, which the media still constructs through discourses of otherness and threat, is 
defined as a barrier to social harmony and integration. Unveiling is conversely 
understood as integrating.  
 
We can consider the definition of the hijab as a ‘pejorative judgement on others’ and 
a ‘problem’ within the framework of an increasingly disturbing visibility of Islam in 
France. As Göle (2011, p.40) states in her study, Islamic presence in Europe appeared 
to European consciousness as a ‘forcible intrusion’ and ‘invasion’ which was not 
desired—‘provoking a feeling of losing its identity, geographical and cultural borders’. 
The expressions ‘pejorative statement’ and ‘creates a problem’ serve not only to 
contrast the hijab with other acceptable and tolerated religious signs which are 
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portrayed in a positive light, but also to emphasise the classification of the hijabed 
body as a ‘problem’ to the French social habitat. The division between tolerated and 
non-tolerated symbols additionally establishes a hierarchical relationship between 
superior hence better religious signs, and inferior symbols which are not to be accepted. 
To expand Göle’s point, one can argue that what we can call the ‘hijab problem’ or 
dilemma (a notion which can also be extended to the French naming of the issue of the 
hijab as the ‘hijab affair’ or affaire du foulard manifests itself not only in terms of the 
visibility of a religion historically classified as other in the secular public space, but 
also of imposing a different culture and identity in the public realm. The hijab’s 
visibility hence epitomises a threatening ‘intrusion’ against the geographic, cultural 
and identitarian borders of the French nation. This incursion, which represents a 
‘problem’ and a cause for worry, anxiety and disturbance, is also perceived as an attack 
to an institutional space which defines which religious signs are acceptable and which 
ones are not. The hijab thus presents a ‘problem’ that goes beyond religious difference 
to include cultural, historical and ethical dimensions which define it against the 
nation’s ‘identity’ and ‘culture’.    
 
The definition of the hijab as a ‘pejorative judgement’ and provocative practice is also 
related to the pressure it is said to exercise on other girls and teachers in schools. This 
negative image positions the dress as a source of anxiety. The 1989 Law, which was 
issued following the emergence of the first affaire du foulard, similarly equates the 
hijab with pressure. This law was issued after the expulsion of two girls from school 
for wearing the hijab. The law establishes a connection between the hijab and pressure 
through stating that ‘all acts of pressure, provocation, proselytising or propaganda are 
prohibited within the secular republican school’ (Commission de Reflexion Sur 
l'Application du Principe de Laïcité Dans La Republique, 2003). In his insightful study 
of French secularism, Talal Asad argues that the Muslimah’s displaying the hijab is 
‘said to incorporate the actor’s will to display it’, hence the simple act of wearing the 
dress is understood as including a motivation or drive to display it, or to parade it. As 
Asad points out, the use of the term by the Stasi commission itself, as one of its 
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members made clear, incorporated the ‘will to (make) appear’, hence the Muslim 
identity of the hijab wearer was paramount to it meaning itself as the ‘will to display 
it had to be read from that identity’ (the act of wearing embodies the will) (Asad, 2006). 
This idea can be usefully applied to Sibony’s vision of the veil as a ‘derogatory’ symbol 
that causes a ‘problem’ as the act of wearing the hijab is equated with a will to send a 
pejorative message to other people in the public space. Because the hijab is a sign of 
modesty, it is understood as negating the modesty of others who share public space. It 
is read as an act which embodies pressure on other members of the society.      
 
In the political discourse, similar references are made. As I stated earlier, the law issued 
in 1989 specifically refers to the hijab that initiated the debate in media and politics, 
as it did not make references to other religious items. The Stasi Report (2003) likewise 
establishes a tie between the hijab and acts of pressure and proselytising, which 
illustrates the vision of the dress as a symbol of proselytising in a more indirect and 
oblique manner:  
 
Demanding the neutrality of the state seems little conciliatory with displaying 
an aggressive proselytising, particularly in the scholarly space. Accepting to 
adapt the public expression of one’s confessional particularities and to put 
boundaries to the affirmation of one’s identity allows the meeting of everyone 
in the public space [...] The spirit of laicity requires this balance between rights 
and obligations (Stasi Report).  
 
The inscription of the hijab within an ethical difference includes attributing a 
missionary stance to it. Here, the expression ‘aggressive proselytising’ suggests the 
hijab’s carrying an inherent mission of not only occupying a scholarly space which is 
constructed as neutral, but also imposing a violent proselytising in the republican 
school. 
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In his study of Islam and secularism, Olivier Roy states that, due to its demographic 
weight, Islam causes anxiety at the ‘banlieue and the world, local and global’ levels: 
‘the communitarian ghetto and triumphant proselytism’ (Roy, 2007, p.30). Islam in this 
perspective is seen as a potential aspect of a deep social change (Roy, 2007, p.30). The 
perception of the hijab as an embodiment of an ‘aggressive proselytising’ demonstrates 
this anxiety about the visibility of French Muslims in France. Rather than a culturally, 
racially or religiously limited practice, the hijab in such a case represents a global 
phenomenon which causes concern.  
 
The additional reference to the hijab being ‘little conciliatory’ indicates its image as a 
violent antagonistic symbol which presents an attack to the secular school.  The Report 
also considers the disturbing visibility of the dress (‘public expression’) as a breach of 
the secular notion of ‘freedom of conscience,’ which underlies the common perception 
of the hijab as unequivocally imposed on French Muslimat. The Report’s allying of the 
hijab to these terms attributes a violent stance to it, and a vision of the hijabed body as 
one that is prone to violent behaviour. I have demonstrated earlier how the notion of 
violence has been repeatedly used in the political and press texts in relation to the veil. 
This view further accords with an inscription of the hijab with a racial and cultural 
difference, and its definition with a particular culture (Islamic) and race 
(Maghrebi/Arab), and with ‘confessional particularities’ which the Report implicitly 
contrasts with the confessional and secular norms of the republican institution. As a 
violent proselytising symbol, the hijab of the young Muslimat requires to ‘adapt’ hence 
adjust to what is understood as a secular normative body appearance. It is this hijab 
which also justifies the intervention of the French state through its Commission to 
prevent the ‘violence’ of the veil from spreading within its borders. This means 
regulating a potentially lethal object that presents a threat to its scholarly space. The 
history of confrontation between Muslims and Christians, and the histories of 
colonialism have additionally contributed to maintaining the image of Islam as a 
missionary and proselytising religion, as I discussed in earlier chapters. The hijab 
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associations in France prior to the 2004 hijab ban can also be read as a renewed 
Orientalist discourse that constructs the veil within a renewed and violent threat.  
 
The image of Islam as an inherently and essentially proselytising religion is also 
accompanied with the attribution of messianism to the hijab, which is also understood 
as a symbol with an intrinsic vocation to convert and hidden power to change the world. 
This is illustrated by Claude Imbert’s  statement in Le Point when he (Imbert, 2003) 
states: 
 
Islam, in its messianism and its distinctive will to rule not only souls, but also 
customs and laws is not, cannot and does not want to be a religion like others. 
Doubtless the great majority of the believers of Islam of France believe that 
they practice ‘a religion like other religions’. At least they aspire to do so. 
Unfortunately, the devout ones are careful to remind us of the social and 
political vocation of the Qur’an. 
 
Claude Imbert here ties Islam with an inherent ‘messianism’, marking it with a 
difference from ‘other religions’. He equates messianism with a ‘will’ hence a 
determination and force to rule not only ‘souls’ but also ‘customs and laws’. The hijab 
again embodies a hidden will to rule. The example also contrasts the ‘believers of Islam 
of France’ with ‘the devout ones’ whom it affiliates with the ‘social and political 
vocation of the Qur’an’ in reference to the ‘will’ of Islam to impose Islamic laws and 
mores in the French context. It is interesting how it is through the hijab that references 
are made about messianism and Islamic laws, and how adopting the dress embodies a 
‘will’ to impose Islamic laws and mores on the French political and social realms. Also 
significant is the reference to ‘customs’ which suggest not only unwelcome mores, but 
also an ‘other’ civilisation. The battle of the veil in also a battle of mores and 
civilisation. As Talal Asad notes, however, the young Muslimat concerned with the 
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ban are French, live in France and are subject to French laws rather than shari’a, which 
means that the hijab indicates an ‘imaginary transgression’ rather than a real status 
(Asad, 2006). We can therefore see how the veil embodies not only a religious and 
ethical difference, but also simultaneously the subordination of women. 
 
In line with the proselytising stance which the earlier political examples emphasise, 
messianism codifies the hijab with an inherent political, religious and cultural 
otherness which makes it pose a threat to the values and laws of the French society. 
This is through the example’s linking it with a different religious, cultural and political 
system. As a symbol carrying Islam’s ‘political and social vocation’ and an implied 
power and will to change the world, the hijab bears a potential threat to French secular 
norms and laws, which are defined in positive terms. Both the ascribed inability and 
unwillingness of Islam to discard Islamic laws in favour of republican laws and 
customs places it outside the borders of an acceptable religious practice in the French 
context. The tacit alliance of the hijab with messianism through Islam positions it 
within a political, religious and cultural difference.  
 
The association of the hijab with messianism further includes references to two types 
of Muslims. The categorisation of French Muslims into ‘believers in Islam of France’ 
and ‘the devout ones’ situates the hijab within a dichotomy between an acceptable 
‘Islam of France’ implicitly symbolised by unveiling, and a tacitly unacceptable 
‘devout Islam’ epitomised by the hijab. Imbert ties the latter to a commitment to 
challenge the secular norms of the French society. Similarly to earlier references to 
‘laic Muslims’ and ‘Muslim French people’, labelling French Muslims and Muslimat 
draws a contrast and delineates the boundaries between acceptable and unacceptable, 
tolerable and non-tolerable types of Muslims. At another level, such a taxonomisation 
consolidates the authority of the republic to define Islam and religious practice for its 
French Muslims, and to promote type of Islam which is in line with its secular norm. 
This is therefore another instance where the French press defines, delineates, and 
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determines whose Islam is to be tolerated, and whose is not within the symbolic borders 
of its secular space. 
 
Ascribing messianism to the hijab operates through describing Islam in missionary 
terms. The example attributes a ‘missionary’ stance to the dress through Islam, 
moreover connoting a fear that has existed since the first contacts with Muslims. This 
was the case more particularly with European missionary movements and the crusades. 
Later during the colonial era, colonisers fought with representatives of nationalist 
movements in Arab countries on the issue of Muslim women’s liberation. This conflict 
has resulted in perceiving women’s liberation movement as an ‘exclusively religious 
problem’, and the conflict against the West was lived as a ‘religious crusade’ (Mernissi, 
1975, p. xii).This is also a time when the veil represents a pivotal point of this religious 
crusade, and is used by different parties.Once used as a tool against a colonial ‘religious 
crusade’ in the context of anti-colonial movements, the hijab for Claude Imbert 
embodies a ‘mission’ against the French republican society which is not only religious, 
but also political and social. The danger perceived to emanate from Islam, and the hijab 
as one of its most salient symbols is projected onto French Muslims, and the messianic 
stance attributed to Islam is manifested through its supposed willingness to govern the 
laws and traditions of the French republic. The visibility of the hijab prior to the 2004 
ban is thus experienced as a form of mission or  ‘crusade’ against French laws and 
customs; hence the preoccupation with the hijab also parallels a concern with a 
‘crusade’ which is attributed to its assigned ‘social and political vocation’.   
 
The equation of the hijab with a missionary stance is repeated in the French press. This 
is the case in another editorial from Claude Imbert in Le Point’s entitled ‘Barbarism’ 
(La Barbarie) which suggests the depiction of Islam as a ‘barbaric religion’. The 
editorial makes the veil synonymous with a missionary stance having Orientalist and 
colonial roots (Imbert, 2004):   
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The veil [...] makes a forceful return in the majority of Muslim countries [...] 
Europe counts ten million Muslims, and France has become the eldest daughter 
of European Islam. If it spreads here, the veil will bring in the urban space the 
insistent spectacle of the Islamic presence, the display of Allah in a land of 
mission [...] the Islamist activists make use of the multiple forms of tolerance 
which the rights of our free societies offer to the enemies of freedom [...] Only 
a successful integration will make these Muslim French persons become 
French Muslims.  
 
The example here refers to the religious revival witnessed in many Muslim countries 
during the last few decades. The term ‘veil’, which does not specify any special form 
of Islamic dress, is linked with a ‘forceful return’ which resounds with the power, 
violence and proselytising stances assigned to the hijab in the earlier examples. The 
expressions also highlight the outsider status of the hijab, through tying it again with 
‘Muslim countries’, and affiliating it with culturally and spatially remote countries 
located outside the boundaries of Europe and France. The link which the example 
establishes between the hijab of French Muslimat and ‘Muslim countries’ suggests the 
dress originates from an ‘other’ culturally, religiously remote people seeking to invade 
France. According to such a vision, the West is entangled in a ‘violent clash with the 
Islamic world’, which is originally cultural, and ‘Islam represents everything that the 
West is not, namely pre-modern, tribal, non-democratic, religious and barbaric’ 
(Razack, 2008, p.84). The reference to ‘Muslim countries’, and a ‘forceful return’ 
regarding the hijab in France therefore serve not only to attribute violence and power 
to a dress constructed as belonging outside of the French and European contexts, but 
also to hint at the threat posed by the existence of an increasingly visible minority of 
French Muslimat who wear the hijab. Besides its disturbing visibility, Claude Imbert 
also equates the hijab with the ‘insisting spectacle of Islamic presence’, and the 
‘display of Allah in a land of mission’, an imagery that suggests a Christian missionary 
rhetoric about Islam. As the title of the text euphemistically states, Islam embodies a 
‘barbaric’ force, infiltrating Europe and France. As the ‘eldest daughter of European 
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Islam’, France represents the country with the highest threat due to its number of 
Muslims.  
 
Political texts also contain references to the missionary stance of the hijab, albeit less 
explicitly. In the Stasi Report, for instance, the Commission (2003) notes that the 
‘visible character of a religious sign is felt by many as contrary to the mission of the 
school that is a space of neutrality, and a space of awakening critical conscience’. 
Although the Report remains careful not to make any direct reference to the hijab, the 
allusions and images used in relation to religious symbols hint at a fixation on the hijab 
which has initiated the affaire du foulard itself. The Report reads the hijab’s visibility 
as a form of mission that contrasts with that of the republican school, and constructs it 
as a threat which marks a clear ‘breach’ of the basic principles of French secularism.  
 
To conclude, equating the hijab with propaganda, proselytising, messianism and 
violence provides instances of how it has been constructed as a threat to the French 
society and urban space. Now I turn to explore how the hijab is repeatedly tied with 
communalism and a threat to integration.  
 
6.2.2. Hijab Communalism71 and the Threat to French Integration 
In this section, I analyse images and language used in the French press and politics in 
relation to the hijab as a symbol of communalism, which contributes to reinforcing the 
idea of the Muslim other in French society.72 After illustrating how the hijab is 
                                                 
71 Olivier Roy (2002, p. 20) defines communalism (communautarisme) as a ‘term is widely used in 
France to describe the trend in which people want to be recognized first as a group (usually 
ethnocultural) and only second as individual citizens, which means ethnocultural identity stands between 
the state and the individual. It is a negative term for multiculturalism’. 
72 Roy (2007, p. x) differentiates between two models mobilised in relation to the management of 
Muslim populations in the West: multiculturalism (usually linked with English-speaking countries such 
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constructed as an ethical and religious threat to the French nation and its laws and 
values, I now focus on how, prior to the 2004 ban, communalism positions the hijabed 
body of French Muslimah with a cultural and racial difference, marking the dress as 
belonging to a different and other community and society existing outside the defined 
boundaries of the French community of citizens. 
 
The hijab has often figured as a signifier for communalism in the French publications 
prior to the 2004 ban. This has sometimes been accompanied with labelling and 
classifying Muslims in terms of binary oppositions. Marie Lemonnier73 in Le Nouvel 
Observateur for instance states (Lemonnier, 2003): 
 
For the ‘liberal’ Muslims, wearing the veil is only a recommendation, which 
has to adapt itself to the society in which the Muslims evolve. ‘If the veil 
prevents women from studying and working, let them remove it [...] Islam is 
not here to push our daughters to ignorance or unemployment’, says Soheib 
Bencheikh, great mufti of Marseille. For the ‘rigorists’, the recommendation 
has the value of an obligation. According to Amar Lasfar, vice-chancellor of 
the mosque of Lille-South, ‘there is only a single reading of the Qur’an which 
is the literal reading. 
 
                                                 
as the US and the UK, and the assimilationist model (which is officially termed ‘integration) which is 
specific to France, where ‘the access of citizenship means that individual cultural backgrounds are 
erased and overridden by a political community, the nation, that ignores all intermediary communitarian 
attachments (whether based on race or ethnic or religious identities) which are then removed to the 
private sphere’.  
73 Lancelin, A., & Lemonnier, M. (2008). Les philosophes et l'amour : Aimer de Socrate à Simone de 
Beauvoir. Paris: Plon.Linkedin:  https://www.linkedin.com/pub/marie-lemonnier/41/234/854   
Articles: http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/journaliste/14907/marie-lemonnier.html 
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The categorisation of Muslims into ‘liberal’ and ‘rigorist’ demarcates the limits 
between an acceptable Islam, and a non-acceptable Islam considered to be 
incompatible with the republic. In opposition to the Islam which requires 
‘development’ and Muslims who need to ‘evolve’, (‘rigorist’ or extremist Muslims), 
the tolerated and tolerant Muslims (‘liberal ‘or moderate Muslims) consider veiling as 
a recommendation rather than an obligation. The proponents of this acceptable Islam 
are the ones which the example categorises within ‘Islam of France’, or the type of 
Islam that is attuned to a secular nation. Conversely, the ‘rigorist’ category of Islam is 
characterised with lack of development and progress through the expression ‘Muslims 
evolve’, and narrow-mindedness through their ‘literal reading’ of the Qur’an. The 
reference to Muslim ‘rigorists’ also suggests not only their endorsement of a strict and 
rigid reading of the scripture, but also their being harsh in their refusal to open the text 
to an alternative reading. This is another instance where the hijab and Muslims are 
affiliated with an inherent and essential inclination for despotism and tyranny, both of 
which resonate with historical associations of Muslims in such terms. As I detailed in 
the earlier sections, labelling Muslims also serves to contrast ‘fundamentalist Muslims’ 
or ‘Islamists’ with ‘Muslim republicans’, or ‘laic Muslims’ with ‘pious Muslims’. This 
justifies the role of the state in classifying Muslims according to different types and 
taxonomies. Yet, as Olivier Roy argues, specific categories such as ‘Islamist’ or 
‘neofundamentalist’ are convenient but cannot purport to incorporate the actual lives 
of millions of people, as such categorisations ‘do not exhaust the complexity of 
individual religious experience’ (Roy, 2002, p.21). Classifying French Muslims into 
different types therefore risks homogenising the individual experiences of French 
Muslims which can be far more complex.       
 
The categorisation of Muslims into opposite types and kinds also contributes to 
showing support and approval to some while denying it to others. This is because the 
first category is said to adhere to republican values (visibility of body in public realm), 
whereas the second one shows non-allegiance to these values (adoption of the hijab). 
In the example, the ‘great mufti of Marseille’ is depicted as progressive and ‘liberal’, 
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whereas the rector of the mosque in Lille is labelled as ‘rigorist’, hence illiberal and 
intolerant. These dichotomies also imply a hierarchy where some Muslims are 
portrayed as better because they are superior and liberated and evolved, as opposed to 
others who are inferior, backward, and intolerant. Such dichotomies therefore 
taxonomise French Muslims by reducing them to a sub-category of Muslims who are 
defined according to their cultural, racial and ethnic origin, illustrating their reduction 
to others who belong outside the French society. 
 
The association of the hijab with a form of communalism includes references to the 
notion of integration. Joceline Cesari (quoted in (Killian, 2006, p. 19)) defines France’s 
assimilationist model as one that:   
 
insists that if immigrants seek to become French citizens, they must eschew 
their foreign cultural, religious, political and ideological alliances. In other 
words, they must accept the already existing consensus of reality and polity of 
the prevailing system and assimilate into it, shedding all alien characteristics. 
The French policy of Gallicization sees the end result of integration as the 
privatization of religious practice, with the Muslim individuals becoming 
socially and economically assimilated. 
 
Cesari’s definition elucidates how assimilation, which represents the French model of 
integration, emphasises the importance of discarding one’s ‘cultural, religious, 
political and ideological alliances’ in order to become French citizens. Marie 
Lemonnier’s statement implicitly refers to integration. In the example, there is a vague 
allusion to integration through the use of the verb ‘adapt’ in relation to Muslims, who 
are defined in terms of their religious and cultural belonging. This reference also serves 
to draw a contrast between the ‘liberal’ Muslims who are framed as integrated to 
French society, and the ‘rigorist’ ones who are in need to be integrated. Equally 
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important is the expression ‘Muslims evolve’ which communicates a vision of French 
Muslims as ‘backward’, in line with a colonial and Orientalist depiction of Muslims in 
need of progress and enlightenment. This also insinuates that the ‘evolution’ of 
Muslims is only possible within French society, the guarantor of progress and 
development. The link which the example establishes between the hijab and pushing 
French Muslim girls to ‘ignorance and unemployment’ further emphasises the idea of 
Islam as a backward religion which prevents young women from gaining knowledge 
and employment. Although what poses a problem is the presence of the hijab in schools 
during the hijab affair, the example positions Islam as a potential barrier for their access 
to education and employment. As Killian notes, although veiled students are moving 
towards higher degrees, many non-Muslims persist on presuming that veiling and 
education for women are paradoxical, while veiling is not inevitably equivalent to 
being less committed to education (Killian, 2006, p.22). We can see how the idea of 
the veil as being contradictory with education is adopted by the mufti Soheib 
Bencheikh. Connecting the hijab with lack of knowledge additionally enhances the 
republican school’s status as the knowledge provider, thereby categorising the hijab 
with a difference which also bears racial and cultural connotations of the veil as a 
signifier of ignorance and unemployment.     
 
Labelling also has a long history. I would argue that the example’s labelling of French 
Muslims resembles how Muslims were grouped into specific categories during the 
colonial period. During the battle of the veil in colonial Algeria, for instance, the 
colonial power’s attempts to break the resistance of the colonised involved promoting 
unveiling and the adoption of Western dress. The colonised people were categorised 
into ‘civilised’ and ‘non-civilised’ or ‘developed’ and ‘non-developed’ natives, as 
mentioned in the earlier chapters. The example’s labelling of French Muslims 
examined above perpetuates a similar strategy to the one previously used by the 
colonial power to mark and sort Muslims who are not to be tolerated. Instead of the 
coloniser, it is the French print media which defines Muslims in such terms.  
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Political texts also evoke the French notion of integration. Jacques Chirac, for instance, 
emphasises the importance of ‘integration’ and respect for republican laws by 
‘foreigners’ joining the French community of citizens. This integration involves 
discarding a ‘foreignness’ that would be contradictory with the ‘spirit of the French 
republic’. In his speech on secularism, Chirac (2003.2) highlights the importance of 
secularism and its success: 
 
These successes [of laicity] also have to be prepared with the foreigners who 
are joining us legally, by asking them to adhere to our values and our laws. It 
is the whole object of the contract of welcoming and integration put in place by 
the government on my request, which is proposed to them at an individual level. 
It gives them access to lessons in the French language, training in French 
citizenship, and a social follow-up in exchange for a commitment to 
scrupulously respect the laws of the republic. 
 
The hijab affairs which started in 1989 as well as the one preceding the 2004 hijab ban 
involved French Muslimat who were born and raised in France. Chirac, however, uses 
the term ‘foreigners’ to define French Muslims, conflating both French Muslims and 
the hijab affair with the issue of immigration. This was done through a series of 
speeches on French secularism prior to the hijab ban. It is noteworthy that Chirac’s 
speech is entitled ‘speech in relation to the respect of the principle of laicity in the 
republic’. As a marker of a religious difference repeatedly associated with a cultural, 
ethnic and racial otherness, the hijab implicitly situates young French Muslimat not 
merely as ‘foreigners’ and outsiders to the French republic, but also as potentially 
disrespectful to its values and laws. In addition to conflating the hijab affair with the 
issue of immigration, the use of the term ‘foreigners’ to refer to French Muslims and 
the hijab affair in France also distances the dress, and categorises it as ‘foreign’ and 
outsider to the values and laws of the republic. Through banning the hijab, the French 
state also announced that the people who embraced Islam to be ‘foreigners to the 
227 of 347 
 
French way of life’, and although it did not apply to boys and men, it signified that 
loyalty to Islam was a barrier to full integration (Scott, 2007, p. 149). The additional 
expression of foreigners ‘joining us legally’ suggests the existence of illegal 
immigration, which in turn the example associates with Muslims being lawless and 
illegal. The successes of French secularism and promise of integration are hence tacitly 
opposed to the outsider status of Muslims, and the hijabed body in particular, which 
needs to be secularised and integrated. As Killian notes, the French model of 
integration entails ‘a loss of ethnic identity and pressure to conform to a standard civic 
model’, and the use of the term ‘integration’ instead of ‘adaptation’ by politicians and 
the press suggests immigrants ‘should learn to fit in rather than just get along’ (Killian, 
2003). We can think about Chirac’s statement as an implicit call for the French Muslim 
to ‘fit in’ with the secular model of integration which requires all signs of belonging 
be discarded. We can additionally read this call as an example of how the hijab is 
tacitly coded as a marker of a different ethnic, cultural, religious and racial identity that 
need to be lost in the process of integration to the French model of citizenship. The 
hijabed body of the Muslimah hence needs to be unveiled to conform to this model. 
 
Chirac evokes additional references in relation to the hijab against integration. His 
statement draws an implicit contrast between ‘our values and laws’ which are deemed 
superior, and the values and laws of ‘foreigners’ which are scripted as inferior. It is 
therefore the duty of the foreigners to adapt and adjust to the secular values and laws 
and discard elements of their foreignness including original beliefs and rules. Chirac 
notes that the ‘successes’ of laicity have to be prepared with foreigners too, and that 
these successes depend on the integration of these foreigners in France.  As Thobani 
(2007, p.6) notes, while failings of national subjects are considered as individual and 
isolated ones, the flaws of outsiders are perceived as reflecting the ‘inadequacies not 
only of their community and culture, but also of their whole ‘race’’, and their successes 
are treated as individual and isolated exceptions. Not only does Chirac’s statement 
suggest the position of foreigners (in this case Muslims more particularly) as outsiders 
to the French nation of citizens, but it also places the republic above ‘their’ 
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(other/foreign) values and laws. The process of integration which Chirac advocates 
hence involves discarding their foreignness which is embodied by their ‘other’ systems 
of belief and laws. His statement equally homogenises ‘foreigners’ by grouping them 
in a fixed and stable entity, and reducing their various experiences and beliefs into a 
single system. In highlighting the governmental ‘contract of welcoming and 
integration’ proposed to ‘foreigners’ at an ‘individual level’, Chirac evokes an image 
of hospitality offered to Muslims in return for integrating into French society, a process 
to be reached through ‘scrupulously respecting the laws of the republic’. The process 
of integration and gaining citizenship hence becomes conditional upon discarding 
values and laws which are associated with people and ‘foreigners’ who have been 
historically defined in terms of belonging to ‘other’ religious, cultural and racial 
origins. The outsider status of the Muslim ‘foreigners’ is thus supplanted to the foreign 
status of Islam and Islamic laws, which are again understood as being imported from 
the ‘Muslim world’ through the ‘foreigners’.     
 
Chirac often reiterates his association of the hijab with communalism. In the same 
speech (Chirac, 2003.2), he refers to the hijab affair more explicitly when he affirms: 
 
Communalism cannot possibly be France’s choice. It would be contradictory 
with our history, our traditions, and our culture. It would be contrary to our 
humanist principles, and to our faith in the development of society through the 
only force of talent and merit, and our attachment to the values of equality and 
fraternity among all French people. This is why I refuse to engage France in 
this direction. It would sacrifice its heritage in communalism. It would 
compromise its future. It would lose its soul. This is also why we have the fierce 
obligation to act. It is neither in opposition to progress, nor in nostalgia that we 
will find again a community of fate. It is rather in lucidity, imagination, and 
faithfulness to what we are.  
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Chirac here uses a more affective language in his speech on secularism. His statement 
includes repeated references to the possessive pronoun ‘our’, which emphasises 
France’s superior status in relation to ‘their’ (other) communalism, defined in terms of 
incompatibility with the French ‘history’, ‘traditions’ and ‘culture’ as well as ‘humanist 
principles’.  We can read Chirac’s statement through the notion of ‘culture clash’, in 
which the other is defined in terms of an irreconcilable cultural difference which 
clashes with the constructed notion of the national citizen. Although the speech makes 
no direct reference to the hijab over which the concept of secularism was evoked, 
Chirac’s references tacitly position the dress in a hierarchical relationship with the 
republic, deemed to be the holder of superior culture, traditions and principles. At 
another level, evoking the pride in French history, traditions and culture (as signifiers 
of a single culture) communicates homogeneous and timeless entities, and a vision of 
the hijab as symbolic of an essential communal and cultural threat. The references to 
culture, tradition and history position the hijab as belonging to the realm of the inferior. 
By contrast, the republic, with its humanist tradition and secular values, is constructed 
as superior to the hijabed Muslimah, who embodies not only a communal threat to the 
republic and its values, but also a cultural and racial menace to its superior values.    
 
Let us consider the tacit construction of ‘foreigners’ as alien to the histories of 
humanism and modernism. The pride in the ‘history’ and ‘heritage’ of the French 
nation, which are defined within humanist principles including rationalism, contrasts 
with the implicit irrationality attributed to the religious beliefs of the ‘foreigners’ and 
by implication the hijab which stands for foreign presence in France. Chirac defines 
the hijab of French Muslimat as contrary to its ‘soul’, in other words its ‘essence’ and 
spirit and perhaps its very ‘humanism’. It operates as a breach of the ‘collective’ and 
‘shared’ French heritage which is in turn defined in essentialist terms. We can situate 
Chirac’s statement within a republican discourse emphasising the traditional 
construction of the hijab. In her study of the construction of Muslim women, Razack 
(2008, p.103) notes that, according to some narratives, Muslim men and women do not 
possess any ‘history, content, or specificity’ and everything we know from culture-
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clash explanations is that they are ‘stuck in pre-history’. Nashat and Tucker (1999, p. 
xxxiv) similarly argue that the study of third-world women poses a challenge to the 
notion of a strict dichotomy between traditional and modern, as women’s lives 
demonstrate that traditional cultures are not ‘static, monolithic or more misogynist than 
Western culture’. The elevation of the republican characteristics in comparison with 
an undefined other, in this case the hijabed French Muslimah, marks this other as 
having no history, and as being absent from the French history, culture and traditions 
which conversely codify the republic as rational and liberal. The homogenisation of 
the republican assets equally operates on the basis of the construction of a monolithic 
other culture, tradition and history in need of adaptation. References to history, 
tradition and culture further operate to emphasise the repeatedly constructed ‘cultural 
clash’ between the French past and ‘civilisation’ which are in conflict with a foreign 
presence embodied by the French Muslimah in hijab.    
 
Secularism, however, which Chirac unquestionably associates with the French 
republic, has also been part of the ‘Muslim world’. Regarding the support of secular 
values outside the French republic, Martine Gozlan in Marianne (2004) links the 
suggestively colonial ‘battle of the Veil’ with ‘secular Muslims’ and ‘Arab democrats’ 
asking: 
 
What can secular Muslims and Arab democrats in France and in the lands of 
Islam do or say about such a refusal [of secular values]? [...] In the daily El 
Watan newspaper, Ahmed Samil denounces ‘the most reactionary forces of the 
Muslim world inviting themselves to this dance of the scalp which is 
determined to twist the neck of secularism in the country of Rousseau and Jules 
Ferry’ [...] President Bouteflika who, in the Sorbonne on December nineteenth, 
quoted secularism among the factors of progress of the Arab societies, a 
world’s first! It is strange that this support for our secular principles from the 
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Algerian opinion – both the government and opposition - as well as Moroccan 
democrats was completely silenced.  
 
The codification of the hijab against secularism is pursued in the press. In this example, 
Martine Gozlan aligns the ‘secular Muslims‘ with ‘Arab democrats’, showing the 
support of French secularism from countries inhabited by a majority of Muslim people 
which are termed ‘lands of Islam’.74 Indeed secularisation and secularism have 
constituted a significant part of the histories of Arab and postcolonial states across the 
Middle East. In nationalist movements struggling for independence from colonisation, 
the veil was equated with regression, and progress was often promoted along the lines 
drawn by the coloniser as I detailed in the earlier chapters. This is the case with Qasim 
Amine in Egypt and Tahar Haddad in Tunisia, for instance, both of whom wrote on the 
necessity for Muslims to adopt a more secular ideology in order to achieve progress 
and civilisation. This is comparable with the example’s reference to the ‘secular 
Muslim’ and ‘Arab democrats’ such as President Bouteflika, which the example 
opposes to a non-secular and undemocratic type of Muslims.  
 
Yet before Bouteflika, other Arab statesmen would have been considered equally as 
secular in their attempts to promote unveiling. One of the examples of this movement 
includes King Mohamed V (grandfather of the current king) during whose reign 
Morocco gained independence from the French protectorate. In a trip he undertook in 
1947, at a time when Morocco was nearing its independence from French colonisation, 
he allowed his eldest son Moulay Hassan (who was to become his successor) and his 
daughter Lalla Aicha to give speeches during an important gathering. Lalla Aicha only 
                                                 
74 This example  echoes an earlier example  where a distinction is drawn between ‘good Muslims’ and 
‘bad Muslims’, with the first ones being coded as secular while the second ones are marked as 
antithetical to secular values. 
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wore a little white scarf on her head (Daoud, 1993, p.265) .75 In a more daring move, 
the late King’s sister Lalla Aicha, who was invited to give a speech to French religious 
figures at the University of Tioumliline in the Middle Atlas, insisted on the importance 
of emancipation, noting that the veil was not important, herself wearing only a small 
scarf on her head (Daoud, 1993, p.265).  In Tunisia in 1960, President Bourguiba, who 
played an active role in women’s liberation movement and was promoting 
modernisation and reform of the country, publicly unveiled a woman during an official 
ceremony filmed in 1960 (El-Khayat, 1992, p. 260). Secularisation has and still is 
therefore part of many Muslim-majority countries. It can be argued that the labelling 
of Muslims in the article is an instance of a division which emphasises the superiority 
of French secularism on the one hand, and a tool to distance French Muslims who are 
presented as anti-secular and undemocratic, echoing historical associations of Muslims 
with anarchy and despotism. This labelling hence bears cultural and racial tones. 
 
The first hijab controversy in France in 1989, like the ones that followed, involve 
French Muslimat who are second and third-generation children of immigrants mainly 
from the Maghreb countries of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. Unlike their parents 
most of whom had an immigrant status, these young girls were born and raised in 
France and are therefore French. The emergence of the hijab affairs coincides with the 
more visible presence of young Muslimat in the public realm and their presence in 
French republican schools. The hijab prior to the 2004 ban stands more for the 
permanent presence of French Muslims who are paradoxically defined in terms of 
religious, ethnic, cultural and racial backgrounds, as they are labelled ‘Beur’ (reversed 
                                                 
75On the second of April 1947, taking advantage of a trip in the international zone of Tangier, Mohamed 
V publicly demands independence. Next to him are his eldest son Moulay Hassan, and his eldest 
daughter Lalla Aicha who both give speeches. Lalla Aicha is unveiled, her head was covered with a 
white scarf. The unveiling of the face is retained more than the terms of her speech. Daoud Zakya (1993) 
provides more details in her book Féminisme et Politique au Maghreb.  
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slang French for ‘Arab’), ‘Muslim’, ‘Maghrebi’ and people ‘from immigration’ as 
illustrated through the examples. 
 
In European societies, the hijab is worn by girls who are much more integrated into 
these societies than their immigrant mothers, as the hijab of schoolgirls which is public 
and visible, constitutes what Göle calls a ‘spatial transgression of moving from the 
periphery to the centre’ (Göle, 2011, p.23-24).  As other studies have shown, even the 
young Muslimahs who voluntarily adopt the veil are more French than most would 
consider them. (Killian, 2003) While these young women discard what they perceive 
as the reduction of their parents’ culture, they consent to integration through schooling 
and employment and demand to be accepted as both Muslim and French (Killian, 
2003). Contrasting the hijab with education and employment in the French context 
therefore remains problematic.      
 
The symbolism of the hijab with traditionalism and anti-modernism therefore contrasts 
with the fact that an increasing number of second and third generation Muslimat are 
visible in European spaces, and challenging traditional divisions of public and private. 
It is useful to think about the visibility of the hijab as a ‘transgression’, and a movement 
from the margin to the centre. Similar to the earlier notion of the hijabed body as an 
‘intrusion’ and ‘invasion’ into the public space, the notion of ‘transgression’ becomes 
a useful tool to conceptualise the disturbing visibility of the hijab in public space. The 
hijab epitomises in this sense a trespassing of boundaries, a disobedience of a visible 
minority to the constructed secular space. It thus embodies not only disobedience to 
the rule of visibility and constructed neutrality, but also a trespassing of the Muslim 
body from the margin to the centre, and paradoxically from the communal space to the 
national space. 
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In the print media, the French weeklies tie the hijab to communalism in more affective 
terms. In Le Nouvel Observateur, for instance, Jean Daniel (2003) expresses shock, 
irritation and embarrassment among the emotions triggered by the dress: 
 
What shocks, irritates and embarrasses is that there is in the desire to make 
children wear a veil, a kippa or another distinguishing sign, a will to assert a 
difference which does neither come under a playful eccentricity nor from a 
solitary challenge. It is an assertion of a collective difference and membership 
to a community outside the nation. What shocks, irritates and embarrasses is 
that the guests of a State do not have the politeness to respect the laws of their 
hosts, and especially their battles. Because it was still necessary to fight a long 
battle to reach the republican secular school, which is compulsory and open to 
all. What shocks is the fact of brandishing the freedom of worship in order to 
deny the equality before the law and the fraternity of children. 
 
A range of emotions are expressed in relation to the veil. In this example from Jean 
Daniel, it is associated with shock, irritation and embarrassment. The statement draws 
a contrast between the Muslim community and the autonomous secular subject 
dissociated from religious, social and cultural bonds. The emotions associate the veil 
with nuisance, discomfort, shame and humiliation insinuated by the words ‘shock’, 
‘irritation’ and ‘embarrassment’. The comfort originating from the visibility of the 
normative secular and autonomous body is troubled by the mixed emotions caused by 
the veil, a sign associated with a visibly uncomfortable, shocking and disturbing 
presence. Through these emotions, the example codes the dress as a challenge to the 
nation by embodying a ‘will to assert a collective difference’. It further signifies 
belonging to a ‘community outside the nation’ and a ‘collective difference’ to the 
community of citizens. The veil hence acquires an affective stance.  
 
235 of 347 
 
The example additionally positions the veil as a ‘collective difference’, and draws a 
hierarchical relationship which restricts Muslims within the bounds of a communal, 
cultural and racial difference implicitly classified as inferior. The example thus 
inscribes the French Muslim community as a visible manifestation of an ‘other’ and 
different community separate from the community of citizens. This consolidates the 
perception of French Muslimat as the outsiders within, failing to integrate and become 
full members of the national community. As Heidi Safia Mirza (Mirza, 2013, p. 96) 
argues in her insightful study of Muslim women and Islamophobia in Britain, the ‘new 
and open climate of intolerance against the foreign “visible other” in our midst is 
characterised by a belief that things would be better if minorities, and in particular 
Muslims, assimilated more’. The image of this ‘visible other’ is reinforced by the use 
of the expressions such as ‘guests of the state’ and ‘hosts’ and ‘battle’, which define 
French Muslimat as temporary rather than permanent residents, having their ‘home’ 
outside the borders of France. The hijab thus remains at the margins of the French 
nation. It stands as a symbol not only provoking strong emotions linked with the will 
to affirm a ‘cultural’ ‘collective’ and ‘communal’ difference, but also as being 
disrespectful to the French values and ‘battles’ for the republican free school. The hijab 
yet again stands within a cultural, religious and racial difference which is incompatible 
with the French republic.76   
 
The emotions which the example attaches to the French Muslim community and the 
hijab demonstrate an anxiety and fear of a difference which has become more visible 
with the second and, subsequently, third generation of French Muslims. In this context, 
Scott states that it was a particular concept of secularism that became an ideological 
                                                 
76 As in earlier examples, the veil is associated with impoliteness and disrespect for the laws and ‘battles 
of France’, the hosting country that has secured an ‘open, free secular republican school to all’. 
Contrasting this with ‘equality’ and ‘fraternity’, wearing hijab is also linked with an image of 
‘brandishing freedom of worship’, which suggests a menace to the French republic. The use of the verb 
‘brandish’ itself suggests moving a weapon, thereby posing a deadly threat to the nation. It reiterates the 
idea of the other as prone to violence, an idea I developed in the political associations of the veil.  
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means in an anti-Muslim campaign positioning Muslims outside the borders of France 
by considering their religion and culture ‘not only different but dangerous’ (Scott, 
2007, p. 97). The hijab, which has now entered the republican public and scholarly 
spaces, marks a difference from the constructed secular norm, classifying French 
Muslimat as outsiders to a nation that only recognises visible subjects. The hijab 
becomes a marker of an unacceptable communal difference, and denotes differences 
within racial and cultural terms. Additionally connected with colonised Muslims, the 
‘uncivilised other’, which was later to become the ‘immigrant’, the hijab today defines 
second and third-generation French Muslimat as belonging to a different community, 
religion and race outside the acceptable bounds of the community of French citizens. 
Hence the symbolism of the hijab within such terms goes beyond communalism and 
difference within the French society to a difference originating from colonialism and 
immigration, and extending to the contemporary globalised world.  
 
As the examples from the press and politics illustrate, we need to consider how the 
implicit definition of the secular and visible normative subject and its elevation of the 
French secular model achieves definition through comparison to a ‘racialised subject’ 
(Razack, 2008, p.160). The depiction of the hijab as antithetical to the French notions 
of community and nation of citizens contributes to reinforcing its vision as an alien 
element of the French society, a strangeness often tacitly defined through racial and 
cultural terms. This is a case where donning the hijab makes its wearer more visible, 
where the French hijabed Muslimah becomes a ‘target, identified as ‘other’ when 
controversies emerge (Alvi, et al., 2003, p. 93). She is symbolic not only of ‘Muslim 
community’, but more importantly and subtly, of an ‘other’ often defined along cultural 
and racial terms. 
 
To conclude, political, sexual and communal associations of the hijab prior to the 2004 
ban illustrate how the hijab comes to embody an antithetical entity to French values 
and secularism. The examples I have explored from the French press and politics 
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demonstrate the mechanisms whereby the hijab becomes a threat to the French nation, 
state, secular values and integration. A history of the hijab in France is a history of 
associations: it is a history of what the hijab is assumed to embody, to bring with it.  
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 Moroccan Veils 
Why examine associations of the veil in Morocco? Reflecting an increasing climate of 
Islamophobia that has intensified since 9/11 and – in the Moroccan context specifically 
– the 2003 Casablanca bombings, the Muslimah and, more particularly Islamic attire, 
has been figured as a renewed threat in Morocco, a Muslim-majority country. The 
visibility of different types of Islamic dress has been a controversial issue in Muslim 
contexts too, and particularly within liberal secular circles. In Morocco, the dress has 
been subject to debate within the liberal press, especially since the ascension of the 
first Islamic Party (PJD) to the government in 1999. In a country where veiled women 
could not appear on national television until very recently, my research establishes the 
need for us to consider the figure of the veiled Muslimah as it has been constructed in 
terms of a threat, especially during the last decade as Islamic clothing has become more 
visibly adopted in Muslim-majority contexts. 
  
In this chapter, I analyse the meanings of the veil during the years that followed the 
2003 Casablanca bombings and the French 2004 hijab ban. First I consider how the 
dress becomes an embodiment of political notions of Islamism77 and extremism, and 
how it is constructed against the ideal liberal secular model promoted by the 
publications. Second, I explore how Islamic clothing symbolises otherness in sexual 
terms through notions of body denial, deprivation, submission and inferiority. In the 
third and last part of this chapter, I discuss how the dress comes to signify ethical and 
socio-cultural meanings of fantasy, fashion and fitna. As I mentioned in my earlier 
chapters, my analysis focuses on how the veil becomes the embodiment of these 
particular concepts, and how these different meanings become techniques of 
                                                 
77 Olivier Roy’s (2002, pp. 58-59) calls Islamism ‘the brand of modern political Islamic fundamentalism 
that claims to re-create a true Islamic society, not simply by imposing sharia, but by establishing first an 
Islamic state through political action. Islamists see Islam not as a mere religion, but as a political 
ideology that should reshape all aspects of society (politics, law, social justice, foreign policy, and so 
on). 
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‘othering’. What struck me when I was researching the veil is how these meanings 
were recurrent in the media texts, and how veil associations also travel with the veil. 
A comparative analysis of associations in the Moroccan print media will enable us to 
assess the heightened anxiety attached to the figure of the veiled woman not only in 
France, but also in Morocco.  
 
I examine the various meanings of Islamic dress in the press through examples of texts 
from the Moroccan Francophone weeklies Tel Quel78, Le Reporter79 and 
L’Observateur du Maroc80, and Arabophone weekly Nichan. Researching the veil in 
the framework of the Moroccan liberal print media means understanding how and why 
it represents a complex and controversial issue which is less debated in audio-visual 
media, and much more in print media. As I pointed out in my methodology chapter, a 
comparative cross-temporal, cross-spatial study of the veil stresses the significance of 
considering the dress across various junctures and contexts. Contrasting associations 
thus aims at considering constructions of the dress in comparative perspective with a 
focus on media. The importance of merging and comparing social contexts and 
geographies, and more particularly Muslim-majority and Muslim minority ones, has 
                                                 
78 Tel Quel (slogan: "Morocco as it is") is a French-language Moroccan private independent magazine.Its 
editorial line is often critical of the Moroccan government. Outside of Morocco, Tel Quel is also 
distributed in France. 
The group Tel Quel edited the Arabic dialect weekly Nichane until October 2010. Tel Quel defends a 
free editorial, without concessions to the state. Several lawsuits have been filed against the magazine 
since 2003.3 In August 2009, it was the publication of a survey testing the popularity of King 
Mohammed VI, which has earned the government's wrath. The magazine discusses several topics, 
combining economy, politics, and society. After the arbitrary arrest of Moroccan journalist Rachid Niny, 
publisher of the first newspaper in the country Al Massae, April 28, 2011, Tel Quel published an editorial 
in which the magazine editor expresses solidarity with Rachid Niny and rejection of his arbitrary arrest, 
despite the differences between Tel Quel and Al Massae. In 2010, Tel Quel's director Ahmed Reda 
Benchemsi sold his shares to Direct Media (publisher of the magazine) and left the country for the 
United States. 
79 Le Reporter is a weekly Moroccan magazine which was created in 1998. Its coverage includes 
Moroccan news, politics, economy, society, culture and world affairs. www.lereporter.ma  
80 L’Observateur du Maroc is a Moroccan Franch-language weekly which was inaugurated in 2008. Its 
coverage includes politics, economic, social and cultural issues and world affairs. In 2011, at the ninth 
edition of the Grand Prix National de la Presse, Salaheddine Lemaizi, who is a journalist for the weekly, 
received an award for his report on heroine in north Morocco. lobservateurdumaroc.info    
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been overlooked in the existing literature on the veil. My research is also an attempt to 
question essentialist constructions of Islamic dress in the Muslim context of 
postcolonial Morocco, which was previously under French Protectorate rule.   
 
 As I noted in my methodology chapter, my choice of these weeklies as sources of data 
for my study is related to the interest which they have manifested in relation to Islamic 
attire. Because the veil represents a more problematic issue to debate in Morocco, the 
liberal press has tended to address the topic more openly and freely from a liberal 
perspective. This is useful for a comparative study of constructions of the veil in France 
and Morocco. The contrast allows for a consideration of the links between parts of the 
French and Moroccan liberal/secular press in relation to the veil, and investigate 
differences between two postcolonial nation-states with past colonial histories.  
 
Starting from this background, I ask the following questions: what meanings are 
attached to the veil after the 2003 Casablanca bombings? How do the press weeklies 
associate Islamic dress with meanings in the political, sexual and socio-cultural 
realms? I begin with a discussion of political associations of Islamic dress, which will 
be followed by sexual and socio-cultural meanings ascribed to Islamic dress. As I 
mentioned earlier, the political, sexual and socio-cultural categories represent the 
emerging themes which have become the focus of my study of Islamic dress in both 
the French and Moroccan case studies.   
 
Political Associations of Islamic Dress 
Since the hijab affair in France which culminated in the ban of 2004, the Islamic dress 
debate has emerged in the Moroccan liberal press at different times. In Morocco, a 
more recent hijab ban in prison administrations was issued in August 2008 which 
nonetheless remains silenced. This ban supplements already existing bans in Moroccan 
banks, military and paramilitary institutions and many schools and businesses that do 
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not welcome Islamic dress in any form.81 In contrast to France, however, the Moroccan 
press has tended not to address the hijab bans explicitly, probably because they 
contradict the Moroccan government’s desire to project the Kingdom as a Muslim 
country whose official religion is Islam (as declared in the Moroccan Constitution) and 
which is ruled by Amir al-Mu’minin (Commander of the Faithful and descendent of 
the Prophet). Islamic dress has nonetheless tended to be addressed in relation to broader 
issues such as religious practices in Morocco, the opposition between secularism and 
Islam, and women’s issues and the status of women in Islam. The publications I have 
selected more explicitly confront Islamic dress.  
7.1.1. Islamism Extremism and the Politicisation and Marketing of 
‘Ostentatious’ Hijabs and Niqabs 
 
Tel Quel and Nichan and Le Reporter associate the hijab with Islamism, extremism, 
fundamentalism and the politicization of Islamic dress. In the context of terminology, 
Leila Ahmed (2012, p. 9) notes that the Islamic Awakening or Resurgence (al-
sahwaal-Islamiyya) brought ‘Islamism’ into existence, a term which, in the 1990s, 
started replacing words such as ‘fundamentalism’ ‘radical Islam’, ‘political Islam’ and 
‘Salafism’, all of which had been used to refer to different aspects of the Islamic 
Resurgence and its movements. In the Moroccan weeklies, ‘fundamentalism’, 
‘radicalism’ and ‘political Islam’ are still being used in relation to Islamic dress as we 
shall see through the examples. As I demonstrate, in Tel Quel and Nichan, Islamism 
has often been associated with the visibility of Islamic female dress in public space and 
politics. This is perceived as a politicization of Islam, including an imposition of 
Islamic laws and an extremist political agenda. In this section, I explore how and why 
the hijab is constructed in terms of this political threat.  
 
                                                 
81 These bans remain silent and rarely evoked in the national press.  
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The Moroccan weeklies Tel Quel and Le Reporter equate the hijab with extremism, 
Islamism and an ideological threat. The first two examples are part of a feature report 
which Tel Quel issued on the hijab in 2002. Concerned with what it considers as the 
increasing visibility of the dress in Morocco, the paper asks why such a phenomenon 
has ‘infiltrated’ the Moroccan scene, suggesting that the political dimension is the most 
important one. In response to the question ‘Why Speak about the Hijab now?’, Driss 
Bennani82 from Tel Quel presents three reasons (2002, p. 17):  
 
The first one is political, as six women who make the veil an ideological 
priority have made their entry into the parliament. The second reason is social, 
as we are approaching the sacred month of Ramadan ... Regarding the third 
reason, it is cultural, as the phenomenon is subject to superimposed sociological 
and theological discourses, yet only the religious explanation gets precedence. 
 
The political dimension gets precedence in describing the hijab in the parliament. The 
example presents the six PJD women (Party of Justice and Development) members of 
the Moroccan parliament from the only Islamic party with government seats at the time 
as giving an ‘ideological priority to the veil’. The term ‘veil’ in this case denotes a 
more ambiguous naming which does not make any distinctions among the various 
types of Islamic dress. This contrasts with the fact that the PJD women in the 
                                                 
82 Driss Bennani is the founder of W5 Media in 2009 in Morocco (Casablanca). W5 Media is an agency 
specialising in editorial communication. W5 Digital provides support and counselling for customers in 
their editorial projects in print, broadcast, web and creative media. Bennani’s agency also publishes ‘My 
Health practice’, the first free newsmagazine for health and well-being in Morocco. Bennani is also 
producer-host of the show Noqat Alal Horouf (Dots on the Letters) in 2M, the second Moroccan national 
television channel.  Noqat Alal Horouf is a political talk show, which hosts politicians, associations, 
opinion leaders from Morocco and elsewhere. Bennani was also the co-founder and managing editor of 
Les Echos du Soir, an independent French-language daily newspaper. He worked for Tel Quel, the first 
French newsmagazine in Morocco.  In Tel Quel, he worked as a chief reporter in the realization of large 
surveys , interviews and feature stories  
Tel Quel is the first French newsmagazine in Morocco. https://www.linkedin.com/pub/driss-
bennani/46/923/9b1 
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parliament are muhajjabat. The example transposes political, social and cultural 
reasons for tackling the ‘phenomenon’ of the hijab, and refers to the Islamisation of 
the Moroccan political scene with the ascent of the Islamic party to the parliament in 
2000. 
  
In fact, although they wrote about Islamic dress in their official paper, the PJD 
members rarely took the opportunity to raise the issue of the hijab in parliament. They 
did so only when there were attempts to ban or discriminate against the muhajjabat, 
such as cases where Moroccan muhajjabat were refused employment or education on 
the basis of wearing the hijab. Such a refusal is considered a form of discrimination in 
both the Moroccan Constitution and the Moroccan Code of Work.83 In the case of the 
Royal Air Maroc controversy, the Moroccan airline company included a ban on hijab, 
praying and fasting for its staff. This sparked a debate in the parliament where the head 
of the group of the PJD, Mustapha Ramid, condemned the company for attacking 
Moroccans in their beliefs. It is noteworthy that Islamic dress, in all its forms, has 
always been banned within the Moroccan Airline company. However, this was the first 
time that the ban was openly mentioned in the Moroccan parliament. The ban exists 
but is silenced in many other private companies and businesses in Morocco. 
 
In this article, Driss Bennani expresses his concern about the visibility of the hijab in 
Morocco. The title of the article itself ‘Why does the Hijab Gain Ground?’ (‘Pourquoi 
le hijab gagne du terrain?’) suggests a battlefield where the dress poses a threat of 
‘infiltration’ to the dominant political scene in which the adoption of the dress has been 
absent. The image is that of an alien intruder ‘making an entry’ and invading the 
Moroccan social and political fields. The hijab, which Bennani vaguely calls ‘the veil’, 
and which also alludes to a cover and disguise, secretly and silently sneaks and creeps 
                                                 
83 Article 9 of the Moroccan Code of Work stipulates that any form of discrimination against employees, 
whether on the basis of race, colour, sex, social status, religion or political opinion, is forbidden. 
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in. It represents a form of contamination with a will to change the political scene. The 
term ‘gagne’ (meaning to win or gain) further suggests the idea of the hijab as 
embodying success and achievement. In gaining ground, the hijab gains success and 
victory. It embodies a triumphant invasion of Moroccan politics.   
 
Bennani considers this relatively new visibility of the hijab in the political realm as a 
will to impose an ‘ideological priority.’ The term ideology connotes not only a creed 
or system of beliefs, but also a code of morals, hence an ethical dimension. The vision 
of the hijab as an alien invader of the political realm accompanies its portrayal as a 
system of beliefs with a will to rule the political field. The dress thus also symbolises 
forceful political rule as Bennani equates the presence of the hijab in the parliament 
with imposing an Islamist political ideology. This is similar to the vision of the veil as 
the ‘emblem of politicized Islam’ in the European context, and the equation between 
veiling and ‘making a political claim’ which Göle notes in her study of Islam in Europe 
(Göle, 1996, p. 83). The visibility of the dress in the Moroccan political realm is 
conflated with a will to impose an extremist Islamist ideology. 
 
Tel Quel also refers to the presence of the hijab in politics as an act or business of 
promoting and selling the dress. Driss Bennani thus classifies the hijab as a form of 
‘Islamist marketing’ and a strategy of transferring religion beyond the private space. 
From a young graduate muhajjaba’s statement that ‘the woman wearing the veil today 
is stronger than woman in the past because she is educated’, the article proceeds to 
assign its preferred interpretation, stating that (Bennani, 2002): 
 
This is called, in the most fashionable Islamist marketing, ‘the right of the 
Muslim woman to decency’...the hijab is sold today much more as a ‘visa for 
participation in social life’ and not only as a ‘religious obligation to which one 
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has to submit’. This discourse has very visible advocates in Morocco: women 
from the Party of Justice and Development (PJD) in the parliament.  
 
Bennani employs additional terms in relation to the politicisation of the hijab which 
point to other meanings. He uses the expression ‘most fashionable Islamist marketing’, 
indicating not only a fixed Islamist stance which he ascribes to the dress of the PJD 
Muslimat, but also depicting it as a changing technique and strategy for marketing. 
Bennani therefore characterises the hijab as an object of commerce or, more precisely, 
as a way of selling or advertising religion in the political sphere. The expression 
‘Islamist marketing’ conveys a strategy through which the muhajjabat access public 
space, and advertise the hijab as an item of Islamist ideology. The dress incorporates 
both extremist Islamism and what we can call a ‘religious commodification’ as wearing 
it in parliament represents promoting and selling it in public space, as well as advancing 
Islamism and extremism84. The hijab hence not only embodies Islamism and 
extremism, but also an act of promotion, a product for public consumption and 
transformation.  
 
Bennani mixes references to the dress with ‘fashion’ and ‘marketing,’ which inscribe 
the hijab as an object of fashion and trade, hence commodifying it. The hijab is thus a 
type of Islamist commodity, a politicised merchandise. At another level, the equation 
of the dress with marketing suggests that it promotes an image; hence it becomes a 
form of propaganda. Since the PJD women represent ‘very visible advocates’ of the 
hijab, it follows that the promotion of the dress constitutes an act of Islamist 
propagation and propaganda. The hijab therefore symbolises an Islamist propaganda 
and commodity. By contrast, Bennani ties the garment with ‘the right of decency’, 
                                                 
84 In addition to the associations of the hijab with Islamism, trade and the division between private and 
public space, the Moroccan weekly also equates it with an ‘ideological stance’ and a ‘political 
commitment’ for first generation women (implying women who have witnessed the independence era).  
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which codes the dress with modesty and morality. The image is that of the hijab as an 
epitome of morality and modesty, but the dress is ‘sold’ for social participation. The 
commodification of the hijab operates through its marketable virtue.   
 
The link which the Moroccan weeklies posit between the hijab and religious extremism 
is often accompanied with a terminology which resonates with that of politicians and 
media practitioners in relation to the hijab affair in France. This is the case with Brahim 
Mokhlis85 from Le Reporter, who concedes that it is difficult to differentiate between 
different motives for wearing ‘the veil’ (Mokhlis, 2007, pp. 18-19): 
 
[N]othing, any more, allows one to identify the woman who is veiled for a political 
movement, an ideological position or a choice of a social project. Let us consequently 
recall that veiled women find themselves, certainly in still unequal proportions, in 
various political parties, trade unions and associative movements without considering 
the hijab as a major ostentatious sign.  
 
Brahim Mokhlis expresses his lack of knowledge about the various motives behind the 
adoption of ‘the veil’. His inability to ‘identify’ the different reasons behind veiling for 
the Muslimat provides an image of the dress as a ‘disguise symbol’ which hides the 
motives of the Muslimat. The veil acts like a mask, a form of camouflage.  The article 
entitled ‘Marriage, Work, Security...In the Name of the Veil’ introduces three aspects 
which he associates with the dress. However, what seems to additionally concern 
Mokhlis is the conspicuous nature or ‘ostentatiousness’ of the veil which he does not 
                                                 
85 Brahim Mokhlis is currently working as a news reporter for the newspaper Maroc Soir. He was 
previously working as a news reporter for Le Reporter. He has also worked in the fields of editing, 
surveys and reports during his career as a journalist. He has a background in journalism and law 
education in Morocco.  https://www.linkedin.com/pub/brahim-mokhliss/15/948/b10 
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define in his article. The expression ‘veiled for’ codes the veil as a motive itself. Not 
only does the veil hide motivations, it becomes a motivation itself, a purpose. The 
Moroccan muhajjaba then veils for a purpose and veils a purpose. Mokhlis further 
refers to the ‘unequal proportions’ of the muhajjabat’s participation in political parties 
and associations. His depiction of the veil in such terms communicates its unequal 
presence in the political realm on the one hand, and its status as a ‘major ostentatious 
sign’ on the other. It therefore epitomises inequality, yet signifies a major visibility. 
The veil is at one almost absent, and yet too conspicuous.   
 
The French press and political texts utilise the term ‘ostentatious’ (ostentatoire), which 
I have discussed in the earlier chapter, to suggest that the hijab symbolises a disturbing 
visibility within the secular public space and republican school. We can see how a term 
used in France during the hijab ban in 2004 is adopted and replicated in the Moroccan 
press in order to criticize the visibility of the dress in the Moroccan political realm. 
This linguistic transposition is striking in a country that purports to be Islamic. Juliette 
Minces similarly notes the ‘ostentatious wearing of Islamic dress’, which she attributes 
to the ‘demand for the moralization of economic, social and political life within 
‘fundamentalism’, as exemplified in countries such as Sudan and Iran (Minces, 1992, 
pp. 96-97). Adopting the hijab in such discourses becomes synonymous with hiding 
and masking a motivation to impose ‘an (extremist or fundamentalist) ideological 
position’, hence with a will to rule political life. The ‘ostentatiousness’ of the veil is 
synonymous with a disturbingly visible Islamism. 
 
As I explained in the previous chapter, both the Stasi Commission Report and the 
French press use the word ‘ostentatious’ in relation to the hijab. Mokhlis therefore 
reiterates the image of a visible threat transposed to the Moroccan political realm with 
a latent will to impose extremism. The transposition of the word from the French to 
the Moroccan context offers an instance of how language can travel from a Muslim-
minority country to a Muslim-majority country such as Morocco. The veil not only 
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stands out in the visual realm of a secular nation, but also in the visual field of a country 
inhabited by a majority of Muslims. 
 
The term ‘ostentatiousness’ or conspicuousness, which expresses a form of 
exhibitionism and arrogant display, is comparable with the Arabic word ‘tabarruj,’ 
which refers to veiling and dressing in a way that attracts attention to one’s body. Often 
used in the religious discourse about modesty, ‘mutabarrija’ (adjective) refers to a 
woman who either dresses or veils in a sexually appealing way that makes her body 
conspicuous and attractive. In the Moroccan and French press and politics, however, it 
is veiling rather than unveiling that is synonymous with a form of ‘tabarruj’. Bennani 
and Mokhlis not only equate the hijab with being ‘extremely’ socially and politically 
visible (‘major ostentatious sign’ and ‘very visible (hijab) advocates’), thereby 
disrupting the visual field of the political space, but also with implicitly imposing an 
extremist Islamist agenda in politics. The word ‘ostentatious’ which means something 
characterised with pretentious display also implies extremism and excess and therefore 
also associates the veil with excessive display and showing off. The veil becomes 
ostentatious because it is extreme, and conversely becomes extreme because it is 
ostentatious. Mokhlis borrows more terminology from the French discourse of the veil. 
The equation between the hijab, Islamism and ‘ostentatiousness’ strikes a chord with 
the categorisation of French Muslims into ‘secular Maghrebis’ and ‘anti-secular 
Muslims’ and between ‘liberal Muslims’ and ‘rigorist Muslims’ in the French press. 
Mokhlis in his article contrasts ‘secular Maghrebis’ who showed support for the French 
government prior to the French ban, and ‘French people of Maghrebi origin’ who are 
coded as ‘anti-secular Muslims’. He characterises French nationals as ‘Muslims’ 
instead of ‘Maghrebis’, which implies the precedence of religious belonging over the 
ethnic or cultural one. He argues that ‘secular Maghrebis’ represent the majority of 
Muslims within France, which brings us to question how a few hundred hijabs 
mobilised politicians and media practitioners and culminated in a national ban. The 
linguistic transposition and ‘migration’ of words from the French to the Moroccan 
context shows how terms can be adopted from a secular to a dominantly non-secular 
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framework. The hijab thus represents a disturbing visibility and allegiance to Islam in 
a Muslim-majority context. The dress does not only embody a visual and visible 
disturbance, but also an Islamist nuisance. 
    
The association of the hijab with political ideology and extremist Islamism, such as we 
find in Tel Quel and Le Reporter, implicitly contrasts it with democracy since it stands 
as a political symbol that represents an ‘extreme’ as opposed to a ‘moderate’ practice 
of religion. In her study of the piety movement in Egypt, Saba Mahmood states that, in 
contrast to other politico-religious movements, the mosque movement, which is part 
of a larger piety movement, does not seek to control the state and make Egypt a 
theocracy (Mahmood, 2004, p. 37). The contrast which the example draws between the 
hijab and democracy implicitly positions it as a symbol of theocracy which resounds 
with the French association of the hijab with theocracy. Such a discourse assigns not 
only meanings of political ideology and extremism to the hijab, but also of theocracy. 
Although the PJD was the only Islamic Party in the government at the time, it has not 
shown a will to impose an extremist or theocratic ideology, but rather to uphold its 
values which include a discourse about the importance of modernisation, democracy 
and development from which it derives its own name (Justice and Development). 
Interestingly, the movement also includes a wider piety movement which can be 
included as part of the Islamic Revival, and its broader initiatives to encourage 
religiosity and Islamic practices which accompany attempts to revisit religious texts by 
women.  
 
References to the hijab in terms of extremist Islamism, ostentatiousness and theocracy 
further suggest its vision as a political threat that increases Islamist danger in public, 
political and social realms. We can associate the hijab’s visibility, however, with 
secularisation and modernisation in the context of Muslim countries. Concerning the 
penetration of secularism and Islamic visibility, Göle (2011, pp. 107-108) states that 
‘women’s participation in public life as citizens and government officials, their 
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visibility in urban spaces, their socializing with men, all indicate a secular way of life 
and an important change in the way civic life is organized’. In the case of the PJD 
members of the parliament, the visibility of the hijab at the governmental, party and 
associative levels constitutes a secularisation of the dress, which has penetrated the 
modern state and its secular bases and institutions. The PJD women introduce the hijab, 
which is coded as an Islamist and anti-democratic symbol. It is perceived not merely 
as a threat to the ideal secular model which promotes the visibility of bodies, but also 
as an attack to the modernisation efforts promoted by the Moroccan state and its 
institutions. The ostentatiousness and Islamism of the hijab supplements its 
Islamisation of political life. We can read the hijab in the parliament, however, as a 
‘secularisation’ of the dress. The presence of the muhajjabat in governmental 
institutions testifies to an acceptance of concepts such as democracy, modernity and 
the participation of women in decision-making positions in a Muslim context.  
 
Although both Bennani and Molkhlis concede that there is nothing to inform the 
observer of the actual motivations for wearing the hijab and accepting that such 
motivations can be political, social or religious, the articles nonetheless proceed to 
assign Islamism and extremism to the dress, thereby attaching more weight to its 
political signification. No survey or similar data is presented to support this. The hijab 
thus becomes equated with an extreme practice of Islam that is to be discarded in an 
ideal secular-modelled Moroccan politics. Saba Mahmood (2004, p. 189) notes that 
‘the neologism “Islamism”...frames its object as an eruption of religion outside the 
supposedly “normal” domain of private worship, and thus as a historical anomaly 
requiring explanation, if not rectification’. The equation of the hijab with Islamism and 
politicisation of space in the Moroccan publications implies that its presence in the 
public and political spheres constitutes a breach of the separation public/private which 
forms the basis of a secular state. They therefore suggest that a modern state should be 
characterized by the separation of the state and religion and based on the ideals of 
freedom, equality and emancipation as defined within a secular government model. 
Leila Ahmed (1992, p. 127) notes that, among other factors, the emergence of 
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“modern” states in the Middle Eastern societies, and the European and colonial 
domination in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, formed the 
comprehensive economic and political frameworks of a ‘fundamental social 
transformation’. The call for a secular political space free from religious signs in the 
Moroccan context should be viewed as a continuity of a discourse adopted since the 
emergence of the modern states after independence from the French Protectorate. The 
equation of the hijab with Islamism and politicisation of space in the Moroccan press 
examples implies that the presence of modest Islamic dress in the public sphere 
constitutes a breach of the separation public/private which forms the basis of a secular 
state. Adopted in the Moroccan framework, this vision presents us with a transposition 
which frames the hijab outside what is constructed as the normative political subject 
adopting a Western-style of dress in public and political spaces. The association of the 
hijab with the PJD and extremist politics is linked to its idea as a political tool 
representing a threat not in a secular country based on a supposed separation of state 
and religion (and a supposed neutrality of the government regarding religions), but in 
a country that states in its Constitution that it is ‘Islamic’, and that its precepts are based 
on ‘Islamic ideals’.86 Adopted and transposed in the Moroccan framework, such a 
vision transposes the conception of the normative secular body from a Muslim-
minority context (France) to a Muslim-majority context (Morocco). In the Muslim 
context, Göle (1996, p. 4) notes that ‘the revival of Islamist movements is often 
interpreted as a challenge to Western modernity, which is built upon a unidirectional 
notion of evolutionary progress conceived in terms of binary oppositions between 
religion and secularism, the private and public spheres, and particularism and 
universalism’. She also notes that ‘metaphorically women’s covered bodies revitalize 
contemporary Islamist movements and differentiate them from the secularist project’ 
(Göle, 1996, p. 4). Bennani and Mokhlis interpret the presence of the Moroccan 
muhajjabat in the government as a threat to the concept of modernity, which 
                                                 
86 Article 6 stipulates that 'Islam shall be the state religion. The state shall guarantee freedom of worship 
for all.' 
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presupposes conforming to a secular bodily appearance instead of a religious one in 
public space. Although the PJD women may not view their adoption of the hijab as an 
‘Islamist’ act, the examples nonetheless assign a political significance to their dress. 
The ostentatiousness of the hijab not only expresses its view as a ‘challenge to 
modernity’, but also expresses its image as an ‘eruption’ or intrusion at the level of a 
religious practice which needs to be confined to private space. Western-style dress, by 
contrast, constitutes the norm. The hijab thus forms an abnormal apparition considered 
as alien to the Moroccan politics. It embodies an Islamist outbreak or anomaly in a 
Muslim context. 
 
In fact, being a member of the Moroccan parliament entails accepting political ideals 
as they are stipulated in law and the Constitution.87 These include promoting a ‘modern 
Islam’ based on the implementation of universal ideals such as democracy, equality 
and progress within the framework of modernity. In this context, it is the ‘universal 
vocation’ of modernity which explains the impact of modernity on ‘other cultures’; the 
signs of modernity have crossed and persist crossing ‘national, cultural, and 
geographical borderlines and participate in the subjective construction of social 
meaning’ (Gӧle, 2011, pp. 112-113). The presence of the muhajjabat from the PJD at 
governmental, party and associative levels, and their use of common spaces with their 
male counterparts, as well as their broader commitment for supporting values such as 
democracy, progress and equality confirm their adherence to modern principles. These 
concepts have been adopted since independence and have also been prevalent in the 
Islamic Party’s discourse through their press and political debates.88 At another level, 
only personal statute laws related to family matters such as marriage, divorce and 
custody (the Moudawana) are based on Islamic texts and have been subject to revisions 
                                                 
87 Article 6 of the Constitution stipulates that Islam shall be the state religion, and that the state shall 
guarantee freedom of worship for all. 
 
88 For more information, see Al-Tajdid, the official newspaper of the PJD http://www.jadidpresse.com    
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and reinterpretations. All other Moroccan laws have been conceptualised following 
French law since the colonial era, and are consequently not based on Islamic texts. 
 
The perception of the hijab in the Moroccan parliament as a sign of the politicization 
of Islam suggests that the visibility of the garment represents a threat to the ideal 
modern secular state and its supposed ‘neutrality’, which Bennani and Mokhlis 
understand to be reflected by a more Western-attuned appearance and dress code. It is 
ironic, then, that PJD woman MPs in fact seem comfortable adopting both traditional 
Moroccan clothes (which often include a djellaba and scarf tied to the neck) and, more 
frequently, Western-style clothes including suits with trousers or long skirts. Leila 
Ahmed (1992, p. 225) points out that Islamic dress can be perceived ‘as the adoption 
of Western dress—with modifications to make it acceptable to the wearer’s notions of 
propriety’. She adds that ‘Islamic dress is the uniform of arrival, signalling entrance 
into, and determination to move forward in, modernity’ (Ahmed, 1992, p. 225). The 
adoption of the hijab alongside Western-style garments by the PJD women is an 
instance of a modified appropriation of Western dress. The hijab hence fits Western-
style dress and complements it. It also modifies it. As the ‘uniform of arrival’ which 
announces the visibility of an embodied pious practice in the Moroccan political realm, 
the hijab signifies morality and ethicality as well as an entrance into modern politics. 
This contrasts with marking the dress as a traditional and fixed symbol which 
represents a breach of modernity.  
 
What the examples from Tel Quel and Le Reporter suggest is that, first of all, a 
‘modern’ state should be characterised by the separation of state and religion, and the 
adoption of a secular model. Secondly, the examples imply that the hijab, which is 
perceived as an embodiment of an extremist ideological and political form of Islam, 
has no place in the Moroccan parliament. The preoccupation of the Moroccan 
independent press with the PJD and women belonging to the Party is demonstrated by 
the attention allocated to these women in their articles, further exemplifying the 
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tendency to link Islamic dress with a political threat. There are repeated references 
regarding the politicisation of Islam in Morocco, the threat of religion and religious 
practices, and the dichotomous relationship between ‘Islamists’ and ‘seculars’, in 
addition to the idealisation of secularism and the demonisation of Islam, and Islamic 
dress. This discourse has permeated the secular-oriented press since the ascension of 
the Islamic Party to the parliament.  
 
If we put the press examples in their socio-political context, we can consider how the 
hijab is attached to such meanings as Islamism, extremism and ostentatiousness. As I 
mentioned earlier, the inclusion of six PJD women in parliament has resulted in an 
increasing discourse about the rise of a dangerous Islamism in the liberal press, and a 
threat to the values of democracy, freedom, progress and emancipation. This type of 
model is based on the separation of religious and political powers, and equating 
religion with backwardness and regression. In his discussion of Islam in the news, 
Edward Said notes that, to Westerners and Americans, “Islam” represents a ‘resurgent 
atavism, which suggests not only the threat of a return to the Middle Ages, but the 
destruction of what is regularly referred to as the democratic order in the Western 
world’ (Said, 1997, p. 55). For Bennani and Mokhlis, the hijab, which represents a 
visible extremist Islamist practice in the political field, also symbolises a return 
backwards and a regression from the concepts of progress and democracy as universal 
models. This opposes progress and development which they associate with secularism. 
Unveiling hence becomes equated with democracy and progress while the hijab is 
coded as theocratic and backward. Preceded by and combined with 9/11 and the French 
hijab ban in 2004, the May 2003 Casablanca bombings further intensified the discourse 
about the ‘Islamist threat’ in Morocco, provoking debates about religious practices and 
the dichotomy between Islamism and secularism. 
 
The depiction of the hijab as a form of backwardness is also accompanied with 
references to emancipation. In her discussion about veiling in universities, Göle (1996, 
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pp. 3-4) contends that veiling in urban places, political organisations and industrial 
places is commonly viewed as a ‘force of obscurantism’. Often identified with 
women’s subservience, the veil is interpreted as ‘blurring the clear-cut oppositions 
between religion and modernity and as an ‘affront to contemporary notions of “gender 
emancipation” and “universal progress”’ (Göle, 1996, pp. 3-4). The vision of the veil 
as a symbol of ‘obscurantism’ similarly echoes linking it with a movement backward 
rather than forwards towards progress promoted by secularism. As such the presence 
of the hijab in the parliament and Moroccan government parties and associations is 
perceived as an attack on the idea of progress and development which are believed to 
be intrinsic to secularism and extrinsic to the veil. Yet such a discourse additionally 
codes the dress with an attack on the notion of gender emancipation. This is done 
through emphasising the position of the dress as a threat to these notions.  
 
Tel Quel also links the hijab with Islamic Revival. It states that the resurgence of the 
hijab dates back to the 1970s, and that it has been influenced by the Iranian revolution, 
social evolution, ‘Islamist discourse’ and ‘social conservatism’, associating it with a 
social movement towards a substantial ‘Islamisation’ of Moroccan society. In her study 
of the mosque movement in Egypt, Saba Mahmood (2004, p. 3) states that the 
Islamisation of the sociocultural landscape of society is predominantly the work of the 
‘piety movement’89 of which the women’s movement is an integral component. In 
Moroccan society, there is a similar mosque movement also led by Morshidat 
(Muslimat guiders), who are responsible for promoting piety through study groups and 
mosque gatherings focused on the reading of the Qur’an, tafsir and related subjects, as 
part of the broader Islamic Revival. The PJD Muslimat and their associated political 
party are also involved in a movement promoting a reading of religious texts and 
educating women in order to empower them and change their status, as I stated earlier.  
                                                 
89 Lila Abu-Lughod (1986, pp. xix, xx) notes that the new veiling of the 1970s was associated with the 
piety movement in the cities of the Muslim countries. 
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By defining the hijab as a part of ‘social conservatism’ therefore, Tel Quel constructs 
it within a political practice against values such as emancipation and modernity. It 
restricts the hijab to traditionalism. Sherifa Zuhur (1992, p. 10) argues that the Islamic 
Awakening or Revival included not only Islamic opposition, but also ‘intellectual 
preoccupations with religion, increased personal piety, and theoretical linkage between 
political circumstances and the situation of faith and modernity’. The restriction of the 
hijab to ‘Islamisation’ and conservatism risks confining a broader piety movement 
which was not only concerned with the political situation, but also with piety in society 
and with women’s empowerment through education and contribution to society.  At 
another level, the resurgence of the hijab and its increasing visibility in public spaces 
and politics have accompanied the growing participation of women in public life and 
politics after independence. The ‘social conservatism’ and traditionalism contrasts 
with the ‘modern’ public visibility and participation of the muhajjabat in public and 
political life. As Leila Ahmed (1992, p. 224) points out, the adoption of Islamic dress 
does not declare women’s place to be in the home but, on the contrary, legitimizes their 
presence outside it. Hence the veiling of women during the last few decades cannot be 
seen as a retreat from the affirmations of female autonomy and subjectivity made by 
the generation of women who immediately preceded them (Ahmed, 1992, p. 224). Tel 
Quel and Le Reporter, however, construct the hijab at once as Islamist and 
conservative. The image is that of active extremism and passive regression, Islamism 
and traditionalism. It is at once backward and Islamist. It is worth noting that the 
Maghrebi feminist construction of Islamic dress has also involved its symbolism as an 
extremist Islamism. I consider some of these constructions in the next section in order 
to examine how Maghrebi feminism, which includes more elements of Muslim 
feminism, contributes to building a similar essential image of the veil as a political 
threat. 
 
7.1.2. Maghrebi Feminist Construction of Islamist Veils and Public Space  
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In parallel to Tel Quel and Le Reporter, some Maghrebi and Arab feminist works 
affiliate Islamic dress with an extreme form of Islamism. Feminist movements promote 
the participation of women in public space, hence crossing the traditional boundaries 
imposed on them (Maadi, 1992, p. 80). Some Maghrebi feminists, however, oppose 
the participation of the muhajjabat in politics, positioning them as the epitome of 
radical Islamism, and contrasting them with the modern, emancipated non-muhajjabat. 
This perception crystallises during the 1970s with women’s desire to adopt the veil, 
which was represented as a ‘political demand’ in Muslim countries as the veiled 
woman became the ‘flag of Islam’ and its politicisation (the Iranian Revolution 
consolidating the vision of the veiled woman with ‘radical’ Islam promoting shari’a 
law) (Göle, 2003, p. 463). As Sophie Bessis and Souhayr Belhassen (Bessis & 
Belhassen, 1992, pp. 192-193) argue, whereas Maghrebi women removed the veil en 
masse during the colonial and early independence era, since 1970 they have been 
increasingly adopting it and this, they argue, is indicative of the development of 
Islamism. The last decades’ subsequent veiling experience and the increasing visibility 
of Islamic dress in the North African cities is perceived only in terms of an expansion 
and development of Islamism. Houria Alami M’chichi (2002, p. 78) likewise maintains 
that wearing the veil plays a role in ensuring the ‘political visibility of Islamism’ in 
public space, which can then be experienced by women as a ‘space of 
acknowledgement’. Similarly, Zakya Daoud (1996, p. 31) depicts the veil as a ‘flag 
that allows Islamist women to infiltrate all the pores of society’, and a new way of 
‘accessing the political sphere’. In other words, many Maghrebi feminists confine 
Islamic female dress with the rise of Islamism and the politicization of public space, 
considering the hijab as its most salient symbol. Associating Islamic dress with 
Islamism is therefore not limited to the Moroccan liberal press.  
 
This is despite the fact that, for many Muslim women, Islamic dress carries other 
meanings and is not necessarily linked to a will to impose an ‘extremist Islamist’ vision 
in the political sphere. What such a feminist discourse seems to overlook is that the 
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hijab for many Muslimat is a part of their pious practice, which does not necessarily 
include a will to impose extremism. Mahmood (2004, p. 119) argues that, in the 
framework of the Islamic Revival movement, bodily practices such as veiling and 
praying serve at most as ‘vehicles for the expression of group interests or political 
differences’. In contrast to the normative liberal conception of politics which is 
separated from ethics and moral conduct, the conception of ‘bodily practices’ and the 
forms they take in the Revival movement are not in themselves seen to have political 
implications (Mahmood, 2004, p. 119). Assigning extremism to the hijab in the 
political realm hence amounts to imposing a political meaning on the garment. The 
adoption of the hijab by the PJD Muslimat therefore marks their difference from the 
liberal conception of politics which may not necessarily carry extremist Islamist 
implications. For a liberal conception of politics such as the one adopted by the liberal 
Moroccan press and feminist discourses, the hijab constitutes a breach of the liberal 
vision of politics which should exclude the ethical dimension. The dress is hence read 
not only as political, but also as extremist.   
 
The Islamist extremism which the press and Maghrebi feminists attach to the hijab 
contrasts with the lived experiences of women in Moroccan politics. Although the 
Moroccan government has signed many international conventions guaranteeing the 
rights of women within the political realm and their participation in public life, 
women’s involvement in politics remains a minority issue. The Moroccan Constitution 
states in Article 8 that ‘men and women enjoy equal political rights’. Examples of 
conventions which the Moroccan government has signed include the Universal 
Declaration of Human rights90, the CEDAW convention91. Additionally, Article 3 of 
the Convention of Political Rights of Women stipulates that ‘women will, in conditions 
of equality, enjoy the same rights as men to occupy public posts and practice all public 
                                                 
90 Article 21 stipulates that ‘any person has the right to take part in the direction of public affairs of their 
country.’ 
91 Article 7 states that ‘all member parties take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
towards women in political and public life of their countries.’ 
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functions’. However, the political scene in Morocco witnessed an insignificant 
participation of women, marking the separation of roles as prominent in this field 
(M’chichi, 2002, p. 93). Furthermore, women who were part of the political scene in 
Morocco after independence have been adopting a Western-style dress different from 
Islamic and Moroccan types of dress.  
 
In her discussion of unveiling and education movements across the Middle East after 
World War I, Homa Hoodfar (Alvi, et al., 2003) notes that, during anti-colonial and 
democratic struggles,  veiling was perceived by women as a ‘corruption of Islamic 
ideals instituted by men in the name of Islam to prevent women’s advancement. The 
Libas Asri (or Modern dress), as they are called in Morocco, have been adopted since 
the colonial era. Wearing such ‘modern clothes’ denotes a will to build an image based 
on principles of modernity, democracy and progress as declared by the Moroccan 
Constitution Moroccan laws. While Moroccan women still draw a contrast between 
‘asri/modern dress and beldi/traditional clothes with reference to adopting either a 
Western dress code or a more traditional one, many among them embrace both types 
of dress in a comfortable manner. Only towards the end of the 1990s did the hijab 
(rather than other types of dress including the niqab and soutra (which remain rare in 
Morocco) or the jilbab92) make its entry into the parliament with a small minority of 
women. Additionally, the hijab has not figured as a priority topic for the PJD in the 
parliament, just as the application of shari’a law has not been on their agenda. Both 
the Moroccan publications and Maghrebi feminism, however, associate the hijab with 
political ideology and extremist Islamism. As my analysis illustrates, the hijab 
embodies a political Islamist threat in their respective discourses, and a will to impose 
extremism in the political realm.  
                                                 
92 The PJD women sometimes wear the traditional Moroccan jellaba, which is a long colourful dress 
with slits on the sides up to the knees and a hoodie, usually accompanied with hand or machine-made 
patterns and embroidery. In contrast to the black uniform jilbab which is more widespread in the Middle 
East and Gulf countries, the Moroccan jellaba represents a local and culturally specific garment which 
is renewed and fashioned in new styles every season. 
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Islamic dress, however, also continues to be tied with the absence of women from 
social life and public space. It is portrayed at once as enhancing the visibility of 
Islamism and simultaneously blocking women from accessing public space. In this 
context, Arab feminist Aida al-Jawhari (2007, p. 170) notes that the veil ‘excludes 
woman from the public sphere, from the places of religious and civil law making and 
from political events more generally’. The greatest impact of the veil on women is 
considered to be their absence from society and isolation at home. The veil 
paradoxically allows women to access public space and bars them from it. Malika 
Benradi (2000, p. 17) argues that women’s role in the private sphere remains a priority 
in Moroccan culture: women can participate in public life and politics so long as their 
participation does not conflict with the private interests of the family. The traditional 
separation of work is linked to notions of the private domain of women and male public 
space, with different roles assigned to each space. Mernissi (1975, p. 143) argues that, 
traditionally, women using public spaces are restricted to few occasions and bound by 
rituals, such as the wearing of the veil. She states that the veil means that the woman 
is present in a male space, but invisible; she has no right to be in the street (Mernissi, 
1975, p. 143). Islam, however, does not in itself restrict women’s political and social 
participation. Historically, Muslim women have participated in all fields of public life 
alongside their male counterparts. During the time of the Prophet, the participation of 
women encompassed all fields to the extent that there was no field that was specific to 
men without women (Karkar, 1990, p. 157). Sultana Alvi (Alvi, et al., 2003, p. 153) 
argues that female participation in the early formative period of Islamic history is quite 
significant, including gatherings in the mosque, and a religious discourse in which 
great religious scholars had female teachers, and women were among the transmitters 
of the Prophet’s statements. On the one hand, Maghrebi and Arab feminist works 
therefore paradoxically associate Islamic dress with Islamism, extremism and an 
invasion of the public sphere, implying a forceful imposition of Islamic law in 
Morocco. On the other, they equate Islamic dress with withdrawal from public space 
and absence of women in traditionally male-dominated spheres.  
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Veiling and the division of space into public and private have witnessed various 
changes over time. Muslim feminists have noted that seclusion and veiling have their 
roots in pre-Islamic practices in the Middle East (Nashat & Tucker, 1999, p. xxx), and 
represent practices which are found in many cultures and supported by religions other 
than Islam (Macleod, 1991, p. 98). Reina Lewis (2004, p. 79) argues that, as a marker 
of status, veiling was part of a system of seclusion that, like the harem, was a feature 
of life for urban upper-class and royal women.  The practices therefore predate Islam, 
and did not come as a result of it as is implied through the Maghrebi feminist discourse. 
In colonial Algeria (and Morocco), women involved in liberation struggles both 
adopted and abandoned the veil as we saw in the first chapter on the histories of the 
veil (Fanon, 1967, p. 61). After independence, many women in Muslim countries 
considered the veil as something from the past, and a custom to be discarded in order 
to achieve the progress and modernity promoted by the coloniser. Progress in this case 
means identification with the coloniser. While veiling was initially established without 
affecting women’s access to the public realm during the initial period of Islam, it has 
been turned into a means of blocking Muslimat from accessing public space. As Rifaat 
Hassan (2000, pp. 53-54) notes, Islamic societies put many women ‘behind the veil 
and shrouds, and behind closed doors’ while forgetting that, according to Qur’an, 
confining women to their homes was instead a punishment for fornication. The veil 
has therefore been used to allow women to access public space and at the same time to 
bar them from it.  
 
The comparison between the press publications and Maghrebi/Arab feminism 
elucidates how Islamic dress, and more particularly the hijab in the Moroccan 
publications, embodies contrasting and conflicting meanings. On the one hand, the 
dress epitomises an extremist Islamicisation of political life, a marketing of Islamism, 
and an ‘invasion’ of the political and social realms.  On the other, Islamic dress in its 
different forms embodies absence and withdrawal from public space in the Maghrebi 
and Arab feminist discourse. The dress becomes an expression of conflicting 
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associations of both an active ‘invasion’ and a passive ‘withdrawal’. Yet the hijab in 
the Moroccan liberal press is also tied with fundamentalism, ethics and shari’a which 
I explore in the next section. I include these notions here as they can also be considered 
within the context of inscribing and constructing the veil in terms of a political threat. 
 
7.1.3. Veils Fundamentalist Ideology, Shari’a and Radicalism 
 
I have examined how Tel Quel, Le Reporter and some Maghrebi/Arab feminists 
affiliate the hijab with Islamism, extremism and ostentatiousness, as well as 
withdrawal from public and social realms. In this section I consider how Tel Quel and 
Nichan link the dress with fundamentalism and a latent will to apply shari’a laws. 
Since the publications advocate a secular political system, they often promote the 
removal of the hijab, which they associate with a will to impose shari’a and a 
‘fundamentalist ideology’ in the political and public realms. Driss Bennani’s (2002, p. 
19) discussion of the veil, for instance, ties the dress with the Qur’an and its 
interpretation:  
 
What does religion say about the veil? The proponents of the fundamentalist 
ideology and the ones who insist on propagating an absolutist literal reading of 
the Qur’anic text cite two verses in particular... (Surat al-Ahzab verse 59 and 
Surat al-Nour verse 31) … Historicists who prefer to limit the phenomenon to 
its original context remind us that the veil appeared initially to distinguish the 
Muslim population from others. During the pre-Islamic era, prostitution was 
quasi-legalised and ‘closed houses’ were tolerated. Islam later insisted on 
differentiating respectable women.  
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Bennani here attaches the hijab to fundamentalism. In her pertinent study of the veil, 
Muslim feminist anthropologist Fadwa El Guindi (1999, p. xix) notes that 
‘fundamentalism’ represents an ethnocentric notion imposed on the Islamic movement 
and that it derives from Western Christianity. Note how the terminology which has 
been used in the French context of the hijab controversies is again adopted in the 
Moroccan context by the liberal press. After being used as an argument against the 
hijab in France, the notion of fundamentalism is transposed onto the Moroccan context. 
Bennani opens his article with the vague allusion to the ‘veil’ which he also 
euphemistically refers to as ‘the phenomenon’, blurring distinctions among different 
types of Islamic dress. In his answer, he positions a dichotomy between ‘proponents of 
the fundamentalist ideology’ and ‘historicists’ in relation to the reading and 
interpretation of the verses relating to modest Islamic dress. The terms code the veil 
with ‘the’ fundamentalism which yet remains undefined, and with ‘ideology’ which 
connotes not only a system of beliefs and dogma, but also a will to impose 
fundamentalism, and perhaps a system of ethical and moral values. The veil thus 
embodies fundamentalism and an inherent will to impose it.  
 
Historicism suggests a vision that the veil is to be limited to its original context: it is a 
historical and cultural practice that is no longer valid in the modern times. Bennani’s 
expression ‘insist on propagating an absolutist reading’ emphasises the forceful will to 
impose a (fundamentalist) reading, and ‘propagating’ it, which suggests the idea of 
promotion and propaganda evoked in both the French press and politics and earlier 
examples. This endows the veil advocates with a will to spread propaganda. The verb 
‘propagate’ (propager) further implies an invading revival which is often attributed to 
the visibility of Islamic dress in public. We can further notice how the word ‘absolutist’ 
suggests a link between the veil proponents and autocracy. Advocating the veil 
therefore amounts to promoting a despotic and tyrannical practice. The veil thus 
becomes dissociated from democracy. The references which Bennani uses to associate 
the veil with fundamentalism carry further meanings of the dress which codify it as 
undemocratic and proselytising. It embodies despotism and propaganda. 
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Bennani’s statement additionally refers to modernism. The article’s reference to 
proponents of ‘the fundamentalist ideology’ and an ‘absolutist and literal reading’ of 
the Qur’an implies its advocating a non-fundamentalist or moderate ideology for 
unveiling in the contemporary era. In the colonial and Nahda eras, a dichotomy was 
established between partisans of ‘social conservatism’ who opted for a closed identity 
symbolized by religious belonging, and reformers who liberally interpreted the shari‘a 
as the fundamental source of law (Bessis & Belhassen, 1992, p. 21). The French press 
and political texts further draw a distinction between ‘Islam of France’ (Islam de 
France) as the desired one in opposition to ‘Islam in France’ (Islam en France) as the 
other and outsider type of Islam embodied by the young French muhajjaba. Olivier 
Roy (2007, p. 26) points out how the slogan of ‘Islam à la Française’ (French Islam) is 
explicitly aimed at favouring liberal or even secular Islam, ‘that is of emptying any 
religion not necessarily of its transcendence, but for its demand for the absolute.’ 
Similarly, Tel Quel and Nichan emphasise the necessity to transform Islam in order to 
make it more compatible with a secular liberal norm. The dichotomy between 
‘fundamentalist’ and ‘historicist’ readings of the Qur’an represents an instance of a 
discourse that aims at not only opposing Islamic dress to a ‘moderate’ practice, but 
also at advocating and supporting a secular vision of embodiment. Such a vision 
implicitly contrasts a ‘good’ and ‘democratic’ reading with a ‘fundamentalist’ and 
‘absolutist’ one. Unveiling becomes democratic and moderate while veiling remains 
despotic and extreme.  
 
The construction of Islamic dress with fundamentalism sometimes includes references 
to shari’a laws. Tel Quel specifies recent historical factors to explain the increasing 
visibility of Islamic dress: ‘The resurgence of the phenomenon dates back to the late 
1970s, with the Iranian revolution and an increasingly widespread discourse on the 
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degradation of contemporary Muslim society’ (Bennani, 2002). Fouad Madani93 
(Madani, 2007, p. 14) from Nichan similarly links the growing visibility of the dress 
in Morocco to a will to impose shari’a laws, stating that: 
 
The spreading of the hijab in the Moroccan context during the last few years is 
significantly related to the change in the hijab to a sign of belonging and 
‘commitment’ to a political religious and social project, especially for woman. 
And it is profoundly related to the appearance of a political Islamic movement, 
the khwanjya, with their new forms of militant movements ... Such a wearing 
of the hijab combines doctrine, politics, ethics and shari‘a with the aim of 
‘cleansing society from the taints of history’. The outward appearance (the 
beard and hijab) have become equal to ‘the frontier that must be announced 
which separates two different representations of the universe, the world, society 
and politics, and that there is no opportunity to conciliate’.  
 
Fouad Madani here expands on the links between the hijab, militancy and shari’a. He 
provides some explanations for the increasing visibility of the dress in Morocco during 
the last few years, and links the ‘spreading of the hijab’ with the related ‘change’ which 
he attributes to the dress. Note how the term ‘spreading’ communicates an idea about 
a new invasion of the dress, an ‘infiltration’ of a strange object, as well as the growth 
of an alien object in the body of the Moroccan society. In contrast to the symbolism of 
hijab with traditionalism and retreat from social and political lives, he ascribes 
‘belonging and commitment’ to the new dress. Not only the hijab, but also the beard 
expresses an ‘outward appearance’ as well as a political, religious, and social 
                                                 
93 Fouad Madani is a Moroccan journalist who was born in 1984. He holds a diploma in media and 
communications from the Higher Insitute of Media and Communications in Rabat, Morocco. Madani 
has previously worked as a journalist for the weekly Nichane and daily Al Massa, as well as the daily 
newpaper Akhbar Al Yawm and the magazine Al Aan. Madani now works as chief editor for Hespress, 
and online Moroccan daily newspaper.  http://www.almaghribia.ma/ 
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membership, or group and a commitment to an other ideology. The hijab thus 
symbolises not only loyalty and allegiance, but also restriction of freedom. It also hides 
an invisible, less conspicuous inward side. The term ‘profoundly’ suggests the 
mysteriousness as well as ‘extreme’ stance which he associates with the hijab, which 
Madani associates with the ‘appearance of political Islamic movement’ (khwanjia). 
The hijab is enigmatic, hermetic and obscure and it is extreme. 
 
In Nichan, Fouad Madani attributes the increasing visibility of the hijab in Morocco to 
‘movements of political Islam’ which he terms ‘new militant movements’.94 The image 
is reminiscent of the French discourse on the hijab as a signifier extrapolated to latent 
Islamist attempts at undermining the laws of the Republic. The reference to ‘new forms 
of militant movements’ further codes the dress not only with radicalism, but also with 
aggressiveness. Madani’s explanation of the visibility of the hijab in terms of 
belonging and commitment additionally refers to ‘doctrine, politics, ethics and 
shari’a’. The hijab thus not only embodies disloyalty and radicalism, but also a hidden 
will to impose ‘shari’a’ along with doctrine, politics and ethics, hence to rule the 
Moroccan social and political systems. The floating signifier shari’a is not defined.  
 
The hijab additionally points to broader ‘militant movements’. In her study of veiling 
as a symbol of Islamisation, Göle (1996, p. 84) notes the paradox of how the black veil, 
which epitomised a going back to premodern Islamic traditions, expressed the ‘active 
participation’ of women in political demonstrations. She also points out how Islamist 
movements replaced the traditional image of the Muslimah as ‘fatalist, passive, docile 
and obedient’ with an ‘active, demanding and even militant Muslim woman who is no 
                                                 
94 The PJD women have not called for the promulgation of the shari’a laws, therefore they do not present 
a challenge to the type of government advocated by the liberal press. Although the PJD relies on a 
religious discourse, it strives to promote an Islamic society based on ideals of progress, democracy and 
modernity as I mentioned earlier. The equation of the hijab with a militant movement therefore 
intentionally assigns an extremist (as opposed to the implicit moderate) stance to the dress. 
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longer confined to the home (Göle, 1996, p. 84). Madani’s reference to the hijab as a 
militant symbol can be situated within a secular liberal vision which equates the hijab 
with militant Islam. For Madani, the hijab epitomises an aggressive intrusion of 
religion into politics and society. The link which he draws between the ‘Islamist 
militant movements’ and the ‘taints of history’ underlines the enduring impact of 
colonisation in Maghreb countries, and the coloniser’s efforts to ‘unveil’ the Moroccan 
woman. The image of the hijab ‘cleansing society from the taints of history’ alludes to 
the colonial eras and their attempts to promote unveiling. The image is that of the veil 
as de-contaminating, sanitising a past contamination. Madani sets a ‘frontier’ which he 
concedes must be announced between two irreconcilable conceptions of the world: a 
political Islamic militant conception and an implicit secular liberal progressive 
conception. The hijab hence separates instead of uniting. It is divisive. 
 
Let us consider the reference to the hijab in terms of Islamism and the implementation 
of shari’a, which reverberates with the French tying the hijab with Islamism and a will 
to impose ‘Qur’anic law’. In Morocco, the laws which are based on religious texts are 
limited to personal status or family. Moroccan feminist movements have been debating 
and challenging the Moroccan Personal Code (Mudawana), in their attempts to 
challenge patriarchal readings of religious texts. This has resulted in changes regarding 
the status of women in family laws which are still subject to debate today. Regarding 
shari’a, Margot Badran (2009, p. 285) emphasises the importance of making a 
difference between the sacred shari’a as ‘divine inspiration and guiding principles and 
the path discerned from the Quran which Muslims are exhorted to follow in life’, and 
the ‘shari’a law(s)’ or ‘laws originating from the understanding of fiqh’ which are from 
humans and hence open to change and inquiry. In Madani’s statement, there is no 
distinction between both meanings of shari’a. His statement therefore reiterates an 
automatic link between the hijab and a will to impose laws which are subject to new 
interpretation and open to question. Madani’s reference to shari’a therefore hints at the 
traditionalism which is associated with family laws and women. The hijab in this 
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context does not only embody militancy and radicalism, but also traditionalism and 
resistance to change.  
 
The dichotomies which are contained in the Moroccan press also repeat the French 
labelling of Muslims as either ‘Islamists’ or ‘laics’, often reiterating the traditional 
binary opposition between traditionalism and modernism. This debate originates from 
the time when Muslim states became independent and the new laws were closely 
connected with the battle between traditional law practitioners and modernists 
(Mernissi, 1975, p. xix). In the Moroccan press examples, the traditional battle between 
proponents of traditional and modern laws is transformed into a battle between 
proponents of a ‘fundamentalist’ reading of the Qur’an and the more modernist reading 
of it, and between the proponents of Islamic dress and its opponents. 
 
We need to examine the terminology which pertains to Islamic attire, and which has 
been used in the liberal Moroccan press. In relation to Islamic modest dress, the Qur’an 
uses the term khimar to refer to a veil which was traditionally loosely worn over the 
head, and which the Qur’an enjoins the Muslimat to wear in a way to cover the 
bosom95. The second term which the Qur’an uses concerning modest dress is jilbab 
which is a loose and long outer garment or cloak. Although not specifying any 
particular form or colour of modest female dress, the ahadith (reported sayings and 
traditions of the Prophet) provide some general guidelines as to its characteristics, 
namely it being loose, non-transparent garment and not disclosing the contours of the 
body. A number of ahadith also mention the adoption of the veil within the Prophetic 
era. Tel Quel and Nichan, however, consider modest dress and the hijab as part of an 
‘extremist’ and ‘absolutist’ reading of the Qur’an and call for a new and moderate 
reading of the acknowledged sources of Islamic jurisprudence. Some Maghrebi 
feminists similarly argue that the Qur’an does not directly refer to the ‘veil’, or that the 
                                                 
95 Quran, Surat an-Nur 24:31 
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veil is only applicable to the first Islamic era. In her analysis, Mernissi, for instance, 
excludes the ayat (verses) which refer to khimar and jilbab.96 
 
The other term which Tel Quel and Nichan use in relation to the hijab is khwanjia. This 
is a colloquial darija (Moroccan Arabic) term which refers to Moroccan Muslimat 
wearing some form of Islamic dress or men adopting the beard and, in some cases, a 
traditional garment sometimes accompanied by traditional headgear. The word 
ikhwanyi(a)which is the singular form, is derived from al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (the 
originally Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood), to refer to an imported Islamism. The term 
links Islamic dress with ‘extremist’ politics and a will to govern political and social 
lives in Morocco. Ikhwany(a) is used for any person in Morocco adopting Islamic 
dress, regardless of whether they advocate political involvement or not.97 The hijab 
therefore is also importable, it is strange and other to the Moroccan context. It is a 
migrating object too. 
  
In Tel Quel and Nichan, the hijab and the beard represent characteristics of a 
contemporary socio-political division between Moroccans promoting ‘fundamentalist 
Islam’ which it defines as ‘militant’, and others endorsing a political system based on 
secularism and the separation, in this case, of religious symbols from politics.98 In fact, 
in a country whose system of governance derives its legitimacy from the imarat al-
                                                 
96 For a study of modest female dress, see Katherine Bullock (2007)   
97 The word zif is an equivalent of hijab in the Moroccan Arabic dialect of darija; it is also referred to 
as derra, the piece of cloth used to cover the head (or some part of it) and the neck, usually worn with a 
djellaba (the traditional Moroccan dress that has replaced the haik or melhfa which is still worn in many 
parts of Morocco even today).   
 
98 It is noteworthy that the beard has also been subject to bans at Royal Air Maroc and in private 
companies in Morocco. As another Islamic symbol that is associated with Islamism or an extreme 
practice of religion, the beard offers another instance of an Islamist threat within the discourse of the 
Moroccan independent press. 
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mu’minin (the leadership of the believers),99 there has been intense debate regarding 
shari’a laws, as seen in the recent reformation of the Mudawwana. The debate has 
often reinforced the opposition between proponents of a code inspired by Islamic texts 
and supporters of the application of international conventions on women’s rights 
instead. Although the King of Morocco is the prime authority on religious issues and 
laws (representing the guarantor of sacred values and ensuring the continuity of the 
imarat al-mu’minin), he is also the precursor for the improvement of women’s 
condition and has placed ‘emancipation’, ‘progress’ and ‘modernity’, at the centre of 
his strategy.100   
 
In addition to attaching the veil to fundamentalism and shari’a, the publications 
sometimes draw a contrast between modernity and tradition in their construction of the 
hijab as a political threat. Yann Barte101 from Tel Quel, for instance, cites the French 
secular model. He asserts that ‘the [French] law banning ostentatious religious signs in 
schools was an important support as well as a considerable barrier against Islamist 
attacks’ (Barte, 2004). Tel Quel pits a ‘majority of secular French Maghrebis’ against 
a ‘rising number of anti-secular Muslims’, warning that ‘disputes lie ahead.’ (Barte, 
2004)  
                                                 
99 Article 19 of the Moroccan Constitution stipulates that the King shall be the supreme representative 
of the Nation and the symbol of the unity thereof. He shall be the defender of the Faith. 
http://www.idea.int/publications/the_2011_moroccan_constitution/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getf
ile&pageid=56782  
100 This is exemplified namely through speeches which are broadcast live on national television 
throughout the year and for different national commemorations. 
101 Yann Barte defines himself as a Political and social journalist, and as an ‘orphan of the left, 
universalist and secular’. He previously worked as a journalist in Casablanca, Morocco. He currently 
lives and works at Journaliste in Paris and is the author of Triso and then! with E. Laloux (2014). He 
also works as an independent journalist for La Redac Nomade. Barte also has a video channel on 
dailymotion, where he posts and publishes videos about his reports and trips, including videos about 
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Tel Quel portrays the French hijab ban as a ‘considerable barrier against Islamist 
attacks’ (Barte, 2004). The use of the words ‘attacks’ and ‘Islamists’ builds a sense of 
a violent and aggressive symbol. Barte further depicts the hijab ban against 
‘ostentatious religious signs’ in France as an ‘important support’. The term 
‘ostentatious’ is again adopted from the French politics and press. The hijab represents 
an ostentatious and Islamist assault. It necessitates not only a ‘support’ but also a 
‘barrier’ of the law. The example also uses the dichotomy between ‘Muslim’ and 
‘Maghrebi’ to contrast religious belonging with cultural or racial identity, and suggest 
a resistance to French republicanism. It contrasts ‘secular French Maghrebis’ with a 
‘rising number of anti-secular Muslims’. The hijab is therefore also a sign of allegiance 
and loyalty to Islam which precedes cultural/ethnic/racial belonging (Maghrebi) in 
importance. The hijab’s threat and visibility is on the rise. The use of the dichotomy 
also suggests the incompatibility between Frenchness and Muslimness, Maghrebis can 
be French whereas Muslims cannot. The hijab therefore stands as a barrier. Because 
they are understood to be anti-secular, they can only be defined following their 
religious belonging: they remain Muslim, anti-secular. The ‘disputes’ suggest the link 
between the hijab and conflict. It also embodies antagonism.  
 
The reference to the French model in the Moroccan publications can be accompanied 
with additional constructions of the veil within extremism. Chadwane Bensalmia102 
from Tel Quel, for example, suggests a more direct link between Islamic dress and 
radicalism, when it states that (Bensalmia, 2004, p. 24): 
                                                 
102 Chadwane Bensalmia is a Moroccan journalist who has worked for the weekly Tel Quel. She has 
covered different areas of journalism with a special focus on women’s issues in Morocco. In addition to 
her career as a journalist, Bensalmia is currently involved in various arts and cultural activities and 
events including the Moroccan festival Le Boulevard, of which she is an active member. During the 
third edition of the Grand Prix National de la Presse in 2005, Bensalmia, among other media specialists, 
was awarded best prize for her work in tel Quel.    
http://simosoftdj.canalblog.com/archives/2005/12/07/1081951.html 
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When countries like France vote for laws banning veils in schools, or when 
employers in Morocco refuse to hire young veiled women today, some women 
react in an even stronger manner by renouncing life altogether, a radicalization 
of religious practice which owes more, perhaps, to social failure than to faith.  
 
Bensalmia here evokes the hijab ban in schools and Moroccan businesses and private 
companies. The example makes a referential shift from the hijab to the niqab with 
which the article is concerned. In Morocco, the hijab is usually worn with libas ‘asri 
(modern clothes) or a jilbab/jellaba, and is quite different from the niqab (usually black 
or dark-coloured face-veil accompanied with a black jilbab covering the whole body), 
which is rarely adopted in Morocco. The journalist relates her day out ‘In the Skin of 
a Crow’. She ties the niqab and jilbab with the ‘radicalisation of religious practice’, 
and the decision of ‘some women’ to leave their jobs instead of discarding Islamic 
dress is portrayed as a form of extremism. This implies that a moderate religious 
practice would result in discarding the dress. It is Islamic dress that makes these women 
‘react in a stronger manner’: the niqab is a reactionary object. It embodies not only 
extremism and radicalism, but also backwardness and obscurantism, which are 
implicitly contrasted with unveiling, which epitomises progress and enlightenment. 
The veil is also dark, and carries affective qualities. The reference to ‘renouncing life’ 
which Tel Quel associates with adopting the niqab equates the dress with death. The 
veil embodies darkness and death. By contrast, unveiling symbolises life and 
enlightenment. The example explains this ‘radicalisation’ with a ‘social failure’ rather 
than faith. The niqab symbolises withdrawal from life, and social decline, which also 
contrast with social improvement tacitly coded with unveiling. 
 
Associating the veil with radicalism, however, includes some paradoxical references. 
In the same Tel Quel article Chadwane Bensalmia equates the niqab and soutra with 
making a statement and gaining ‘a space of expression’ (Bensalmia, 2004, p. 24): 
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Dressing oneself completely in black, wearing black socks and gloves, covering 
one’s face except the eyes (some go so far as to wear black glasses) … is no 
longer simply a matter of religion. It is a way of asserting oneself. These women 
gain a space for expression that they do not explicitly link to a religious 
movement.   
 
However, Tel Quel notes, these women ‘are also an expression of despair’. The 
radicalism of the soutra is all the more dangerous because it is defended by the very 
same women who are ‘victims of the dictatorship that mandates it’. The ‘radicalization 
of religious practice’ is compounded by the ‘radicalism of the soutra’ which is seen as 
a threat. It is not only to the outside world, but to the women adopting it themselves, 
framed as the ‘victims of dictatorship’. This makes them, paradoxically, threatening 
victims. They are both active and passive. Through the soutra, the women represent an 
active threat and a passive victimhood at once. The connection between the veil and 
death, on the one hand, and between the soutra and radicalism, on the other, positions 
the veil within a threat-victim paradox whereby it symbolizes, simultaneously, a threat 
to society and the victimization of the veiled woman.  
 
Analysing the various affiliations of Islamic dress with political notions in a 
comparative framework reveals its complexity not only in a European French secular 
setting in which the dress acquires a range of associations which position it as a threat 
to the French nation and values, but also in a Maghrebi Muslim-majority context. As I 
have demonstrated, a study of how the veil becomes attached to these different notions 
is a means of understanding why and how it is persistently inscribed within an 
‘essential difference’ not only in a Muslim-minority framework, but also in a Muslim-
majority context such as Morocco. Yet while this Islamist/fundamentalist/extremist 
difference is defined in terms of a threat to the French nation and its secular values, it 
is defined as an increasing infiltration of religion in Moroccan politics, the public realm 
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and wider socio-cultural life. One inference we can draw is that Islamic practice should 
remain confined to private space, a vision that is in line with the French model of 
secularism. 
 
As I have illustrated in this section, journalists from liberal Moroccan weeklies Tel 
Quel, Nichan and Le Reporter equate Islamic dress in its different forms (hijab, niqab, 
jilbab and soutra) with Islamism, extremism and fundamentalism. My analysis of the 
press examples demonstrates how this equation is made more complex with references 
to other notions which become attached to the dress. These include visions of the veil 
in terms of an invasion and contamination of the political and social realms, Islamist 
commodification and marketing, propaganda, ostentatiousness, camouflage, 
regression, backwardness and darkness. These notions emphasise the position of 
Islamic dress as a threat in a Muslim-majority context. Moreover, the inscription of the 
dress in such terms illustrates how its perception as an assault to the political and social 
domains is complicated with references not only to its constructed political difference, 
but also its ethical and affective otherness. Let us now turn to another category of veil 
associations which pertains to defining the dress in terms of a sexual difference, and 
examine how the veil is constructed in sexual terms in the Moroccan publications.  
 
Sexual Associations of the Veil 
The Moroccan weeklies associate various forms of Islamic dress with sexual meanings 
such as submission, inferiority and lack of emancipation. My aim in the second part of 
this chapter is to consider how such meanings are attributed to the dress in the 
Moroccan weeklies, and examine how the language used in relation to the veil 
construct it in terms of an essential sexual otherness. As a gendered object, the veil 
also represents a practice which has been defined in relation to women’s oppression, 
inferiority and inequality since colonial times. As I illustrated in the previous chapter, 
these and similar associations have also been used more recently in the media debate 
prior to the 2004 French hijab ban. The question now is how do the Moroccan liberal 
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publications define the veil within the sexual realm? What links and differences can 
we discern through comparing the construction of the dress in sexual terms in a 
Muslim-majority context in the postcolonial era? I first examine this construction 
through the notions of freedom and emancipation, then through submission, inferiority 
and violence in the second part of this section. 
 
7.2.1. Niqab, Jilbab and Soutra: ‘Greatest Deprivation of Women’s Being and 
Freedom’ or ‘Reaction Against the Male Gaze’ ‘Denial of the Female 
Body’ 
 
In this section, I consider examples from Tel Quel and Nichan associating Islamic dress 
with lack of freedom and body denial. In one of its special reports, Sana El Aji103 from 
Nichan relates the experience of spending a day dressed ‘Ninja Style’, a reference to 
wearing a black niqab and jilbab. At the end of her day, she concludes the niqab 
experience (El Aji, 2008):  
 
As soon as the game ended, I quickly took off my false appearance, eager to 
breathe air in a normal way. What are the results of the experience? The niqab 
                                                 
103 Sanaa El Aji is a journalist, writer and columnist. She covers several issues, and is in favour of a 
‘modernist vision of society, and banning conservative and populist discourses’. Holder in 2008 of the 
third best investigative journalism Award from Press Now, a Dutch NGO, she has also presented 
numerous shows and chronicles on Moroccan television including Entreprendre ,  Compétences, and 
Ilayki, as well as a weekly social column on Aswat Radio."Batoul", the weekly column she held in 
Nichane between September 2006 and October 2010, traces the experiences of a young woman (named 
Batoul), a character which challenges clichés and stereotypes: she is black, divorced, emancipated and 
curious. Challenging stereotypes, machismo, conservatism and populism every week in Nichane, Batoul 
tackled all taboo issues including sex, religion, family and politics. Batoul have earned El Aji the status 
of a famous journalist in Morocco. 
Sanaa El Aji was also a member of the jury of the national film festival in Morocco in January 2012. 
In 2003, she published a novel in Arabic, Majnounatou Youssef. She also contributed to a collective 
book entitled "Letters to a young Moroccan" which was released in 2009 in French and Arabic. El Aji 
also contributed to another collective book entitled "Media Coverage of diversity in Moroccan society", 
which was published in 2009 by the Center For Media Freedom. Sanaa El Aji is a weekly columnist in 
the newspaper Assabah. http://www.sanaa-elaji.com/  
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is the greatest deprivation of women’s being and freedom [...] In addition to 
this, it brings about a completely opposite result: the niqabed woman attracts 
more attention than an unveiled woman. Anything excessive gives a reverse 
effect.  
 
El Aji here describes her experience of the niqab and jilbab as a ‘game’. The image of 
a ‘false appearance’ not only refers to the fictitious appearance which the journalist 
adopts for a day, but also suggests the idea of the niqab (and its accompanying jilbab) 
as an object of deceit and dishonesty, as a fake entity. At one level, the garment 
operates within a game of dressing up that the journalist adopts to experience the black 
niqab for one day in the Moroccan street. Yet the expression ‘false appearance’ also 
hints at the niqab more implicitly as a deceptive dress, and a masquerade reminiscent 
of the orientalist equation between the veil and the mask which I discussed in an earlier 
chapter. This type of image strikes a chord with the French definition of the hijab as a 
potentially deceptive and dishonest symbol. The niqab does not appear what it is, it is 
in itself a ‘false appearance’.  
 
The journalist further links unveiling with being able to ‘breathe air in a normal way’. 
The use of ‘breathing air’, which constitutes a crucial element for life, hints at the 
construction of the niqab as death through the more explicit link of unveiling with 
‘life’. Nichan equates the niqab with death and eccentricity through implicitly 
positioning unveiling with a ‘normal way’. Thus the niqab is not only an embodiment 
of anomaly and abnormality, but also death. In answering a question about the results 
of her experience of the dress, the last statement offers the most important conclusion: 
the niqab is the ‘greatest deprivation of woman’s being and freedom’. Hence she again 
ties the dress with the ‘greatest’ deprivation: the niqabed woman is deprived of life, 
and of freedom. The niqab symbolises deprivation, death and anomaly.    
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Such an inscription of the niqab and jilbab as we find in Nichan marks the dress as an 
alien and foreign object. Yet Moroccan women have traditionally worn different forms 
of modest dress, historically accompanied with a face veil or niqab, referred to in 
Morocco as ‘ngab’. This is the equivalent of niqab in classical Arabic, which many 
women still wear in different parts of Morocco today. While many women still adopt 
the ngab such as is the case in many Moroccan rural and to a lesser extent urban areas, 
the example portrays the garment outside Moroccan women’s attire. Although 
Moroccan women overwhelmingly choose colours other than black, and many have 
replaced the haik (or the mlehfa) with djellabas having modern patterns, fabrics and 
colours, many still adopt the niqab as part of their dress. By contrast, the niqab which 
Nichan and Tel Quel mention refers instead to a black outer garment including a black 
scarf and a face veil, a type of dress which is coded as ‘other’ as it is tied with a more 
Middle Eastern and Gulf styles of Islamic attire. The type of niqab which the example 
describes differs in colour, shape, style and fabric from the commonly used garments 
adopted in Morocco by the majority of women who wear the niqab in various colours 
and textiles often accompanied with a djellaba or mlehfa. It is also the type of dress 
associated with a ‘radical’ form of Islam in the liberal Moroccan press, and is 
associated with of an imported type of dress.  
 
In defining Islamic dress in terms of sexual otherness, references are also made to 
patriarchy. In the example from Nichan, Sana El Aji (2008) draws a further connection 
between the niqab, the ‘male gaze’ and patriarchy:  
 
It is therefore certain that today, the veil is not a religious practice but rather a 
reaction against the male gaze, a way of acquiring freedoms in a patriarchal 
environment that curbs the freedom of women, in a society where man is 
incapable of controlling his instincts. The result is that a woman has to wear 
the veil and deny her body because that is exactly what the veil means: a denial 
of the female body.  
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Here the ‘veil’ which refers to the niqab and jilbab is dissociated from the religious 
dimension with which other examples from Tel Quel and Nichan associate the hijab. 
Tel Quel proposes an alternative explanation. Rather than a symbol of piety and 
religious practice, Sana El Aji depicts the niqab (which includes a jilbab) as a ‘reaction 
against the male gaze’, hence an attitude and response to the male gaze. The use of the 
term ‘reaction’ also suggests a reactionary attitude linking the dress with 
backwardness. However, in contrast to examples which position the niqab as the 
epitome of slavery, subjugation, and subordination, Tel Quel here states that the niqab 
is a way of acquiring freedoms in a patriarchal environment. The dress is also 
empowering. Yet the niqab is also a tool in a society ‘where man is incapable of 
controlling his instincts’, and is therefore not only attached to the male gaze, but also 
instinct. The niqab is a barrier against being watched, in a patriarchal context where 
the Muslimah’s body is an object of surveillance. The veiled body is both subject to 
and blocks visual examination. Hence the invisible body becomes ostentatious. Tel 
Quel offers another reading of the niqab: it embodies a denial of the female body. 
Although it allows women to gain freedoms, the dress constitutes a dismissal and 
disavowal of the female body. The niqab therefore denies and disavows the body, it 
signifies renouncement.   
 
Nichan defines the niqab and jilbab in contradictory ways:  as being both against 
women’s freedom and for women’s freedom in a patriarchal society.  Some Muslim 
feminists argue that Islamic dress embodies freedom in several circumstances. In her 
study of the veil in North America, Homa Hoodfar (Alvi, et al., 2003, p. 38) for 
instance notes that framing the debate about the veil in a larger context than the 
dichotomous one of religion/Islam/patriarchy in opposition to individual freedom of 
choice provides a more comprehensive understanding of this practice, contributing to 
a view a veiled woman ‘not as a passive subject, but as an active agent involved in 
defining her position and options in the contemporary context of her life’. Challenging 
the lack of acknowledgement of women’s agency, Hoodfar (Alvi, et al., 2003, p. 39) 
further argues that even if the veil was introduced and disseminated in a patriarchal 
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framework, women have adopted it to ‘loosen the bonds of patriarchy’. Sana El Aji’s 
association of the niqab and jilbab with lack of freedom is an instance of limiting the 
debate of Islamic dress within the dichotomy Islam/patriarchy, which tends to occlude 
women’s agency. In such a type of discourse, the unveiled body of the Muslimah 
represents freedom and autonomy while the veil, in this case the niqab and jilbab stand 
for choice denial.    
 
Nichan’s depiction of the niqab and jilbab has resonance with colonial and orientalist 
depictions of the veil as a form of control of male sexuality, and of the blame 
historically attached to the man for victimising and constraining the ‘oriental woman’ 
in order to control his desire. Yet the veil is both subject to control by women, and 
symbolic of their constraints, an ‘ambiguity’ which is crucial to understanding the 
privileged nature of the veil as a symbol in Middle Eastern culture (Macleod, 1991, p. 
102). As Arlene Macleod (1991, p. 102) notes, we can read the veil as a ‘subtle and 
evocative sign of the negotiation of power, and the intersection of domination and 
resistance’.  This indicates what Macleod (Macleod, 1991, p. 102) refers to as ‘the 
interpretive struggle to define women’s place within the family and the larger society’. 
The equation between the niqab and the denial of the female body positions the 
munaqqaba as the victim of her society, which is also reminiscent of the link between 
Islamic dress and the negation of the female body which I detailed in the previous 
chapter. The depiction of the niqab and jilbab strictly in terms of body denial and 
domination occludes the possibility of the dress to offer alternative meanings to the 
women wearing it. The journalist therefore fixes her own reading of the dress, which 
communicates its vision as a patriarchal symbol.   
 
Muslim women undoubtedly need to change and challenge patriarchal structures from 
within their own social and historical contexts. Yet in Maghrebi and Arab societies, 
the question of patriarchy involves the situation of women inside the family that can 
be a means of understanding their problems through time (El-Khayat, 1992, pp. 108-
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109). Concerning the dynamics of family and gender, Amina Wadud (2006, pp. 47-48) 
notes that, as women were not deemed total agents with a view of full choice in their 
role, their identity has been respective to their role in the family as care-takers. Yet to 
confine woman’s identity to this role, while they are fulfilling other roles, unjustly 
violates the significance of care, and limits or doubly encumbers women in the 
performance of other aspects of divine purpose as Khilafah (trustees) (Wadud, 2006, 
pp. 47-48). At another level, as some Islamic feminists argue, discrimination against 
Arab women is not only an issue of liberation or equality with men, nor is it simply a 
question of family, personal rights, education or work, but rather a question of social 
trends drawn from customs and cultural traditions that are predominant within society 
(Assa'ati, 2000, p. 311). Outside influences of Islam such as tribal norms have 
significantly determined the status of women in Muslim countries, and have permeated 
Islamic traditions (Hassa'n, 2000, p. 50). These outside influences are deemed to have 
affected the attempts of the Qur’an to liberate women from various forms of 
oppression and injustice, often in the name of Islam (Hassa'n, 2000, p. 50). As Wadud 
(1999, pp. xxi-xxii) argues, it was the interpretation of the Qur’an rather than the text 
itself which restricted women. She further notes that, while in other religions feminists 
had to insert woman into the discourse to attain legitimacy, the Muslimah has only to 
read the text to gain ‘undeniable liberation’ (Wadud, 1999, pp. xxi-xxii). The 
essentialist and fixed representations such as the ones I have analysed restrict the issue 
of freedom and emancipation to the niqab, jilbab or sometimes the hijab. As Nashat 
and Tucker (1999, p. xxxiii) state, associating oppression with the niqab and veiling 
poses the danger of overlooking the ‘interrelationships of multiple forms of oppression 
such as race, class, imperialism, and gender. The fixations on Islamic dress limit the 
debate to traditional dichotomies which have been attached to the veil, and overlook 
the wider issues of inequality and lack of choice and freedom which define the 
everyday lived realities of the Muslimat. 
 
For Morocco, there is a gap between constitutional laws and the lived realities of 
women (Maadi, 1992, p. 20). In contrast to the unfair policies which do not protect the 
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rights of the overwhelming majority of poor and institutionally unsupported Muslim 
women (Wadud, 2006, p. 53), the first Muslim women believers, who accepted the 
new teachings of the Qur’an to transform the older tribal society, conceived themselves 
to be ‘independent individuals, liberated from the shackles of pre-Islamic customs and 
a degrading social status’ (Alvi, et al., 2003, p. 156). The Muslim woman’s rights 
included consenting to her marriage, initiating divorce if it seemed necessary, 
inheriting from her parents, and developing her intellectual, personal and economic 
skills (Alvi, et al., 2003, p. 156). Limiting the debate about liberation and patriarchy to 
Islamic dress therefore is questionable, as well as imposing a patriarchal meaning to 
its practice. Islamic dress can be a personal choice for many Muslimat who do not 
necessarily view it as a ‘negation of the female body’. Fadwa El Guindi’s notion of 
modesty and privacy among Arab cultures, and Saba Mahmood’s study of the piety 
movement in Egypt are pertinent in indicating how Islamic dress can symbolise 
meanings which challenge the fixed visions of the dress within patriarchy and 
oppression.  
 
 Through coding the veil with body denial, lack of freedom and patriarchy, Nichan 
implicitly marks unveiling with the assertion of women’s bodies in public space. The 
visibility of the Muslimah’s body in public space is considered both as a pre-requisite 
for and a symbol of freedom. The equation of the niqab with body denial marks the 
niqabed body as oppressed, which defines the unveiled body as emancipated.  Such a 
notion of body autonomy and women’s freedom is based on a universal and liberal 
concept of the body which equates veiling with oppression and unveiling with 
emancipation. Commenting on the act of becoming muhajjaba in Egypt, MacLeod 
(1991, pp. 104-105) points to the importance of questioning Western assumptions that 
the veil means ‘subjection and a return to a restrictive and 'medieval’ version of Islam 
in the face of large numbers of intelligent, often educated and modernized women who 
choose voluntarily to put on this dress’. She further argues that veiling has local 
meaning in the past or present, which is most fundamental in attempting to understand 
the nature of the ‘power struggles which it carries on and illuminates’ (Macleod, 1991, 
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pp. 104-105). The journalist’s assigning meanings of oppression and subjection to the 
niqab, therefore, risks reducing the dress to a uni-dimensional vision which suppresses 
its complexity. Such a type of discourse on Islamic dress as we find in Nichan also 
suggests its vision as an ‘intruder’ in a space that should be governed by a universal 
ideal of the liberal subject, which considers Western dress and unveiling as the norm. 
When the veil is visible, it is not normal whereas when it’s invisible, it becomes 
normal. This contributes to a normalisation of veiling and “abnormalisation” of veiling. 
At another level, it is the ostentatious aspect of Islamic dress (disturbing visibility) 
which makes it abnormal, while the invisibility of unveiling (acceptable visibility) 
makes it normal. The normality of the veil is conditional upon its invisibility. In 
addition to these references, the Moroccan publications construct Islamic attire as an 
embodiment of submission, inferiority and violence which I investigate in the next 
section. These notions also pertain to defining the dress in terms of a sexual otherness 
in relation to an ideal liberal and emancipated normative subject.  
 
7.2.2. Submission, Inferiority and Violence  
 
In this section, I analyse examples which associate Islamic dress with submission and 
inferiority. I tackle these additional notions as part of associations of the veil in sexual 
terms as they have been used as techniques for othering Islamic dress within the sexual 
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realm. In a Tel Quel article which includes a paradoxical definition of the niqab, Maria 
Daif104 and Driss Ksikes105 state (Daif & Ksikes, 2004):  
 
For me, wearing the veil is nothing else but a new form of feminism. Let me 
explain myself. By wearing the veil, these women have decided to be masters 
of their bodies. But one also has to acknowledge that it is also a form of 
submission to a patriarchal culture, a way of protecting oneself, of giving 
oneself more worth, or responding to something absolute. There is therefore no 
single truth regarding the issue which, to me, has entered a phase of 
trivialisation.  
 
                                                 
104 Maria Daif was hired a journalist in the Moroccan women's magazine Femmes du Maroc in 1997. 
She held this position for four years, until the creation of the independent weekly Tel quel where I 
worked for four years. Her favourite subjects and contributions in Tel quel were society and culture. She 
was approached to coordinate the team of the new women’s magazine parade, in which she was later 
appointed as a director. The publication of the magazine however ceased in 2007. In addition to her 
career as a journalist, Daif has contributed to Atlantic Radio and Eden Com. She also works as a press 
secretary in charge of cultural and arts projects, and the field of media and communications consulting 
partnerships. She is additionally a member of two funds which promote culture in Africa (Art Moved 




105 Driss Ksikes was born in 1968 in Casablanca, Morocco. He is a francophone Moroccan writer and 
journalist. but also a journalist. He wrote two plays: Pas de Mémoire ... Mémoire de Pas in 1998, Le 
saint des Incertains in 2000, and a novel entitled Ma boîte Noire in 2006, Tarik -Casa- and The Great 
Breath in 2006. He is mostly known for being the editor of two Moroccan weeklies, Tel Quel and the 
publishing director of Nichane. Ksikes left his position as managing editor of Nichane after his 
conviction for ‘insulting Islam’ in Morocco, following a dossier published in 2006 in Nichane speaking 
of " Humor of Moroccans " and having included jokes which were considered insulting to Islam. 
http://www.babelio.com/auteur/Driss-Ksikes/134047 
Driss Ksikes is director of CESEM, HEM Research Center and managing editor of La Revue Economia 
and works as a writer and analyst for several international journals. He is also managing director of the 
company Dabateatr and co-founder of the Rencontres d' Averroes, under the sign of Ibn Rushd in Rabat. 
https://www.facebook.com/DrissKsikes.CitoyenCritique/info?tab=page_info 
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On the one hand, Daif and Ksikes codifiy the adoption of the veil as systematically and 
categorically ‘a new form of feminism’, which they explain in terms of the veiled 
women’s decision to be ‘masters of their bodies’. The image here is that of the veil as 
a symbol of bodily command and control. Yet the journalists state the obligation to 
acknowledge its definition as a form of ‘submission to a patriarchal culture’. We can 
note how the depiction of the veil shifts between feminism and patriarchy. The example 
exposes contradictions within associations of the veil. First categorising the niqab as a 
form of feminism and an instance of women being ‘masters of their bodies’, they 
paradoxically portray the dress as a form of submission to patriarchal culture including 
elements of protection, worth and absolutism.  
 
At another level, the example’s reference to ‘culture’ marks the dress with an inferior 
cultural characteristic, which implicitly contrasts it with a superior culture to which 
unveiling belongs. Daif and Ksikes also refer to the veil as a form of ‘protection’, and 
of giving ‘oneself more worth’ or ‘responding to something absolute’. The term 
‘worth’ suggests not only virtue and morality but also value, pride and arrogance, 
hence a feeling of superiority. The veil is also narcissistic. The reference to ‘something 
absolute’ alludes to the vision of the veil as a form of absolutism, which links the dress 
not only with extremism, but also with despotism and tyranny. The allusion to 
‘something absolute’ in the article echoes orientalist meanings of the veil with 
despotism. The symbolism of the veil as submission to a patriarchal culture is 
supplanted with its epitomising despotism and absolutism. Attaching ‘insignificance’ 
to the niqab, the example declares the multiplicity of ‘truths’ regarding the dress.  
 
In the same article, Maria Daif and Driss Ksikes (Daif & Ksikes, 2004) paradoxically 
affiliate the niqab and jilbab with superiority, violence and submission: 
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On the way to the house, H. continuously asks me questions about how I feel 
in my dress. Is it comfortable? Do I not feel myself slightly above other people? 
I am thinking about Iranian women. I wonder what they would think about such 
an assertion. I took away what appears to be a choice and is essentially the 
outcome of an excess full of violence. These women perceive (a form of) 
freedom in submission.  
 
Daif relates the time she spent in the company of some women who adopt the niqab 
and jilbab. When she was out in the street dressed in a similar way to the women (in 
niqab and jilbab), she writes about the ‘continuous’ questioning which the munaqqaba 
directs at her regarding ‘how [she] feels about the dress’. The feeling of disturbance 
which the word ‘continuous’ suggests is added to the idea of tenacity and obstinacy 
which the word communicates. The niqab expresses tenacity and repetition. The 
questions of the munaqqaba evoke Iranian women. The Moroccan journalist therefore 
ties the situation of the Moroccan niqabed woman with that of the tchador worn by 
Iranian women. She ‘wonders’ what Iranian women would think about the assertion of 
superiority expressed by the Moroccan munaqqaba. The act of ‘taking away’ the niqab 
and jilbab also hints at the act of distancing them.  
 
Similar to earlier references, expressions such as ‘appears to be a choice’ allude to a 
‘hidden’ side of the veil. The niqab is not what it appears to be, and it cannot be a 
choice. The example also links the niqab with ‘the outcome of an excess full of 
violence’, and an ‘apparent choice’ which is nonetheless a form of submission. The 
niqab thus hides violent acts against women. Not only is the dress viewed as a proof 
of women’s submission within patriarchy, but it is also understood as a form of 
violence towards women. The examples show how the association of the niqab and 
jilbab with violence reiterates a similar reference in the French press which equates the 
hijab with violence, and associates the dress in turn with shari'a law. We can 
additionally relate the idea of an apparent choice with the visibility and 
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ostentatiousness attributed to the dress. The visibility of the dress hence becomes a 
symbol of compulsion, its ostentatiousness a negation of choice. 
 
Positioning the niqab as a symbol of inferiority and as antithetical to freedom negates 
the possibility of it being a tool granting women a form of body autonomy. The 
statement by the munaqqaba questions the ‘choice’ of the niqab without providing any 
space for these women to voice their thoughts. Concerning the wilful compliance to 
religiously prescribed social principles, Saba Mahmood (2004, p. 148) notes that the 
mosque movement women in Egypt are often seen as ‘depriving themselves of the 
ability to enact an ethics of freedom, one founded on their capacity to distinguish their 
own (true) desires from (external) religious and cultural demands’. She adds that this 
criticism turns upon ‘an imaginary of freedom, one deeply indebted to liberal political 
theory, in which an individual is considered free on the condition that she act 
autonomously: that the actions be the result of her own choice and free will, rather than 
of customs, traditions, transcendental will, or social coercion’ (Mahmood, 2004, p. 
148). Daif and Ksikes’s example from Nichan represents an instance of how niqab is 
perceived as a barrier against freedom as it is defined in liberal terms in the Moroccan 
context, a Muslim-majority country. The inability of the journalists to conceive of a 
different conception of freedom from that which is contained in the secular liberal 
ideology demonstrates the extent to which the secular conception of body autonomy 
norm has been adopted in a Muslim-majority context.  
 
The image in Tel Quel and Nichan is therefore that of body denial and deprivation from 
a notion of freedom which understands veiling as subordination and unveiling as 
freedom and emancipation. Mahmood’s notion of an ‘imaginary of freedom’ is 
particularly useful in considering how Tel Quel and Nichan conceptualise individual 
freedom as freedom from veiling, which is considered as a religious convention to be 
discarded in order to achieve freedom. Veiling is thus contrasted with autonomy, and 
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the act of adopting it symbolises subordination to an outside pressure or compulsion. 
The veil through such a vision is an epitome of coercion and oppression.  
 
The issue of women’s inferiority in Arab states is often codified through law and, 
despite all the judicial changes of the last half of the century, Islam and restrictive 
interpretations of religious texts are still invoked in order to justify restrictions imposed 
on women’s rights (Bessis, 2006, p. 330). Women’s position of inferiority is 
strengthened by the choice of religious texts and their inferior status is consolidated 
through the reliance on texts and hadiths attributed to the Prophet which are often read 
out of context. Religion has therefore been used to justify the lower status of women. 
In the Maghreb, the persistence of the inferiorisation of women conflicts with the 
acknowledgement of equality between the rights of women and men (Tamzali, 2006, 
p. 412). As I mentioned earlier, the Moroccan Constitution and laws posit equality as 
a basis, yet many laws still position women as lower and inferior as is the case with 
family laws and some labour laws that discriminate against women. In addition to these 
types of discrimination, male domination, including that of the sacred and religious 
interpretation, still persists in most Arab and Muslim countries (Tamzali, 2006, pp. 
426-427). Examples of this attempt to dominate women can be found in laws such as 
the one making divorce initiated by women more difficult to achieve than those 
initiated by men, or preventing a woman from accessing or dealing with her private 
properties without permission from her partner.  
 
As far as equality is concerned, Muslim and Islamic feminists argue that we need to 
make a distinction between Islam and its precepts, and Islam as it is interpreted and 
disseminated by official policy. As Mernissi (1975, p. xvi) states, there is a 
fundamental contradiction between Islam as interpreted in official policy and equality 
of the sexes. She further states that, in ‘Western culture’, sexual inequality was based 
on a belief in women’s biological inferiority, whereas in Islam, there is no belief in 
female inferiority (Mernissi, 1975, p. xvi). The whole system is based on the 
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assumption that the woman is a ‘powerful and dangerous being’, and all sexual 
institutions (polygamy, divorce, sexual segregation, etc) are a strategy to contain her 
power (Mernissi, 1975, p. xvi). However, in addition to the absence of Qur’anic 
evidence for such a claim, the view of the Muslimah as dangerous source of fitna and 
that she is responsible for man’s behaviour has no basis in the Qur’an. Such a vision 
of the Muslimah as a ‘dangerous being’ is also used to justify veiling as a male 
protection from a potential threat. Mernissi also links polygamy, divorce, and sexual 
segregation with attempts to control women, using similar arguments often employed 
to charge Islam with oppressing women.106 According to Rifaat Hassan (2000, p. 25), 
Islamic societies believe women were created principally to be beneficial to men who 
are superior to them, and the supposed superiority of men over women which 
permeates Islamic, Jewish and Christian traditions is rooted not only in the reporting 
of the Prophet’s sayings, but also in the common interpretations of some Qur’anic 
verses. These studies highlight the significance of considering notions such as 
inequality and inferiority beyond the traditional bounds of Islamic dress.  
 
In this section I have explored examples from Nichan and Tel Quel, and demonstrated 
how they depict Islamic dress against freedom and emancipation, and as an epitome of 
inferiority, submission and body denial. On the one hand, the inscription of Islamic 
dress within these concepts implicitly constructs it in opposite terms with the ideal 
secular normative and autonomous body which is understood as visible and free. On 
the other hand, the portrayal of different forms of dress (and more particularly the 
niqab, jilbab and soutra) in the Moroccan weeklies in these terms reveals how the 
various meanings can be complicated with other implicit references and insinuations 
to such as deceit, masquerade, anomaly, and death, which allude to the ostentatious 
disturbance of the dress for the Moroccanpublications. On the other hand, associations 
                                                 
106 As far as polygamy and divorce in Islam are concerned, polygamy is tied to requirements which are 
almost impossible to fulfill, divorce is not one-sided in Islam as women can also initiate divorce and 
obtain it. 
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of the veil with lack of freedom allude to visions of the dress as an embodiment of 
renouncement, control, pride, tenacity and violence. At another level, these further 
inferences complicate the construction of sexual veils through introducing affective 
qualities to the dress. Islamic dress in the Moroccan weeklies is hence also affective. 
Such depictions reproduce traditional dichotomies of the veil which I have examined 
in earlier chapters. However, they also establish the difference of the veil in terms of 
an emotional and ethical otherness. I now move to the last section in order to look at 
examples which pertain to socio-cultural associations of Islamic dress through which 
it is constructed as the embodiment of fantasy, fashion and fitna.  
Moroccan Ethical and Socio-Cultural Veils  
7.3.1. Fantasy Fashion and Fitna107 Ostentatious Sexual Fashionable and 
Religious Hijabs and Niqabs of Threat and Fitna   
 
In this section, I analyse how the Moroccan weeklies inscribe the veil with religious 
(ethical) and socio-cultural themes. In addition to the associations of Islamic dress 
within the political and sexual realms, the Moroccan weeklies Tel Quel and Nichan 
assign socio-cultural meanings to it. I analyse how they do so. In the first section, I 
examine how the dress is associated with fashion and fitna, and then I explore how the 
veil is tied with the notions of honour, shame and sexual purity. I am grouping these 
meanings together under the umbrella of ethical and socio-cultural ones as they are 
more related to the social and cultural realms. Although these constructions of the veil 
are closer to those in terms of sexual meanings, I want to make a distinction among the 
                                                 
107 According to Margot Badran (Badran, 2009, p. 74), it was popular belief that constructed women 
differently from men as ‘essentially sexual beings’, and women were believed to have  greater sexual 
instincts, ‘threatened to ignite chaos, or fitna with which she was equated’.  
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meanings which were viewed exclusively within sexual terms, and the ones that 
pointed to further definitions of the veil within ethical, social and cultural otherness. 
 
In a Nichan article entitled ‘Jarrabna Ninja’ (We have tried the Ninja outfit), Sana El 
Aji (El Aji, 2008) spends a day out in Casablanca dressed in a niqab and a black jilbab 
describes her day. The word ‘Ninja’ likens her wearing of the niqab and jilbab (black 
niqab with a black cloak) to the persons skilled in ninjutsu: 
 
Even after he walked past me, the young man continued looking in my 
direction, contemplating my appearance with interest. I could not determine if 
my ‘covered’ appearance strengthened his feelings of higher status and 
authority towards me as a covered female, or if what was agitating him was 
merely an internal fantasy creating the desire to uncover whatever hidden 
things were there.   
 
The scene here describes the niqabed journalist fully dressed in black walking along 
one of the main upper-class brand shopping areas in Casablanca. On her way out of a 
shop, two young men walk past her. One of them comments: ‘I like this style’, and 
keeps looking at her with interest. El Aji interprets this gesture as either a proof of her 
‘covered and hidden’ body intensifying the young man’s inner feelings of superiority 
and power over the ‘covered female’, or merely a sign of his internal fantasy creating 
a ‘desire to uncover what is hidden’. The allusion to the ‘continued looking’ echoes 
the earlier example about the woman in the soutra who ‘continued asking’, both 
examples emphasise the idea of repetition and persistence. The niqab is subject to and 
a cause for the male gaze. The term ‘appearance’ hints at the veil as an object of display 
and exhibition. It therefore echoes the notion of conspicuousness attached to the niqab, 
which becomes visible and ostentatious. The term ‘appearance’ also suggests 
unveiling, which contrasts with the ‘veiled appearance’ of the writer. The veil is 
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apparent and conspicuous. It can become a form of spectacle and show. The expression 
‘covered appearance’ and ‘covered female’ further suggest the position of the niqab as 
a mask and disguise. The term appearance (external) also hints at the idea of the veil 
being a fabrication, and a fantasy, which we can compare with the ‘internal fantasy’ 
attributed to the male gaze. The veil is thus both a fantasy and a source of fantasy, both 
an object and subject of fantasy. What it appears to be is therefore different from what 
it is. At another level, we can link references to appearance with fashion. The veil is 
therefore a symbol of fashion. The veil additionally agitates, which evokes the idea of 
disturbance in turn associated with the visibility of the dress. The expressions ‘desire 
to uncover’ and ‘what is hidden’ also point to the perception of the dress as a source of 
fitna. Because the veil covers, it provokes desire to uncover. Unveiling is hence 
equated with knowing.  
  
As in the previous examples, El Aji ties the niqab with male power and authority over 
women, and reads it as a proof of the inferior status of women. Yet what accompanies 
this depiction is the vision of the ‘hidden’ or veiled, in this case niqabed female body, 
as a source of sexual attraction. The niqab therefore moves from being an object of 
passivity (the image of the niqab as an oppressive and passive prison) to a symbol of 
sexual desire and fantasy and active sexual symbol. This movement resonates with the 
orientalist depiction of veiled women as ‘oppressed victims’ and ‘sexual threats’. The 
veiled woman is thus at once a passive victim and an active threat.  Likewise, during 
the colonial era, the veil was often associated with exoticism and sensuality, as the 
body of the Muslim woman ‘behind the veil’ represented an object of fantasy (Fanon, 
1967, p. 43). It was later to be viewed as a threat, as was the case during the colonial 
battle detailed in the earlier chapters.  
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The association of the veil fitna comes up in other contexts. The weekly Le Journal 
similarly ties the niqab and jilbab with a strong sexual drive. In an article entitled ‘The 
G-String under the Hijab’, Amelie Amilhau108 states (Amilhau, 2008): 
 
Passionate is what describes the bearded men and their wives so much hidden 
under so many heavy black shawls that some people call them ninjas? This is 
not always the case, but we encounter lace and eroticism, more often than we 
can imagine when we lift the veil.  
 
Amilhau defines ‘bearded men and their wives’. Their description as ‘passionate’ not 
only hints at the vision of the niqab (and now the beard) as a lascivious and erotic 
object, but also connotes their perception as signifiers of a fervent and zealous 
disposition. The niqab and beard are taken to be fanatical symbols. The expressions 
‘so much hidden’ and ‘so many heavy black shawls’ intensify and heighten the feeling 
of surprise which the veil and beard provoke, and additionally suggest the excess and 
exaggeration which the weeklies attribute to the dress as an extreme practice. The 
‘black shawls’ not only refer to the black cloaks also called jilbab which complements 
the niqab, but also more subtly associate the dress with camouflage and mask. The 
image is that of the veil as a disguise. It is again a semblance and appearance. The 
                                                 
108Amilhau is a journalist and director of production in French broadcast media in Paris. She previously 
worked for Cosmopolitis production, Courrier Atlas, Pernel Media and SAS Education. She is a 
correspondant, collaborator and freelance journalist with various French and foreign media including  
l’Express, West France, France 24 and Mail Atlas. She worked in Morocco as a director journalist and 
team leader on two television Moroccan programmes in 2M (Lights and Toubkal), the second Moroccan 
channel, as well as a corresponding and freelance journalist. In Morocco, she has also worked for Le 
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‘black’ darkness and obscurity of the niqab itself contrasts with and implicitly defines 
the lightness of unveiling. The colour also characterises the dress as nebulous and 
vague. The dark veil embodies gloominess hence sadness and melancholy which 
implicitly defines the happiness of unveiling. At another level, blackness and darkness 
also echo invisibility, whereas lightness and brightness suggest visibility. The niqab 
therefore is both visible and makes invisible. By contrast, unveiling is invisible and 
makes visible.  
 
The article also contains references to the dress as a symbol of eroticism, connecting 
the veil and ‘bearded men’ with ‘lace’ and ‘eroticism’. The terms suggest a fabric of 
silk or cotton used for underwear. Amilhau portrays the niqab as a tool for seduction 
and fashion, and a symbol of eroticism and sexuality. Ironically, the title of the article 
‘The G-String under the Hijab’ focuses on the niqab rather than the hijab as an object 
hiding eroticism. The view of the niqab (and beard) in terms of an active eroticism 
contrasts with its earlier definition as a form of passive oppression and victimisation 
within a patriarchal framework. Le Journal here presents the dress as denoting the 
sexualisation and eroticisation of Islamic dress. Although most women interviewed in 
the article wear the hijab rather than the niqab, repeated references are made to the 
niqab as an active sexual symbol. The example thus depicts the dress as an item 
reinforcing the image of the woman not as a negated body within public space, but as 
a hidden yet sexually active, erotic body.  
 
It is worth considering what Islamic and Muslim feminism says about Islamic dress 
and sexuality. In orthodox Islam, sexuality is considered as a normative aspect of 
ordinary and religious life. Outside marriage, however, behaviour between men and 
women has to be temporarily ‘desexualised’ (desexualisation) as both body and space 
need to be regulated and controlled to make public interaction possible (El Guindi, 
1999, p. 136). The challenge which Islam poses to individual Muslims is to 
‘accommodate’ both sexuality and religiousness as normative while striving to 
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accomplish the ideal of ‘sociomoral behavior’ (El Guindi, 1999, p. 136). El Guindi’s 
concept of ‘desexualisation’ of the body is particularly useful in considering how Le 
Journal instead emphasises the ‘sexualisation’ of the niqab (and beard) in public space. 
In contrast to the ‘desexualisation’ and moralisation of behaviour, Le Journal 
associates the niqab with an active eroticism and immorality through constructing the 
dress as erotic and lascivious.    
 
We need to also consider the veil in relation to modesty. In her ethnographic study of 
Bedouin society, Lila Abu Lughod (1986, p. 165) argues that, for the Awlad Ali 
Bedouin society, veiling is best conceptualised in a ‘symbolic language about morality 
and a denial of sexual interest, which includes avoiding and acting uninterested in men, 
dressing modestly so as not to draw attention to their sexual charms, and veiling’. In 
this context, it is sexuality and the bonds it establishes between individuals that 
represent a threat not only to the ‘conceptual system of social relations’, but also to the 
‘solidarity of the agnatic kin group’ which is important in Bedouin society (Abu-
Lughod, 1986, p. 145). In the framework of the new veiling movements of the past 
decades in Egypt and the larger Arab and Muslim countries, the hijab of the muhajjabat 
refers to a garment which intends to comply with the Islamic requirement that the dress 
be ‘modest and not sexually enticing’, an obligation that applies to both men and 
women (Ahmed, 1992, p. 221). Al-Ziyy al-islami (Islamic dress) is generally 
understood as robes or loose-fitting long-sleeved and ankle-length garments that do not 
reveal the contours of the body (Ahmed, 1992, p. 221). In Le Journal, the ‘dark and 
heavy shawls’ are instead portrayed as sexual objects in a space which supposedly 
desexualises the body. The modesty and desexualisation which are often attributed to 
the hijab and niqab from a religious perspective are reversed to inscribe the dress as 
immodest and sexual. The veil thus becomes not only immodest, but also ostentatious.  
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In an article entitled ‘Non l’Homme n’est pas un Animal primitif’ (‘No, Man is not a 
Primitive Animal’), Maria Daif (2002) from Tel Quel similarly ties the niqab with 
sexual instinct, seduction and danger: 
 
The veil and the large long outfit which accompanies it protect the hair, arms 
and legs of the woman from the male gaze. Let us not make ourselves blind. It 
is nothing more than this. This broadly means that the twenty-first century man 
does not see in the twenty-first century woman anything more than a vulgar 
object of seduction and a catalyst of his own sexual instincts. In short, she is a 
danger to be absolutely dismissed. 
 
Maria Daif here reiterates the association of the niqab and jilbab with a protection of 
the female body from the male gaze. The expression ‘long outfit’ which refers to the 
jilbab echoes not only a costume and a guise, but also a uniform. The jilbab thus 
symbolises belonging to a particular organisation, group or clan. Against the act of 
‘making oneself blind’, hence remaining in darkness, Daif offers the only explanation 
for the adoption of the dress, and proposes to uncover the truth about Islamic dress. 
The expressions ‘vulgar object of seduction’ points to a vision of the veil as offensive 
and filthy. It suggests characterising the veil as indecent, impolite and dishonourable. 
This positions it within an inferior status. Such a depiction also codes the dress as 
antithetical to decency and morality. The veil is thus immoral. It is both offensive, and 
embodies an offense, a sexual attack. At another level, we can note how the use of the 
adjective ‘vulgar’ suggests something barbaric, hence connecting the veil with 
savageness and barbarism. It is also uncivilised. The vulgarity of the veil also makes it 
stand out as a symbol. Not only does it embody immorality and barbarism, but also 
ostentatiousness. It embodies a visible sexual offensive to be dismissed.    
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Tel Quel includes references to Islamic dress, and more precisely the niqab and jilbab 
as a symbol igniting the desire to uncover the veiled body. The dress is depicted as a 
sexual threat, through such expressions as ‘vulgar object of seduction’ and ‘catalyst of 
man’s sexual instincts’.109 The idea of ‘protection from the male gaze’ resonates with 
the historical symbolism of the veil as a protection for upper-class women from the 
gaze of common men (Nashat & Tucker, 1999, pp. 32-33), in which the practice is 
equated with protecting women from the male gaze in Moroccan society. We can 
contrast the vision of Islamic dress as a ‘sexual threat’ with the assertion of the hijab 
as a ‘tool of protection’ for women, warning men and strangers that the wearer is a 
‘good and virtuous woman’ (Macleod, 1991, p. 113). In the recent decades, the veil 
also preserves ‘order in the community by Islamist women who wilfully cover their 
sexuality’ (Göle, 1996, p. 93). The example’s equation of the veil with a sexual threat 
and protection from the male gaze therefore assigns both passive and active stances of 
the dress. The veil thus embodies both passivity and activity. It is both a passive 
reaction to the male gaze and an active sexual symbol. The examples also express a 
labelling of Muslimahs within an eroticism and licentiousness reminiscent of the 
historical orientalist and colonial meanings. Viewed as a ‘protection from the male 
gaze’, the niqab and jilbab not only establish the concept of fitna, linked with a 
woman’s entire responsibility for a man’s attraction, but also with man’s inability to 
control his desires and fantasies.  
 
                                                 
109 A similar discourse among feminists equate the hijab with hiding women’s bodies to protect them 
from the male gaze: A headscarf like any other imposed visual hijab, is supposed to protect the Muslim 
female’s body form a male gaze and hide her body to prevent men from being seduced by her sexual 
potential. (Hamzeh, 2012, p. 79)  
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Comparing the various types of Islamic dress among different generations of Moroccan 
women, an article entitled ‘Schizophrenie sous le voile’ (‘Schizophrenia under the 
Veil’) by Salaheddine Lemaizi110 notes (Lemaizi, 2009): 
 
Whilst grandmothers wore the niqab, and mothers wore the zif, their daughters 
are wearing the hijab...which is sexy. Being a sign of an asserted and 
ostentatious religiosity, it has established itself as a fashion phenomenon with 
its media mechanisms and even economic ones. But prior to this, the veil went 
through a phase imbued with ideology.  
 
In the terminology of the article from L’Observateur du Maroc, the generational 
differences between various forms of Islamic dress omits reference to the haik or 
mlehfa which many women in Morocco especially in rural areas still adopt today. 
Although Lemaizi attempts to differentiate between three generations of women in 
terms of Islamic dress, the division is nonetheless generalised, as some women today 
still wear the niqab and mlehfa (which resembles the haik in shape). The zif or derra 
which refer to a headscarf, have a more traditional connotation of a head covering 
which many Moroccan women adopt today, either to cover the whole hair and neck or 
some part of it, or to be placed on the shoulders on top of a traditional Moroccan 
jellaba. Rather than strictly denoting religiosity, the zif or derra symbolises a 
traditional type of garment which may or may not be adopted for religious reasons. 
 
Lemaizi suggests that the contemporary hijab is ostentatious and conspicuous, and 
paradoxically defines it with sexual attraction, ‘sexiness’ and an ‘asserted and 
                                                 
110Salaheddine Lemaizi is a journalist who specialises in the media coverage of political news. He is a 
part time journalist at Les Echos and l’Observateur, and is based in Casablanca and maintains a blog on 
Moroccan media: http://journalinbled.wordpress.com/ 
 https://www.facebook.com/salaheddine.lemaizi 
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ostentatious religiosity’ (Göle, 1996, pp. 4-5). In the more contemporary context, 
veiling represents an ‘active reappropriation of Islamic religiosity’ and way of life 
(Göle, 1996, pp. 4-5). Instead of expressing a passive submission to prevalent 
community norms but, it affirms an ‘active interest in Islamic scripture’, as young 
educated lower and middle-class women distinguish themselves from traditional 
uneducated women (Göle, 1996, pp. 4-5). The notion of appropriation of religiosity is 
useful in considering the association of the hijab with ‘an asserted religiosity’ in the 
text. In contrast to earlier depictions of the veil as a passive symbol, the texts of the 
press which tie the veil with fashion also inscribe it with meanings of assertion.  
 
While the earlier examples from Tel Quel and Nichan categorise the dress as the 
epitome of body denial and deprivation (niqab, jilbab, soutra), Lemaizi’s article 
positions the hijab as the embodiment of assertion and fashion. The veil is another 
means of performing Muslimness. In addition to connoting it with an ‘alleged 
religiosity’, the term ‘asserted’ conveys a strong and forceful stance associated with 
the hijab, hence to affirm one’s religiosity is also equated with force and power. Also 
important is that this assertion is also a statement about existence. This associates the 
dress with life which contrasts with death associated with it in other examples. 
‘Ostentatious’ religiosity is what also characterises the new hijab of young Moroccan 
Muslimat. In contrast to earlier veils which Lemaizi links with ‘ideology’, the more 
contemporary and trendy hijab expresses a loud and conspicuous visibility, and an 
exhibitionistic religiosity. The new hijab embodies a disturbingly visible and audible 
religiosity. Yet it is also a provocative and seductive religiosity.     
  
It is useful to consider Islamic feminist notions of Islamic dress and fashion. Towards 
the end of the 1990s, some women started adopting a new type of veil through covering 
their head and body in a seductive manner, and calling themselves ‘mutahashimat’ (the 
modest ones) (Badran, 2009, p. 83). While these women dressed in ways more 
evocative of the ‘mutabarrijat’, they acknowledged their non-adherence to the spirit 
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of the hijab (Badran, 2009, p. 83). Lower-middle class women in Cairo adopted a 
similar type of hijab, which was part of a trend increasingly influenced by the dictates 
of fashion, a trend which marked a difference from what MacLeod describes as the 
‘early extremism of the new veiling movement’ which was becoming peripheral 
(Macleod, 1991, pp. 106-107). In the Turkish context, the ‘turban movement’, which 
refers to the new ‘Islamist veiling,’ combines elements of Ottoman Turkish heritage 
and the West (Göle, 1996, p. 6). In contrast to the traditional headscarf, the turban 
marks a ‘hybrid and transgressive character’ of the Islamist veiling movement, and 
suggests instead ‘fashion and change’ and a ‘modern way of appropriation’ (Göle, 
1996, p. 6).  In her more recent study of Islam in Europe, Göle (2011, p. 95) notes how 
the contemporary Islamic dress seems to be ‘transregional’ or ‘transnational’, as the 
fabric, colour and cut are inspired by modern fashion trends, and reflecting the shape 
of the Western woman more. The allusion which L’Observateur du Maroc makes 
through its description of the hijab is one that inscribes the dress within contemporary 
meanings of fashion and change. In contrast to the fixity usually attributed to the veil 
as an epitome of tradition, this new type of veil which the weekly terms ‘ostentatious’ 
represents a ’modern’ changing element, responding to the fashion trends where the 
dress signifies fashion. 
 
The examples which I examined establish a correlation between Islamic dress in its 
different forms (hijab, niqab, jilbab) and fashion on the one hand, and with the notion 
of fitna on the other. The implication is that the dress symbolises an object of fashion 
and beauty, or an inherent sexual threat. Anyone who walks around major cities in 
Arab countries today will be exposed to a form of hijab that presents the female body 
as a sexual attraction, with younger women and teenagers being more inclined to adopt 
this type of dress. The resurgence of the hijab in Muslim countries as well as European 
and other Muslim-minority countries, has been accompanied with a fashion trend. This 
trend positions the body of the Muslimah amidst a growing market geared towards 
catering for a growing demand of the new fashionable Muslimah wear. We need to 
consider the depiction of the veil within fashion in a context of a discourse of the hijab 
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as a sexual object where the female body is perceived as sexually attractive. The 
relatively new fashionable veils strive to place the body of the Muslimah in the midst 
of the fashion market where colours, shapes and models have become more important 
than the concept of modest dress. I now turn to an examination of the veil as en 
embodiment of fashion and fitna within Maghrebi and Arab feminist debates. 
 
7.3.2. Fashionable and Fitna Veils in Feminist Debates  
 
Some Arab and Muslim feminists have similarly constructed Islamic dress as a form 
of sexual threat. After examining examples of associations of the hijab, niqab and 
jilbab with fashion and fitna in the Moroccan press, I discuss in this section some 
Maghrebi and Arab feminist texts which define the body of the Muslimah in terms of 
fitna and fashion, and the veil in relation to the woman’s body which is socio-culturally 
understood as a source of chaos in society. The consideration of such constructions 
will allow us to explore how the veil is constructed in terms which consolidate the 
Moroccan publications.    
 
In the context of associating Islamic dress with a sexual phenomenon, Moroccan 
feminist Fatima Sadiqi links it with fashion. She notes that this dress has been 
witnessing renewal and modernisation, with designer houses specialising in 
‘muhajjabat dress’, and fashion shows specific to this type of clothing (Sadiqi, 1998, 
p. 33). This is in addition to the different forms and colours of veils, which are 
sometimes bright and ‘may be more attractive to the eyes’, and the use of ‘accessories 
and make-up’ just like unveiled women (Sadiqi, 1998, p. 33). Similarly, Egyptian 
feminist Nawal El Saadaoui notes the increase in veiling as a fashion phenomenon. 
She states that the dress has become a modern veil in the form of a ‘scarf covering the 
hair, accompanied with kohl, lipstick, blush, tight American jeans and sharp elevated 
high heels’ (Saadawi, 2000, p. 127). She links the phenomenon with the ‘advent of 
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democratic winds, the free market and privatisation, and the entrance of Egypt in the 
new modern era’ (Saadawi, 2000, p. 127). . In her more recent study of modest fashion, 
Reina Lewis notes how the spreading of ‘fashionabe modesty’ has been increased by 
the internet and information communication technologies (Lewis, 2013, p. 2). Such 
studies on the veil emphasise its symbolism as a fashion phenomenon. The veil in these 
terms becomes appropriated by young Muslimat as a fashion statement. Sadiqi’s idea 
of the new veils as being ‘more attractive to the eye’ echoes earlier press examples 
about the veil as a symbol of sexual attraction and seduction. The veil therefore also 
epitomises fashion and attraction. Both Saadawi and Sadiqi tie the new fashion veils 
with modernisation which Muslim countries have witnessed during the past few 
decades. Saadawi further links them with ‘new democratic winds, free market and 
privatisation’. The new fashion attraction veils can also be democratic, and become 
part of a market. This is also part of the commodification of Islamic dress.  
 
The modern trend of fashionable types of Islamic dress with designer houses and 
fashion shows may have been more widespread in some Middle Eastern countries such 
as Egypt, but Islamic fashion has become a globalised phenomenon enjoying 
popularity in many Muslim-majority countries including Morocco, as well as Muslim-
minority places in Europe and elsewhere. These new styles of veiling and clothing have 
constituted a shift in the meanings of Islamic dress. However, the Qur’an enjoins 
women not to use make-up and ornaments, and insists that women’s garments should 
be devoid of exhibitionism (tabarruj), which requires that they cover all parts of their 
body except the hands and face (Saadawi, 2010, p. 85). The association of Islamic dress 
with fashion places it within a paradigm in which the veiled body of the Muslimah is 
paradoxically Islamic and Western, modern and traditional. The link between Islamic 
dress and fashion emphasises the concept of the body amidst changing styles and a 
vision of the dress as an object of fashion. Yet, as Reina Lewis argues, the manners in 
which ‘self-presentation is achieved are myriad and so are the reasons that motivate it’ 
(Lewis, 2013, p.3). Indeed, as Lewis notes ‘modest dress can mean different things for 
different women and can change meanings over the course of their lives’ (Lewis, 2013, 
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p.3). The tendency to reduce modest dress to fixed and unchanging meanings therefore 
risks not only homogenising the dress or reducing it to particular categories, but also 
subsuming women’s experiences of modest dress and, to use Reina lewis’s term, 
‘modest fashion’ into a single and monolithic view.    
 
Other Maghrebi and Arab feminists construct the veil from the perspective of the 
female body as forbidden or shameful. Nouzha Lamrani (1994), for instance, argues 
that a woman in the street is considered a ‘provocation’ and even an ‘offense’ not only 
in rural areas, but also among urban populations. Because the woman is viewed as a 
sexual object, she is constantly harassed and sometimes subject to aggression or by the 
male gaze in the public spaces (Lamrani, 1994, p. 22). By contrast, Tunisian feminist 
Raja Benslama (2005, p. 53) states that the contemporary hijab presents a gender 
marker (wasm jandari) more than an ideological one, and an attempt to remove the 
concept of desire from public space. She also argues that women today have gone out 
of their hijab (as the traditional space separation between men and women) without 
changing the relationship structure at the core of family life (Bensalama, 2005, p. 53). 
Nor has the physical hijab, which considers woman as ‘awra and a forbidden body, 
disappeared (Bensalama, 2005, p. 53). The concept of a woman as ‘awra, which refers 
to a woman’s body only in sexual terms, is nonetheless a notion which predates Islam. 
In Arab countries, women were considered as bodies or ‘awra that have to be buried 
alive and disposed of before Islam (Haikal, 2006, p. 20). Benslama provides a double 
depiction of the hijab as an attempt to remove the notion of desire from the public 
realm (in line with the ‘desexualisaiton’ noted earlier), and as a symbol emphasising 
the concept of woman as ‘awra on the other (sexualisation of the woman’s body).The 
definition of Islamic dress in relation to the female body as ‘awra limits the female 
body to sexuality, and instils a similar discourse to the patriarchal one which it attempts 
to challenge. The notion of ‘awra as it is used in the sense of woman’s body as 
forbidden and sexual, moreover, does not find support in Qur’an.  
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The link some Maghrebi and Arab feminists establish between Islamic dress and the 
concept of ‘awra reduces woman to a body rather than a person possessing full 
intellectual abilities. However, as I noted, Islamic dress is a requirement for both 
women and men in Islam. In addition to this, the Qur’an refers to women as persons 
equal to men in creation, mental ability as well as rights and responsibilities.111 
Traditional societies have divided the world into two spaces, which expressed a vision 
of the woman reducing her to a body carrying desire, hence the necessity of 
‘constraining and confining her behind walls’ (Azrwil, 1990, pp. 54-55). This 
separation has contributed to dividing spaces into a male space where freedom of 
movement is given, and a female space which restricts women to particular 
responsibilities and detaches them from the world at large (Azrwil, 1990, pp. 54-55). 
The division of space, however, is linked to a historical concept of separation between 
the sexes which predates the advent of Islam. This vision also contrasts with the 
participation of women and their involvement in numerous activities outside their 
private spaces and families. Equally important is the fact that responsibilities in the 
private space are not regarded as an obligation for women within Islam. The cultural 
belief that housework is restricted to women for instance and that it is included within 
their religious obligations does not have a basis in Islam. Let us now explore the last 
cluster of associations which include attaching Islamic dress to notions of honour, 
shame and sexual purity, which figure among the ones the Moroccan publications 
associate with Islamic dress in its various forms. As with associations of the veil with 
fashion and fitna, I am grouping the notions of honour, shame and sexual purity 
together since these tend to be constructed differently from the ones I grouped under 
the sexual realm. They also pertain more to the ethical and sociocultural realm as my 
analysis will illustrate. 
 
 
                                                 
111 See Amina Wadud (2006), Asma Barlas (2002), and Baraganzi (2004) 
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7.3.3. Veils of Honour and Shame 
 
In this last section I discuss examples of socio-cultural associations of Islamic dress 
with honour, shame and sexual purity. The themes in this section complicate the earlier 
associations of fitna and ‘awra, and link the veil with both oppression and threat. The 
meanings of the veil in such terms also complicate earlier associations of the dress with 
such meanings as oppression, inferiority and lack of freedom and emancipation. In the 
article entitled ‘In the Skin of a Crow’ (Dans la peau d’un corbeau), Chadwane 
Bensalmia adopts the full-face veil (soutra) is reported to have said (Bensalmia, 2004): 
 
‘I want to protect the honour of my husband. He is my man’, H. insisted H. (to 
be understood as ‘my Lord’), as this is exactly what these women signify 
through such an affirmation. They have chosen to forsake all forms of active 
social life within society, and to live doubly imprisoned, first by their items of 
dress, and second by the philosophy that dictates wearing it. All of this is to 
blindly obey a doctrine which insists on them considering their body as a heavy 
and dishonourable burden to their men. These women have also abandoned 
their right to question the logical foundation for this prescription.    
 
Chadwane Bensalmia defines the meaning of the soutra through her understanding of 
the woman’s statement. When the unnamed woman expresses her wish to ‘protect the 
honour of [her] husband’, the image is that of a woman protecting the dignity and 
respect of her husband. The example attaches the soutra with protecting male honour 
and withdrawal from social life and a double imprisonment inside the veil and the 
philosophy dictating it. In addition to implying a moral code, the term honour connotes 
obedience. The soutra here becomes a symbol of loyalty and allegiance to the husband. 
At another level, the allusion to honour evokes the status of male superiority (her 
husband), a rank which positions the soutra as a signifier of female inferiority. In order 
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to emphasise the association of the dress with male authority and superiority, 
Bensalmia explains the woman’s calling her husband ‘my man’ as meaning ‘my lord’. 
The term further stresses the image of the soutra as a symbol of female inferiority. The 
reference to the husband as ‘lord’ also implies his position as a commander and ruler, 
which contrasts him with the servant/follower status of the woman in the soutra. It also 
implies the eminence and greatness attached to the term lord, and to the husband in a 
more implicit manner.  
 
Bensalmia elaborates on what the soutra signifies: forsaking all forms of active social 
life and double imprisonment. On the one hand, the term ‘forsaking’ indicates the 
action of abandoning, and turning one’s back on something, in this case ‘an active 
social life’. The soutra therefore embodies a movement, a ‘turning back’ and turning 
one’s back. This suggests the idea of renouncement often evoked in the weeklies in 
relation to Islamic dress. On the other hand, forsaking also implies betraying or 
deceiving, hence being disloyal. The dress in this sense symbolises both loyalty to the 
husband, and disloyalty to an ideal active social life and presence in the public realm. 
It denotes the action of deviating from the normal or expected (which is forsaking the 
dress for an active and free social life). The soutra is therefore marked as an abnormal 
deviation. It expresses a social withdrawal, a turning one’s back on. The idea of double 
imprisonment of women, (both physically because of the dress and psychologically 
because of what is referred to as the ‘philosophy’ of the soutra) deprives these women 
of any will and agency. Although it is stated that they ‘choose’ to forsake social life 
for confinement, Bensalmia assumes that they do so ‘blindly’, following a doctrine that 
considers their bodies as ‘heavy weights’ on their husbands. 
 
Bensalmia’s statement includes other connotations. The image is also that of a woman 
who ‘blindly obeys’ the doctrine that commands wearing it. The veil is again dark. 
Moreover, it represents a ‘heavy burden’ and an excessive weight on man, as well as a 
‘dishonourable’, hence shameful and deceitful burden. It is noteworthy that the title of 
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the article ‘In the Skin of a Crow’ suggests blackness, darkness and bad luck implicitly 
inspired by the dress which usually includes a black cloak combined with a niqab and 
soutra. In addition to the image of darkness which resounds with orientalist and 
colonial tropes, the crow itself epitomises bad luck, hence ties the dress with bad 
fortune. The ‘doctrine of the veil’ is linked with viewing the female body as a ‘heavy 
and dishonourable burden to man’. The title of the article also refers to Bensalmia 
donning the niqab in order to spend a day with women who wear the niqab and soutra. 
At the end of the article she writes: ‘These women in Black’. The references to black 
and crow are metaphors for the niqab/soutra. We can see how the association of the 
veil with the concept of honour triggers a cluster of other meanings through which the 
veil embodies further constructions of the dress with dis/loyalty, anomaly and 
backwardness. 
 
Such statements as we find in Tel Quel from Bensalmia implicitly affiliate the veil 
(soutra/niqab) with male honour, which is generalised to all women wearing it (‘this 
is exactly what these women signify’). The garment itself embodies honour and its 
preservation. The definition of Islamic clothing as symbolic of male honour derives 
from a socio-cultural view of the woman’s body as an object of shame rather than a 
religious one. In addition to this, the value of dignity (‘ird) in popular belief is the axis 
on which the whole family’s reputation (sharaf) is based (Azrwil, 1990, p. 180). Since 
antiquity, Arab societies have cultivated a type of patriarchal family whose 
characteristics included the concept of honour (also called nif in Maghrebi culture), the 
reputation of wives (‘ird), their moral and psychological chastity (‘iffa), and, most 
importantly, their premarital virginity (bikr) (Chebel, 2003, p. 235). Arab societies are 
dominated by a patriarchal ideological framework characterised by the power of family 
and the state, as well as the eminence of one sex over another and the monitoring of 
women, and their honour (Bataina, 2004, p. 96). The veil in such a view has been used 
within a patriarchal framework in order to isolate women from conspicuousness and 
from the outside world under the pretext of safeguarding honour (Naamane-Guessous, 
1988, p. 96). Dignity and honour (‘ird and sharaf), albeit to varying degrees depending 
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on regions and social categories, continue to legitimate social relationships and 
individual forms of behaviour, and whereas a woman’s honour is closely linked to 
shame (being timid, reserved and acknowledging her inferiority and dependence vis-
à-vis men), a man’s honour is linked to others, to courage, initiative and strength of 
character (Harras, 2000, p. 45). These different studies by Maghrebi and Arab 
feminists demonstrate how the notion of honour is closely linked with a patriarchal 
vision of woman. 
 
We can read Tel Quel’s tying the soutra with male honour as part of a discourse which 
imposes a socio-cultural reading on the dress. In her compelling anthropological study 
of the veil, Fadwa El Guindi (1999, p. 79) argues that the paradigm honour-shame 
(public/private) is the one most frequently enforced on Arab and Islamic cultural space 
in order to describe the separation between the sexes. It has been argued that this 
paradigm is more appropriate to describe European Mediterranean and Balkan culture 
(El Guindi, 1999, p. 79). It is therefore interesting to consider how a notion which 
belongs more to a European Mediterranean framework, and which links the dress to 
male honour, is applied on the soutra in Morocco. The statement of the woman herself 
and Bensalmia’s comment link the soutra with preserving the reputation of the 
husband. It correlates with a vision of the woman’s body as an object of shame which 
needs to be hidden for male honour. Such a vision does not have a basis in the Qur’an.  
 
The notions of honour and shame which are associated with the soutra can be added 
to the concepts of chastity and sexual purity which are in turn constructed as inherent 
to Islamic dress. The Moroccan publications contain instances of how the veil becomes 
an embodiment of these notions. I am ending this chapter with the article which I first 
began with, which proposes an answer to the question ‘Why is the Hijab gaining 
ground?’, and in which Driss Bennani proposes another answer (Bennani, 2002): 
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...And even when they do not always acknowledge it, wearing the hijab has a 
close relationship with the look of the patriarchal society which wants women 
to be ‘pure’ and ‘untouched’. But as soon as marriage is consummated, the 
question takes another dimension. The woman lives in the pace of her social 
integration, and from the age of forty, the phenomenon of the veil acquires 
another meaning.  
 
The article here admits with certainty that the hijab signifies sexual purity in a 
patriarchal framework. It thus purports to disclose information about the ‘truth’ of the 
dress. Islamic dress can both reveal and conceal, it can both make known and unknown. 
The veil can also reveal its own meanings. The reference to the hijab and its 
‘relationship with the ‘look of patriarchal society’ resounds with the link between the 
dress and the patriarchal gaze. The term suggests an affiliation and interconnection 
between the hijab and the ‘look’, which emphasises the visibility of the veil and its 
conspicuousness. The allusion to women being ‘pure and untouched’ refers to virginity 
which is considered as a pre-requisite for sexual purity. The article states that the 
meaning of the veil changes according to whether a woman is unmarried or married. 
Tel Quel further advances that the veil changes in symbolism after marriage and after 
the woman reaches forty. It nonetheless does not detail these different meanings. The 
article’s section entitled ‘the veil of menopause’ claims that Islamic dress changes from 
a symbol of purity and chastity to one of social status. Ironically women of menopause 
age and beyond are not requested to cover in the same way as younger women. They 
can in fact lay aside their ‘outer garments’, as the Qur’an enjoins them to do. 
 
Let us consider the example through some feminist debates on the notions of sexual 
purity. Islamic dress, which is also referred to as the ‘dress of piety’, is linked in the 
Qur’an to the concepts of purity and chastity or virginity (Naqa’e, ‘afaaf) when it is 
mentioned within verses related to Mary the Virgin (Maryam al ‘adraa). In relation to 
modest Islamic dress, in the Qur’an, there is no correlation between purity and 
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donningmodest dress. In her study of the veil in social space, Fadwa el Guindi (1999, 
p. 113) states that, in comparison with other cultures, purity and impurity are not part 
of characterisations in Islam in relation to either gender, which instead considers bodies 
of men and women as temporarily being in ‘states of purity or impurity’, states which 
end with washing rituals. However, in Moroccan society, the hijab has been considered 
as symbolic of chastity. A number of Moroccan men prefer to get married to women 
already adopting the hijab, which they consider as a proof for chastity. Therefore the 
references to purity and virginity are linked to a cultural view of the hijab rather than 
a religious one. The view partly originates from the parallel drawn between virginity 
and piety which is linked to the image of Mary. In Islamic practice, however, premarital 
sexual abstinence is required for both men and women. The importance of the concepts 
of reputation and honour (‘ird and sharaf) is most demonstrated by the importance 
attached to virginity in young women, and the fact that the hymen is considered as the 
only proof of chastity (‘iffa’), and the protection of dignity (‘ird) (Assa'ati, 2000, p. 
186). Traditionally, men have believed in Arab countries that woman is a shame, and 
that her dignity is linked with her body and virginity (Haikal, 2006, p. 4). The example 
from Tel Quel reiterates a similar association of the veil with virginity and sexual 
purity. The veil in these terms signifies virginity. In Islamic practice, and contrary to 
cultural belief and practice, neither virginity nor sexual abstinence is limited to women, 
nor is Islamic dress a pre-requisite for sexual abstinence. They are practices which 
include both.  
 
In relation to the construction of Islamic dress in terms of shame, Tel Quel’s article 
entitled ‘No, Man is not a Primitive Animal’, Maria Daif poses the following question 
(Daif, 2002): 
 
Could man be a primitive animal? Yes, but in such a case, neither I nor other 
women have to suffer the consequences of this. I am of the opinion that I do 
not have an obligation to hide my body, to deny it. I reckon I do not have to be 
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ashamed of it. I am undoubtedly ashamed of these men who imprison us and 
imprison our bodies, who deny us all desires, all sexual feelings – as if we 
apparently do not react to their uncovered bodies. Yes, I am ashamed of these 
men who are essentially afraid of us.  
 
Maria Daif starts with the question: could man be a primitive animal? The question 
hints not only to a prehistoric state, but also to the notion of barbarism evoked in other 
examples of the publications in relation to Islamic dress: unevolved and 
underdeveloped or prehistoric condition. Similarly to earlier examples, Islamic dress 
is equated with body denial and with ‘hiding the body’. This evokes not only the act of 
concealing and making unseen and non-visible, but also masking and obscuring, and 
to the idea of the veil as a camouflage and disguise. The veil is again dark and 
deceptive. Daif additionally refers to shame in relation to the dress, which suggests the 
perception of the female body as an object of shame to be hidden. This shame linked 
with the female body is reversed by the journalist’s feeling ‘ashamed’ of men who 
‘imprison our bodies’. The veil therefore is both an object of shame and embodies 
shame (Abu-Lughod, 1986, p. 108). These men are the ones to blame for denying 
women ‘all desires and sexual feelings’. Daif declares that the niqab, jilbab and soutra 
are forms of imprisonment and shame, linking body denial and shame to the veil. 
 
Maria Daif’s vision, however, accords more with a cultural conception of the veil 
rather than a religious one. An example of such a vision can be seen in Awlad Ali’s 
conception of the veil as an item hiding sexuality and sexual shame. In Abu-Lughod’s 
study of Awlad Ali’s tribe, she states how aspects of sexuality and sexual behaviour 
are codified as threatening, and provide a negative view of sexuality (Abu-Lughod, 
1986, p. 145). Abu-Lughod states that the origin of the force and persistence of such 
an attitude lies in tribal socio-cultural model rather than in Islamic ideology (Abu-
Lughod, 1986, p. 145). The notions of shame in relation to the female body and the 
veil do not find proof in the Qur’an. In the ayas about modesty in dress which point to 
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khimar and jilbab, no reference is made of the veil as an element hiding shame. Nor is 
the Muslimah’s body mentioned in relation to an object of shame.  
 
It is interesting to consider the associations of Islamic dress with honour, virginity and 
shame in comparison with the Arab/Muslim feminist discourse about the woman and 
body exposure. Some Muslim feminists who consider veiling as a negation of the 
female body (body denial) and the epitome of woman’s oppressive patriarchy, also 
deem body exposure, or the display of woman’s body in public space, as a form of 
liberation, as we have seen in examples in the earlier section. Other feminists, however, 
argue that veiling is part of a strategy to place woman within public space as a person 
rather than as a ‘female body’, or in Göle’s terms ‘personality rather than femininity’. 
The veil can therefore also symbolise an emphasis on women as persons rather than 
bodies in public space. Modest dress is supposed to encourage respect and esteem in 
both men and women.  
 
In Moroccan culture, as well as in many other patriarchal cultures, the body of the 
woman is encompassed by many taboos (virginity, chastity and shame). While 
virginity remains a requirement for both men and women before marriage in Islam, 
young women can endure considerable psychological pressures to ‘preserve’ it as 
opposed to men. It is worth noting that the patriarchal cultural vision of woman’s body 
as an object of shame increases pressure on women in relation to the notion of honour. 
What is referred to as ‘honour crimes’ is a case in point. In her study of sexuality in 
Morocco, Soumia Naamane-Guessous notes that during puberty, Moroccan 
adolescents are often confronted with a culture that silences them, emphasises the 
forbidden, and the concept of shame, coupled with a negation of the body and a refusal 
to speak about it (Naamane-Guessous, 1988, pp. 87-88). An example of the 
predominance of the concept of shame within Moroccan culture is the silence around 
menstruations, namely the inability to broach the subject with fathers or other male 
members of the close family (Naamane-Guessous, 1988, pp. 87-88). The culture of 
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silence and shame does not have a basis in Islam where the expression ‘la haya’a fi 
deen’ means there is no shame in religion, and no restrictions on discussing issues 
including ones pertaining to sexuality. These various studies illustrate how notions 
such as shame and honour are more in accordance with socio-cultural norms than to 
religious practice. 
 
Concerning bodily acts like wearing the veil and conducting oneself modestly in 
interactions with people and especially men, Mahmood (2004, p. 158) argues that these 
bodily acts constitute ‘critical markers’ and ‘ineluctable means by which one trains 
oneself to be pious’. (being and becoming) ‘While wearing the veil serves at first as a 
means to tutor oneself in the attribute of shyness, it is also simultaneously integral to 
the practice of shyness: one cannot simply discard the veil once a modest deportment 
has been acquired, because the veil is part of what defines that deportment (ie 
behaviour) (Mahmood, 2004, p. 158). Mahmood (2004, p. 158) argues that the 
importance of this aspect is left out of consideration when the veil is grasped only in 
relation to its symbolism as a sign of women’s submission or Islamic identity.  
 
In this chapter, I analysed how different types of Islamic dress (exemplified by hijab, 
niqab, soutra and jilbab) become associated with meanings which I have identified as 
and categorised under political, sexual and socio-cultural themes. I have demonstrated 
how Islamic dress is tied not only with Islamism, extremism and the politicisation of 
Islamic dress in the Moroccan political and social lives, but also how these notions in 
turn construct the veil in terms of a difference. This difference is expressed through 
generating a chain of definitions and references of the dress in terms of and Islamist 
and extremist invasion, contamination, marketing, commodification, propaganda on 
the one hand. On the other hand, the inscription of the veil as an Islamist threat defines 
the dress through meanings of backwardness, autocracy, anti-modernity, propaganda, 
regression, darkness and barbarism. (camouflage, mask, ostentatiousness) Islamic 
dress has additionally been repeatedly marked as a symbol against emancipation and 
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freedom, hence a sign of submission and inferiority. Yet it has also been defined as the 
embodiment of deception, dishonesty, deceit, death and deprivation. Portrayed as an 
outsider and strange presence in the Moroccan political and social realms, Islamic attire 
has additionally been tied with body denial, renouncement, anomaly, as well as 
violence, tenacity and coercion. (mask, masquerade, ostentatiousness, visible 
disturbance). In the last section I explored how Islamic dress becomes tied with 
concepts of fashion, fitna. 
 
My analysis has also illustrated how the definitions of the veil in these terms have in 
turn sparked more implicit associations of the dress with exhibitionism, display, 
fantasy, eroticism and lasciviousness on the one hand, and darkness, sadness. Other 
meanings of the veil include fitna, indecency, dishonour, immorality, commodification 
and barbarism. The associations of the veil with notions of honour, shame and sexual 
purity have in turn included references to the veil in terms of withdrawal, 
renouncement, anomaly, deviation, darkness, barbarism.  (mask, disguise, 
camouflage,ostentatiousness/invisibility). Many Maghrebi and Arab feminist debates 
have tended to consolidate definitions of Islamic dress from the Moroccan press.  
 
What the themes have in common is the repeated inscription of Islamic dress with the 
notions of camouflage, disguise and masking on the one hand, and with 
ostentatiousness and disturbing visibility on the other. Associations of the veil 
therefore also construct the dress within an affective, ethical and a more tacit cultural 
otherness in Morocco. Such depictions reproduce traditional dichotomies of the veil 
which I have examined in earlier chapters. However, they also establish the difference 
of the veil in terms of an emotional, ethical and cultural otherness. These meanings 
complicate the continuities and discontinuities of a colonial/orientalist discourse of the 
veil in contemporary print media, as the re-production of a secular neo-colonial and 
orientalist discourse in a postcolonial Muslim context introduces differences in the 
otherness of the veil. 
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 Conclusion  
 
What have we learned from a study of Islamic dress such as mine? This project has 
proposed a close and critical textual reading of the veil across different historical and 
geographical dimensions, and offered an Islamic postcolonial reading of contemporary 
constructions of Islamic dress, and the broader category of the Muslimah, in the 
Moroccan and French print media and politics. In the thesis I have shown how the veil 
is simultaneously a mobile sign, one that moves across time and space, but how the 
veil in moving is also fixing or stabilising. Indeed I have shown how the veil, in moving 
from Orientalist and Nahda times and spaces to postcolonial Moroccan and French 
press and politics maintains a remarkably consistent range of meanings and values. As 
Heidi Safia Mirza (Mirza, 2013)  argues, Muslim women’s dress has turned into being 
‘interchangeable with essentialist notions of ethnicity, traditionalism and religion’.  My 
study has also investigated and expanded on some of these essentialist notions. In this 
conclusion, I first return to some of my major arguments. Secondly, I reflect on the 
implications of my study for Islamic and Muslim feminism today, and on how my 
study of Islamic dress has contributed to developing my own understanding of Islamic 
and Muslim feminism. And finally, I discuss potential future directions of research on 
the veil.   
 
Veil Comparisons  
To what extent can we learn from comparison? A comparative study of Islamic dress 
allows for a broader consideration of the dress, and its discourses across different 
parameters. My particular study focused on different time frames (Orientalist, colonial, 
Nahda, postcolonial) and spaces (Morocco, France, Egypt). It highlighted patterns of 
various constructions of the veil through these various times and spaces. The 
comparative aspect is also a technique for tracing the various discourses which retain 
the essentialisation and othering of Islamic dress in different times, spaces, in both 
Muslim-majority and Muslim-minority contexts. Additionally, comparisons allow us 
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to examine how historical and present, Orientalist, colonial and postcolonial 
associations of the veil relate to one another, how they move yet remain fixed. In the 
present section, I am pointing to some of the differences in veil constructions, bearing 
in mind that the texts on the veil are more nuanced, and that they often carry more 
subtle differences in meanings of the veil.  
 
In the chapters focusing on Orientalist and Nahda texts, I explored how the veil 
becomes associated with unhappiness, enslavement, imprisonment, exoticism, 
ignorance and backwardness, and darkness and enlightenment. While the Nahda texts 
I examined tended to preserve many of these veil associations, they used them to create 
a more complex picture, hence both retaining and expanding the meanings of Islamic 
dress. These Nahda texts, therefore, maintain many of the Orientalist tropes, whilst 
broadening their scope. Orientalist and Nahda texts not only depict material veils 
(bodily face-veil), but also employ the language of the veil to describe space (harem, 
imprisonment) as well as time (backward, primitive). 
 
The Nahda texts which I analysed further expand the Orientalist language of ethics in 
relation to the veil such as the one on happiness to include a discourse about the family 
and Muslim society on the one hand, and the global Muslim Ummah on the other. 
These Nahda writings emphasise a transnational pan-Islamic, pan-Arab vision of the 
veil, and a more global ethical and affective discourse (happiness, death, global 
Ummah). The veil marks and is marked by an ‘other’ time, space, code of conduct and 
emotions. However, it also embodies an ‘other’ time and space through its different 
associations. The veil thus is both a movement and a fixed object.  
 
The comparison of French and Moroccan texts has additionally elucidated how some 
the veiled Muslimah is constructed in both Muslim-majority and Muslim-minority 
contexts in print media and politics. My study has shown how the hijab of the young 
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French Muslimah is not only marked as an essential threat to the French nation 
(Islamist, fundamentalist, extremist, fanatic and violent), but is further defined, in a 
more tacit manner, as belonging to another race, religion and cultural origin 
(Arab/Maghrebi/Muslim). This adds a racial difference to the political one, hence 
simultaneously racialising, culturalising and politicising the French Muslimah’s hijab. 
I have also examined how the French press and politics similarly codify the hijab, 
through sexual terms, with a racial and cultural otherness as the dress embodies an 
essential racial, religious and cultural background, and is fixed as a religious-bound 
and violent emblem. The dress in these terms confines the body of the French 
Muslimah to the boundaries of a patriarchal cultural and religious tradition.  
 
We have also seen how the hijab, in the French press and political texts, is scripted in 
terms of an-other time through being contrasted with and constructed against 
secularism, modernity and progress, and space through being tied with the Maghreb 
and the ‘Muslim world’. In relation to time and space, I have examined how the studied 
texts mark the hijab of the French Muslimah not only with a sexual difference from the 
normative secular body (symbolising such notions as inequality, oppression and 
stigma), but also a temporal, spatial and affective difference through embodying such 
meanings as backwardness and constraining young Muslimat’s bodies. At another 
level, the French press and political texts under study equate the hijab with propaganda, 
proselytising, violence and a messianic stance. I have thus discussed instances of how 
the dress was constructed as a threat to the French public space andcommunity of 
citizens, and an intrusion against the national borders of France, as well as a movement 
from the margin to the centre. The hijab is hence marked as having no history, and as 
being absent from the French history and time. De-historicising the French Muslimah 
operates through the veil.  
 
My study has also explored how the veil is used to establish norms or ideals of conduct, 
which we can describe as an ethical realm. The hijab is here associated with meanings 
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such as impurity, immodesty, stigma and violence, which in turn become tools for 
codifying the dress with an ethical otherness in relation to an implicit normative secular 
subject. The hijab is further associated in the texts with different emotions, such as 
fear, which helps to script the dress as dangerous and even deadly. It becomes an 
embodiment of death, opposition, conflict, and disruption of national harmony. At the 
ethical level, the construction of the hijab includes its symbolism as a moral and visual 
trespassing of boundaries by French Muslimat. It embodies another form of 
disobedience to the laws and values of the Republic. The hijab is therefore figured as 
an intrusion and invasion in the body of the French nation, signifying a religious and 
cultural otherness that cannot be accommodated.  
 
The French media and political texts I examined also construct the hijab of the French 
Muslimah as a communal and religious threat, and as an embodiment of communalism, 
barbarism, backwardness and violence. The hijab through these meanings figures as a 
marker of an essential racial, cultural otherness (Maghrebi/Arab/immigrant), as well 
as religious otherness (Islamic), and is tacitly contrasted with the secular norm and the 
French community of citizens. The hijab defines second and third-generation French 
Muslimat as belonging to a different community (previously colonised/immigrant) 
situated outside the bounds of the French nation. The hijab hence signifies a religious 
and communal object belonging to a race, culture, and religion situated outside the 
bounds of France.  
 
Islamic dress in its different forms in the Moroccan press examples is remarkably 
loaded with meanings, many of which resonate with the French media and political 
meanings of the veil. I have illustrated how the publications under study portray the 
dress as a threat to the Moroccan political and social realms. The symbolism of the veil 
through meanings such as Islamism, extremism and fundamentalism is moreover made 
more complex and nuanced with more implicit references to its otherness. I have 
examined how the French print media and politics emphasise time, space, racial and 
319 of 347 
 
and ethical realms in their portrayals of the hijab. By contrast the Moroccan press 
positions the difference of Islamic dress in terms of space (an invasion and 
contamination of the political and social realms), at the level of time (regression, 
backwardness and darkness), and in relation to codes of conduct 
(commodification/marketing, propaganda), and in terms of vision (ostentatiousness, 
camouflage). In addition to the salience of an emotional language through these various 
notions attached to Islamic dress, the Moroccan texts I examined often tend to 
substitute the French focus on racial otherness with a higher emphasis on the 
visual/visible difference of the veil. This shows how Islamic dress is constructed as a 
threat in a Muslim-majority context.  
 
My study has additionally demonstrated how the Moroccan texts conflate Islamic dress 
with a sexual difference which obliquely constructs it in opposite terms to a visible 
secular liberal normative body. The otherness of the hijab, niqab, jilbab and soutra is 
expressed here in terms of time (freedom and emancipation), space (enslavement, 
confinement), status (inferiority, submission) and embodiment (body denial, violence). 
Yet, as I illustrated, the Moroccan texts also show instances of more contradictory 
meanings such as equating the veil with oppression and feminism. The portrayal of 
different forms of Islamic dress in the Moroccan weeklies in terms of a sexual 
otherness (also defined as a spatial and temporal difference) reveals how various 
associations can be complicated with their embedding other ethical and emotional 
meanings (such as deceit, masquerade, anomaly, and death). These meanings within 
their contexts in turn allude to the visual and visible disturbance of the dress in the 
Moroccan context. At another level, these associations indicate affective meanings 
such as renouncement, control, pride, tenacity and violence. These further inferences 
complicate the construction of sexual veils through introducing affective qualities to 
the dress. 
 
My study of the Moroccan press has lastly illustrated how Islamic dress (hijab, niqab, 
jilbab, soutra) becomes tied with fashion and fitna. The definition of Islamic dress in 
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these terms has in turn generated a more implicit chain of meanings embedding the 
dress with a difference defined in relation to vision (ostentatiousness, display, 
exhibitionism), ethics (fitna, commodification, immorality, dishonour, mask, 
disguise), time (barbarism, darkness) and affect (anomaly, darkness, sadness). The 
associations of the veil with notions such as honour, shame and sexual purity have in 
turn triggered references to the veil in terms of space (withdrawal, renouncement, 
deviation), time (barbarism, darkness), ethics (anomaly, mask, disguise), and vision 
(ostentatiousnes, invisibility). Maghrebi and Arab feminist debates have tended to 
consolidate definitions of Islamic dress in the Moroccan press. As I mentioned earlier, 
I have attempted to highlight some of the most significant differences among the 
different associations of the veil. My analysis, however, does not claim to be 
comprehensive, and it is equally important to acknowledge that, although I have drawn 
out some differences from my particular study, the picture of the veil is also more 
nuanced and its meanings more complex and ambivalent.  
 
Implications of Study 
What is the significance of a comparative study of Islamic dress in the media? And 
what are some of the implications of my research and the importance of such a study 
for Islamic/Muslim postcolonial feminism in the contemporary times? Before 
considering this question, I first turn to Heidi Safia Mirza’s (2009) notion of ‘embodied 
intersectionality’ to reflect on how my research has enabled me to develop my own 
understanding of the veil through Muslim and Islamic postcolonial feminism.  
 
In their study of the gendered and social construction of Muslim women in schools, 
Heidi Safia Mirza and Veena Meetoo use the concept of intersectionality which refers 
to ‘the interaction between gender, race and other categories of difference in individual 
lives, social practices, institutional arrangements, and cultural ideologies, and the 
outcomes of these interactions in terms of power’. (Davis quoted in (Mirza & Meetoo, 
2013, p. 130))  The epistemological concept of intersectionality represents a useful tool 
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to think about my particular study of the veil, as it allows for considering Islamic dress 
(and the category of the Muslimah) through the ‘interaction’ of diverse categories of 
difference such as race, gender, sexuality, religion, ethnicity and class. An analysis of 
the veil in media and politics necessitates investigating how various intersecting 
dimensions continuously construct the dress past and present. Indeed, as my study of 
Islamic dress has illustrated, the construction of the veil, as demonstrated through texts 
across time and space, depends upon the ‘intersection’ of different categories such as 
politics, sex, race and ethics as the Muslimah’s body is scripted in terms of a multi-
dimensional and ‘intersectional’ otherness. The body of the Muslimah muhajjabah, 
munaqqaba or mujalbaba, is similarly written through powerful media and political 
discourses which continually construct her in essentialist terms. 
 
The construction of the veil which comes under the examined political, sexual, ethical 
and socio-cultural realms illustrates the extent to which the veiled Muslimah figures as 
an object of discourses which have not only ‘politicised’, ‘sexualised’ and ‘racialised’, 
but also ‘ethnicised’ and even ‘culturalised’ her. The media and politics play a crucial 
role in these processes, not only in Muslim-minority, but also in Muslim-majority 
contexts. The gender difference symbolised by the veil (as a gendered sign) is therefore 
complicated and run through by other categories of difference which contribute to 
retaining the position of the veiled Muslimah as a political, sexual, racial, ethnic, 
religious and cultural threat.     
 
Moreover, theorising the veil at the intersection of these dimensions opens up the 
possibility of considering the dress not only at the level of media and political 
discourses, which exercise power through constructing the veil, but also within the 
framework of ‘how [intersectionality] is experienced at the micro level of young 
women’s lives’ (Mirza & Meetoo, 2013, p. 129). As a Muslimah muhajjaba living in 
the West, I am also affected by these constructions through embodying the material 
veil in the shape of a hijab. My politics of location, which I detailed in my introduction, 
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is hence complicated by my location at the intersection of gender, sexuality, race, 
ethnicity, class and religion which all interact in defining me as a Muslimah muhajjaba. 
As my study of the veil has demonstrated, reading the veil through texts also constitutes 
a step towards resisting such discourses. 
 
A consideration of intersectionality in the context of constructions of the veil in 
contemporary media and politics additionally draws our attention to how power 
traverses the relations among categories such as race, gender, sexuality and ethics. Yet, 
recognising the significance of this power in terms of building and maintaining 
discourses of fear and threat around such figures as the veiled Muslimah should not 
overlook the importance of Muslimat’s agency in resisting and countering these 
structures of power. In her article about Muslim women in Britain and their narratives 
of identity and belonging, Heidi Safia Mirza (2013) argues that the concept of 
‘embodied intersectionality’ allows an ‘understanding of how power is written through 
and within the raced and sexed body’, and offers a theoretical framework elucidating 
Muslim women’s agency which ‘continually challenges and transforms hegemonic 
discourses of race, gender and religion’. Just as my study of the veil has elucidated the 
power inherent in retaining the construction of the veiled Muslimah in essentialist and 
‘other’ terms, it has equally highlighted the importance of countering that power by 
Muslimat who are also politicised, sexualised, racialised and even culturalised in their 
individual and respective experiences of the veil. Countering such homogenisations 
amounts to resisting the power of discourses, such as the media and political ones in 
my study, in erasing the complexities of women’s experiences and the various potential 
embodiments of Islamic dress. As Mirza and Meetoo point out, in the context of 
intersectionality, we can expose how ‘gendered raced and classed structures of 
dominance and power shape Muslim women’s gendered subjectivity and experiences’ 
(Mirza & Meetoo, 2013, pp. 142-143). My own embodied history of the veil remains 
important for my research. As  a Muslimah muhajjaba, I have also come to learn about 
how the veil represents a heavily loaded signifier through my own embodied 
experience of the hijab.  
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As a framework for study and analysis, embodied intersectionality provides a route 
through which I can, as a Muslimah muhajjaba myself, intervene and challenge the 
more contemporary discourses which continue to ‘otherise’ Muslimat through different 
categories. As Mirza convincingly states, we can ‘methodologically operationalise 
intersectionality’ in order to ‘map the effect of gendered and raced Islamophobic 
discourses (Mirza, 2013). The concept of intersectionality allows me to reflect on how 
power can be exercised through maintaining the difference of the veil in Orientalist, 
colonial and postcolonial times. It further provides the opportunity to draw the 
outcomes and consequences of Islamophobic discourses ‘as lived in and through 
Muslim women’s embodied subjectivities’ (Mirza, 2013). As far as my research is 
concerned, following the veil through texts provided me with a way of understanding 
how the various constructions of Islamic dress compare across different axes of power 
on the one hand, and how I, as a Muslimah muhajjaba, am living the impact of these 
axes through my own embodied experience of a Muslimah. How do I experience the 
concept of intersectionality as a Muslimah who embodies modesty through the hijab? 
As I already noted, I argued that the construction of the Muslimah in the contemporary 
media in France and Morocco demonstrates how the process of essentialising and 
othering Islamic dress operates through a chain of often more implicit web of 
embedded connotations and references which accompany textual and linguistic 
representations of the dress. What ‘embodied intersectionality’ allows us is to consider 
how the intersection of gender, sex, race, ethnicity, and ethics define Islamic dress 
through various histories and geographies. The veil is thus located at the crossroads of 
these dimensions, and is traversed by their power. As a Muslimah muhajjaba who has 
and still lives in and through various ‘worlds’, I recognise the significance of both 
engaging with and resisting hegemonic discourses that persist constructing the 
Muslimah in essentialist and ‘other’ terms, both in Muslim and non-Muslim contexts.  
 
My comparative study of Islamic dress in the Moroccan and French media and politics 
emphasised the importance of considering such complex objects as the veil from a 
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cross-cultural, cross-historical and cross-spatial dimensions. Due to the impact of the 
media in building understandings of various phenomena, the construction of meanings 
acquires a particular importance at a time when Muslims have become a focal point of 
attention. It demonstrates how Islamic dress specifically figures as a fundamental tool 
and technique for othering, and maintaining Orientalist and neo-colonial depictions of 
the veiled Muslimah. As I argued, it is remarkable to notice how the movement of the 
veil from Orientalist and Nahda times and contexts to postcolonial media spaces and 
times has been accompanied with a movement of meanings historically attached to the 
veil. My research demonstrates how recent texts reiterate historical associations of the 
veil on the one hand, and reinvigorate them with additional references and meanings 
on the other hand. It additionally highlights the ways in which Orientalist constructions 
of Islamic dress are not a ‘European’ or ‘Western’ phenomenon, but also one that exists 
in Muslim-majority frameworks, as is the case with Moroccan publications and the 
Nahda. 
 
In relation to Islamic and Muslim feminisms, my study represents an attempt to 
intervene in discourses of the veil which limit it to an essence (Islamist, fundamentalist, 
oppressive, etc). It offers a vision of the veil from a Muslimah muhajjaba’s perspective. 
Also, as a theory that seeks to promote women’s rights and gender justice from an 
Islamic perspective and challenge patriarchal readings, my study which has relied on 
Islamic and Muslim feminism sought to question texts and its constructions of the 
veiled body in both Muslim and non-Muslim contexts. From an Islamic feminist 
postcolonial perspective, my work represents an attempt towards understanding how 
and why texts matter, and how meanings of the veil past and present demonstrate the 
persistent and ongoing difference and otherness of Islamic dress, and its Orientalist and 
neo-colonial histories. 
 
My comparative media study of Islamic dress has also contributed to developing my 
understanding of Muslim feminism as a theory that is significant in intervening into 
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racialising, sexualising, politicising discourses of the Muslimah’s body. Although such 
a focus has been a characteristic amongst Muslim feminists, Islamic feminism has 
tended to focus on religious texts and scriptures. My work sought to position a middle 
passage between the essentialising construction to which the Muslimah is subject 
through media discourses on Islamic dress, and a reading of texts from an Islamic 
feminist perspective. My reading of texts is therefore part of strategy to question 
existing discourses that maintain the difference and otherness of the Muslimah through 
the veil. This reading is, however, also undertaken from a Muslimah muhajjaba’s 
perspective, and although reliant primarily on Muslim feminism, nonetheless departs 
from an Islamic perspective. I am reading from the perspective of a Muslimah 
muhajjabah and a Muslim believer who embodies and lives the hijab. With its focus 
on discourse and language, my study points to the importance of the media and text in 
building and maintaining understandings of the Muslimah’s Islamic dress.  
 
Through the stories/histories of the veil across time and space, I argue that the 
otherness, difference and essence embodied by the veil and reading the veil through 
time and space provides an understanding of how its otherness gets renewed and 
revived in the contemporary media. My study foregrounds the significance of 
considering Islamic dress not only in terms of a difference constructed in political, 
sexual, ethical and racial terms, but also in relation to space, time and emotion. At 
another level, with the increasing Islamophobia and focus of the media on the figure 
of the ‘Muslim’ and ‘Muslimah’, paying close attention to the histories and repetitions 
becomes an important step towards building an understanding of how and why the 
threat that is perceived to emanate from Muslims can be used to maintain Islamic dress 
within an essential difference that becomes repeated in various frameworks. 
Furthermore, an understanding of the current postcolonial media in both Muslim 
majority and minority contexts necessitates a consideration of the veil through history.  
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From an Islamic postcolonial feminist perspective, my study further seeks to challenge 
the long feminist histories attempting to ‘save Muslim/ Third World/other women’. 
The media texts in both Moroccan and French cases, as well as Orientalist and Nahda 
writings resound with this concept of saving Muslimahs from their state. In the 
contemporary Islamophobic context, it becomes even more important to question 
scripts about the Muslimah which repeat, albeit with a difference, the otherness of 
Islamic dress in its various forms, as well as reinforce the images of the veiled 
Muslimah as a victim in need of saving.  
 
Potential Directions for Further Research 
My research touches upon the broader issue of Islamophobia (anti-Muslim racism or 
prejudice) and what I term ‘veilphobia’ (phobia of Islamic dress) not only in a Muslim-
minority context (France), but also in Muslim-majority context (as is the case in 
Morocco, the Maghreb and the Mashreq). In addition to its alleged absence in Muslim 
contexts, my focus on this transposed or imported Islamophobia in both contexts 
constitutes an attempt to tackle the issue both inside and outside the Western context, 
and to assess its impact on Muslim contexts of parts of the Moroccan print media and 
the Arab Nahda. This difference in focus also enables us to map the influence of neo-
colonial discourses in postcolonial frameworks. My study can additionally be placed 
within wider issues of the politics of the veil in an era governed by dichotomies 
between religion and secularism, Islam and the West, and the heightened threat that 
‘Islam’, as an often homogenised and constructed concept, is said to represent not 
merely to Western nations, but also to Muslim-majority frameworks. Other potential 
areas related to my research include freedom of dress and religion, women’s and 
minority rights in Western and Muslim contexts, and issues of immigration and 
Muslim diasporas in Europe. My project contributes to breaking the barriers often set 
between different geographic and socio-political frameworks by including a 
comparative study of associations through the examples of France and Morocco, the 
Maghreb and the Mashreq, Orientalism, colonialism and the Nahda periods.  
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Although the veil has been the subject of extensive research, my comparative focus 
and media analysis through a trans-historical, transnational and transcultural approach 
alongside my focus on an Arabic and French material introduces a diverse perspective 
on the study of the veil in a postcolonial context, due to the lack of studies which 
consider the veil within such comparative frameworks with a focus on media. While 
my study does not claim to be comprehensive, potential avenues for further research 
on the Islamic veil include comparative studies of the veil within countries other than 
France and Morocco. Tunisia and Turkey, for instance, have witnessed significant 
debates on the veil, which make them equally significant sites for the study of Islamic 
dress. My own focus has been on secular materials and how they construct Islamic 
dress, yet a potential route for future research could consider a comparison between 
secular and religious discourses of Islamic dress in both Muslim-majority and minority 
contexts. Further studies would consider the veil within other historical eras and media. 
Potential media for research on the veil include television, radio, film and the 
expanding cyberspaces that are increasingly transforming religious discourses within 
a globally connected world, breaking boundaries and traditional frontiers.    
 
As I hope my study has illustrated, undertaking a comparative focus of the veil allows 
a broadening of our perspective to consider this dress through various historical and 
spatial frameworks. Further research on Islamic dress could therefore consider 
including comparisons of different contexts. Additionally, other types of 
methodologies would be equally important in contributing to a deeper understanding 
of how the veil is constructed through various discourses, and how the politics of the 
veil operates in different contexts. Additional qualitative research of Islamic dress 
could include interviews or focus groups with Muslimat, with perhaps a focus on their 
perceptions and experiences of the media, and their particular reception of such media.   
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My research has demonstrated how language, as a complex network of codes, has been 
used in order to disseminate, perpetuate and maintain the veil within the parameters of 
a renewed and readopted threat across time and space. The comparative focus of my 
study allowed me to broaden my research scope to include not only Orientalist and 
colonial histories, but also Arab Nahda and Maghrebi feminist writings, along with the 
more contemporary French and Moroccan material from the press. The comparative 
dimension of my study has further allowed me to acknowledge structural continuities 
which maintain different forms of Islamic dress within particular ideologies, as well as 
spot the differences that show how anti-veil rhetoric fluctuates through various 
contexts. Both my focus on the print media and the comparative dimensions have, I 
hope, enabled me to provide a contribution to the already extensive literature on the 
topic, and contributed to the efforts of Islamic postcolonial and feminist gestures 
aiming at challenging and questioning contemporary Orientalist and neo-colonial 
representations of the othered Muslimah. I would like to end this conclusion with 
Spivak’s statement ‘If in the context of colonial production, the subaltern has no history 
and cannot speak, the subaltern as female is even more deeply in shadow’ (Spivak, 
1994, p. 104). My research represents an endeavour to take this female out of the 
shadow. As a Muslimah muhajjaba speaking in the global postcolonial context, my 
responsibility lies not only in forging a space for this subaltern Muslimah to speak and 
have a voice, but also to unsettle the very structures of domination and power that 
maintain her within the bounds of a object of construction rather than a subject of 
deconstruction. Embodying the veil at various junctures thus also entails becoming a 
site of resistance.         
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